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Wargaming has been part of military curricula for about 200 years since the introduction of Kriegsspiel, 
but it is still something of an art form. This thesis attempts to theorise the practice of military 
educational wargaming, and specifically to explore why such wargaming takes the form it does.  
The thesis is limited to army educational wargaming for officers and officer cadets. Wargaming for 
analytical purposes, and political and strategic gaming, are excluded.  Instead, the focus is on army 
educational wargaming at the tactical level, which is arguably more comparable between countries. 
The research method combines an exploratory approach influenced by grounded theory with a 
comparative case study approach encompassing three successive levels of army officer education in 
five countries: Sweden, Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States and Japan.  
The research indicates the central importance of individual game directors. This is particularly evident 
when wargaming forms evolve. The main concern of the individual game director is how to achieve 
instructor buy-in. This core category encompasses control, credibility and comfort. Three methods, or 
strategies, were discovered regarding how to achieve instructor buy-in. Those three strategies are: 
innovative active learning, simple standardising and control & veiling. This discovery contributes to 
new substantive theory, as it explains how specific army educational wargaming forms commence, 
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1.1 A practice without theory  
Wargaming – Kriegsspiel – was introduced in the curriculum in the 19th century as a method to simulate 
warfare in order to improve the military profession (officers). However, despite a long tradition, 
wargaming remains elusive even though arguments are made to increase the use of wargaming.1 This 
thesis looks at wargaming – ‘to wargame’ – as an interactive activity in various forms by human 
participants who simulate warfare for a specific purpose. To shed light on this phenomenon this thesis 
endeavours to theorise the practice of military educational wargaming by the development of an 
applicable substantive theory that is of relevance for the practice.  
Wargaming has sometimes been described as a practice without theory.2 Military doctrine generally 
states that wargaming is necessary but seldom provides examples or instructions on how to conduct 
wargaming. This is not a new dichotomy: the chief traditional user of military wargaming, Germany, 
did not provide official military instructions due to a belief that such written manuals might reduce the 
educational value of wargaming by transforming it into a repeatable exercise; i.e. regimentation.3 The 
lack of official handbooks on methods of how to conduct military educational wargaming indicates that 
the practice is imprecise. Moreover, wargaming suffers from a tremendous disagreement about its 
definition, and hence different perceptions of what wargaming entails. The issue of wargaming is 
further accented by the development of more and more advanced computer-based simulations. 
Accordingly, while wargaming today is an activity that is highly relevant for the military profession, it 
remains ambiguous because of a lack of understanding of the actual practice. 
The experience of the author has significance for this thesis. Since 2007, the author has worked as a 
game director, designer and instructor of military educational wargaming at the Swedish Defence 
University. This practical experience is the primary reason why the author developed an interest to 
explore the practice of military educational wargaming. This personal experience, however, has both 
possibilities and drawbacks. As someone very familiar with military educational wargaming, the author 
brings pre-conceived ideas about likely explanatory variables. The drawback of such pre-knowledge is 
the high probability that such variables are conjectures, i.e. the author’s own biased opinions. To 
decrease the impact of this drawback, the thesis aims for transparency.  
 
                                                          
1 UK Connections Wargaming Conference (2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016). 
2 Rubel (2006), and, Frank (2014), p. 37. 




1.2 The research question 
Theory of the actual practice of wargaming is arguably needed for both professionals and laymen to 
understand military educational wargaming. Hence, the aim of this thesis is to investigate the 
phenomenon of military educational wargaming and explore its various wargaming forms. The 
research question is as follows: Why does military educational wargaming take the forms it does? 
The research question combines an exploratory approach to actual contemporary forms of wargaming 
with an explanatory approach that theorises the practice of military educational wargaming.   
Since military wargaming is a wide definition of a phenomenon, four major limitations are used. First, 
the investigation is limited to educational wargaming. Consequently, wargaming for analytical 
purposes is not included unless such wargaming is used primarily for an educational purpose. Second, 
the focus is on officers and officer cadets. Hence, wargaming for other ranks and non-commissioned 
officers is excluded since the focus is on the officer profession, which involves a traditional use of 
wargaming. Third, the analysis includes only army wargaming since this is the military branch which 
has the highest proportion of all officers and which carries a long tradition of wargaming. Fourth, 
political and strategic gaming is excluded since this level is arguably different in different countries. 
Instead, the focus is on tactics, which is a more comparable level of analysis of different countries. For 
example, all of the involved countries have tactical brigade level formations.  
Personal experience, reasoning (deductive and inductive) and empirical research are overlapping 
means to understand a certain phenomenon.4 Based on the author’s experience of military educational 
wargaming, there are several potential explanatory factors that are likely to influence the choice of a 
particular form of wargaming. The four supporting questions below clarify the author’s conjectures 
and also serve as the starting point for this exploratory study.  
1. Are the forms influenced by foreign concepts or national traditions? One of the most famous and 
successful wargaming forms for military education was designed and introduced by a young Prussian 
officer, Lieutenant von Reisswitz, in 1824. This form was further developed and soon spread to other 
countries. For example, the rules from 1824 were translated into Swedish already in 1830.5 There is 
every reason to believe that contemporary military wargaming practices likewise are spreading 
between countries today and in particular between co-operating nations. On the other hand, it is also 
conceivable that national contemporary doctrine has a large-scale influence on the current use of 
military educational wargaming. Historically, this was the case during the 20th century interwar years 
in Germany when wargaming was arguably implemented at a more thorough level than ever before in 
                                                          
4 Cohen & Manion (1994), pp. 1-5. 




any military organisation. The military doctrine and military leadership of that time (Reichswehr and 
General Hans von Seeckt) promoted this high level of use. Military doctrine and educational/training 
manuals should provide a clear indication of how wargaming should be used. If there is a lack of a 
strong national tradition in military wargaming, foreign influences may arguably play a significant role 
in the choice of specific wargaming forms.  
2. Are the forms influenced by the availability of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) wargames? A large 
number of ‘wargames’ exist outside the military. Usually, such wargames are developed from a hobby-
perspective and hence the common reference to ‘hobby-wargaming’, which includes a wide range of 
purposes such as exploration and encouragement of interest in history with the help of a challenging 
‘fun’ factor. It is not unreasonable to believe that such hobby wargames of various military battles, 
historical military campaigns and wars, offer insight for military education. Thus, the availability of such 
wargames may be a more appealing option than developing an expensive military-procured wargame. 
Recent use of modified commercial wargames in military curriculums, such as the Virtual Battlespace 
(VBS) by Bohemia Interactive Simulations (BISim), indicates a potential influence from the commercial 
gaming industry. There are thus reasons to consider the prevalence of COTS in military educational 
wargaming including possible influence from COTS on the military instructors themselves.  
3. Are the forms connected to an established process? At the centre of this question is a general 
distinction between two different and principal purposes in military wargaming: ‘classroom planning’ 
and ‘classroom warfighting’. The former is a wargame for plan development in the military planning 
process while the latter is a wargame for execution-training, i.e. when the developed plan is actually 
executed by orders, a process which is connected to a military decision-making process. Both 
‘classroom planning’ and ‘classroom warfighting’ are in this thesis considered as military educational 
wargaming albeit with a difference in purpose. It is therefore not inconceivable to believe that each 
purpose utilises a different form of wargaming.  
4. Are the forms influenced by the individual instructors? This variable specifically accounts for any 
explicit concerns of the instructors that are not applicable to the other three supporting questions. 
Hence, the fourth and last conjecture is about the possible influence of certain individuals. This 
suggests tangible connections between key personnel and certain wargaming forms. This question 
specifically covers the role of individual ‘enthusiasts’, i.e. wargame designers as well as wargame 





1.3 The wargaming literature  
The literature on wargaming is vast, diverse and multi-disciplinary. Generally speaking, the literature 
can be divided into four main areas. Of these four, literature on military wargaming is deemed most 
relevant for this thesis. Literature on hobby wargaming is considered to have the least relevance.  
1) Literature on military wargaming 
2) Literature on wargaming in general  
3) Academic literature on wargaming 
4) Literature on hobby wargaming 
Literature on military wargaming is specific about certain forms of wargaming and is usually written 
from an inside perspective. Focus is either on 1) how wargaming is conducted at a certain 
establishment, or 2) on the usefulness of wargaming for the military profession. The former focal area 
is generally written by experienced individuals (rather than scholars) while the latter focal area is 
typically authored by official military institutions and published as handbooks or doctrinal texts. 
Examples of the former sub-category are the American keystone handbook on wargaming: 
Fundamentals of War Gaming by Francis McHugh from 1966; the German General von Cochenhausen‘s 
Anleitung für Planübungen und Kriegsspiele im kleinen und großen Rahmen from 1942; and a Swedish 
educational and training handbook by Baudin et al, Handbok i taktikutbildning, mark from 2012.6 
Examples of the latter category are the Swedish Defence Forces’ Pedagogiska grunder from 2006, the 
US Army Field Manual 34-130 IPB from 1994 and NATO’s Allied Command Operations Comprehensive 
Operations Planning Directive COPD Interim v1.0 from 2010.7 The focal area on how wargaming is 
conducted is typically specific regarding forms and methods of wargaming. The second focal area 
regarding the usefulness of wargaming is specific regarding purposes – why it should be done – while 
relatively vague about specific forms of wargaming. Basically, it forwards the argument that ‘you just 
have to do it’. Recent developments in computer technologies and interactive media have led to more 
emphasis on the usefulness of computer wargames. Much of this literature is, however, typically 
referred to as military simulation rather than wargaming. One example is Military Simulations and 
Serious Games from 2009.8 This specific and growing sub-area of military wargaming literature is 
connected to the academic literature on wargaming since it connects with theories outside the military 
domain.9 In comparison, the contribution of this thesis is the construction and exploration of new, and 
relevant, theory for the literature on military wargaming. 
                                                          
6 McHugh (2013), von Cochenhausen (1942), and, Baudin ed. (2012). 
7 Försvarsmakten (2006), US Army (1994), and, NATO (2010). 
8 Smith (2009). 




The literature on wargaming in general consists of a few noteworthy and, in wargaming circles, well-
known sources. Peter Perla’s The Art of Wargaming from 1990 is a good example in this category. 
Other examples are Martin van Creveld’s Wargames (2013), Thomas Allen’s War Games (1987) and 
Andrew Wilson’s The Bomb and the Computer (1968).10 Included in this field of literature is also 
wargaming history, such as von Hilger’s War Games: A History of War on Paper.11 The common 
denominator of this rather diverse collection is the focus on the general usefulness of wargaming 
connected to the historical usage. This focus is thus broader than literature on military wargaming. The 
sources primarily concern wargaming for planning and analysis but also contemplate, on a deeper 
level, wargaming as a methodology in order to ‘understand the true nature of war’.12 Nevertheless, 
details are becoming dated and the focus is overwhelmingly on the USA. This thesis’s contribution puts 
emphasis on contemporary wargaming in military education, rather than the customary focus on 
analytical and historical wargaming.  
Academic literature on wargaming problematises the use of wargaming to a larger degree than the 
previous two categories of literature. For example, certain dichotomies such as ‘accuracy vs simplicity’ 
and ‘manual vs computer wargames’ are discussed in Professor Philip Sabin’s book Simulating War.13 
Furthermore, the educational usefulness of wargaming, in most cases designated with terms such as 
‘games’ or ‘simulations’, is directly connected to rapidly emerging theoretical contexts, for example, 
‘game-impact theory’, which promotes the adoption of game technology by diverse industries.14 
Another concept, ‘serious games’, is the topic for an entire academic discourse, manifested, for 
example, in the bimonthly academic journal Simulation & Gaming and also on specific sites such as the 
PAXsims blog run by Professor Rex Brynen.15 In this category fault lines are identified and links are 
made to adjacent but non-wargaming activities, such as modelling of warfare, simulations with no 
humans in the loop, operational research/analysis, and game theory. Notably, game theory is well-
established in political science as a theoretical model on how to explain difficult and important choices 
in high-level decision-making. Overall, this field of literature is of particular use in a description of the 
current status of theory within the vast field of games (rather than just wargames). For example, the 
concept of gamification in the use of game-based mechanics to engage people and promote learning 
is applicable to all types of games and not just wargames in particular.16 The literature on ‘gaming’ is 
immense and gradually increasing. However, only a tiny proportion concerns military wargaming. In 
                                                          
10 Perla (1990), van Creveld (2013), Allen (2009), and, Wilson (1968). 
11 von Hilgers (2012). 
12 van Creveld (2013), p. 8. 
13 Sabin (2012), pp. 19-30. 
14 Smith (2009), pp. 308-314. 
15 PAXsims blog (2014). 




addition, literature on game theory tends to be somewhat derisive of other categories of games, such 
as, for example, ‘recreational board games’, which are often referred to as an ‘unserious activity’ which 
may dilute the definition of ‘serious games’ occupied with game theory.17 While this thesis will add to 
academic literature, the focus is to construct new substantive theory relevant for the practice of 
military educational wargaming rather than to utilise existing (and non-applicable) theories such as 
game theory. 
The literature on hobby wargaming covers a vast area of different fields of interest and thus differs 
from other sources. Compared to the literature on academic wargaming, this category is much more 
about ‘wargaming’. Hobby wargaming tends to acknowledge that one crucial element in wargaming is 
the factor of fun and/or challenge. James F. Dunnigan, a notable wargame designer in the USA, argues 
that it is the chance to personally experience genuine history – military history – that makes people 
want to play a wargame.18 The majority of hobby wargames includes a historical aspect while others 
are focused on fantasy and science fiction. A central feature is to control warfare.19 Hence, hobby 
wargaming is closely linked to military history, especially how to fight a historical battle as realistically 
as possible. This connection has been suggested to constitute a separate ‘wargame theory’ in how to 
re-create a historical battlefield.20 A well-known designer of hobby wargaming in the United Kingdom, 
Donald Featherstone, has written that most hobby wargames aim to have the greatest possible realism 
in their rules, i.e. to get the historical details correct.21 While the connection to traditional military 
wargaming is strong for this category in literature, one latent issue in every hobby wargame is 
‘playability’ versus ‘realism’. One view is that if ‘realism interferes with enjoyment then out goes 
realism!’.22 This is not to say that hobby wargaming generally consists of simple games for fun – in 
many cases it is rather the opposite: they display a deep understanding of the modelling of certain 
factors, such as logistics in a specific war/battle. One example is the commercial wargame Operational 
Art of War III, which is also played by officers. Such wargames are realistic but also include obvious 
game mechanisms, such as victory points. Another aspect of hobby wargaming is the focus on role-
playing, which is connected to academic literature on wargaming, such as studies in how to create 
narratives for education in history.23 Factors like these are relevant for military education and raise the 
question to what extent hobby wargaming influences military instructors involved in wargaming. The 
contribution of this thesis is to investigate such possible influence. 
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In summary, the literature on wargaming is either very general or very specific. The first case can be 
exemplified by Martin van Creveld and his book Wargames: from Gladiators to Gigabytes. While a 
recent (2013) addition in the literature on wargaming, almost the entire length of the book covers 
historical wargaming rather than contemporary wargaming. In this context, van Creveld claims that 
‘each armed force and service seems to have developed its own [wargaming] methods.’24 Here a 
critical piece of information emerges: there is a lack of contemporary sources that either describe or 
problematise different armed forces’ use of wargaming. Historically, there are few sources that have 
attempted to give an overview of wargaming. One example is Francis Sayre’s Map Manoeuvres and 
Tactical Rides.25 However, it is from 1910 and completely outdated. A somewhat similar source, 
although with a very distinct emphasis on naval military wargaming in the USA, is Francis J. McHugh’s 
Fundamentals of Wargaming, from 1966. It is published in the form of a handbook and covers the use 
of different forms of wargaming. However, it is focused on a descriptive overview of the U.S. Navy’s 
wargaming at one facility: the Naval Warfare College in Rhode Island. In general, the military literature 
on wargaming tends to concentrate on wargaming’s usefulness as an instrument to validate plans, or 
as a research and analytical tool. There are few sources, almost no contemporary ones, which focus 
on wargaming in military education.  
The thesis’s main contribution to this vast and diverse field of literature is to theorise the sub-class of 
military educational wargaming as part of the general phenomenon of wargaming. This kind of 
approach is sometimes referred to as the construction of ‘middle-range theory’ since it involves an 
effort ‘to explain various subclasses of general phenomena [and] provide better guidance when various 
strategies will be effective’ in order to bridge the ubiquitous ‘gap between theory and practice’.26 For 
this reason, the contribution of this thesis is the construction of theory primarily for the practitioners 
of military educational wargaming.  
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The chosen research design of this thesis balances the author’s pre-conceived notion of what 
influences various forms of wargaming, with an openness to include the possibility of unknown factors. 
The author’s preconceived notions of military wargaming stem from years of experience with 
professional military educational wargaming in Sweden. In order to contribute to the research on 
military wargaming it is, however, necessary to look beyond mere descriptive forms, anecdotes and 
conjectures. Pre-conceived notions, such as the selection of supporting questions and the possible 
inclusion of established theories such as organisational theory, enable theory-testing rather than 
theory-generating. However, the result may put more focus on testing existing (and probably 
peripheral) theories rather than theorising the phenomenon. A partially inductive approach counters 
this risk, and puts the focus on theory development relevant for the phenomenon by taking into 
account the main concerns of individual instructors. In comparison, a common deductive approach 
proposes hypotheses at the initial stage for verification rather than for discovery.27  
 
Grounded theory 
The inclusion of an inductive approach should not be seen as an attempt to pursue a methodology of 
grounded theory to the fullest extent possible. The aim is nonetheless similar to grounded theory: to 
enable theory development rather than to pursue theory verification.28 Since there is a lack of present-
day theory on the actual practice of contemporary educational military wargaming, the ambition is to 
build a theory grounded in data rather than import a chosen theory of social science deemed suitable 
and apply it – for verification or falsification – to the practice of wargaming. Hence, while theory testing 
may contribute more to the understanding of how a chosen social theory fits into the field of 
wargaming, the selected alternative of theory development contributes to the development of a 
theory that is relevant for the practice of contemporary military educational wargaming.   
One reason why the methodology of grounded theory cannot be fully implemented in this thesis is the 
author’s preconceived views. It is important to reflect on such preconceptions.29 Therefore there are 
several pre-conceived supporting questions inferred from the author’s own experience in the field of 
professional military wargaming. These can, within a common deductive approach, be considered 
explanatory variables regarding why wargaming takes the form it does. However, there is a risk that 
these selected and considered independent variables on proposed factors of influence on the form of 
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wargaming will instead ‘force data’ into pre-established categories.30 On the other hand, it is also 
important to acknowledge that the experience of the author does constitute an integral part of the 
theoretical construction of a research design.31 This is also the reason why this thesis initially brings 
forward supporting questions. 
Of the four selected supporting questions on what influences the forms of wargaming, the last 
question on individual instructors is specifically open for inductive reasoning. The research design is 
influenced by the methodology of grounded theory, which is a mixture of deduction and induction. 
Furthermore, grounded theory emphasises the development of substantive theory rather than grand, 
or general, theory. Substantive theory covers practical situations that can apply to similar situations at 
other locations. Substantive theory constructed from data may later lead to formal theory (albeit not 
general or ‘grand theory’ such as Marxism) for a certain conceptual area such as ‘stigma’ or 
‘organisations’.32 Since military educational wargaming arguably suffers from a lack of theory, a 
reasonable approach for this thesis is to construct a substantive rather than a formal theory. 
Substantive theory can be exemplified by how nurses communicate to a dying patient that he is indeed 
dying.33 In comparison, formal theory applies this substantive theory, the awareness context, generally 
and to any case. For example, regarding how the umpire influences players’ behaviour in a game.34 
The construction of theory means that the analysis of collected data must adhere to a sound 
methodological method.  This risk of forcing data can be mitigated by a grounded theory approach with 
a mixture of induction and deduction through an interactive, simultaneous and repeated undertaking 
in the selection, collection and analysis of data. This interactive method is named constant comparison 
and is used in order to ascertain what is relevant in the collected data and to build, and grow a theory 
that is grounded in data.35 This is done by constructing codes from the data. This in turn generates 
tensions between analytic insights and described events, which leads to further interpretation of the 
views and actions by the wargaming instructors. This is a form of active coding that sees repeated 
interaction between the author and the collected data.36  Accordingly, while the overall method is a 
comparative multi-case study, grounded theory is used in order to discover unknown facts and to 
reduce the risk of forcing data to suit pre-conceived notions on what influences the forms of 
wargaming.  
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The analytical method selected for this thesis is the comparative case study. Case studies are well-
suited to accommodate an explanatory approach since a case study focuses on a certain phenomenon 
in order to investigate conditions or processes more thoroughly.37 Case studies emphasise the real-
world context in which the phenomena occur.38 Case studies include several empirical sources such as 
interviews and study of documents and are accordingly frequently used in contemporary and 
comparative studies. Another factor that favours a case study approach is when there is little possibility 
to control or manipulate events. Such events are, for example, a wargaming exercise which the author 
merely observes rather than organises. Furthermore, an inductive approach that encompasses cases 
with rich empirical data is likely to produce theory that is ‘accurate, interesting and testable’.39 
The data collection method for the cases is interpretative. This coupling of a comparative case study 
with a methodological interpretative approach allows the method of induction and reduces the risk of 
‘forcing data’. Hence, the data is the centre of analysis rather than the supporting questions or any 
hypothesis.  While the deductive method entails observation and measurement of data to verify/falsify 
hypotheses made at the very beginning of the research process the method of induction does the 
opposite: data is first collected and then hypotheses are generated.40 In short: the deductive method 
is closely related to the positivist scientific tradition, which strives to make things observable and 
measurable, and therefore scientific. In comparison, the method of induction is related to the 
hermeneutic tradition, which aims to interpret the meaning people ascribe to reality. Since individual 
instructors are likely to play an important role in military wargaming, their views and concerns are 
included by the use of induction. This regards especially how the instructors perceive wargaming and 
what they believe is most important in their practice. 
The choice was made to include various countries as different cases. The reason for this choice was 
that a multi-case study with several countries can establish empirical generalisation. Other countries 
can thus support a single case by offering insights into things that are not apparent in, for example, a 
Swedish-only context. It is considered very likely that comparative cases will support each other, 
forcing a second look at things or stimulating a return to collect additional data.41 Furthermore, it may 
as well be possible to infer invariant structures, meaning objects or functions which are constant 
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throughout a certain range of conditions.42 Invariant structure may also be expressed as analytically 
equivalent phenomena. In order to discover such phenomena a consideration of contextual factors is 
needed. Case studies are deemed to be a good method of looking at contextual factors in order to find 
and measure such phenomena.43 This method is also supported by the selected grounded theory 
approach as it aims to discover regularities, i.e. the identification and categorisation of elements and 
the exploration of their connections.44  
In order to test and refine a research design a pilot case is usually needed.45 In this thesis, the initial 
case study of Sweden replaced the concept of a pilot case. Sweden is the case where the level of access 
is the best in comparison to other countries. Access in the case of Sweden was supported by: 
geographic proximity, existing access due to the author’s work at the Swedish Defence University 
(SEDU), pre-established personal relationships and trust, pre-acquired knowledge of wargaming 
activities and the reduction of language inaccuracies since the author and all participants speak the 
local language (Swedish). This initial case allowed testing of the research design by identifying and 
connecting with the principal individuals, and the application of a case study with embedded units of 
analysis with an analysis of the collected data. The initial case also provided the ability to conduct 
observations of actual wargaming sessions – this was more problematic in other countries due to 
difficulties in securing access. Thus, the initial case of Sweden provided insights into the forms of 
wargaming and the individuals involved in this practice.  
The scope of this thesis is limited to military educational wargaming conducted with army officers and 
officer cadets. The main reason for having an army focus only is that the army branch is any country’s 
largest service in terms of personnel, usually consisting of between 50-80 percent of the total 
personnel pool of a defence force. Traditionally, wargaming was also first and foremost an army (land) 
activity. Currently, at least in the USA, some believe that army ‘gaming’, rather than simulation, is 
ahead of the navy and air force.46 The differences between wargaming and simulation is discussed in 
Chapter 2. While the focus of this thesis is on army wargaming, many staff colleges and some officer 
schools are nevertheless joint establishments. Therefore, the thesis cannot claim to have an exclusive 
focus on army or land. In practice, however, the analysis is restricted to wargaming forms either 
exclusively with a land focus or with a tilt toward land operations.  
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The four supporting questions are likely to be found lacking (which was indeed also the case). Such 
incongruity is, however, in accordance to grounded theory, which argues that theory should be 
constructed from real data in order to create relevant and useful theory for a specific field of practice.47 
Consequently, in Chapter 4, an enhanced methodological discussion includes an analytical framework 
centred on categories developed from the data from the initial case of Sweden. This analytical 
framework is further explored, rather than tested, by data from the remaining four case studies. 
Consequently, the research design constitutes four integrated parts: 
1. Analysis of supporting questions (conjectures) by coding of data from the initial case study,  
2. Construction of an analytical model (categories) by an emphasis on the main concern of the 
participants and how they handle that,  
3. Exploration of the analytical model through the other four case studies,  
4. Generation of a synthesis in the form of substantive theory.  
 
  
                                                          




1.5 The five case studies 
A total of five countries were selected to be included in this international multi-case study. The 
approach was to use cases that are rather similar, rather than as different as possible.48 A non-similar 
selection of countries would arguably include countries such as Russia, China, Israel, Turkey and India. 
The five selected countries – Sweden, Germany, the UK, the USA and Japan – are instead quite similar 
as they are all developed democracies with modern defence forces and co-operate with the USA. 
However, there are differences between the selected countries. The USA, as the most militarily 
involved country in the world, and as the dominating nation of NATO, has considerable influence on 
contemporary military developments and doctrines. The USA has also developed a robust and 
multifaceted wargaming, simulation and modelling tradition since the Second World War.  
The main difference between the selected countries – besides the unique cultural aspect of Japan – is 
the traditional and contextual background concerning the development of military wargaming. 
Germany and Japan were considered world-leading users of wargaming before the Second World War. 
Post-war, both were forced to demilitarise and ostensibly lost their edge in military wargaming. Those 
constraints may still linger in combination with newer ones. For example, Japan is constrained by 
training restrictions due to land congestion and environmental issues and would presumably rely 
heavily on wargaming for education and training instead of field manoeuvres. Since all five countries 
are unique, with their own national traditions of wargaming, it is not unreasonable that wargaming 
forms may differ. Alternatively, influence from the USA may be overwhelming.  
 
Sweden 
Already in 1830, six years after the publication of the rules of the Kriegsspiel in Prussia, the rules were 
translated and published in Sweden.49 Military educational wargaming in Sweden was well established 
in the early 20th century, with discussions in wargaming literature on how to use different wargaming 
forms by translated German sources.50 Specific adaption to the Swedish climate and terrain was seen 
in the widely distributed Vinterkrigsspelet in 1909 (the ‘Winter Wargame’). Today, military educational 
wargaming is, however, primarily considered a doctrinally-supported method to validate and improve 
military planning. With its historical wargaming tradition, especially influenced by Germany, the minor 
country of Sweden constitutes an interesting example. It has contemporary good military relations to 
the USA, the UK and Germany, albeit not as a formal member of a military alliance.  
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Military educational wargaming began in Prussia as Kriegsspiel, the German word for wargaming. Its 
widespread use in military education started in 1824 with an introduction by the Chief of the General 
Staff, General von Müffling. Before the Second World War, the top military leadership, such as General 
von Seeckt, promoted extensive use of wargaming. Germany was demilitarised after losing the Second 
World War and the use of Kriegsspiel was terminated. Today, Germany has a modern military force 
and is a key member of NATO in regards to geographic location and military capability. The use of 
wargaming in the contemporary German Armed Forces, die Bundeswehr, are indicated by several 
sources. One of them is referred to as ‘the NATO handbook on wargaming’.51 This text was published 
in 2004-2006 by the Command and Staff College, die Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr. It explicitly 
re-connects with previous German experiences of military wargaming, which, it is claimed, ‘were lost’ 
in the post-war period, and thus offer detailed instructions on how to organise and conduct a course 
of action (COA) wargame.52 This raises questions about what traditions, if any, have survived or 
developed. A second indication of conceivable contemporary usage is the recent general popularity of 
commercial hobby board games in Germany. Examples of such games are Puerto Rico and 
Carcassonne. It is likely that such board games are present in conjunction with game-based learning in 
German civil education. It is conceivable that this use of gamification in civil education also has found 
its way to military education. A couple of examples indicate that this occurs. One is the educational 
role-playing game POL&IS (Politik und Internationale Sicherheit), which are actually run by German 
officers  (Jugendoffizier) in order to give high school students an understanding of team work, conflict 
resolution and world affairs.53 Another example is a ‘Planspiel’, a game that simulates diplomacy within 
the United Nations (MUN: Model United Nations). This game is used at the Bundeswehr University in 
München.54 Whether or not these examples indicate a widespread use of similar games within the 
professional military education of army officers and officer cadets in Germany is something this thesis 
will investigate.   
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The United Kingdom (UK) saw the development of what was called the first naval wargame by John 
Clerk in 1782. After the 1870-71 war between France and Prussia, educational wargaming found its 
way to the UK. Ample historical examples can be found, especially in high level wargaming prior to the 
start of the Great War in 1914. The expansion of civilian hobby wargaming was particularly developed 
in the UK in the early 20th century as evidenced by the designs of H.G. Wells and Fred T. Jane. In a 
related development, Frederick W. Lanchester entered the path towards operational research 
methods with his combat models of attrition. Recently, initiative in the UK to invigorate military 
wargaming is evident in the conferences (UK Connections) on wargaming that have been held annually 
since 2013. The author’s active participation in this annual wargaming conference has provided 
opportunities to meet people connected to military wargaming in the UK as well as other countries. 
Individuals from the UK, for example Major General (ret.) Andrew Sharpe, Lieutenant Colonel Ivor 
Gardiner, Major Tom Mouat and Major (reserve) Graham Longley-Brown, are outspoken proponents 
of an increased use of professional educational military wargaming within the British Army.55 With 
both historical and contemporary developments the UK is an essential case. 
 
United States 
As the strongest contemporary military power, the United States of America (USA) is in a league of its 
own and any comprehensive case study on wargaming consequently has to include it. William R. 
Livermore, Captain in the US Army Engineers, introduced military wargaming in the USA in 1872 in the 
form of translated wargaming rules from Prussia.56 Wargaming was developed in conjunction with 
‘staff rides’, which were conducted on the many accessible battlefields of the Civil War.57 Naval 
wargaming, centred at the U.S. Naval Academy in Rhode Island, developed into an enduring wargaming 
tradition. After the Second World War, wargaming became interrelated with scientific approaches 
such as system analysis and operational research. Furthermore, civilian hobby wargaming, such as the 
board game Tactics from 1954 by Avalon Hill, also became established post-war. Besides traditions in 
both military and hobby wargaming, developments in civilian education in the form of game-based 
learning since the 1970s, as well as recent military promotional computer wargames such as America’s 
Army, may have significantly influenced contemporary military educational wargaming in the USA. 
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As a primarily non-western culture, Japan is an interesting case in itself. Wargaming was adopted for 
military use in the late 19th century, following the country’s path of rapid modernisation. Military 
influences from the ‘west’ were strong: Germany assisted in the creation of a modern army while the 
UK similarly assisted in the creation of a modern navy. The use of wargaming was particular 
noteworthy during the Second World War. Indeed, one of the most famous, or rather infamous, 
examples of the use of military wargaming is the wargaming conducted during Japanese planning 
conferences before the decisive naval battle of Midway in 1942.58 Similar to Germany, Japan was 
demilitarised after the end of the war and the use of military wargaming was subsequently terminated. 
Today, Japan is a very close ally with the USA and has, compared to most countries, relatively 
sophisticated military forces, albeit with a restricted self-defence role. Japan is culturally different from 
the other four cases and this may influence educational practice. Another aspect is that since the 1980s 
Japanese hobby wargaming has benefitted from the development of innovative game consoles and 
card games. This raises questions if such contemporary developments have influence on Japan’s 
military educational wargaming. One specific benefit related to this case is that the author has 
knowledge of the Japanese language and culture.   
 
Embedded units of analysis 
Each country is represented as one case study. Each case study is further divided into three minor case 
studies, i.e. embedded units of analysis. These units represent three general levels of officer education. 
This differentiation is applied because of the need of space triangulation, which takes into account the 
effects of educational processes as a cross-sectional study. This lessens the problem of validation 
regarding single observations and is particularly suited for case studies of complex educational 
phenomena.59  
The three different levels were selected based on the following reasoning. Logically, every country has 
an officer school where officer cadets learn the basics in the officer profession before receiving their 
commission and becoming an officer. At the level of officer cadet, it is particularly likely that wargaming 
is conducted. If it is not then there should be reasons why. The other logical educational level is staff 
colleges/schools where officers obtain qualification for staff positions. This is part of the higher level 
education for officers. In those educational establishments it is highly likely that wargaming is 
conducted. In contrast to the officer cadet schools the students at this higher level have acquired 
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between 10 to 20 years of professional experience which may entail different educational methods 
and hence different forms of wargaming. Situated between the formal educational levels are training 
establishments such as a ‘Land Warfare Centre’, which includes officer education. Here, wargaming is 
likely to occur, albeit potentially with a focus on specialised training rather than on general education. 
Accordingly, the three embedded units of analysis in each selected country are: 
 
 Level I (lower level): Army Cadet Academy or Joint Officer Training Academy: This is where 
officer cadets are initially introduced to tactics as well as military educational methods. In 
some places parts of the education are organisationally divided between a ‘defence college’ 
and an ‘army cadet training school’. This is, for example, the case in Sweden and Japan. 
 
 Level II (intermediate level): Land Warfare Centre or Tactical School: here, developments and 
further education in tactics are conducted. Education is usually provided for the rank of captain 
and for specific tasks such as Company Commander or battalion staff member.  
 
 Level III (higher level): Army Staff College or Joint War College: This is generally the last level 
of education of an army officer. Typically, the military students enter this level with the rank 
of captain or major and graduate as major or lieutenant colonel. 
 
An alternative selection would include every major garrison in each country. However, it would be too 
costly and too time consuming to visit them all in order to cover everything. The other extreme 
alternative would be to concentrate on a single country study. As a consequence, this would create a 
dilemma whether a discovered problem is general in character or only applies to a single country or 
facility. One middle ground alternative could be to include a few military units, i.e. pairing a Joint War 
College with a Joint HQ, and a service school with a brigade HQ etc. However, the question could be 
raised if there really are such clear connections between levels of education and levels of command in 
terms of wargaming. Furthermore, not all countries have the same structure regarding levels of 
command which will create complications in comparisons. Finally, this alternative would still create 






1.6 The sources 
The thesis utilised three primary sources: interviews with the instructors, observation of wargaming 
activities, and documents including doctrinal publications, manuals, presentations and instructions. Of 
these primary sources, the far most important one is the individuals involved in wargaming. This 
emphasis is influenced by grounded theory, which is focused on theory development by interpretative 
findings of empirical concerns from individuals at the very core of a practice. In addition, military 
educational wargaming has historically been associated with a few individuals who were crucial for the 
development of certain forms of usage. Lieutenant von Reisswitz in early 19th century Prussia 
represents a good example of this kind of individual. Moreover, some individuals were senior decision 
makers who decided to use their influence to help promote and implement the use of wargaming. 
Such an individual can be exemplified by von Müffling, the Prussian Chief of Staff in the early 19th 
century. 
The interviews of the instructors covered individuals organising and running the wargaming sessions. 
Some individuals were additionally in charge of a course with wargaming while a few individuals 
belonged to the educational establishment. In contemporary education, a ‘facilitator’ is seen as an 
individual who uses the art of leading and guiding people through a process toward agreed-upon 
learning and teaching objectives.60 When such individuals are directly involved in teaching they may 
influence the specific form of a wargame. The interviews were focused on ‘lower-level officials’, i.e. 
instructors, as those often work in direct contact with wargaming. Such persons probably provided 
better insight into the actual use of wargaming. On the other hand, it should be noted that a potential 
drawback is that individuals at this lower level may not provide the complete picture.61 Furthermore, 
reliance on individuals may lead to false verification rather than exploration and reconsideration.62 
Embedded units of analysis, however, allowed space triangulation by the collection of data from 
interviews from three physical locations per case.63 Furthermore, the interviews were conducted as 
semi-structured interviews in order to let the interviewees themselves tell their story, which is 
important for an approach influenced by grounded theory.64 General background information was, 
however, sent out beforehand to each respondent to ensure that relevant data was gathered. This was 
sent in addition to the formal ethical approval of the research and the individual information and 
approval sheet for each interviewee. All interviews after the Swedish case were done without audio-
recording in order to let the interviewees speak more freely. Notes were taken by the author and 
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coded no later than a few days after each interview. Transcribing the written notes into a digital word-
format enabled the data to be coded regarding themes and emerging categories. This process included 
the writing down of reflections and provisional conclusions as memos shortly after the occasion of the 
interview.  
Observation of wargaming activities complemented data from the interviews by allowing the exact 
wargaming forms to be corroborated. However, observation is a data collection method that is highly 
dependent on accessibility and is also time-consuming. Therefore, the proportion of observations is 
largely concentrated to the initial case of Sweden. While the case of Sweden enabled several 
observations the opposite situation occurred in Japan. On the other hand, the case of Sweden is 
arguably the most important case because the analytical model (Chapter 4) is constructed from data 
on the Swedish case. 
Besides interviews and observation, documents were the other primary source. Official doctrinal 
publications and manuals, presentations and instructions provided a context for interviews and for 
comparison between the cases. However, many documents that would provide additional information 
were restricted and/or classified. This was to some degree compensated by books and articles written 
by experienced individuals, who had previously worked at the establishments or were in fact still 
employed. Such sources were useful, albeit scarce. Further written material, such as non-official, 
and/or non-published guides to military educational/training wargaming methods were collected 
when accessible.  
Efforts were made to collect as much data as possible before the physical visit of each establishment 
and interviews. However, in many cases, documents such as presentations etc. were provided by the 
interviewees on site, and were then used for analysis after a visit. Each visit consisted of a long process 
that included the task of personally searching for relevant persons at each establishment. Initial 
contacts were necessary well in advance before the actual visits to properly inform potential 
interviewees about the research project in order to give them reasonable time to contemplate their 
voluntary participation. Included in this process was the reception on site of documentation on 
wargaming, something which would have been difficult to achieve without the actual physical visits. In 
several cases, documents were received after the visits by email, which in turn contributed to 
additional post-visit follow-up questions. 
A major challenge during the research process was identifying individual instructors willing to 
participate. There were, for example, variations regarding a person’s public profile on social media and 
previous exposure to studies and articles. Some individuals were very public about their wargaming 




by a local point of contact. One measurement of success was to have established a point of contact 
well in advance of a visit. The point of contact selected relevant personnel to interview based on 
information from the author. This included research information and an intentionally inclusive list of 
wargaming activities, including sand table and staff exercises. This list enabled the ‘gatekeepers’ at the 
educational establishments to consider a wide selection of ‘wargaming activities’. For that reason, 
access was provided to activities beyond the gatekeepers’ more narrow perceptions of ‘wargaming’. 
The inclusive list of wargaming activities was essential since the author was regularly told during the 
initial efforts of communicating that ‘there is no wargaming here’ even though a simple search on the 
internet provided indication of the opposite.  
The author’s own role carries significant implications as there are negative aspects of a pre-
understanding of the research field. First, there is a possibility that respondents thought that they 
knew the author’s preferences of wargaming forms. The author has, for example, designed and 
implemented a manual hybrid map/board wargame for use in military education and has presented 
this at the wargaming conference UK Connections in 2013. Second, there is a risk that the reader of 
this thesis may be susceptible to possible biases. On the other hand, there are positive aspects 
attributable to the author’s acquired experience in planning, directing and designing wargaming 
activities for the Swedish Defence College/University since 2007. Thus, interviews with instructors on 
how wargaming is conducted were covered more thoroughly than would otherwise have been the case 
if little pre-understanding had existed. Focus was thus directed on why wargaming is done rather than 
on what wargaming is done. To decrease possible bias, interviewees were allowed to speak freely 






1.7 The structure 
The thesis is divided into two major parts. Initially a theory overview is presented followed by an 
exploratory analysis of the case of Sweden. The initial part concludes with reflections on the initial 
supporting questions, a review of interpreted findings and the construction of an analytical model 
informed by grounded theory. The second part consists of four case studies where the analytical model 
is further explored. 
The initial part consists of four chapters: the introductory chapter, the chapter on wargaming theory, 
the chapter on Sweden and the fourth chapter reflecting on initial results. The introduction is centred 
on methodological concerns while the chapter on wargaming theory provides a framework for the case 
studies by a definition of wargaming grounded in social sciences. Notably, this chapter on wargaming 
theory indicates that while there is much literature on wargaming, there is little or no theory that 
attempts to explain why wargaming takes the form it does. The initial case of Sweden is structured in 
accordance with the initial supporting research questions while data collection is influenced by 
grounded theory. The fourth chapter provides an analytical framework for the second part. This 
chapter is an important part of the thesis and is a reappraisal of the initial supporting questions with 
an approach influenced by grounded theory. The main contribution of this chapter is the construction 
of an analytical framework based on inferred findings in the form of categories that emerged from the 
explored case of Sweden. From this exploration the core category – the main concerns of the 
instructors – is revealed. The chapter discusses how this core category can be achieved by the use of 
transcendent conceptual categories grounded in data. The core category, the conceptual categories 
and their properties and indicators constitute an analytical framework for exploration of data in the 
remaining four case studies. 
The second part consists of the additional four country cases (Chapters 5 to 8) as well as the final 
concluding chapter. The overall structure of the country cases is similar to the Swedish case as each 
country is divided into three parts in accordance to its three embedded units of analysis. The subparts 
are, however, different as the three conceptual categories are made explicit to increase the 
transparency of the findings. Each chapter ends with a short conclusion of the main findings. The final 
analysis (Chapter 9) presents a developed substantive theory on the practice of wargaming in military 





2. Wargaming theory  
 
2.1 The essence of wargaming 
 
Part 1: The grey zone of wargaming 
Wargaming is defined in the Swedish Armed Forces abbreviation handbook as ‘the orchestration of a 
played war or combat situation with at least two antagonistic sides where the output is affected by 
actions from those sides’.65 This emphasis on antagonism and actions from different sides seems 
important. Furthermore, the Swedish Armed Forces’ book on educational pedagogy defines a ’game’, 
since ‘wargame’ is not mentioned, as ‘an exercise with no troops’. A ‘game’ is conducted to arouse the 
participants’ ‘imagination’ in order for them to learn and practise tactics and combat methods. A 
‘game’ is thus directly connected to decision-making, albeit contextualised within a framework. This 
framework includes participants’ roles, their mission, and their task to produce an order, i.e. the 
solution to the problem.66  
An important military definition is NATO’s definition of wargaming. This international definition by a 
military alliance, which encompasses such countries like the USA, the UK and Germany, defines a ‘war 
game’ as ‘a simulation, by whatever means, of a military operation involving two or more opposing 
forces, using rules, data, and procedures designed to depict an actual or assumed real life situation.’67 
In comparison, the Swedish definition is more explicit, stating that it is the participants’ actions that 
affect the output. While both the NATO and the Swedish definitions are general there are also 
additional delimited definitions of wargaming. For example, the UK-NATO doctrine of Joint Operational 
Planning defines ‘war gaming’ as ‘a flexible instrument to develop, compare and improve COAs 
[courses of action].’ The real value of wargaming is ‘to visualise the conduct of operations and gain 
insight into opposing capability and action, as well as conditions in the operational environment.’68  
Beyond the military definitions of wargaming there are well-known general definitions of wargaming. 
One of the most quoted, and accepted, definition of wargaming is offered by Peter Perla in his book 
The Art of Wargaming from 1990. Perla states that ‘a wargame is a warfare model or simulation whose 
operation does not involve the activities of actual military forces, and whose sequence of events affects 
and is, in turn, affected by the decisions made by players representing the opposing sides.’ 69 In 
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comparison to the Swedish definitions above there are several similarities which can be described as 
three fundamentals of wargaming:  
1. Real actions by real military units are not included,  
2. The players shall represent opposing sides,  
3. A wargame is an exercise in human interaction. Therefore, according to Perla, each and every 
wargame is unique since actions by the players affect the opposing players, whose actions 
further affect the ongoing development of actions.70   
Wargaming is centred on simulation with different purposes. The initial point above acknowledges that 
a wargame is a simulation, something which is also included in the previous military definitions. The 
second point connects to the initial presentation of the Swedish military definition regarding the 
antagonistic interactional aspect. The third point explicitly refers to the interaction between players. 
This particular aspect of role-play is what makes wargames better than any other intellectual activity 
to simulate the dynamics in war, according to Perla. For this reason, Perla argues, role-playing and the 
development of what happens between the players and the different sides are the reasons why 
wargaming is such an effective tool for learning.71 However, wargaming is not only for learning. 
Wargaming is a tool with two purposes: to simulate the dynamic in war for analysis and to enable 
learning. Analysis (including planning) and education (including training) are often described as two 
different purpose of wargaming.72  
 
 
Illustration no. 1: a spectrum of wargaming, for analysis and education.  
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Wargaming is not exclusively a tool for analysis or for education. The illustration shows the range of 
the term ‘wargame’. To the left of wargaming are field manoeuvres, which involve real troops in real 
terrain. While such exercises are hardly ever perceived as wargaming, staff exercises, which includes 
Command Post Exercises (CPX), on the other hand, are different. Such activities, if they are not centred 
on basic tasks such as learning to use communication equipment, can be akin to a wargame since no 
real units are involved. When a wargame ends and a staff exercise commences constitutes a grey zone. 
The same can be said of what is to the right side of wargaming. This concerns simulations and models. 
Generally, every simulation includes one or several models, which are representations of reality. When 
humans are included in the simulation the simulation is called a ‘playable simulation’.73 This means 
that there must be humans that make the decisions. Such a simulation constitutes a wargame, in 
accordance with Perla’s definition. To further complicate the grey area of wargaming, the purposes of 
education and analysis are intermingled. While a wargame may have a sole analytical purpose, there 
is also almost certainly an educational (learning) aspect. The same for vice versa. The dotted box in the 
illustration constitutes the applicable area of Perla’s definition, which is a balance between education 
and analysis.  
The terms simulation or (combat) modelling are in many ways more prevalent than the term 
wargaming. For example, consider the journal Simulation Modelling Practice and Theory.74 While some 
simulations can be said to constitute wargaming, far from every simulation is a wargame. Wargaming 
is therefore both delimited by, and constituted by, simulations and models. A model is a representation 
of reality. Such representations can be physical (a globe representing the earth), conceptual (game 
theory), or mathematical (Lancaster’s attritional combat model). A simulation includes at least one 
model operationalised by the application of time. With humans in the loop the simulation becomes 
playable and subsequently a wargame according to Perla. Hence, a wargame is a playable simulation.  
Simulations are usually divided into three different types: live, virtual and constructive.75 A live 
simulation includes the use of real equipment, such as combat vehicles equipped with laser-based 
systems to determine if the vehicle is hit and damaged. However, when a live simulation is placed in 
the spectrum of wargaming, it is in essence a form of field maneuver. A field maneuver is not a 
wargame according to Perla’s definition. Even so, field maneuvers are often described by the media as 
‘war games’. In comparison to field maneuvers, in particular live fire exercises, a live simulation does 
not include the use of real ammunition. More distinctly, in a virtual simulation no real vehicles or 
systems are included. Such are instead represented by symbols, such as computer-generated images. 
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The symbols, however, depict each and every object. This is in contrast to a constructive simulation, 
where one symbol can comprise hundreds of vehicles and individuals. A constructive simulation is thus 
more abstract. Accordingly, while a virtual simulation often utilises 3D visualisation a constructive 
simulation usually only depicts a 2D map. The general applicable rule is that constructive simulation is 
the less costly form of simulation while a live simulation is the most expensive form. However, a 
constructive simulation is not per se non-complex because it is relatively less expensive. Non-
computerised forms, such as board games, which are constructive simulations, can include elaborated 
rules and the use of detailed miniatures as symbols. This is especially apparent in hobby wargaming.76 
Hence, constructive simulation as a term encompasses several forms of wargaming of various 
complexity, including board games, computer games, miniatures games and seminar games.  
The use of military simulations is connected to technology. Recent development of computer 
technology has affected simulation which has become ‘hyperrealistic’ with a high level of fidelity.77 
This emphasis to connect simulation to technology has been criticised by officers within the military 
profession. This is referred to by Major General Orme as the ‘simulation dilemma’: i.e. the focus is on 
technology and desired tactical outcomes rather than on how an armed force fights, i.e. tactics. Major 
General Orme exemplifies this dilemma with the exercise ‘Millennium Challenge’ in 2002, a mostly 
virtual simulation between blue (USA) and red (a country in the Middle East). The tactics of the 
successful red commander, the US General Paul van Riper, was perceived as ‘unrealistic’. Hence the 
exercise was stopped and later restarted: the exercise evolved from a free play exercise to a scripted 
exercise with the result that the exercise did no longer serve as a learning tool. This example indicates 
a misuse of simulation that does not encourage innovation and adaptability. To solve this dilemma, 
Orme argues for a much better integration of simulation, and wargaming, in military education. The 
key to achieving this is cultural acceptance of wargaming.78 On the other hand other proponents of 
wargaming in military education, such as Michael Macedonia in the USA, believe that a military culture 
has in fact emerged ‘that accepts computer games as powerful tools for learning’.79  
There is criticism that simulations are too focused on technology and producing desired products, 
rather than functioning as a process for complex decision-making in an environment rife with complex 
interaction. Criticism on the lack of wargaming in the British Army has been articulated by Major 
General (ret.) Andrew Sharpe, who has emphasised that wargaming is a necessary instrument for 
increasing officer competence, the important human element in warfighting. Sharpe argues for the 
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need of double-sided wargaming in the guise of the original Kriegsspiel or equivalents, for example, in 
hobby wargaming, since a fictional wargame such as Warhammer can represent British army tactical 
principles, such as ‘pin-pivot-punch’. This is an example of a gaming approach of military simulations.80 
This gaming approach can be compared to the analytical approach in the United Kingdom of ‘red 
teaming’, which is a tool set to question assumptions by the red cell in order to either provide a better 
product or a better informed decision. This sets red teaming apart from wargaming, which is centred 
on the actual decision-making.81 Therefore, it can be said that a gaming approach focuses on the 
adaptive decision-making process whereas an analytical approach focuses on improving the product, 
such as the comparison and evaluation of different courses of action (COA). This reconnects to the dual 
focus of education and analysis. Wargaming, in the form of a playable simulation, constitutes both 
purposes to various degrees. 
The view that wargaming equals a military simulation centred on decision-making can be criticised as 
a too delimited definition of wargaming. The military theorist Martin van Creveld believes that only 
real war should be excluded from the term wargame. Wargaming should, in van Creveld’s view, 
connect to human culture. Therefore, it should encompass real, albeit controlled, violence. This 
attitude is somewhat similar to the approach by John Keegan regarding his definition of war as a 
cultural act.82 Consequently, all sorts of activities, such as large field manoeuvres, pistol duels and even 
gladiator games are to be included as wargaming, as long as the element of violence is ‘limited and 
controlled’.83 While this clearly goes against Perla’s definition as well as military definitions, van 
Creveld makes a strong case by supporting the other two fundamentals of Perla’s definition by 
emphasising the necessity of an opponent. van Creveld is adamant that a real wargame must include 
a duel against a thinking opponent. In his view, a wargame:  
(…) consists of the interplay between the two sides. Whether that interplay takes place 
on a board, or in a court, or on a computer screen, or between two squads, or between 
two army groups, is immaterial. (…) No exercise that does not involve the kind of 
interplay just mentioned can be considered a wargame. (…) Also excluded is the kind of 
exercise where an individual or team plays not against an opponent similar to 
themselves but against some sort of control which determines the course of the game 
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but cannot be influenced in return. Such games may have their uses; however, they 
involve not strategy but a puppet-master and his puppet.84 
The question of whether opposing teams should be a required part of wargaming is a central question. 
Perla is of the opinion that it is essential for the wargame to be perceived as realistic.85 What is a key 
issue is, however, not the number of players per se but the presence of contingent actions.86  
 
Part 2: A refined definition of wargaming grounded in theory  
This thesis proposes the following definition of the research object: wargaming is a playable 
simulation of military action. In essence, a game is a process that structures information in the 
construction of a narrative (story) by human interaction.87 The storytelling allusion makes it clear that 
while wargaming is not ‘real’, its interactions certainly are. Interaction can take several forms, such as 
adversarial or cooperative.88 The interaction, however, needs to be contingent, i.e. the action of the 
self is dependent on the action of the other in a cyclical relationship. Without any form of contingent 
interaction, the activity is not a wargame but a scripted exercise. Predetermined procedures are not 
games.89 Hence, rehearsals are not wargames because of the lack of dynamic interaction and role-play 
of participants, whose actions further affect the ongoing development of actions.90 A wargame needs 
human players to create and sustain a narrative by contingent and symbolic interaction. The action in 
a wargame is conducted symbolically. For that reason, live simulations, in the guise of exercises with 
real entities that move and simulate firing, are not defined as wargaming in this thesis. 
Symbolic interaction is a theory rooted in behaviourism and pragmatism. It departs from positivism in 
its relation to truth and instead recognises that ‘truth is seen as that which most benefits man’s 
actions’. This is because situations, in which actions are taken, are subject to constant change.91 War 
is a prime example of the impacts of contingency, i.e. unpredictable possibilities for actors’ actions. 
The situation of war causes actors to use creativity to create new plans.92 War and contingency are 
interlinked. This is apparent in how von Clausewitz emphasised the frictions and fog of war by his 
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comparison of the aspect of probability in war to a game of cards.93 Since wargaming is to simulate 
aspects of war and warfare, wargaming is theoretically connected to symbol interactionism.  
The inclusion of theoretical constructs in the form of ‘contingency’ and ‘symbolic interaction’ produces 
three consequences for this thesis. First, a conceptualisation of wargaming by a refined definition 
grounded in theory allows an inclusion of wargaming forms beyond the original map-based Kriegsspiel. 
Second, the theoretical connections reveal the importance of human control of wargaming, which 
supports the selection and inclusion of instructors as the most important primary source. Third, the 
bare existence of theoretical connections reveals that wargaming – ‘a practice without theory’ – is 
actually embedded in relevant general theory. 
Wargaming is a social interactional process in which the participants, the players, engage in social 
action. While real, but not actual reality per se, wargaming aims to simulate aspects of reality. Hence, 
theories on behaviour in the real world are equally applicable to wargaming. The theory of symbolic 
interaction describes the process within a wargame. This linkage can be found in the theory of 
communication, and especially the views of George Herbert Mead on communicative action.94 
Wargaming, as a social activity, is a context where interaction occurs symbolically. This may involve 
calls and/or signals such as ‘Fire!’ and ‘Attack!’, which are understood by all the participants within the 
context of a wargame. This understanding lays the foundation for predictive behaviour regarding 
responses from other participants.95 For a wargame to be ‘playable’ it is thus necessary for all the 
participants to understand the rules of the wargame and be able to communicate, i.e. take action. 
Contingency means being dependent on a situation, either external or internal. The opposite of 
contingency is determinism. Frictions and fog of war are examples of contingent factors, which 
therefore make war a highly contingent activity. Contingency is, similar to simulation, dependent on 
the advancement of time. It is not a frozen moment in history.96 Contingency becomes a so-called 
‘double contingency’ when the Ego and the Alter are contingent: they may behave in different ways 
but their choice of action is dependent on the behaviour of their counterpart. ‘Double contingency, 
then, is a circular contingency that immediately produces a paradox: ‘I do what you want if you do 
what I want’ – and like all paradoxes, seen abstractly, it should lead to an impasse: who moves?’.97 In 
social theory, this impasse is seen as a problem that needs to be resolved, for example, by social 
consensus or communication.98 What separates wargaming from most other social activities is, 
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however, a desire for players, in an adversarial or competitive environment, to actually increase the 
level of uncertainty to deceive an opponent. Hence, more contingency. This is also applicable to 
competitive games such as sport activities. Sport is a tangible example of double contingency in action: 
opposing teams try to defeat each other by scoring the most points while adhering to the rules of the 
game. Consequently, for wargaming double contingency is not a problem but a prerequisite. As 
Luhmann writes, ‘[the other] can leave his intentions unclear or be deceptive about them’. This is about 
either striving for mistrust or trust: a strategy of choice that only appears because of the double 
contingency.99 In this way, a wargaming process utilises the social problem of double contingency to 
its own advantage in comparison with most other forms of social interaction which instead strive to 
reduce the level of contingency.  
‘A contingency framework is embedded in the war game’.100 The connection between contingency and 
wargames is central in von Hilgers’s book on military wargaming focused on mathematical discourse. 
von Hilgers argues that wargames combine chance and skills and hence provide the best 
representation of human life, as well as an inspiration for inventiveness. Military practice, which relies 
on skills and contingencies, is thus considered to be best represented by wargaming.101 This connects 
to the view of von Clausewitz that war resembles a card game rather than a mechanical system.102 In 
the early 19th century the inventive tactical wargame by Baron von Reisswitz (the father of Lieutenant 
von Reisswitz, and an acquaintance of von Clausewitz himself) regulated ‘the representation of 
visibilities, information flows, movements, strikes and losses of troops during a battle. His rule system 
is thereby open to the contingencies that different tactical manoeuvres can produce. The rules were 
centred on ‘(…) the systematic use of dice [which] contributed to the unforeseeability and 
irreversibility of simulated courses of battle.’103 In a wargame for education, rules serve to explain the 
meaning of examples, which then directly lead to understanding. This understanding is linked to the 
participant’s competence in following rules.104  
Rules, in society as well as in wargames, form a direct link to human action by the way of social 
interaction. George Herbert Mead, often seen as the father of symbolic interactionism, offers two 
terms on how interaction develops. The first is ‘play’ and the second is ‘game’. Both words are 
inherently related to wargaming, i.e. you play a wargame by wargaming it by playing a certain role, i.e. 
role-play. In Mead’s example, both play and game relate to role-playing. Game especially relates to 
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competitive roleplaying. As play is associated with the play of children, game is contrasted as being a 
more organised form of role-playing where competition becomes prevalent. Participants in a game are 
organised as units.105 In wargaming this usually means a ‘red team’ versus a ‘blue team’. In order for 
play to transition to a game there is a need for an uninvolved third person. This person is to have a 
neutral attitude as the third person, differentiating him/herself from the first and second persons who 
have a performance attitude.106 The third person is evidently more of a role, or a third-person mode, 
to which the first and second persons are supposed to switch, in order to develop an objective attitude 
to his/her interaction. This can be juxtaposed to traditional military educational wargaming, where an 
umpire was to play the role of neutral adjudicator, who was integral to, and a requisite for, the conduct 
of a wargame. That person was called the ‘trusted one’, which indicates the neutrality of the third 
person’s position.107 A contemporary encompassing term is game director.  
A central thesis in education is the need of reflection for learning.108 Symbolic interaction entails that 
an individual’s action is reflected back through the reactions of other human beings. Hence, the 
possibility of reflection occurs, as ‘my ego is reflected back to me in the reactions of the other or 
others’.109 This quote captures a central tenet in symbolic interaction. It connects to the learning cycle 
of experiencing and experimenting and also indicates that wargaming produces consequences because 
of one’s action, which are then reflected back. For this reason you have to deal with the consequences 
of your own actions in the form of reactions of the other. This is something that is explicitly apparent 
in a turn-based wargame, with a continuous loop of action and reaction.110 Herbert Blumer argues that 
symbolic interacting is a self-reflecting process.111 Reflective interpretation by participants thus 
describes symbolic interactionism in a wargame. 
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Illustration no. 2: interaction (actions and reactions) within a wargame.  
 
The illustration indicates the core of wargaming: the symbolic interaction between two sides (blue and 
red). Symbolically, this may be done with the use of a printed map on a table (as shown), or with other 
forms such as computers. What is important to note is the presence of a game director who facilitates 
this interactional process. Wargaming is an iterative action-reaction process. There is, however, no 
explicit need for the red and blue being equally manned in a military educational wargame. In fact, 
there are many wargames with game directors that also control the red side.112 In some wargames, 
especially hobby wargames, solitary play is possible. However, to constitute a wargame the iterative 
action-reaction dynamic needs to be implemented in some form. The role of the game director is 
fundamental since he/she can ‘manipulate the rules to structure interaction within a game.’113 The 
presence of a game director is a significant feature in the categorisation of games because that person 
‘maintains control over the game flow’ and can ‘decide the outcome of a battle quite independently 
of how the dice rolls’.114 The instructor’s role in ‘actively and dynamically controlling’ the wargame is 
further acknowledged in a recent dissertation on the instructor’s role in educational serious games, 
including military wargaming.115 The illustration indicates that the game director may influence the 
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wargame by controlling the information flow between the player teams. It is also possible for the game 
director to either act as the red team, or influence the red team, without the blue team’s knowledge. 
 
Part 3: Forms of wargaming 
Traditionally, wargaming has been linked to a specific and physical form. The initial military educational 
wargame was a bulky apparatus as evident in depictions of the initial Kriegsspiel by von Reisswitz the 
Elder. That wargame consisted of a large and heavy wooden table with a number of built-in lockers for 
game pieces. Later versions by von Reisswitz the Younger became more portable with the use of maps 
and smaller metal unit pieces. Still, it was common to enclose rules, maps and game pieces etc. in 
heavy wooden boxes as depicted in the photograph. 
 
 
Photograph no. 1: the components of the Swedish Army´s coastal defence wargame, 
early 20th century (author, the Defence Museum in Boden, 2015). 
 
Traditionally, military wargaming was perceived as manual and map-based. One example is from an 
official Swedish manual which provides specifics of the actual physical form of wargaming in use: ‘The 
wargame is a military exercise which consists of the movement of discs [i.e. game pieces, such as chips], 




of some rules, in order to the highest possible degree correspond to how real troops are handled in 
the field by the person in question.’116 In other words, military wargaming was traditionally viewed as 
the movement of unit symbols on a regular map. This rudimentary form of wargaming was referred to 
as ‘map manoeuvres’ and was used as a ‘learning device’.117 The striving for realism and the activity’s 
link to the officer profession are palpable.  
Another and much broader view that encompasses vastly different wargaming forms can be discerned 
in the German use of wargaming up to the end of the Second World War. A post-war report on the 
German use of wargaming identified a number of different military educational activities that were 
apparently referred to as ‘wargames’: 118  
⚔ The ‘proper’ wargame (Kriegsspiel) which was conducted double-sided (on maps).  
⚔ Map exercise. The game director played the opposing side.  
⚔ Command Post Exercise (CPX) in which the participants were organised as a headquarters and 
the game director played the opposing side.    
⚔ Sand table exercises for minor units (battalion to platoon).  
Not all activities mentioned by Hofmann or Vego are listed above.119 Two activities, staff rides (or 
‘exercise ride’) and tactical exercises without troops (TEWT)/‘terrain discussion’/tactical walks, have 
been removed. The reason is that such outdoor activities are generally not playable simulation but 
more akin to outdoor discussions or presentations of concepts/orders. Potentially, both examples are 
part of a grey zone and may constitute a wargame as defined by this thesis. It is, for example, possible 
for a wargame to be explicitly included as part of a staff ride. In some cases, a staff ride can also follow, 
or initiate, a wargame. It is not uncommon that a staff ride and a wargame are integrated. 
Furthermore, a tactical exercise, or terrain walk, is sometimes referred to as ‘game’.120 This variation 
of terms is confusing, but from an officer viewpoint, wargaming and staff rides are after all two 
different educational activities.121 A Command Post Exercise (CPX) and a sand table exercise, on the 
other hand, are potential wargaming activities. However, a CPX may have a focus on internal staff 
procedures rather than on decision-making. Such a purpose almost certainly entails a scripted exercise 
with frictions played by the exercise director according to a predetermined script. Likewise, a sand 
table exercise may be conducted as a rehearsal rather than as a dynamic wargame. 
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One additional activity can be added to the historical German examples above. This is described by 
Vego as Planspiel – a ‘planning game’ or ‘planning exercise’. Hofmann, on the other hand, refers to this 
as a map exercise. A specific purpose for planning games was to rehearse plans for future military 
operations. In comparison to ‘proper’ Kriegsspiel, which were double-sided, Planspiel included only 
one team manned by players (blue) since the opposing team (red) was directly controlled by the game 
director. Planning games were delimited to test certain plans and specifically linked to the education 
of doctrine and tactical principles. In comparison to Kriegsspiel, Planspiel was conducted quicker since 
the double-sided Kriegsspiel was more complex to organise and run.122 While both forms can be 
described as map-based wargames, there is a notable difference due to the difference in purpose as 
Planspiel is one-sided while Kriegsspiel is double-sided. A contemporary military Planspiel is known as 
course of action (COA) wargaming. This form is integrated in military planning with a focus on 
comparing different courses of action.123 As with the historic planning game, the game director seems 
influential in the choice of wargaming form. For example, the UK-NATO doctrine on operational-level 
planning acknowledges that ‘the coordinator (…) decides which method will be applied.’124  
One conclusion based on the examples of German historic wargaming is that there is little difference 
between wargaming forms. In other words, a military wargame is generally conducted on a map, or a 
terrain model, with game pieces modelled after military unit symbols. One major difference, however, 
is if the game director is playing the opposing side or if the wargame includes two (or more) teams of 
players. This conclusion is, however, not based on contemporary data of military educational 
wargaming. What occurred after the end of the Second World War was the introduction of computers 
to handle combat adjudication. Later, computers were used to provide visualisation, which could hide 
some information from the players. One example of contemporary military educational computer-
based wargaming can be seen in the photograph below, which depicts military officers in a wargaming 
exercise. The wargaming form is a network of individual computer stations rather than traditional 
movements of unit symbols on a physical map.  
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Photograph no. 2: military computer-based educational wargaming (author, 2007). 
 
The introduction of computer-based wargaming has led to an academic debate on the merits of 
computer wargaming versus the traditional map-based or board game wargaming forms. One 
applicable feature of computer-based games is the ability to limit information to what players can see 
and therefore implement the ‘fog of war’. On the other hand, Professor Philip Sabin lists six limitations 
of computer-based wargaming. First, the majority of computer-based wargaming is designed with a 
focus on entertainment rather than on realism. Second, many computer wargames are only digitalised 
versions of existing board games. Third, design ambitions are devoted to graphical visualisation rather 
than the human dimension. Fourth, computer wargames tend to become obsolete and unusable due 
to the constant upgrades of soft- and hardware. In comparison, many more available board games 
exist. Fifth, physical game pieces and maps often provide a better pedagogical presentation than 
expensive computer screens. And sixth, manual wargames are generally more accessible for redesign 
tweaks.125 While this debate has a general focus including any educational wargame, the criticism is 
also applicable to military educational wargaming. From this follows that the distinction between 
manual and computer wargames constitutes an explicit variable between wargaming forms.  
                                                          




The physical form is not the sole distinction between wargames. A civilian specialist in US military 
(naval) educational wargaming, McHugh, has classified wargaming forms with six variables.126 Two of 
those six variables have been removed since they are already delimited by this thesis. The removed 
variables concern purpose and what level/organisation are represented in the scenario. Since this 
thesis is focused on educational wargaming on the tactical level those two variables are therefore not 
included in the list below. The remaining four variables are: 
1) Sides (manned by players): one-sided, double-sided or multi-sided, 
2) Information: open or hidden (limited), 
3) Combat adjudication: free, rigid or semi-rigid, 
4) Physical form: manual, computer-supported (‘machine’) or computer. 
The four variables offer a basic framework for a descriptive comparison of contemporary wargaming 
in military (army) education. Regarding the number of sides, it is relevant to observe if the game 
director, rather than players, controls one (or more) side. Alternatively, a small player cell may play 
one of the sides. Notably, a true double-sided wargame, such as Kriegsspiel, involve two equal teams 
(regarding size, focus and learning objectives).127 The availability of information accessible to players 
connects to the factor of realism, i.e. a player in a specific role is only able to observe what that role 
would be able to spot in reality. Regarding combat adjudication, free adjudication is the case when the 
game director acts as a ‘god’ and him/herself decides every outcome and event during the wargame. 
For example, by relying on experience and/or intuition. In comparison, semi-rigid adjudication exists 
when the game director still makes the major decisions, but relies to some extent on results from, for 
example, a computer or written rules. The latter can come in the form of a combat result table. A rigid 
form of adjudication exists when the rules are paramount and solely decide the outcome. In this case, 
the game director may have very limited input or might in fact not even exist as a role during the 
wargame. Regarding the physical form, ‘machine’ refers to the early/pre- introduction of computers 
and includes various methods to support the game director with calculated data. Today’s computer-
supported form includes such functions as well as, for example, visualisation. Manual wargaming 
comprises the original Kriegsspiel and covers all map-based, board and seminar forms. It is possible to 
computerise board and map games, such as the original Kriegsspiel. Computer wargames, however, 
also cover more elaborate wargames, i.e. both virtual and constructive simulations are included. 
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2.2 Educational games and military wargaming 
 
Part 1: Game-based learning  
The use of games in education is centred on the concept of ‘game-based learning’ – an elusive term.128 
Game-based learning is sometimes perceived as a specific form of game, to be precise, computer 
and/or video games.129 In general, game-based learning can be described as a game-supported method 
applied to a task and creatively handled by participants.130 Player motivation is indispensable for an 
educational game. Motivation is generated when participants experience ‘flow’, a notion articulated 
and categorised by Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi and since then often applied in theoretical studies on the 
use of educational games.131 Flow is achieved when the player has the right skill to master the 
challenge the game presents.132 The need for flow is not the only general theory applicable to game-
based learning. One common denominator in texts on game-based learning is the inclusion of 
assurances that the activity is not frivolous. Therefore, educational games are considered to be ‘serious 
games’.133 This seriousness is grounded in the concept of evident usefulness. This is generally 
motivated by three specifics: a reference to the important role of play in the pedagogic development 
of children;134 the proposition of the incorporating role of play in human culture in the form of ‘Homo 
Ludens’;135 and finally, references to the educational philosophy of pragmatism and its portal gestalt 
John Dewey, who emphasised the importance of reflectivity and ‘learning by doing’.136  
Two key words within the wider context to which game-based learning belongs are ‘problem-based 
learning’ and ‘gamification’. Problem-based learning is a method of learning: education is conducted 
according to how individuals learn in the real world to solve real problems with available resources.137 
Gamification, on the other hand, is about game design. However, gamification has become a ‘hyped 
concept in game-based learning.’138 A general definition of gamification is that it ‘is the use of game 
design elements in non-game contexts.’139 This can be exemplified by three specific design elements: 
abstraction, mechanics and interfaces. Abstraction simplifies representations in the game and 
introduces complexity step by step so that the player can learn. Mechanics is about the feedback loops 
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concerning the game’s challenges, which become progressively more difficult and rewarding for the 
player. Third, game interfaces are designed to invite ongoing participation. The purpose is to promote 
player engagement and to create a sense of fun.140 Accordingly, gamification is about improving 
learning by increasing motivation. This is done by incorporating the elements of fun, competition and 
tangible scores, such as victory points, in an educational game design. In short, problem-based 
learning constitutes a context and an overarching purpose, while gamification is the actual technique 
(design) to increase the educational effectiveness of a specific game.  
Problem-based learning is deemed especially suitable for profession-based higher education since the 
best way to become a doctor is arguably to be one (under supervision). Central in this form of learning 
is that it starts with a problem from the real world and that the solution requires knowledge that the 
students do not have and thus must acquire during the process. By solving the problem, the students 
accumulate knowledge, practice and attitudes.141 The direct purpose of problem-based learning is that 
the students ‘learn to learn and develop their own critical thinking’.142 Critical thinking is created as the 
individual generates various attempts at solutions. With a developed solution the unclear becomes 
clear and this process generates knowledge by reflective thinking.143 Problem-based learning is related 
to pragmatism, a philosophy that emerged at the end of the 19th century. Pragmatism is based on the 
value of ideas and theories as tools to solve a problem. One of the most famous pragmatists was John 
Dewey (1859-1952) who argued for its implementation within education. Dewey’s argument is that 
reality is always changing which therefore constantly creates new problems. Those problems are 
managed by the individual using reflective thinking which concretely means a goal-oriented 
systemising and organising of ideas that leads to a solution and an action. Consequently, a test is 
conducted to see if an idea works in reality. In this regard, failures are also instructive and indicative. 
The educational method proposed by Dewey is ‘learning by doing’ where students investigate from a 
concrete starting point and with an abstract end state. In other words: students engage in problem-
solving. This is envisaged to be done as teamwork with other students.144 In problem-based learning, 
the influence of the instructor on the process should be minimal in order to let the students themselves 
handle the process.145  
Problem-based learning covers several educational methods. Two of the more utilised methods are 
educational games and the case method. The case method consists of a case presentation to the 
                                                          
140 Yunyongying (2014), and, Whitton (2014), pp. 112-115.  
141 Biggs & Tang (2011), pp. 178-181. 
142 Bron & Wilhelmson (2011), Olstedt, p. 166. 
143 Bron & Wilhelmson (2011), Olstedt (ii), pp. 133-134. 
144 Stensmo (2007), pp. 201-221.  




participants in the form of a narrative – a story – about a real situation or event. 146 A game, on the 
other hand, entails that the students themselves participate in – and create – their own narrative, 
regardless if the game is about a historical or fictive situation. In comparison, the case-method ‘is 
always a situation that an individual finds herself in, which causes the learning to become dependent 
on that situation, contextualised and related to previous experiences of the individual student’. The 
learning occurs in the case seminar, which constitutes the main methodology of the case method.147 
The seminar discussions aim to illustrate particular cases where principles and theories may apply. The 
individual student is thus able to hear the viewpoint of other students about a particular case, and in 
particular, how they reached their conclusion.148  
In comparison to the seminar discussion of the case method, the focus in an educational game is on 
the students’ creativity in the construction of their narrative. Consequently, one important part of an 
educational game is role-play. For example, students may play different roles in order to increase their 
knowledge in a certain area, for example, their understanding of the conflict complexities in the Middle 
East. Role-play offers the participants the possibility to observe the world with new perspectives to 
increase their understanding and therefore also their learning.149 An educational game entails both co-
operation between individuals within a team, and competition between different opinions/ideas by 
individuals in different teams, or, within the same group/team. Obviously, co-operation also exists in 
team assignments, while competition exists in debates, but in a game, co-operation and competition 
exist simultaneously and affect each other in a dynamic way. Participants need to co-operate with each 
other to increase their team’s chance of success. Since it is a game an allure of competition exists: to 
play the game can thus become more important than the learning objectives.150 However, a focus on 
the role-play of the participants reveals no fewer than four potential and different dynamic human 
relations within a game:151  
1. Antagonism: two sides are attacking or threatening each other,  
2. Competition: different teams compete with each other for limited resources. One classic 
historic example would be the relationship between the two famous allied generals 
Montgomery and Patton during the Second World War,    
3. Co-operation: different teams work together to reach a common objective,  
4. Representation (act for): a participant is to represent other (subordinate) roles. 
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The variation of dynamic interaction between human participants is one reason why games are good 
for education. This assumption is centred on one key-word: role-play. This forces the participants to 
see things from another (role’s) perspective.152 The inherent essence of games is, however, the 
decision-making by participants. Hence, the participants must have meaningful roles in the game. The 
resulting immersion is necessary for participants to buy into the game and thus enable suspension of 
belief. The ‘role-assumption is a fundamental feature of gaming’s utility.’ The role-play in combination 
with human interaction creates a powerful tool for learning.153  
The application of critical thinking by the participants and subsequent problem-solving of the 
challenges in the game is described as the ‘principle of learning’ in educational games. Hence, a game 
constitutes a learning cycle which begins with a proposition which is then tested. This causes a 
reaction, upon which reflection occurs. The cycle then continues anew since it is a repeatable 
process.154 This cycle is akin to David A. Kolb’s learning cycle, which is a general idea on how learning 
is accomplished. The basic principle is to learn by testing, in other words, to experiment. Hence the 
phrase ‘experimental learning’, a phrase which was also developed by Kolb. His model was additionally 
influenced by the previously mentioned John Dewey as well as Jean Piaget. The latter emphasised the 
necessity for the student to be active in order to learn – i.e. ‘active learning’ – rather than relying on 
teachers or other tools.155 Regarding Dewey, his connection to pragmatism also connects to symbolic 
interactionism. This is evident in that the participant is required to construct his own actions on the 
basis of his own interpretation of the situation: i.e. ‘he may do a miserable job in constructing his 
action, but he has to construct it’.156 This quote regarding reflective interpretation followed by action 
represents a core thesis in symbolic interactionism.157 It also represents the connection between 
symbolic interactionism and learning. This is visualised in Kolb’s learning circle, where learning is 
explained as a process that can begin at any phase as long as the process is a loop in which participants 
self-learn.158 
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 Illustration no. 3: the learning cycle: a model by David A. Kolb. 
 
Educational games may constitute the driving element in Kolb’s model as a representation of 
‘experiment’. Experience emerges from – and during – various activities (‘experiment’) such as 
simulation or role-play.159 Subsequent steps in the circle involve reflection on the newly acquired or 
previously held experience. During ‘conceptualising’ sorting occurs and abstract formulations lead to 
conclusions. Then experiments test the conclusions and the process continues in further loops.160 
Examples of educational games that provide experience, and allow experiments, are the computer 
games Civilization (historical progress and developments in the guise of nation building), SimCity 
(modern urban development) and The Sims (modern social role-play). Such games are examples of 
experiments that produce experience and therefore contribute to learning.  
While educational games in the guise of game-based learning and gamification seem to be effective 
learning within the overall concept of problem-based learning, many instructors and teachers seem 
hesitant to use ‘games’. One reason is that ‘play and games are dirty words to many traditional 
educationalists because of their connotations of trivial, wasteful and indulgent activity.’161 Due to this 
negativity, which can be likened to a form of stigma, the use of terms such as ‘serious games’ signifies 
a determination to avert a potential perception that educational games are only applicable to child-
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like play. The presence of such a perception would arguably limit the use of educational games for 
adults. This is a paradox since ‘fun’ is arguably a powerful tool for learning according to proponents of 
gamification and thus generally applicable to higher education and serious professions, such as the 
medical field.162 One reason behind the drive for ‘serious games’ is arguably that many games are not 
perceived to be realistic, and hence not suitable for higher education. This aversion seems to affect 
some game forms in particular: criticism has been levelled at board games, including chess, as too 
simplified and too abstract.163  
 
Part 2: Wargaming in military education 
The above concerns of educational games as being too childish or too abstract to be of any value for 
an adult education as serious and traditional as the army officer corps raises questions about the 
applicability of game-based learning and gamification in military education. Military wargaming has, 
however, a much longer history than the civilian educational terms of game-based learning and 
gamification which surfaced after the Second World War. In a military wargame, participants act as 
themselves rather than play a fictional role (or position). This sets it apart from games in civilian 
education and hobby wargaming.164 Furthermore, participation in educational military wargaming is 
compulsory which differs from ‘games’ and ‘play’ where players to a large extent voluntarily participate 
for fun. ‘War’ and ‘game’ are however not antonyms. For example, in military culture war can be 
construed as ritual and rule-based behaviour.165 Martin van Creveld has even explicitly referred to the 
legendary fighting representation during the Roman era, Gladiator tournaments, as a form of 
‘wargame’.166 The connection of wargames – Kriegsspiel – to theatre, or drama, is palpable.167 The 
uncertainties in games, since results are contingent on many factors such as the behaviour of other 
antagonistic and/or competing players, are comparable to the uncertainties of war. Hence, von 
Clausewitz claimed that the human activity most similar to war is a ‘game’.168 The use of ‘games’ in 
military education is, however, not completely standardised.169 For example, in the Swedish Armed 
Forces’ handbook on education a ‘game’ is a ‘verbal combat exercise’, i.e. an exercise without troops 
but with ‘fantasy’ which can occur either outdoors or indoors. While no further description of ‘game’ 
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is provided in that handbook, the stated purpose of ‘games’ in military education is to practise tactics 
and combat methods by decision-making.170  
Instead of ‘game’, ‘wargaming’ is the traditional term used in military education. Wargaming was 
formally introduced in Prussian professional military education in 1824. At that time, in Berlin, a 
lieutenant named von Reisswitz conducted a demonstration of his own designed double-sided map-
based wargame with rigid rules for the Prussian chief of staff, General von Müffling. The demonstration 
of the Kriegsspiel went smoothly and the General became so impressed with the feel of the wargame 
that he allegedly exclaimed loudly ‘this is not a game, this is practice for war’. This feel of realism was 
exactly what von Reisswitz the Younger had in mind with his wargame – a refined version of his father’s 
wargame to ‘give a realistic picture of actions on the battlefield’.171 The subsequent introduction of 
Kriegsspiel in Prussian military education as ordered by von Müffling saw further developments. The 
rigid rules for combat adjudication were continuously developed and made more detailed in order to 
produce realistic combat results. Following this route, directing a wargame became a cumbersome 
process. This in turn developed into a major complaint among officers assigned to conduct a wargame 
since they saw a fundamental flaw: ‘when an officer fluent in operation is intimidated by the prospect 
of administrating a wargame – the dissonance being that if the wargame is supposed to train officers 
for war, how can seasoned officers lack the capability to conduct wargames?’172 To increase the 
instructor’s ability to control a wargame a Prussian colonel named von Verdy proposed a major revision 
of the Kriegsspiel in 1876. This changed the wargaming form from rigid to free: the combat result was 
to be decided by the instructor (umpire) rather than be conducted in accordance to extensive printed 
rules and adjudicated through lengthy calculations. This revised wargaming form became akin to an 
interrogation, in which the director asks the commanders and/or subordinates their intentions at a 
certain time. This general form of wargaming, known as free Kriegsspiel, received a positive reception 
from officers. Supposedly, this major revision also increased the military use of educational 
wargaming.173  
The issue of ‘too much game’, exemplified by the rigid approach in wargaming, is arguably a traditional 
concern for the officer profession. This concern is compounded with what Anders Frank has described 
as ‘gamer mode’, when military students become so focused on winning the wargame that they 
concentrate on winning at all costs rather than on the learning objectives.174 While academics, such as 
van Creveld, may emphasise the need for double-sided wargames, many officers, exemplified by the 
                                                          
170 Försvarsmakten (2006a), pp. 416- 432. 
171 Peterson (2012), pp. 227-228. 
172 Peterson (2012), p. 246.  
173 Peterson (2012), pp. 246-247. 




US Army officer Farrand Sayre, represent a fundamentally different view.175 Sayre believed that the 
concept of ‘game’ was unnecessary for wargaming (‘map manoeuvres’): 
Although map maneuvers owe their origin to a game [by von Reisswitz], the game 
feature is no longer an important element of them. A predominance of the game idea 
has always been an obstacle to the proper development of these exercises as a means 
of military instruction and training. (…) in order that no injustices might be done to 
either side, computations of losses were made (…) the dice, tables and rules served to 
secured fairness to the players and to clear the director of suspicion of bias; but when 
the idea that the map maneuver is a sort of game – in which one merely plays to win – 
is set aside these considerations lose their importance.176 
There are two perspectives inherent in Sayre’s argumentation. One embraces the concept of 
wargames with two opposing sides, which have more or less equal chances of winning, while the other 
perspective believes that the instructional value does not require two sides of players competing 
against each other. The core in Sayre’s argument is that a wargame has nothing to do with a ‘game’ 
since it is a military exercise. However, by putting forward this argument, Sayre acknowledges the 
connection between games and wargames by referring to the original wargaming form designed by 
Lieutenant von Reisswitz in 1824. The answer to the simple question of whether a wargame is a ‘game’ 
or not was actually the reason that Kriegsspiel was adopted, as the Prussian General von Müffling, to 
whom the demonstration was done in 1824, clearly emphasised that ‘It’s not a game at all’.177  
The military dislike for the word ‘game’ concerns the amusement and/or entertaining aspect 
connected to the competitive settings. However, even Sayre noted that a latent entertaining and 
positive factor exists in educational wargaming. This is directly related to the intellectual challenge of 
a contest against a live opponent. If that duel-situation were removed, the only thing left would be 
pure order training. This order training is, however, what Sayre sees as the usefulness of wargaming. 
On the other hand, he also acknowledges that a double-sided game with an opposing side raises the 
interest for the wargaming exercise. His counter-argument to this is that single-sided wargames are 
more effective since they are controlled: a game director controls the opponent directly and therefore 
shortens the waiting time between moves. Nevertheless, his conclusion is paradoxically an 
endorsement of the double-sided version:  
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Broadly speaking, it may be asserted that the one-side maneuver is the better vehicle 
for instruction – the two-side maneuver the better means for given training and 
practice. (…) Two-side map maneuvers have important advantages and will probably 
always be regarded as the highest form of the exercise and be the form most frequently 
used. There is a closer approximation to the conditions of war, for there is an actual 
contest and greater interest is aroused. Responsibility is thrown directly upon the 
commanders, who thus acquire training in bearing it. The lessons taught are more 
convincing and are more indelibly impressed upon the memory.178 
The reality is, however, not as clear-cut as Sayre presents it. There is a grey zone in the respect of 
players and different sides. Pure double-sidedness can be said to be relatively rare as this should entail 
both sides (teams) having a more or less equal chance of winning the ‘contest’. In many cases, a 
separate minor ‘red cell’ or the game director himself plays the opposing ‘red team’. This is a form of 
double-sidedness, at least in regard to the interactional aspect. Furthermore, different cells in the 
same ‘blue’ team may co-operate or may even, to some extent, compete with each other. The issue of 
double-sidedness can be exemplified by the difference between the German forms of Kriegsspiel and 
Planspiel. In Kriegsspiel, two equally manned teams (blue and red) play through a war scenario while 
in Planspiel only one team (the blue side) directs the phases of the wargame.179 Both forms, however, 
include the term ‘game’ (‘spiel’) which indicates that the issue of player sides is a dichotomy within 
wargaming, rather than a difference between a wargame and a non-wargame. 
Arguably, an aversion to relate to the ‘game’ part of wargaming means that the term ‘wargame’ is 
currently avoided in military education. A similar aversion has been noted in the civilian application of 
educational games.180 According to Thomas Allen, many academics avoid the term ‘wargaming’.181 
Instead, terms such as ‘conflict simulation’ and ‘military simulation’ are used. Notably, ‘games’ are said 
to have ‘undesirable characteristics [that] encourage the operator to deviate from standard 
operational procedures.’ In short, the term ‘game’ is affiliated with entertainment and fun and not to 
real-world tasks.182 In a professional military setting, games incorporate competition, but they are not 
played for entertainment as military training is seen as ‘a very serious activity’.183 This attitude is 
reinforced by norms.184 The aversion in both the military and civilian fields of educational games to 
bring ‘game’ and ‘war’ together thus leads back to the term ‘serious games’, which was coined by Clark 
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Abt in the early 1970s. Contrary to the popular notion that ‘serious games’ imply that the fun factor is 
to be excluded, Abt in fact clearly states that: 
‘serious games’ […] have an explicit and carefully thought-out educational purpose and 
are not intended to be played primarily for amusement. This does not mean that serious 
games are not, or should not be, entertaining. We reject the somewhat Calvinistic 
notion that serious and virtuous activities cannot be fun.185  
In other words, Abt, the inventor of the phrase ‘serious games’ himself emphasised the inherent 
emotional satisfaction that may arise from any game, even if played seriously. Furthermore, Abt also 
makes the connections of games to war, a competitive activity of the largest scale where the outcome 
is uncertain. His conclusion is that games are essential in military planning and training.186 Accordingly, 
military educational wargaming suffers from a paradox. While wargaming has a recognised usefulness 
in military education, the practice suffers from controversy because of its connections to gamification 
– a game design’s use of fun and competition to increase learning motivation –, which on the other 
hand is also a key factor behind the usefulness of wargaming.  
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Wargaming is a playable simulation of military action. Inherent in wargaming is a process that 
constructs a narrative by contingent symbolic interaction. Hence, every wargame is unique. Within an 
educational framework, ‘to wargame’ is to experiment in order to gain experience to reflect upon and 
learn. Wargaming is a mirror – a metaphor of the ongoing symbolic interaction between the 
participating individuals, conventionalised as Ego and Alter, whose interaction enables the participants 
to reflect on their own actions. This process augments learning. While the inherent process is thus 
clear, wargaming can take on many different forms. This is evident in four variables: the number of 
participating sides, hidden or open information, combat adjudication methods and the physical form. 
The last variable is especially noteworthy regarding the traditional map-based (manual) form and the 
more recent computer-based form. Two major dichotomies in wargaming are also covered by the 
variables: between rigid and free wargaming and between one-sided and double-sided wargaming.  
One major disputed area has been identified: military wargaming is often not considered a ‘game’. This 
concerns the unwillingness in military culture to connect wargames to entertainment, as military 
wargaming is ‘not supposed to be entertaining’. Instead wargaming is seen as ‘serious games’ and is 
often referred to as ‘simulation’ or ‘decision-making exercises’. Simulation, however, does not carry 
the same meaning as wargaming. In many cases, simulation is not about human interaction and role-
play: at times no humans are actually ‘playing’. Such activities are not ‘playable simulations’ and hence 
not wargaming. The aversion to connect wargaming to games may inhibit learning from educational 
concepts such as game-based learning and gamification. The latter concept, gamification, in particular 











In Sweden the Defence University (SEDU, Swe: Försvarshögskolan) has a dominating position in the 
education of military officers. A civilian university since 2008, the SEDU is tasked by the Swedish 
government to organise the three-year Officer Programme with a professional officer degree (BA) that 
enables graduated officer cadets to apply for employment as a second lieutenant in the Swedish Armed 
Forces. In addition, the SEDU provides the higher officer education in accordance to requirements from 
the Swedish Armed Forces.187 A central part of the higher education is the two-year Senior Staff Course, 
which offers mid-ranking officers (majors) the opportunity to graduate with an advanced degree in 
War Studies (MA). Accordingly, the SEDU is responsible for all officer education related to university 
credits and degrees. The Swedish Armed Forces retain, however, several schools for additional 
education and training for officers. The largest of those is the Land Warfare Centre (Swe: 
Markstridsskolan) which offers education, development and training in all aspects of land warfare.188 
This includes a one-year education, at the Land Warfare Centre’s detachment in Kvarn, for officer 
cadets of the Officer Programme in the infantry/armour branch. For these reasons, the embedded 
units of analysis regarding contemporary military educational wargaming in Sweden are:  
 The SEDU and the Land Warfare Centre: the Officer Programme with officer cadets (I), 
 The Land Warfare Centre: courses for army officers (II), 
 The SEDU: the staff courses (III). 
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3.1 Lower level: the Officer Programme 
The Officer Programme (OP) was designed in 2006-07 as a joint three year programme with most 
officer cadets attending similar courses. The intake for each year, starting in August, usually consists 
of 100 to 150 officer cadets. By 2014 the Officer Programme had evolved into four profiles. The largest 
group is called the War Studies Profile with an emphasis on land warfare. The second group is the 
Military Technology Profile, with military technology as the main subject instead of War Studies. The 
third group is the Nautical Profile for naval officer cadets. Part of their education is conducted at the 
Kalmar Maritime Academy within the Linnaeus University. Finally, the fourth group consists of air force 
pilot apprentices – their education/training is set up as contracted teaching on behalf of the Armed 
Forces, while the other three profiles consist of accredited university education. Of the four profiles 
above only the War Studies Profile is covered since the focus is on land (army). The 4th and 5th 
semesters (one year) are conducted at Armed Forces’ schools, such as the Land Warfare Centre.189  
 
Contemporary wargaming  
Below is a chronological overview of wargaming conducted in 2014-2015 at the War Studies Profile. 
WHEN WHY WARGAME CLASSIFICATION 
2nd semester: 
intermediate module in land 
tactics 
A two hour introduction to 
‘gaming the plan’ in the 
planning process 
A map wargame; to ‘game the plan’ 
with a focus on ‘classroom planning’: 
‘PUT-spel’ 
2nd semester: 
intermediate module in land 
tactics 
A ‘wargaming week’ to learn 
tactics at battalion level 
An in-house developed hybrid 
map/board wargame with a focus 
on ‘classroom warfighting’: BMBat 
4th-5th semester: 
Land warfare centre (Kvarn) 
A ‘wargaming week’ to learn 
combat techniques within 
company level 
A focus on ‘classroom warfighting’ 
using the computer game VBS 
(StriSim-PC) 
4th-5th semester:  
Land warfare centre (Kvarn) 
A couple of occasions to discuss 
specifics issues through a 
‘reasoning wargame’  
An in-house developed hybrid 
seminar/map wargame with a focus 
on ‘classroom planning’ 
Table A: overview of wargaming for Swedish officer cadets (armour/infantry) 2014-15. 
 
The five-week intermediate module in land tactics starts with lectures followed by a battalion level 
scenario of planning, including a simple map wargame. The planning is followed by a one week staff 
ride focusing on reconnaissance of the terrain. What remains before the final examination week is the 
‘wargaming week’, which gives the officer cadets the chance to practise decision-making in a double-
                                                          




sided scenario between a red and blue side. The wargaming activity thus forms part of a progression 
in the form of an educational ‘ladder’ within the module.190 In 2014, and every year since 2011, the 
wargaming form used in the ‘wargaming week’ for the intermediate tactics module is the Board Game 
Mechanized Battalion (BMBat): an in-house hybrid map/board game developed by the author. BMBat 
allows up to 16 officer cadets to participate in two teams (blue and red), each with two levels of 
command: the battalion tactical command post (Bn HQ) and the Company Commanders (Coy). During 
the ‘wargaming week’, each officer cadet (out of a typical total number of around 60) is able to play 
twice: in a different role (Bn HQ or Coy) and on a different team (red or blue).  
 
 
Illustration no. 4: The hybrid map/board game BMBat created by the author.191 
 
The central tactical map – the ‘tactical board’ – is an enlarged version (1:7,500) of an ordinary map 
(1:50,000). The map has two hexagon overlays (1,500 m and 150 m) to measure distance and speed 
up the adjudication process, which is handled by one game director (GD). He or she is supported by up 
to two observer-trainers (OT), whose main task is to assist the officer cadets, primarily at the battalion 
(Bn) level. The OT also observe the wargame in preparation for the debriefing session at the end. The 
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last 30 minutes of one wargame is for the debriefing session and is led by the OT. The entire wargame 
takes about three and a half hours. With two game directors and two wargaming sets, up to four 
wargames per day have been conducted.  
 
 
Photograph no. 3: an overview of the central tactical map with hexes (150 and 1,500 m) 
and contour lines (5 m) in BMBat.192 
 
In 2014-15 there were few subsequent occasions of wargaming for the land warfare officer cadets 
besides the ‘wargaming week’ at the SEDU. However, one year of a total of three years is conducted 
at one of the Armed Forces’ schools. The Land Warfare Centre’s detachment in Kvarn utilises two 
different forms of wargaming: 
1. Computer game: Virtual Battlespace (VBS) with roles as soldier, Section Commander, Platoon 
Commander and company headquarters, 
2. The ‘reasoning wargame’ (Swe: ‘resonemangsspel’).193  
In 2014, the officer cadets received one week of practice with VBS and several scenarios ranging from 
platoon to company were used. During that one week, the officer cadets spend their morning outdoors 
in the terrain participating in a tactical exercise without troops (TEWT) before going to the computer 
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facility. The officer cadets were thus able to wargame ‘in the same terrain’ they had visited in the 
morning. The longest consecutive computer-session conducted with VBS lasted almost 24 hours, which 
included the time to synchronise the activities in the wargame with the need for people to eat and rest 
in real-time. The instructors themselves played the red cell since the focus was on the co-operative 
interaction between the blue side’s levels of command (section-platoon-company).194  
The Virtual Battlespace (VBS) is a modified commercial game, and a virtual simulation, with a first 
person shooter view. However, VBS is not used as a stand-alone computer game. The outdoor TEWT 
and the focus on command roles indicate an integrated and organised approach in the use of VBS. 
Notably, the VBS manufacturer, Bohemia Interactive simulation (BISim), refers to the Swedish use of 
VBS as ‘integration of Live-Virtual-Constructive (LVC) exercises’.195 Computer-based wargaming in the 
Swedish Armed Forces is implemented by a single concept called StriSimPC (Eng.: ‘combat simulation 
personal computer’) at garrisons and in schools. StriSimPC consists of software (VBS), hardware (about 
30 computers) and one large classroom. StriSimPC also allows constructive computer-based 
simulations, such as Steel Beast Pro, with aggregated player-control and a 2D-view.  
 
 
Photograph no. 4: the StriSim-PC facility in Kvarn (Markstridsskolan, 2014). 
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The second wargame at the Land Warfare Centre is not part of StriSim-PC. The ‘reasoning wargame’, 
was specifically developed by the Land Warfare Centre’s detachment in Kvarn. The ‘reasoning 
wargame’ is a hybrid form of wargame: it combines a seminar focused on discussions with a map 
wargame centred on visualising frictions – specifically constraints attributable to the laws of physics. 
At least two maps are used: an overview map and an enlarged map. The latter is used to show details 
and to move pieces symbolising vehicles and personnel. A game director runs this wargame by control 
questions, such as: ‘did you actually bring the grenade launcher with you?’, ‘How much ammunition 
did you bring?’, ‘Where is the extra ammunition?’ Conclusions are generated from the answers. This 
form of wargame was developed in 2010-11 to analyse the situation of Swedish units in Afghanistan 
by the use of real combat data. Since then, the ‘reasoning wargame’ has evolved to educational use.196 
In the ‘reasoning wargame’ the emphasis is not on generating combat results but on generating 
conclusions from the responses of the participants to critical questions asked by the game director. 
The common form of the ’reasoning wargame’ is an enlarged map with unit symbols on the floor 
surrounded by the training audience which is supported by subject matter experts in the back row. 
 
 
Photograph no. 5: ‘the reasoning wargame’ (Markstridsskolan, 2014). 
 
                                                          




National traditions and foreign influences 
Historically, wargaming in Sweden has been influenced by the close proximity of Prussia/Germany. In 
1830, just a few years after the publication of the Kriegsspiel rules in 1824, the rules were translated 
into Swedish and published. Hence, military wargaming in Sweden has a long tradition with several 
publications and manuals from the 19th and early 20th centuries on how to conduct wargaming at 
tactical levels.197 This data influenced the contemporary in-house development of the Board Game 
Mechanized Battalion (BMBat) regarding the role of the game director and how to handle time and 
space. The ‘reasoning wargame’ has also connections to traditions, in particular the physical map-
based form. Captain Gyhagen at the Land Warfare Centre in Kvarn explained that historically, 
wargaming in Sweden was connected to maps. Enlarged photographs were chosen for the ‘reasoning 
wargame’ to complement the maps as photographs evidently give a better sense and visualisation of 
the actual terrain at the lower tactical level.198 Both the BMBat and the ‘reasoning wargame’ seem, 
however, first and foremost connected to specific individuals rather than national traditions.  
It is individuals – the course module directors – who ultimately decide if a wargame is to be included. 
One director, Major Perkola, noted that ‘no one from the armed forces told me, as director, of the 
need for any wargaming. I did it myself as director, relying on written regulations and doctrine.’199 This 
specifically concerns the use of wargaming in the Swedish planning manual PUT. This manual regulates 
wargaming to test and improve an almost complete plan by ‘playing through the plan’. The purpose is 
to make the plan more robust by finding new points for decisions. Another purpose is to inform the 
commander, the staff as well as subordinate commanders of the subsequent execution phase. The 
effectuation of the wargame thus aims to increase the mental awareness of the plan and what needs 
to be done.200 However, quite often the time allotted to do this kind of planning-wargaming is very 
limited. The result is that, in general, Swedish officers consider that they have inadequate experience 
of using wargaming for this purpose.201 
Swedish national traditions seem inherent in map and discussion-based wargames, while computer 
games such as VBS may seem to have foreign influences since the software is a foreign product, 
although somewhat modified for Swedish requirements. There exists, however, a third category of in-
house-developed wargaming forms connected to certain individuals, such as the BMBat and the 
‘reasoning wargame’. Lieutenant Colonel Palmqvist, a former teacher at the Officer Programme in 
2004 and a well-known army advocate of wargaming as the head of the Tactical Section at the Land 
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Warfare Centre in Skövde has offered one explanation of this. Wargaming has not existed in Sweden 
at lower tactical levels since it was never well-established. Instead, there are ‘enthusiastic driving 
forces’ – i.e. individuals – who decide about the form of wargaming.202 Another instructor also noticed 
this apparent lack of Swedish contemporary wargaming when he was a student for one year at a US 
Army military school in the late 1990s. In his view, US Army wargaming was ‘better integrated’, and 
also double-sided, in comparison to Sweden.203 However, it appears that the recent implementation 
of planning manuals, such as PUT, which stipulate the use of wargaming in planning processes, has 
given support to individual instructor to promote and conduct wargaming. The forms of such 
wargaming seem, however, to be based on the preference of the individual. 
 
Availability of commercial off-the-shelf games (COTS) 
The ‘wargaming week’ during the second semester of the Officer Programme at the SEDU has seen a 
variety of forms of wargaming since it was instituted in 2008. Initially, computer games were used, for 
example, the COTS computer wargames Operational Art of War III and Decisive Action, before the 
activity in 2011 evolved into an in-house developed hybrid map/board-wargame, the Board Game 
Mechanized Battalion (BMBat). In play testing with teachers, COTS manual hobby wargames such as 
the World at War: Blood and Bridges were found to be lacking in realism. For example, non-
simultaneous movement based on chance were found to be distinctly unnatural by instructors with 
recent combat experience at the company level. This limitation due to perception was likewise 
detected in the previously mentioned computer wargames. To put it simply, such wargames were 
designed for another level of command: corps/division rather than battalion. In fact, no COTS wargame 
was found to be suitable for use in the intermediate module in tactics. Some were better than others, 
one example is the computer-based Modern Close Combat, but did not provide editing functions for 
the right terrain, a crucial factor since the wargaming session was to be preceded by a staff ride in the 
same terrain. Furthermore, the COTS wargames did not include Swedish equipment/units. Thus, the 
remaining alternatives were to either develop in-house (manual or computer-based) wargames or 
procure a wargame according to specifications. The first alternative can be exemplified by the BMBat. 
The second alternative can be exemplified by the StriSimPC, which in 2014 encompassed Steel Beast 
Pro and VBS. Those are modified foreign commercial games adapted for military use by the addition 
of correctly modelled Swedish units, terrain and other features, such as hardware to simplify control 
of the players’ avatars.204  
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Previous attempts to introduce COTS wargames in military education have been unsuccessful. During 
Lieutenant Colonel Palmqvist’s position as an instructor in tactics at Karlberg for the officer cadets in 
2003-04, he experimented with wargaming for a proposed supplementary module in tactics with 
different forms of wargaming. In his view, what was needed were ‘smaller, simpler and uncomplicated 
wargames based on historical examples, where the officer cadet could apply military theoretical 
principles to a tactical situation.’205 Those ‘smaller, simpler and uncomplicated wargames’ were 
envisaged to be COTS: either in the form of board games or computer games. Palmqvist’s conclusion 
was that general military education in tactics is well-suited for board games. The main reason for this 
preference was the similarity to military practice in the use of maps, and also the suitability of using a 
board game as a part of discussions with students and teachers around the table.206 However, in order 
to get a good effect from board games, either the students had to get extra time for reading and to 
practise the rules, or a game director had to conduct the wargame. The conclusion was: if there is no 
time for students to learn the rules then there is definitely a need for a game director who is well-
versed in the board game.207  
An experiment to test the feasibility of ‘smaller, simpler and uncomplicated wargames’ was conducted 
with volunteer officer cadets during a weekend. The officer cadets planned a historical operation with 
a commercial board game (Lost Victories) and used two command-levels (army and army group) of 
players. The result was that this kind of wargame – ‘a dynamic double-sided applicatory example’ – 
was considered appropriate for illustrating applications of maneuver warfare. It was also ‘fun’ and 
‘motivating’.208 A couple of additional experiments with some of the officer cadets were also 
conducted regarding the use of commercial board games for the purpose of instructing cadets in 
military theory and tactics. However, the education of officer cadets in Sweden was discontinued for 
two years due to lack of funding. Eventually, the new three-year Officer Programme started in 2006. 
This two-year gap, which saw Lieutenant Colonel Palmqvist and other teachers transferred away to 
other assignments, meant a lack of continuity regarding the instructors. Thus, the projected five-week 
module in tactics on various forms of wargaming was never implemented. What remains in 2014 from 
this wargaming initiative is the ‘wargaming week’ in the intermediate tactics module.  
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Photograph no. 6: officer cadets at Karlberg practise tactics with the COTS board 
game Battle for the Ardennes in 2004.209  
 
The attempt by individuals to introduce COTS wargames in order to enhance the military education 
may indicate a relationship of such individuals to hobby-wargaming. One proponent in particular, 
Lieutenant Colonel Palmqvist, has indeed explicit connections to hobby-wargaming.210 In many cases 
such individuals were often introduced to hobby-wargaming before joining the military. But that is not 
always the case. Another military teacher who also participated in Palmqvist’s experiments, Lieutenant 
Colonel Nilsson, is adamant that he is not a hobby wargamer. However, he agrees with the proposition 
that in order to learn tactics and combat principles from wargames, ‘umpires, dice and/or computers’ 
are necessary. Features such as dice and written rules are often integral parts in manual hobby 
wargames. While computer games also have such features, board games are seen as more suitable 
since computer games, according to Nilsson, are time-consuming in the set-up and pre-game 
preparation.211 However, COTS wargames seem to suffer from the fact that such games, hobby 
wargames, are designed for something other than professional military education. Consequently, the 
use of COTS wargames at this level is currently (2014-2015) non-existent. On the other hand, much of 
what is used, for example the hybrid map/board BMBat and the computer-based VBS, are refined and 
developed military versions of COTS wargames.  
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Processes: planning and decision-making  
What separates ‘classroom planning’ and ‘classroom warfighting’ is the latter’s emphasis on decision-
making during double-sidedness: i.e. wargaming with two sides. Promotion of double-sidedness as 
helpful for practising decision-making can be found in a wargaming manual at the SEDU. However, 
there are several different forms: only a few examples envisage two perfectly equally-manned 
teams.212 As can be seen in the VBS activity and the previous experiments with a COTS board game, 
teachers, not officer cadets, play the opposing side. The clear-cut team vs team double-sidedness in 
the ‘wargaming week’ with BMBat seems to be an exception.  
The learning objective of the ‘wargaming week’ in the intermediate tactics module is as follows: ‘the 
officer cadets will through staff rides and wargaming analyse tactical problems and train decision-
making and issuing orders.’213 This learning objective thus reveals a challenge in the perception of 
wargaming among the military teachers and instructors. Wargaming is often seen as a simple binary 
choice: either to test a plan or to practise decision-making.214 Since the ‘wargaming week’ in the 
intermediate tactics module was established in 2008 the theme has consistently been decision-making. 
However, the basis for this practice are previously developed plans by the officer cadets. Hence, while 
the ‘wargaming week’ is about decision-making, it is also about testing plans.  
The officer cadet opinion of the ‘wargaming week’ can be seen in a student evaluation from 2011. The 
officer cadets believed that wargaming in general, and a manual map-wargame in particular, could 
offer a chance to understand frictions and provide an opportunity to practise issuing orders and use 
tactics. In short, for them it was an opportunity to test themselves and the team in order to improve 
their skills. However, the officer cadets also noted that there were some risks of rigid adjudication of 
wargaming. The emphasis on game rules may overshadow the focus on learning tactics, especially if 
adjudication takes too long to resolve. While the latter critique concerns manual wargames with rigid 
rules, the comments, on the other hand, explicitly prefer the visualisation and interaction of a manual 
wargame over computer screens.215 These comments indicate conflicting individual preferences for 
different wargaming forms.  
Influence from individuals can be counteracted with official instructions on how to conduct 
wargaming. Two specific wargaming forms can be found in the Armed Forces methodology handbook 
Basic Command Battalion. In a ‘map-wargame’, the chief of staff is recommended to take the role of 
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game director, while in a ‘discussion-based wargame’, which is more abstracted regarding time and 
space compared to a ‘map-wargame’, the Battalion Commander leads the wargame. Adjudication is to 
be done by a ‘leading commander’ and relies on ‘values based on experience’ and various manuals.216 
Both forms are envisioned as part of planning. However, a duality then surfaces in the statement that 
‘games’ are a good way to train decision-making.217 The actual wargaming forms in use indicate that 
some forms are connected to handbooks while some are not. The initial map-based planning game, as 
well as the ‘reasoning wargame’ are both quite similar to what is envisaged in the handbook. Such 
simple forms seem connected to ‘classroom planning’. This is different than the more elaborate 
wargaming form of the ‘wargaming week’ (BMBat) and also the computer-based VBS.  
It can be argued that wargaming forms differ if the wargame is about planning or decision-making. 
One conclusion from the experience of the ‘reasoning wargame’ at the Land Warfare Centre at Kvarn 
was that the purposes of analysis and decision-making cannot be combined in the same wargaming 
session. There is a perceived need to keep these purposes separated because of the mental 
environment that execution-training generates in a wargame in comparison to plan development.218 
This conclusion is also supported by the general division of wargames into those that generate 
‘decision-making information’ and those that generate ‘decision-making experience’.219 On the other 
hand, the ‘reasoning wargame’ did originate with an analytical purpose but has since its initial 
development also been used for education. Thus, the very same form of wargaming can be used for 
either purpose, albeit preferable not at the same time. Consequently, while some forms of wargaming 
are arguably connected to the planning process (map- and discussion-based) and some forms are 
arguably connected to execution-training for decision-making (hybrid map/board and computer), the 
same wargaming form can be used for either purpose. In some cases, such as the BMBat, the duality 
of ‘classroom planning’ and ‘classroom warfighting’ is somewhat integrated.  
 
The individual instructor 
The importance of the individual instructor has been consistent throughout the above issues. What 
illustrates the various responses from individual instructors is the need for ‘control’. Administrative 
concerns are part of this, but first and foremost ‘control’ refers to the actual running of a wargame. 
For example, the best strength in the ‘reasoning wargame’ is mentioned as the possibility by the game 
director to exercise control of the wargame by ‘accelerating and braking’. The wargame may be paused 
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(in Swedish the explicit phrase used was ‘frozen’) and a situation can then be discussed in detail. When 
the game director is satisfied, the wargame may continue. This form of explicit control requires the 
game director to be firm and clear in his/her directives.220 Administrative concerns are used in 
conjunction with control as the setting-up time of a wargaming session is often mentioned by the 
interviewed instructors either as an advantage or a disadvantage. In the education/training of officer 
cadets by the Land Warfare Centre, the ‘reasoning wargame’ is seen as a wargame that can be quickly 
set-up (in 30 minutes). This is then compared to a computer wargame, VBS, which needs about eight 
hours of pre-training of the officer cadets before a session.221  
One opinion from an interviewed instructor was that the combat technical level (platoon) is not suited 
for wargaming. From this perspective it would be more suitable for officer cadets to conduct role-
playing or actual outdoor field exercises rather than wargaming, as the latter is better suited for 
battalion and higher command levels.222 This opinion corresponds to official documentation which 
tends to view ‘games’ as an outdoor activity in the forms of TEWT. However, this arguably transforms 
the activity from a wargame to a non-wargame. Major Perkola states that while no officer is completely 
negative to wargaming they all have different degrees of willingness to use it. The reasons for this 
hesitation are supposedly due to one, or several, of the five reasons below as listed by Major Perkola:  
1. It takes too much time and effort, 
2. Few positive personal experiences, 
3. No clear identified connection regarding the purpose and the effect, 
4. Not comfortable in the role of game director, 
5. Too insecure to handle the conflict between two sides in a double-sided wargame.223 
While 1) is about administrative concerns and 3) covers the effort of connecting educational objectives 
to learning effects in teaching methods, the other three reasons indicate a deeply personal relationship 
between the wargame and the instructor. It would seem that the form of decision-making (‘classroom 
warfighting’), as in 5) above, requires more personal effort from the game director than a wargame 
for plan development (‘classroom planning’). The importance of the individual is accentuated by the 
apparent perceived lack of support from academic literature on wargaming at this level. The manual 
on wargaming at the SEDU contains, for example, no references or footnotes.224 In the case of the 
‘reasoning wargame’ there is no handbook on how to conduct it, and no academic sources were said 
                                                          
220 Interview: Gyhagen, 2014-09-19. 
221 Interview: Walldén, 2014-09-19. 
222 Interview: Anonymous no. 2, 2014-06-13. 
223 Interview: Perkola, 2014-04-01. 




to have been used during its development.225 Consequently, educational wargaming in use at the 
lowest level seems connected to the personal concerns of the individual instructor. Arguably, if the 
instructor is not comfortable with a certain form of wargaming because of a negative perception 
and/or previous bad experience with a wargaming form, there is less willingness to use wargaming as 
an educational method. 
  
                                                          




3.2 Intermediate level: the Land Warfare Centre 
Military education at the Land Warfare Centre in Skövde is concentrated on three courses for army 
officers (2014). The first course is the OF 2 ‘Captain Course’ that runs from January and is 17 weeks 
long. The other two courses begin directly after the end of the OF 2 course, and are named Company 
Commander Course and Battalion Staff Member Course. Those two latter courses are both eight weeks 
long and run in parallel during late spring until early summer. It is possible to continue from the OF 2 
course into either of the other courses.226  
The Land Warfare Centre facilitates live, virtual and constructive simulations. Live simulation consists 
of a mobile combat training facility (STA) to support mechanised companies training with laser 
equipment to simulate combat. Virtual simulations are conducted with mock-ups, such as the BTA 122, 
a platoon simulator for the main battle tank Leopard 2 improved (Strv 122), as well as the combat 
infantry vehicle type 90 (CV 90). What can be described as a combined constructive and virtual 
simulation is the ‘command training exercise’ (LTÖ) at the command training facility (LTA). LTÖ is 
mainly used to train battalion headquarters (mechanised, artillery and engineers) in a variety of 
situations: from a brigade level high-intensity operation versus an enemy mechanised force, to a 
battalion level low-intensity operation, where the opponent has limited military capabilities.  
 
Contemporary wargaming  
Below is an overview of the Land Warfare Centre’s educational wargaming activities for officers. 
WHEN WHY WARGAME CLASSIFICATION 
OF 2 Course 
(Captain Course) 
A ‘wargaming week’ (the 16th of 
a total of 17 weeks) to learn 
tactics at brigade level. 
An in-house developed hybrid 
map/board wargame with a focus 
on ‘classroom warfighting’ 
Company Commander Course A recurring weekly activity to 
learn tactics at company level 
A map wargame to ‘game the plan’ 
with a focus on ‘classroom planning’ 
Company Commander Course A ‘wargaming week’ (the 7th of 
a total of 8 weeks) to learn 
tactics at company level 
A map wargame to ‘game the plan’ 
with a focus on ‘classroom 
warfighting’ 
Recurring over the entire 
year: week-long training 
‘command training exercise’ 
(LTÖ) at the LTA   
A ‘command training’ week for 
staff training and about the 
execution of a developed plan 
A fusion of a virtual and constructive 
simulation: a computer-assisted map 
wargame with a focus on ‘classroom 
warfighting’ 
Table B: overview of wargaming at the Land Warfare Centre in 2014-15. 
 
                                                          




One specific form of wargaming is the ‘wargaming week’ during the OF 2 Course, run since 2011. The 
participants, about 30 army lieutenants, put their planning from the previous week to the test by 
playing two blue brigades that defend against an attacking opposing force of two red brigades. This is 
a good example of a symmetrical double-sided wargame since the lieutenants were divided equally 
between the blue and red brigades. The game director himself only controlled a (red) parachute 
regiment, a non-mobile entity with a defensive role. In 2014, each of the four playable brigades had 
around eight participants with their own classroom and maps. Rigid adjudication occurred in an 
additional (fifth) separated classroom on an ordinary map with a hexagon overlay. The game director, 
Lieutenant Colonel Palmqvist, used two dice and a combat result table to determine combat results 
based on probability. Each brigade had two military instructors that were playing the roles of 
subordinate Battalion Commanders. After the combat adjudication, the instructors reported back to 
their brigade what actions or events had occurred during the last turn. In the morning of the fourth 
and last day all participants gathered in a lecture hall and the game director presented what had 
happened during the game. The presentation was followed by a discussion on key tactical decisions 
made during the wargame.227  
 
 
Photograph no. 7: the game director’s master map: an ordinary map (1:100 000) with a 
printed hexagon overlay.228  
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In the Company Commander Course a map-based wargame was used almost every week to test the 
plans that the participants (army lieutenants) had developed during the initial part of the week. The 
opponent was played by the game director. The penultimate week of the Company Commander 
Course has in recent years seen several different teaching methods or forms in use: map-wargames, 
VBS, training with the LTA and cadre exercises. In 2014 a decision was made, according to the course 
director Major Torgén, to use a map-wargame instead of an outdoor cadre exercise, since the former 
provided a better learning progression. The cadre exercise would have had to use ordinary vehicles in 
their outdoor exercise, which would have been a step backwards since combat vehicles were used 
early in the Company Commander Course. The map-wargame was used for one week. Focus was on 
decision-making to indicate frictions, provide opportunities and understanding. The map used was 
scaled at 1:10 000 since the focus was on the company level and the ordinary map scale (1:50 000) 
would have overfilled the map with unit symbols.229  
Finally, the ‘command training exercise’ (LTÖ) at the command training facility (LTA) involves the most 
people. Each LTÖ consists of a one-week focus on ‘classroom warfighting’. One aspect that was notable 
during the author’s observation was that the training audience does not directly interact with the 
supporting computer system (CATS). Instead, the game directors, higher command (HICON) and 
subordinate commanders (LOCON) interact with the computer system. The first day in a ‘command 
training exercise’ usually consists of computer training for the subordinate commanders, who 
commonly belong to the unit whose headquarters is being ‘command-trained’. Each day finishes with 
a feedback session, where game directors highlight certain events that occurred in the exercise. The 
purpose of the feedback is not primarily to discuss what happened: it is to make people realise what 
needs to be improved.230   
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Screenshot no. 1: the overhead map-view (2D) in CATS at the LTA.231  
 
The LTA is to a major extent used for constructive simulation rather than virtual simulation. This is an 
interesting aspect since the LTA relies on the Computer Assisted Training System (CATS), a windows-
based Swedish product (in 2014 the BAE Systems C-ITS) to simulate weather, line-of sight, movements, 
and combat. Each and every vehicle can be represented in two different views: map overview (2D) or 
3D. A mock-up of a CV 90 command version, surrounded by large projector screens, allows a Battalion 
Commander’s forward command post to move around in the 3D environment, modelled on real 
Swedish terrain. The system also allows voice communication between the battalion headquarters and 
subordinate Company Commanders. The latter are located in different stands in a large room, named 
the ‘game dungeon’, together with game control. The latter is envisaged to consist of three game 
directors and several assisting game directors, all with specific tasks and with individual workstations 
connected to CATS.232 Almost all the computer screens, however, show the 2D map rather than the 3D 
view.233  
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National traditions and foreign influences 
In Sweden ‘wargaming’ is perceived as being connected to manuals and handbooks on military 
planning.234 For example, in one handbook for the battalion level, wargaming within the planning 
process is either done as a discussion-wargame or a map-wargame. The map-wargame is played on an 
ordinary map with unit symbols, visible to everyone, and does not have any specific rules for 
adjudication. Instead, combat results are determined by values based on experience and data from 
various army manuals and regulations.235 Another manual, at the brigade level, includes an annex 
specifically named ‘wargaming’. While similar to the battalion level, the handbook also includes 
computer-support as helpful ‘to quantify relations of time and space’. Wargaming, as a method, is 
nonetheless explicitly associated to planning.236 While manuals influence the choice of wargaming 
forms in education/training to a certain extent, such as discussion and map-wargaming, there are other 
forms of wargaming in use at the Land Warfare Centre. These other forms involve a specific and more 
complex control organisation of teachers as game directors. The manual wargaming in the OF 2, and 
the mixed form in the LTA, indicates a more sophisticated way of using wargaming that is beyond what 
is found in manuals.  
Regarding foreign influences, the game director at the OF 2 Course, Lieutenant Colonel Palmqvist, is of 
the opinion that Sweden is using the traditional German form of wargaming and not American 
traditional wargaming. German wargaming purportedly put more emphasis on war as an art – a duel 
combined with irrational factors. Palmqvist referred to this difference between the US and German 
traditions by referring to the book Command Culture by Jörg Moth – a comparison of US Army and 
German officer education before the Second World War. One of the differences between US and 
German educational wargaming was that the German school emphasised that there was no optimal 
solution in a wargame because of too much ‘chaos and turmoil’ in war. Accordingly, decisiveness and 
creativity were ranked high.237 The wargame Palmqvist uses in the OF 2 wargaming week is indeed 
adjudicated with dice, involves fog of war and is double-sided with students divided equally into blue 
and red teams.  
The use of specific computer support systems is another indication of foreign influence. One example 
is the BAE virtual world (CATS) used in the LTA. In addition, there is a Memorandum of Understanding 
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in existence between Sweden and Germany which allows various activities such as study visits.238 As 
an example, in the fall of 2014 a delegation from the Swedish Land Warfare Centre was scheduled to 
travel to the Infanterieschule in Hammelburg, Germany, to study a comparable command training 
facility to the LTA. Major Sturesson, who previously visited another such German facility in Münster, is 
of the opinion that besides some differences – such as the training concept, the level of complexity 
and integration regarding tactics vs. method – ‘Germany does it in about the same way’.239 There are 
thus indications of foreign influence, primarily from Germany, and first and foremost regarding the 
‘command training exercise’ of the LTA.   
 
Availability of commercial off-the-shelf games (COTS) 
While there are historical examples of the use of COTS wargames at the Land Warfare Centre, none 
are actually in use today (2014). One example of a previously used commercial wargame is Steel 
Panthers.240 While a similar commercial computer game may be suitable today, there are difficulties in 
accrediting it on computers.241 In addition, while commercial wargames are much cheaper than a 
wargame developed in-house or procured from outside, the issue of cost-effectiveness is related to all 
education/training methods. Hence, any simulation system hypothetically acquired by the Land 
Warfare Centre is cheaper to run compared to an outdoor field manoeuvre.242  
The wargaming form used in the courses (OF 2 and Company Commander Course) is manual rather 
than computer-based, even though computer halls are available at the nearby LTA. Major Torgén, the 
course director at the Company Commander Course, believes that the same wargaming methods that 
officers are educated and trained in must also be suitable for use out in the field during wartime. 
Consequently, he considers a map or terrain model/sketch the most suitable form since it is the least 
complicated in terms of administration and has no need of technical support and personnel support.243 
Another instructor believes that the main challenge is to make the wargame simple enough for the 
students to handle, yet useful for its purpose. The first major obstacle is that about 50 % of the students 
in a course are not interested in ‘game rules’. In other words, the wargaming method should not be 
discussed but rather the content.244 This indicates a concern of instructors that directly relates to the 
wargaming form.  
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The above instructor-based argumentation, on shielding the students/training audience from the 
actual game, can be said to be how wargames are used at the Land Warfare Centre. Such a usage may 
actually support using COTS, if the students are never to actually observe the system for adjudication 
and/or visualisation. However, this is currently not the case since no COTS are used. At the Captain 
Course (OF 2) during the ‘wargaming week’ a manual board game is used for adjudication, but it is an 
in-house developed version rather than a COTS hobby wargame. The game director, Lieutenant 
Colonel Palmqvist, experimented with COTS as ‘smaller, simpler and uncomplicated’ wargames in his 
previous teaching job at the officer cadet school in 2004.245 Palmqvist’s decision to use his own in-
house developed hybrid map/board wargame seems to indicate that COTS wargames are difficult to 
fit within a course without modification.  
The issue of COTS seems to relate to the individual level. One example is an ongoing competence 
development initiative that involves several instructors at the Land Warfare Centre participating 
voluntarily in an ongoing wargame akin to a play-by-email (PBEM) format. This is encouraged as 
competence development for teachers mainly at the section for tactics: instructors can commit to it 
for about one work hour per week. The wargaming form involves submitting written orders to a game 
director, Lieutenant Colonel Palmqvist, who uses a COTS manual board game and a historical World 
War 2 scenario. Orders are submitted once or twice per week and in turn generate reports back to the 
players after adjudication by the game director.246 Here is a good example of a wargaming form based 
on COTS and with a hobby wargame perspective, namely, to re-fight a historical scenario. It is, 
however, only used for and by the instructors rather than in the education of military students. It is 
also connected to, and personalised by, a single instructor. 
 
Processes: planning and decision-makings  
The focus of wargaming at the Land Warfare Centre is on ‘classroom warfighting’ rather than 
‘classroom planning’. Instructors have an understanding of, and a will to use opposition (red vs blue 
team) since it generates dynamism with expected (and unexpected) reversals. This is considered good 
in the context of practising decision-making.247 If the concept of winning is incorporated in education 
the argument is that talented officers will emerge. Such officers will be able to take initiative, accept 
risks and be calm and stable.248 The necessity of taking (or re-taking) the initiative is a central principle 
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in Swedish military doctrine on tactics.249 While recent doctrine puts an emphasis on acquiring 
information and analysing the situation where the enemy’s vulnerabilities are, the simple, general and 
traditional Swedish dictum on how to act in tactics can be said to be as follows: ‘if you do not know 
what to do, attack’.250  
Simplicity in doctrine does not entail the use of simple wargames for ‘classroom warfighting’. One 
noted limitation of wargames in ‘classroom warfighting’ is possible player misunderstanding of rules – 
hence a need for someone to continuously supervise the wargame. If the wargame takes the form of 
a computer-assisted wargame, as in the LTA, the game director can concentrate on possible manual 
intervention rather than vigorously running everything. In comparison, an abstracted board game as a 
military educational wargame has arguably characteristic limits as not many people can be directly 
involved and receive feedback, compared to computer wargames. The latter form can also handle 
thousands of simultaneously moving objects. This is good for mechanical functions, such as indirect 
fire, which may be needed for immediate implementation in a real-time exercise, which in turn 
generates a necessity for rapid feedback to the training audience. On the other hand, if the situation 
is simulated more abstractedly, the use of a board game may become a viable alternative. However, 
one opinion at the Land Warfare Centre is that the wargame should only visualise units that are visible 
in real life. Thus, an open map wargame would be more similar to a ‘game of chess’.251 On the other 
hand, in the Company Commander Course, the open wargame was not an issue. However, it was an 
issue of concern for the OF 2 Course and also for the LTÖ. In both latter cases the combat adjudication 
was shielded from the training audience and results delivered by communication system/messengers. 
Since the OF 2 and the LTÖ were more focused on ‘classroom warfighting’ this raises questions if 
‘classroom warfighting’ is especially sensitive for what the training audience may perceive as flaws in 
the adjudication.  
One major issue related to wargaming in general, and ‘classroom warfighting’ in particular, is how the 
training audience may perceive possible flaws within the wargames. The issue of how the instructor 
imagines the attitude of the training audience towards the wargame seems to play a major part in the 
selection and preference of wargaming form. In an interview with the game director Lieutenant 
Colonel Palmqvist directly after the conclusion of the ‘wargaming week’ (OF 2) in 2014, Palmqvist 
stated that one of the most frustrating things about wargaming is that the training audience does not 
accept certain aspects of the wargame such as: pre-conditions, abstraction of time and combat results. 
This non-acceptance blames the specific form of the wargame. As a consequence, the participants may 
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start to use the game rules to their advantage, by optimising ‘game tactics’. In order to alleviate this 
concern, even though the OF 2 Course consists of ‘mature’ lieutenants aged 25-30, combat 
adjudication was done in a separate room by the game director together with other teachers, the latter 
employed as LOCON (battalions). The form of the wargame, a rigid adjudicated manual board game, 
makes it possible to modify combat results similar to the ‘command training exercises’ (LTÖ). Even so, 
such kinds of intervention did not occur during one complete wargame session observed by the 
author.252 Nevertheless, results in a wargame can be modified because of pedagogic reasons, such as 
an effort to keep the students engaged and committed to the wargame process. In the view of 
Palmqvist, it is better to use a manual map-based wargame rather than a computer-assisted wargame, 
as results in the latter form are either difficult or time-consuming to change.253 This striving to control 
the pace of the game is described by Major Sturesson, a game director at the LTA, as an important 
feature; namely the possibility to ‘accelerate or brake’ during a wargame.254  
There is a difference between controlling the pace of the wargame and actually changing combat 
results. One example of the former issue was seen during the author´s observation of the OF 2 
wargame. Lieutenant Colonel Palmqvist asked the course director (another lieutenant colonel) if they 
(HICON) should allow the two blue brigades to attack, even though it was clear that this would be 
rather unrealistic since the enemy red side was well entrenched and the odds for a successful attack 
were accordingly very low. This assumption was deducted on the game director’s table where all 
information was available. In consultation, they decided to frame it as a question from HICON to the 
two blue brigades: ‘if the brigades thought they still could achieve their objectives they would be 
allowed to proceed according to plan and attack’.255 The above example indicates that there is an 
element in wargaming that emphasises the importance of control. The training audience is not aware 
of this control mechanism since they are physically separated from the game director. One aspect is 
to synchronise the environment around the training audience. Another aspect is a palpable desire by 
the game director to alleviate the wargaming process by avoiding perceived obstacles; negative such 
as when the training audience questions certain combat results; positive such as when combat results 
are altered to support learning objectives. In the case of the ‘wargaming week’ in OF 2, the wargaming 
form included a separate room for adjudication and game control – a design feature by the game 
director to enhance control. 
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The individual instructor 
The game director seems to be the major influencer on the actual form of the wargame. In a report by 
the Defence University in 2010 on the status of the use of wargaming in the Swedish Armed Forces, 
Frank and Granberg state that ‘the amount of interest and wargaming competence of a game director 
constitute perhaps the most persistent obstacle as to why wargaming is not used [more] at the Land 
Warfare Centre’.256 One example of this was the author’s discovery of a fixed sand table in the middle 
of a classroom for the Company Commander Course. This sand table, equipped with vehicle miniatures 
is not used except for its overhead cover, which functions as a table for a large map where manual 
map-wargaming occurs during the Company Commander Course. One conceivable reason why the 
sand table is no longer in use is because it models the wrong terrain: it would take some effort to 
correct the settings. A second reason, told by Major Torgén, who for four years has been the course 
director and chief instructor of the Company Commander Course, is that previous instructors used the 
sand table. Those instructors no longer work at the Land Warfare Centre. The fact that the fixed sand 
table is no longer in use highlights the importance of individual teachers.257 According to Lieutenant 
Colonel Eriksson, ‘individuals drive the form of wargaming, and wargaming drives the exercise.’258 
Individuals that drive the form of wargaming understand wargaming as a useful educational tool. One 
specific reason for this, according to Lieutenant Colonel Palmqvist, is the ‘fun factor’, which delivers 
good learning. Nonetheless, while the instructor is important for the actual form of the wargame, it is 
the course director that decides if wargaming is to be included as part of a course.259 
How to run a wargaming activity and what forms of wargaming are considered valuable seem to 
depend on the concerns of the individual game director. One example is the ‘wargaming week’ in the 
OF 2 Course. This particular form can be traced to the game director, Lieutenant Colonel Palmqvist, 
who believes that the primary training audience should be shielded from the game rules and 
adjudication to avoid ‘game optimisation’.260 Another game director, Major Sturesson, stresses the 
need of intuition to run a ‘command training exercise’. In his view, the game director controls the 
wargame process by either ‘accelerating or braking’. This is done by the use of various actors beyond 
the primary training audience: HICON (Higher Command), LOCON (Lower Control) or the opposing 
team (OPFOR). Hence, the game director is perceived as a ‘soccer coach’, since he/ she strives to create 
the best challenge for the training audience.261  
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The individuals who work as game directors at the Land Warfare Centre have extensive experience of 
game control. Inscribed on annual metal plaques outside the ‘game dungeon’ are the names of the 
seven to ten personnel assigned at the LTA. Many have been at the LTA, although not at the same post, 
for as long as ten years.262 Therefore, opinions of individual instructors on how to use wargaming seem 
to have developed from extended and extensive personal experience involving wargaming, primarily 
the ‘command training exercise’ (LTÖ) at the LTA. Consequently, while the importance of individuals is 
clear at most courses, the LTA facility seems to have developed a certain culture centred on one form 
of wargaming. This culture is manifested in the views and concerns of a few individuals, such as Major 
Sturesson and Lieutenant Colonel Eriksson. 
One explicit aspect of individual influence is that the game directors consistently overrule and modify 
combat results generated by CATS during an LTÖ.263 Personnel at the LTA state that computer 
technology in itself does not matter as the same result could be achieved with manual techniques, i.e. 
ordinary maps or even miniatures on a terrain model. In their view, an estimated 75 % of the output is 
generated by the competence of the game directors rather than the computer system. However, by 
the use of a computer-assisted form the game directors can concentrate on supervision of the training 
audience and save data (map views, combat results etc.) for the daily feedback routine, instead of 
doing all the detailed adjudication.264 Consequently, the ‘command training exercise’ is driven by a 
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3.3 Higher level: the Swedish Defence University (SEDU) 
There are two staff courses at the Defence University (SEDU): the Staff Course (SU) and the Senior Staff 
Course (HSU). During the Staff Course, the officers (captains) are for the majority of the course 
separated into their respective branch (army, navy and air force). After one year they graduate as 
majors. The Senior Staff Course is integrated and joint. After two years they graduate with a Master of 
War Studies and are eligible for promotion to lieutenant colonel. The education during the Senior Staff 
Course is focused on staff work during a joint operation, with an emphasis on planning according to 
NATO’s Comprehensive Operational Planning Directive (COPD). In comparison, the education during 
the Staff Course is focused on tactics (brigade level). 
 
Contemporary wargaming  
The wargaming activities in the staff courses for officers at the SEDU are listed below. 
WHEN WHY WARGAME CLASSIFICATION 
Staff Course: Basic Module 
Higher Formation Land 
Operations (SU 3) 
One to two hours of ‘gaming 
the plan’ within the Swedish 
planning process. 
A map wargame to ‘game the plan’ 
with a focus on ‘classroom planning’ 
Staff Course: Basic Module 
Higher Formation Land 
Operations (SU 3) 
 
A ‘wargaming week’ (the fourth 
of a total of five weeks) to learn 
brigade tactics 
A map wargame with a focus on 
‘classroom warfighting’ (2013). The 
form has constantly changed 
A computer wargame (2015) 
A computer and a hybrid map/board 
wargame (2016) 
Staff Course: War Studies 
Basic Module in Joint 
Operations Planning (SU 4) 
A one day introduction to COA-
wargaming in NATO planning 
A discussion wargame to ‘game the 
plan’ with a focus on ‘classroom 
planning’ 
Senior Staff Course: War 
Studies; Services, Branches 
and Functions (HSU 4) 
A ‘wargaming week’ (the ninth 
of a total of ten weeks) to learn 
branch (land/naval/air) tactics 
within a joint operation 
A discussion wargame to ‘game the 
plan’ with a focus on ‘classroom 
warfighting’ (2013). The form has 
constantly changed  
A board game (2015) 
Senior Staff Course: 
Operational Art (HSU 5) 
A one day introduction to COA-
wargame within NATO planning  
A discussion wargame to ‘game the 
plan’ with a focus on ‘classroom 
planning’ 
Senior Staff Course: Regular 
warfare (HSU 6) 
A ‘wargaming week’ (the ninth 
of a total of ten weeks) to learn 
how to conduct joint operations 
A discussion wargame with a focus 
on ‘classroom planning’ (2013). The 
form has constantly changed  
Senior Staff Course: Land 
Power (HSU 8) 
A ‘wargaming week’ (the third 
or fourth of a total of five 
weeks) to learn land tactics  
A computer-assisted wargame 
(COTS) with a focus on ‘classroom 
warfighting’ 





Students in the Staff Course are introduced to wargaming in the Basic Module Higher Formation Land 
Operations (SU 3). The initial wargame is a simple and open map-wargame for the Swedish planning 
process (PUT). The purpose is to teach the officers the basics of using wargaming as stipulated by the 
PUT. This initial wargame is thus part of the planning process as ‘classroom planning’. Near the end of 
the same module, a second wargaming occasion occurs as a ‘wargaming week’. The focus is on 
decision-making, hence ‘classroom warfighting’. What is notable is that the actual form of the 
wargame for the ‘wargaming week’ in SU 3 has constantly changed. In 2013 the form changed from a 
computer-based (Decisive Action) double-sided rigid wargame to a semi-rigid map-wargame with the 
game director playing the role of the red team. The previous form (in 2012) was akin to a classic ‘three-
room wargame’, with two student-controlled brigade forces (red vs blue) in two separated rooms while 
the third ‘room’ was the master map (computer). In 2013, the red team and the master map were 
combined into one room and the wargame thus became akin to a ‘one-room wargame’. The new game 
director in 2013, Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Baudin, used map overlays as visualisations and based his 
semi-rigid adjudication on a study from the 1980s on conventional weapons as well as Lanchester’s 
Square Law.266  
The ‘wargaming week’ of SU 3 has changed recurrently. In 2014 the ‘wargaming week’ in SU 3 saw the 
‘one-room’ semi-rigid wargame conducted as two simultaneously played wargames by a single game 
director: two blue teams, representing different brigade headquarters, were in sequence called into 
the room of the red team/game director to present their orders at the master map for the next turn. 
This somewhat complicated arrangement was fully dependent on the game director’s ability and 
experience in wargaming.267 In 2015 the wargaming form once again became a ‘three-room’ wargame. 
However, this time the wargaming form was a new in-house developed computer wargame (SSM-
Land), which utilised an additional team of students to input commands into the computers.268 One 
student team played as the blue brigade headquarters while another student team was split into the 
blue LOCON (battalions) and the red cell. While a three-room layout was used, only the LOCON and 
the red cell inputted commands into their rooms’ computers. In 2016, the wargaming form changed 
again. The computer game became a proper double-sided wargame with a corresponding blue and red 
brigade headquarters with LOCONs. The wargame thus turned into a ‘four-room’ wargame as each 
headquarters had a team of inputters in a separate room who represented the lower command 
(battalions/companies). In addition, this time the computer game was supplemented by a rigid ‘three-
room’ hybrid map/board wargame (BMBrig) developed and directed by the author.269 Both forms were 
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similar – double-sided, limited information and with rigid rules – except in physical form: the computer-
based wargame used four rooms and the hybrid map/board wargame used three rooms (maps). The 
students played both forms during the SU 3 ‘wargaming week’ in 2016 since one of the learning 
objectives was to understand how different forms of wargames contribute to land operations. The two 
game directors, who had developed each wargame, ran the two forms of wargames separately. 
 
 
Photograph no. 8: the computer-based SSM-Land (left), and the hybrid map/board game 
BMBrig (right).270 
 
The last wargame in SU 3 is one day of COA-wargaming scheduled in the three-week long War Studies 
Basic Module in Joint Operations Planning (SU 4). In 2013, this one-day COA-wargame session was 
actually cancelled for all but one team of students. This decision was made by the teachers of the 
course because of a lack of time.271 As a consequence, in 2013, the main and only wargaming activity 
for the land students, excluding whatever initiatives the students themselves took regarding simple 
map-wargames as part of their own plan development sessions, was the ‘wargaming week’ in the initial 
land warfare module (SU 3). The apparent lack of wargaming at the Staff Course was previously noted 
in an overview of wargaming activities in 2010 – due to a lack of prioritisation there is little wargaming 
done including during planning processes, in which wargaming should be conducted according to 
doctrine.272  
                                                          
270 Elg (2014-15), and, Granberg et al. (2015), (photograph by author in 2016). 
271 Interview: Nilsson, 2014-10-07. 




Constant changes in wargaming are also apparent in the Senior Staff Course. Three ‘wargaming weeks’ 
exist in the curriculum of the Senior Staff Course, however, this quantity is subject to change. For 
example, in 2010, non-land officers only received one week of wargaming.273 For the Senior Staff 
Course in 2014-2016 there are two joint ‘wargaming weeks’ plus one additional in an elective module 
(HSU 8). The initial joint ‘wargaming week’ belongs to the ten-week module War Studies; Services, 
Branches and Functions (HSU 4). The focus is on ‘classroom warfighting’. This joint wargame was 
conducted in 2013, since the two-year Senior Staff Course only starts biannually, as a discussion-
wargame. Previously, in 2011 and before, it was a branch-only wargame, meaning that the land 
students had their own ‘classroom warfighting’ session in the form of a computer-assisted wargame 
similar to the ‘three-room wargame’ in the Staff Course’s ‘wargaming week’ (SU 3) in 2012. In 2015 
the wargaming form evolved again as a new instructor developed an in-house board game.274 This 
board game, with hexes, dice and unit counters, was introduced in the HSU 4 module in 2015 as a ‘one-
room’, open, double-sided and rigid wargame. Four wargames were conducted simultaneously in four 
separated classrooms with all students. The wargaming form of this initial ‘wargaming week’ has thus 
evolved constantly (2011-2013-2015) in conjunction with the changes of game directors.  
 
 
Photograph no. 9: the board game in HSU 4 as a ‘one-room wargame’ (Author, 2015). 
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Following HSU 4 and before the second ‘wargaming week’ of HSU 6 there is a specific form of 
wargaming for plan development. In the module on operational planning, Operational Art (HSU 5), a 
session of COA-wargaming is scheduled. The purpose is, however, only to teach the basics of the 
method rather than to practise the method. Actual COA-wargaming is to be conducted in succeeding 
modules by the students themselves as part of their plan development sessions with NATO (COPD) and 
Swedish planning processes.275  
The ‘wargaming week’ of the ten-week module Regular warfare (HSU 6) has seen several forms during 
the last years: in 2010 as a multi-team discussion-wargame, in 2011 as a map-based wargame in a 
classroom with a central master map, one game director and 3-5 teachers as umpires. In 2013, the 
wargame evolved into a seminar style wargame with a total of three moves. Each move began with a 
PowerPoint brief by the teachers, representing the Land Component Commander, the Maritime 
Component Commander etc., of what had happened during the previous three days. The officers then 
went into three parallel planning groups and discussed the events in the context of the operational 
plan. The day finished when one of the three teams briefed the commander (played by the head of the 
department, a colonel) on their recommendations. The commander then approved or disapproved 
and the teachers spent the next few hours until the early evening to synchronise a new and updated 
situation that was to be presented the next morning to the three blue teams in the same large 
classroom. Notably, the evolved wargaming form included a change in focus from ‘classroom 
warfighting’ to ‘classroom planning’: i.e. the teams provided staff recommendations and did not 
practise decision-making. 
The third and last ‘wargaming week’ is part of the five-week module Land Power (HSU 8), an elective 
module of the Senior Staff Course. For one week, at a conference centre away from the Defence 
University, the students (8-16) initially present various themes in military theory, conduct a two-day 
staff ride, followed by a quick planning process, before one full day (12 hours) of wargaming. The 
wargame form is computer-based and double-sided (two-room). Combat adjudication is provided by 
a COTS computer wargame, Operational Art of War III. The map view is projected on a large screen in 
each classroom.276 While the commercial wargame is thus visible, each team has one dedicated 
instructor that inputs all orders into the computer. The main purpose of the wargame in HSU 8 is 
‘classroom warfighting’ of a fictional modern scenario between a red and a blue team, each with three 
to four subordinate Brigade Commanders. For such purpose, Operational Art of War III has proved 
resilient. The conceptual idea of fog of war is augmented with an initial physical separation of 
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command levels. This means that the wargame actually begins as a four-room wargame (physical 
separation between headquarters and subordinate commanders) and then, from the second turn of 
the wargame, transforms into a two-room wargame as subordinate commanders join each 
headquarters. While there are drawbacks with a turn-based sequencing in Operational Art of War III, 
since many students find sequential turns strange compared to simultaneous movement, the turn-
based approach allows abstraction of time and a possibility to move deeper into a scenario. It also 
allows each side a 30 minutes pause for planning (and reflection) before the turn results get back and 
it thus becomes a 30 minutes phase of action. This cycle is equivalent to a learning loop. Furthermore, 
some scholars also deem alternating player turns as a more realistic simulation of war ‘as it reflects 
the episodic nature of real military operations […]’.277 The perception among instructors of effective 
learning, and realistic representation of higher-level tactical land warfare, have arguably contributed 
to the continued use of this commercial wargame.  
 
 
Screenshot no. 2: the blue team’s (divisional headquarters) view in the COTS computer 
wargame Operational Art of War III for HSU 8 (2014).278 
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National traditions and foreign influences 
Since the end of the Cold War and especially since 2000 there was a reduction in the amount of 
wargaming conducted in the Swedish Armed Forces.279 During that time frame, all joint operational 
area headquarters (Swe: MILO) and divisional level land commands (Swe: fördelning) were disbanded. 
Instead, one single and centralised headquarters became responsible for the military strategic, 
operational and higher tactical planning of war. The contemporary situation is thus fundamentally 
different compared to the early 1990s or indeed the early 2000s. Today’s (2014) Sweden has a small 
voluntary and professional army of two brigades, whereas, in 1992, a conscripted army was capable of 
mobilising 21 combat brigades. In addition, the focus shifted in the early 2000s from invasion defence 
to international missions, such as participation in the mission in Afghanistan (ISAF). Due to this major 
re-orientation, previous traditions of wargaming, especially on the operational and higher tactical 
levels, have been reduced and even diminished. One indication of this reduction is that manuals on 
how to conduct wargaming as well as staff rides etc. were discarded.280 A ‘wargaming centre’ (Swe: 
Försvarets Krigsspelscentrum, FKSC), situated at the Armed Forces Headquarters in Stockholm, existed 
until 2006 but was then relocated and combined with what is today (2014) the Command Combat 
Centre (Swe: Ledningsstridsskolan) in Enköping.  
 
 
Illustration no. 5: the Coat of Arms of the disbanded Swedish ‘Wargaming Centre’ (Eng.: 
‘War Case Centre’).281 
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The Command Combat Centre’s contemporary activities include the provision of simulator support to 
large high-level (brigade and above) staff exercises (CPX/CAX), such as the annual two-week Combined 
Joint Staff Exercise (CJSE) organised by the SEDU and attended by the Staff Course and Senior Staff 
Course. Notably, the Command Combat Centre’s role is to provide exercise facilities and simulation 
support (computers, software and networks) and not the pedagogical framework.282 Hence, there is 
no perception of any ‘wargaming’ activities at the Command Combat Centre. Instead, officers refer to 
the SEDU, rather than the Armed Forces themselves, as a place where wargaming traditions are kept. 
One reason is that ‘the right people’, individuals who can stand up against perceptions of a ‘negative 
culture of wargaming’, are present at the SEDU.283 Lieutenant Colonel Eriksson, at the Land Warfare 
Centre, recollects from his studies at the SEDU the instructor Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Baudin and his 
operational level map-wargame (1:250 000) with metal markers and states that the continuous use of 
wargaming by the SEDU has had effects on how wargaming is perceived in the Armed Forces. Thanks 
to a handful of such individuals, this ‘negative culture’ has to some extent been reversed.284 Such 
individuals also seem to promote certain forms of wargaming. Baudin himself claims that traditional 
Swedish wargaming is similar to German inter-war wargaming, in particular the integration of map-
wargames together with staff rides and field exercises in one planning cycle. This is complemented by 
a Swedish tradition from the early 19th century of ‘preparatory exercises’ – to ‘think before action’. 
However, Baudin adds that wargaming, while perceived as useful, is ‘not always used because it takes 
time’. The consequence of the reduction of wargaming in the Armed Forces since 2000 is that officers 
are no longer used to running wargames.285  
The traditional Swedish wargaming as presented by Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Baudin has seemingly 
been superseded by an international form of wargaming. This concerns COA-wargaming as stipulated 
by the NATO Comprehensive Planning Directive (COPD). This form of wargaming occurs in, for example, 
the module Operational Art (HSU 5) for plan development. The head teacher in Operational Art at the 
SEDU, Lieutenant Colonel Nilsson, has attended NATO courses on wargaming, and refers to the ‘NATO 
handbook on wargaming’, a published document from the German Führungsakademie in Hamburg, on 
how to conduct COA-wargaming.286 There is also a Swedish version of the COPD, in use since 2014, 
which is applied in the following module (HSU 6). However, there is no difference in regard to how 
COA-wargaming is supposed to be conducted: both versions are in accordance with the ‘NATO 
handbook on wargaming’.287 COA-wargaming in accordance to NATO doctrine on the operational level 
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seems to have superseded Swedish traditional wargaming regarding ‘classroom planning’. However, 
there are no particular indications of foreign influences regarding ‘classroom warfighting’. Moreover, 
the influence of individuals to implement wargaming (or not) is apparent in all the investigated courses.  
 
Availability of commercial of-the-shelf games (COTS) 
The use of a COTS wargame, Operational Art of War III, could only be found in one module, the Land 
Power (HSU 8) in the Senior Staff Course. This particular computer wargame has been continually 
updated and used for at least ten years at the SEDU. This staying power may have come about since 
the course module itself has remained in basically the same form over the years. The instructors 
assigned to this module have also remained more or less the same individuals. In comparison to other 
modules the number of students is far lower: around eight in comparison to a total amount of about 
40-60 students at the Senior Staff Course. This means that only one wargame will run rather than 
several in parallel, or in sequence, which is the case at the previous ‘wargaming weeks’.  Consequently, 
there will be more instructors available to run the wargame. This also means that the students 
themselves do not have to run the wargame. The students just communicate with their appointed 
instructor what they wish to do and the instructor then implements this in the game system as an 
‘inputter’. Notably, the game directors of this particular module are only a few recurring individuals 
over a period of ten to fifteen years. No major changes have been made regarding the form of 
wargaming in these years. Only minor revisions have been implemented regarding the order of battle 
and the map, which is a graphic representation (and not a real map) that covers the actual terrain 
which is visited during the preceding staff ride.  
While there are no other COTS currently in use with the other ‘wargaming weeks’ other COTS have 
nevertheless been previously used in two modules: the SU 3 at the Staff Course and the HSU 4 at the 
Senior Staff Course. The wargame in the SU 3 module was until 2012 the COTS wargame Decisive 
Action. This is the commercial version (2.7) of a wargame originally developed for the US Army 
Command and General Staff College by Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Lunsford. Only one person – the 
author –, who as game director inputted orders from both the red and the blue teams into the 
computer system by shuttling back and forth between the teams’ rooms, ran Decisive Action in 2012. 
Regarding the HSU 4, in 2007 a computer game procured by the SEDU, King’s game, was used. 
However, technical difficulties due to lack of support and updates meant that its use was discontinued. 
The author witnessed this debacle, which led to the improvised use of a simple map-based wargame 
as an instant replacement since the computer wargame did not work. Subsequently, a COTS wargame, 




in 2010-11, as the latter was considered more suitable for brigade level combat. The use of COTS 
wargames enabled a continuation of computer-based wargaming, which the author, at that time, was 
told was the desired form of wargaming. However, at the next occasion in 2013, the HSU 4 module 
again evolved: a new game director changed the wargaming form into a discussion wargame.  
What might have contributed to the demise of COTS in SU 3 and HSU 4 was that they were put directly 
in front of the training audience and were as a result vulnerable to criticism regarding the realism in 
the modelling of units, combat results and the concept of time and space. A comparison can be made 
with the Land Warfare Centre where the use of various wargaming forms, such as by computer and/or 
manually, are actually kept away from the training audience in separate rooms. With this in mind, the 
reduction of COTS at the SEDU has seen other forms of wargaming with less emphasis on duality 
despite the continued focus on ‘classroom warfighting’. The one major exception is the longevity of 
the HSU 8 module. In addition, recent developments (2016) in SU 3 have focused on double-sided 
wargaming. In SU 3, however, the in-house developed wargames (SSM-Land and BMBrig) are physically 
separately from the students regarding combat adjudication. This is different from HSU 8, where the 
COTS wargame is intentionally put directly in front of the training audience in order to contribute to a 
more stressful environment with the watching of a graphical overview of the opponent’s 
actions/reactions. Still, if the main concern would be to hide the wargame from the training audience 
one may argue that you would not need a computer game at all – a manual wargame or even one 
umpire with a map would do just as well. This potential development did happen at the SEDU: during 
a staff exercise the game director decided to halt the computer-assisted system and revert to an open 
map-wargame where adjudication was discussed and decided.288 This indicates the influence of 
individuals and their preferences for certain wargaming forms. Furthermore, it also exemplifies the 
importance of control, and, how individuals may establish control with a wargame.  
Perhaps the best explanation why the only COTS wargame currently (2013-16) in use, Operational Art 
of War III, has endured is because it offers some credibility. For example, the editing function allows 
Swedish units, with accurate equipment, to be represented in the correct map area. However, the 
game itself does not allow control during a wargame – there is no ‘master map’. This lack of control, 
experienced by the author, has led to frustration among both instructors and students and sometimes 
caused the rigid adjudication to be complemented by manual adjudication, implemented through 
improvisation by instructors during the wargame. Such improvisation, however, arguably makes the 
wargame more vulnerable to criticism from participants – the importance of the instructor explaining 
what is happening (and why) is thus simply essential for the utilisation of a COTS wargame.  
                                                          




Processes: planning and decision-making  
At the SEDU there exist both ‘classroom warfighting’ as in the ‘wargaming weeks’ as well as ‘classroom 
planning’ as seen in the recurrent COA-wargaming sessions. The students themselves often conduct 
the latter, whereas ‘wargaming weeks’ are conducted by teachers with students as the training 
audience. A teacher has arguably more leeway to change or modify the wargaming form for ‘classroom 
warfighting’ since that form does not seem to be regulated in doctrine. One non-published SEDU 
manual, however, exists. This in-house manual supports alterations since it discusses optional 
wargaming forms based on the configuration of the training audience (one-sided, double-sided and 
subordinate leaders etc.).289 Conversely, the wargaming forms used in ‘classroom planning’ are 
regulated in external manuals and instructions, as, for example, COA-wargaming (NATO COPD). 
One issue of ‘classroom warfighting’ in particular is that some forms of wargaming are seemingly more 
demanding than other forms for teachers. Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Arne Baudin claims that the risk of 
using computers is that ‘the teachers hide and let the computers run everything’. In his view, it is much 
more demanding for a teacher to do manual wargaming, where the teachers also have to perform and 
have to be able to answer military questions such as ‘what can be done?’ and ‘what cannot be done?’. 
This requires a high level of self-confidence as the teacher needs to be able to respond to: ‘what would 
you have done as commander?’. Baudin’s conclusion is that there is a need for a course module in how 
to organise wargaming. What is essential is that such instruction on how to conduct wargaming must 
take place early on in an officer’s military career.290 This vision to use wargaming progressively in 
military education, for both teachers and students, is also advocated by Lieutenant Colonel Jan 
Nilsson.291  
The constantly changing and evolving wargaming forms seem to indicate indecisiveness, or worse, a 
lack of knowledge, amongst instructors about how to conduct ‘classroom warfighting’. Furthermore, 
there is evidently a lack of in-house modules in how to run wargames in the context of military 
educational progression. This general lack of education, coupled with a lack of manuals, may lead to 
either strict implementation of wargaming according to the few existing manuals (COA-wargaming) or 
the individual teacher’s preference for a certain wargaming form. However, a possible distinctive drift 
towards wargaming forms used in ‘classroom planning’, i.e. seminar and map wargames, cannot be 
fully ascertained. Nor does it seem that the temptation to let the computer handle it all has occurred. 
Instead, the influence of individual instructors seems to prevail. 
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The individual instructor 
The wargaming forms at the SEDU are constantly evolving. One example is the HSU 4 ‘wargaming week’ 
where in 2015 a new in-house developed board game was introduced by a new teacher with a 
background in hobby-wargaming. It is not uncommon to find strong opinions among game directors 
on how to conduct wargaming. Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Baudin emphasises and describes wargaming 
as a ‘ladder in educational progression’. Near the end of this ‘ladder’ a wargame is conducted with a 
‘duel’ followed by an examination in tactics.292 This emphasis on ‘experience-based learning’ can also 
be found in publications at the SEDU.293 However, there is a distinct lack of any referral to external 
academic literature on the use of educational games.294 Instead, while wargaming is accepted as a 
military educational method, it seems that it is the individual instructor that determines the actual 
form. On the other hand, as wargaming is a recurrent activity in courses and modules, wargaming 
forms are carried on from teacher to teacher.295 This knowledge does not seem to be in documented 
form until very recently, with the exception of a ‘wargaming memo’ in existence since 2003.296 A recent 
addition is a handbook from 2012, which specifically outlines the wargaming experience and 
recommendations of Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Baudin.297 
While there are strong individual opinions about how to conduct wargaming, there are conceivably 
different motivations behind these opinions. Hypothetically, the wargaming form is dependent on the 
opinion of the individual game director, which in turn is influenced by how participants and others 
evaluate his/her credibility in wargaming. Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Baudin used a personal anecdote 
to describe this premise as he recollected when he was, for the first time, in charge of running a staff 
ride – in his perspective an ‘outdoor wargaming session’. A colonel, responsible for the exercise, said 
during the final brief that it was a well-conducted exercise despite the ‘very inexperienced’ leader. 
Baudin was at that time a 38 years old major.298 This indicates that wargaming is a practice developed 
within the military organisation. In detail, older, more experienced teachers nurture their less 
experienced younger colleagues. This kind of knowledge transfer, connected to experience and age, 
and the absence of any formal modules/courses in wargaming in military education, may be 
characterised as an intra-professional mentor system where an experienced person – in wargaming 
methods – transfers his/her skills to a person with less experience.  
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One example of a mentor is Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Baudin, who was employed by the SEDU as a 
consultant in wargaming after his retirement. In 2013-2014 he organised the ‘wargaming week’ in the 
SU 3 module. He also participated as a teacher in the HSU 8 module – his longevity as an instructor in 
the HSU 8 module has arguably contributed to the module’s unique and enduring form of wargaming. 
Consequently, Baudin can be considered a mentor in wargaming at the SEDU. However, the constant 
evolving forms of wargaming at the SEDU do not provide support of only one particular standard. 
Instead, each game director has arguably his/her own, and different, individual preferences. In other 
words, no single individual at the SEDU decides the form of wargaming in every module. Instead, each 
individual game director seems to influence the eventual form. Some instructors, however, arguably 






Conclusion: military educational wargaming in Sweden  
The various wargaming occasions are fairly equally distributed over time: i.e. no obvious imbalances 
seem to be in existence such as a total absence of wargaming at a certain level. The various forms of 
wargaming can be sorted in accordance to the four variables of wargaming forms. Elaborate forms of 
wargaming exist in all three embedded units of analysis: the Officer Programme (I), the Land Warfare 
Centre (II), and the SEDU’s staff courses (III). Such wargaming occasions typically consist of week-long 
‘classroom warfighting’ and are often referred to as the module´s ‘wargaming week’. The other 
activity, ‘classroom planning’, is commonly referred to as ‘game the plan’ events. Most wargames are 
manual and have military students playing only one side (blue). In comparison, diversity exists 
regarding information and combat adjudication.    
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Wargaming forms are connected to a specific process: i.e. either decision-making or planning. The 
latter is generally inferred from official handbooks and manuals, which promote open discussion- and 
map-based wargames with no rigid rules.299 The former does not have the same support in manuals 
and hence comprises more diverse forms, albeit likely with double-sidedness as an included variable. 
While wargaming centred on planning is explicitly mentioned in manuals and handbooks, individuals 
provide improvements and further developments: the ‘reasoning wargame’ at the Land Warfare 
Centre is one example of this. This influence by individuals is especially accented regarding wargaming 
centred on decision-making. Such individuals are likely to have been engaged in hobby wargaming. 
However, this connection has not led to a widespread use of COTS wargames. Instead, hybrid and 
unique forms have appeared, such as in-house developed board- and map-wargames. Moreover, 
wargames for decision-making are either directly visible or shielded off from the players.  
International influence is rather evident regarding computer wargames and COA-wargaming. The 
computer wargame Virtual Battlespace (VBS) is used in other countries (the USA and the UK). In 
Sweden, this usage is represented by the ongoing (2014) implementation of the StriSim-PC in the 
Swedish army with a focus on the lower tactical level (section, platoon and company).300 The 
‘command training exercises’ at the LTA are also to some extent influenced by foreign input, since the 
software (CATS) is originally of British origin. Germany also uses a similar form of simulation as noted 
by visiting Swedish instructors. However, international influence arguably affects only a minority of the 
total educational wargaming activities in Sweden. This is because ‘game the plan’ in PUT is a Swedish 
wargaming method for planning at the tactical level. Furthermore, most ‘wargaming weeks’ seem 
connected to the preferences of individual instructors.  
What can be inferred from the three embedded units of analysis is the central role of the individual 
game director. This is supported by data from interviews that indicate categories of concerns by 
wargaming instructors that influence the wargaming form. One aspect that was discovered during the 
data collection was that in all three embedded units of analysis wargaming forms are evolving. This 
development seems primarily related to instructors: when a new game director is assigned to a course 
module the wargaming form tends to change as well. The constant evolution of wargaming forms 
cannot be explained by national traditions or foreign influences, availability of COTS wargames or a 
connection to a specific process (‘classroom warfighting’ and ‘classroom planning’).  
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4. Concerns and strategies: an analytical model grounded in data 
 
Introduction 
The preceding chapter on the case of Sweden indicated that the forms of wargaming continually evolve 
and that these changes are primarily connected to individuals, i.e. the game directors. When a new 
game director appears, the wargaming form is also likely to change. Based on this find, an analytical 
model grounded in data was developed for the remaining four country cases. This analytical model is 
robust since it is grounded in data rather than based on the author’s preconceived explanatory 
variables, i.e. the four initially presented conjectures. Consequently, the model presented in this 
chapter is centred on the concerns of the game directors and instructors.  
A key feature in the methodology of grounded theory is to look into the concerns of respondents 
(interviewees) and specifically what they do to alleviate those concerns.301 This chapter presents those 
concerns in a conceptualised manner based on explanatory substantive theory with developed codes 
at the following three levels: categories, properties and indicators of incidents. Each category has at 
least one property, and each property is indicated by one or several incidents. The codes were created 
and refined during the constant comparison of data from the Swedish case.  
The first part of this chapter covers the individual’s main concern, the discovered core category. The 
chapter’s second part presents three conceptualised categories based on developed codes (categories) 
from the collected data on how the main concern is alleviated. The conceptualised categories are used 
in the chapter’s third part as theoretical concepts in order to formulate an analytical model as to why 
wargaming takes the form it does within the substantive field of army educational wargaming. The 
theoretical concepts’ properties and indicators are subsequently further explored in the four country 
cases regarding Germany, the United Kingdom, the USA and Japan. 
 
  
                                                          




4.1 The core category and its supporting core categories 
The finding of a key explanatory variable, known as the core category, is the result of the application 
of grounded theory methodology. In other words, the discovery of the main concern, i.e. to answer 
‘what is really going on?’, was developed from the collected data by a process of coding and constant 
comparison. The core category, which was discovered to be instructor buy-in, was developed based 
on three initial aspects recognised from the comparison of notes from interviews and observations 
regarding the case of Sweden. Those three aspects are so-called supporting categories to the core 
category. They were found to be credibility, comfort and control. These three categories constitute 
the essence of instructor buy-in. Before presenting a more detailed overview of each supporting core 
category, it should be made clear that these three categories were not the only codes at the categorical 
level discovered during the constant comparison process. For example, one code that surfaced early 
on and then appeared repeatedly was the issue of simplicity. However, simplicity was found to be a 
method for achieving instructor buy-in rather than a property or supporting category of the core 
category. To put this in clear terms: a simplified wargaming form is one way for the game director to 
accept and support the wargaming form.  
Acceptance is what instructor buy-in is about. What is at stake is the credibility of the individual game 
director. As one respondent put it: ‘to be responsible for one group requires knowledge – what can be 
done and what cannot be done – accordingly a high level of self-confidence is needed; you need to be 
able to answer the question: what would you have done as commander?’.302 It is, however, not enough 
to have sufficient proficiency in military matters in order to run a wargame. Indeed, as another 
respondent with solid experience in military educational wargaming put it: ‘if one does not know how 
to do [wargaming] people will instead make a speech for two minutes.’303 In order to protect one’s 
credibility, the wargaming form may thus regress into a non-wargaming activity. While the category 
credibility to a certain extent describes instructor buy-in it has limited explanatory power in itself 
regarding how to actually run a wargame. Data indicated two further categories that support the core 
category and are more explicit about the actually running of a wargame. While credibility is a key 
feature of instructor buy-in it is also akin to a personal mind-set that a game director must deal with 
before, during and after a wargaming session. Such a mind-set is integral to the additional two 
supporting categories. 
To run a wargame the game director must have a sufficient level of comfort. For example, one issue 
discovered during the data collection was that an instructor, with the role of game director, has to 
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handle – in front of the training audience – problematic issues such as a perceived lack of realism in 
the wargame. Such concerns over unrealism are also noted in a recent doctoral thesis on Swedish 
military educational wargaming by Anders Frank.304 To handle this aspect in wargaming, the game 
director needs to continuously comprehend the output of the wargame.305 Consequently, the category 
of comfort is about the game director’s own comfort in directing a wargame. One property of comfort 
manifested itself at an early stage, namely whether the instructor had been introduced to wargaming 
at a young age. This can take the form of hobby wargaming, such as board games, before the individual 
began his military career. This kind of introduction, or the case of a potential mentorship between 
officers, actually seems a common way of transmitting wargaming forms between officers in lieu of 
written documentation and manuals.306 Accordingly, comfort is integral to the individual’s preferences 
regarding what form of wargaming to use in military education.  
The third supporting category is control. This forms an important part of instructor buy-in since it 
allows the game director direct authority over the wargame. This specifically applies to ‘accelerating 
or braking’ the wargaming process. For a game director to do this, he or she must be fully in control. 
The category of control also is about the level of complexity and internal support within the control 
organisation of a wargame. If the control team is large, i.e. with several assisting game directors 
assigned for specific wargaming functions, then the level of complexity in that function is determined 
by that particular assisting game director’s level of competence.307 Consequently, the game director’s 
individual competence is affiliated with the ability to control a wargame.  
The issue of individual competence can be traced to the actual purpose of the wargame, in essence 
the specific educational objectives. The competence of the individual game director is connected to 
the person’s professional knowledge and experience in military affairs and how that knowledge can be 
used in a wargaming context. When key personnel teach in the same educational establishment for 
long periods of time they become experienced in the use of wargaming. Wargame directing is an 
individual ‘perishable skill’ – one has to continually practise it to manage it.308 Several of the game 
directors interviewed have remained in positions where they, over time, have developed their own 
preferred wargaming forms. Such experience connects to the individual’s need of comfort. However, 
comfort also refers to the ability of being in control. Different forms of wargaming offer different 
possibilities for this. For example, it seems that the possibility to hide the wargame from the training 
audience is a successful way of achieving comfort for the game director in the running of the wargame. 
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This particular feature of removing a wargame from the views of the participants also means that the 
credibility of the game director can be protected since unrealistic features can be hidden from the 
training audience. In addition, control can more easily be achieved when in a position of overseeing 
(in an adjacent control room) rather than would be the case during direct involvement as in, for 
example, a map wargame within the same room. 
Interviews indicated that instructor buy-in constitutes the core category because of the three 
supporting core categories. Significantly, indications of instructor buy-in emerged early in the data 
collection and comparison process as respondents voiced opinions and concerns related to, for 
example, ‘perception’, ‘understanding’ and ‘epiphany’. These properties matured during the constant 
comparison to become the supporting categories of credibility and comfort. In comparison, credibility 
was initially deemed a potential core category but was later found to be a supporting category together 
with comfort and control. One reason that credibility was initially deemed to be the core category was 
general concerns in the wider wargaming community regarding the possibility of ‘stigma’ and 
‘legitimacy’.309 Such concerns are valid, and arguably connect to various philosophical constructs such 
as tradition and rationality. However, the focus on respondents’ concerns made it clear that credibility 
and comfort were more tangible, and hence more relevant, than for example ‘stigma’. As a case in 
point, it is a challenge for the individual to be comfortable and secure in the role of game director.310 
A key issue, according to several respondents, is thus the ability of the individual to exercise control of 
a wargame.311 The last supporting category to mature was control, which was likewise to credibility 
initially considered a potential core category. However, control was not deemed sufficient in itself to 
explain the main concern – the core category – of game directors.   
The discovered core category of instructor buy-in is strengthened in the light of other potential aspects 
of buy-in besides instructor buy-in. Two plausible examples are hierarchy buy-in and participants’ buy-
in. These were found to be integrated parts in how instructor buy-in is achieved. For example, 
hierarchy buy-in is connected to the property of doctrinal adherence. This relates to (the few) manuals 
and official planning guides that promote certain forms of wargaming that are both ‘allowed’ and 
‘necessary’. Hence, doctrinal adherence provides some credibility for the instructor to apply a certain 
wargaming form. On the other hand, it was found that there is a reluctance from the hierarchy to 
interfere in exact educational details. In other words, the exact form of wargaming is up to the 
instructor and/or course director to decide.312  
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Participants’ buy-in, on the other hand, is part of the property of promotion of gamification and 
consequently also to the property of suppression of gamification. Both properties relate to the 
exposure of the training audience to the wargame and their potential questions about unrealistic 
aspects, which undercut game director credibility and therefore affect the core category of instructor 
buy-in. In Sweden, formal evaluations of course modules can arguably measure the amount of 
participants’ buy-in of a certain wargaming form. However, while such feedback is essential, the 
experience of the author is that, in the advent of negative feedback, this causes the instructor to 
reassess his/her instructor buy-in. For example, the HSU 4 module in the Senior Staff Course (III) 
introduced a board game for its wargaming week in 2015 because of a new instructor. As shown in the 
left side graph in the illustration below, many participants were either very negative (1-2) or very 
positive (4-5) about the wargame being appropriate for the learning objectives. The relatively high 
proportion of negativity – in general few participants have a neutral stance on wargaming – did cause 
a reassess. Subsequently, during the next course in 2016, the feedback was much better (right side 
graph). However, the wargaming form did not change. What did change was that the game directors 
in 2016 were willing teachers whereas students were assigned as directors during the initial run in 
2015.313 Based on the author’s observation in the classrooms in 2015, several of these students 
(Directors) did not achieve instructor buy-in, which in turn affected the participants’ buy-in. 
Accordingly, the evolving forms of wargaming in the Swedish case do not occur primarily because of a 
lack of participants’ buy-in. Instead, constant changes occur because instructor buy-in is not achieved. 
 
 
Illustration no. 6: student feedback of the board game in HSU 4 (2015 and 2016).314 
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That the core category was found to be instructor buy-in is perhaps not unexpected in hindsight. This 
finding reconnects to a historical concern about officers becoming unable to administer a wargame 
even though the wargame is supposed to cover core issues in the officer profession.315 Accordingly, 
the issue of instructor buy-in seems to have existed over time. This presence is further strengthened 
by the general discussion about the risk of individual stigma and striving for legitimacy in wargaming.316 
However, what is noteworthy and of significant explanatory value for this thesis is not the core 
category in itself but how the individual game director strives to achieve it. This reconnects to the 
proposition that the core category socially organises the behaviour in a substantive field, which in this 
thesis is the field of army educational wargaming.317 
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4.2 Three theoretical concepts (conceptual categories) 
The initial case study of Sweden established that the main concern of the interviewees was found to 
be on how to avoid loss of credibility, comfort and control when functioning as a wargame director. 
To solve this – to achieve instructor buy-in of the specific wargaming form – one of three conceptual 
categories arguably has to be actively preferred by the game director. The problem of achieving 
instructor buy-in is therefore solved by individual adherence to one of these three discovered 
conceptual categories, developed during an analytical process into three theoretical concepts with 
properties and indicators. These three concepts are: simple standardising, control & veiling and 
innovative active learning. The names are conceptual since these categories directly connect to the 
core category of instructor buy-in. 
The initially developed concept was simple standardising. The code simplicity was discovered early in 
the data collection and analysis as an issue that was often raised by interviewees. Notably, simplicity 
was initially thought to be a possible core category as it kept appearing in the data. However, this code 
was found to differ from the supporting core categories of credibility, comfort and control as simplicity 
concerns a solution for achieving the core category of instructor buy-in.  Simplicity requires that a 
wargame takes the form of a standard that ‘every officer’ can understand and use. On closer 
examination, simplicity was found to be just as important as another code, doctrinal adherence. Both 
of these codes were subsequently determined as properties of a specific category, i.e. a concept that 
generally covered the viewpoint that ‘every officer should be able to do wargaming’. Hence, this 
concept concerns a rudimentary and straightforward wargaming form with doctrinal support. This 
concept was initially and tentatively termed as regimenting and was as such the initially discovered 
solution to the concerns of particularly credibility and comfort, which were determined to be 
properties (and eventual core supporting categories) of the main concern instructor buy-in. With the 
refinements of the properties simplicity and doctrinal adherence, the concept of simple standardising 
was found to be a fitting name to describe this particular endeavour into certain simple and 
straightforward wargaming forms, such as rudimentary map-wargames with ordinary military maps 
and free combat adjudication, in conjunction with organisational and hierarchical support because of 
doctrinal prescriptions of wargaming.  
An endeavour for simplicity in organising and running a wargame is evident since some game directors 
promote it. The first of two explicit arguments is that wargaming should be easy to use ‘in the field’, 
hence outdoor with no need for extra equipment such as computers or elaborate unit markers. The 
second argument is that wargaming should be easy to organise and conduct. Both arguments thus 
favour simple forms of wargaming, meaning neither computer-based nor advanced board games. 




models. The second argument favours very few ‘rules’, i.e. none at all. In other words: the fewer the 
rules, the better the game. Thus, the concept of simple standardising endorses wargaming forms that 
are rudimentary, uncomplicated and straightforward. Specifically, this concept favours wargaming 
forms such as map or terrain model-based wargames as well as discussion-based wargames. Notably, 
the Swedish army’s manuals and regulations for the planning and decision-making process explicitly 
support such simple wargaming forms.318 It may also be argued that the international (NATO) form of 
COA-wargaming is part of this concept since this wargaming form for planning is rather simple and 
straightforward, i.e. there are few rules besides the action/reaction/counter-action sequence of turn 
order. 
One issue that was exposed during the constant comparison was the difficulty for an instructor in the 
role of game director to – in front of the training audience – handle problematic issues such as a 
perceived lack of realism in the wargame. This was especially a factor in wargames with a focus on 
decision-making (‘classroom warfighting’). To hide the wargame, or certain aspects of a wargame, from 
the training audience arguably removes or reduces this issue. In addition, this separation protects the 
instructor’s credibility and increases his/her control and comfort. Consequently, this concept requires 
actual wargame procedures, especially the combat adjudication, to be put behind a physical barrier. 
The wargame would thus be veiled off so that the training audience would neither observe the 
adjudication nor be able to directly complain or stage opposition to issues regarding a lack of realism. 
This issue of unrealism is grounded in perceptions by individuals but also includes valid concerns of 
‘modern fiction’, i.e. when certain weapon systems are promoted beyond their actual values and 
capabilities.319 Another aspect of unrealism are game design artefacts such as, for example, when it 
does not matter what direction to shoot a tank since it is (incorrectly) modelled as having an equal 
level of amour protection on all sides (rather than on the front).  
The second developed concept was termed control & veiling. This is when the training audience is 
separated away from the wargame, including adjudication, input and/or visualisation. This was found 
to be applicable to both manual and computer-based wargames. In the case of a manual and rigid 
adjudicated board game, one common method is to situate the master map in a separate room, 
entirely away from the training audience. Only the umpires and the control team, who may also play 
subordinate commanders (LOCON), are aware of the actual game rules and the ongoing adjudication. 
The training audience is thus steered away from ‘game tactics’, ‘hexagon tactics’ and ‘optimisation’, 
which is the drawback of rigid game rules. This particular risk has been categorised as ‘gamer mode’ 
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by a recent (2014) PhD dissertation on military wargaming by Anders Frank from the Swedish Defence 
University.320 Another issue is that technical malfunctions can be handled separately from the training 
audience, i.e., they will not be aware of the fact that the game director is actually revising and/or 
redoing results in the wargame. Such modifications may also happen either because the game director 
believes that the specific computer-based adjudication was completely wrong, or that the 
learning/training objectives would benefit from a different result. Overall, this concept is about the 
game director ability to take control of the wargame. The author witnessed one particular incident of 
this at the Swedish Defence University as part of the evolution of the wargaming form (from manual 
to computer) in the Staff Course: Basic Module Higher Formation Land Operations (SU 3). Shortly after 
the wargame, during the interview with the instructor, he motivated his action as follows:  
I considered the shutting down of the monitor showing the computer-based simulation 
a criterion of success for having tactical discussions rather than focusing on game 
tactics.321 
The level of control by the game director is augmented by veiling the wargame from the training 
audience, which thus mitigates the risk that the training audience complains about unrealistic and/or 
complicated rules and perceived unrealism in the adjudicated results. In comparison, a direct exposure 
would force the students to translate their tactical ideas to the rigid ruleset of the computer-based 
wargame, which favours ‘game tactics’ and steers away from reality.322 By separating the wargame 
from the training audience, the military students can focus on the actual learning purpose of the 
wargame by acting to accomplish their assigned task without realising that they are playing a wargame. 
Consequently, while wargaming is necessary for the educational objectives in control & veiling, the 
overall activity is seldom termed ‘a wargame’. Instead, it is named something else, such as, for 
example, a ‘command training exercise’.323  
The third concept proposes that the instructor should not strive to hide the wargame. Instead, the 
opposite is proposed as the wargame, and specifically the use of gamification, is promoted as an 
important part of the education. Hence, the training audience is supposed to experience their 
interaction directly with the wargame, i.e. ‘hands on’. This approach is focused on learning by allowing 
the training audience to experiment. This requires the wargame to be accessible so that the 
possibilities, and risks, or different outcomes become tangible. This third solution was named 
innovative active learning, which refers to two things: 1) the game director puts the wargame out in 
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the open in order for it to become transparent for the training audience as akin to an experiment, and 
2) the training audience learns by actively experimenting with the wargame. This latter aspect is 
explicitly connected to learning theories, such as game-based learning. This include gamification 
regarding specific game design choices, such as an emphasis on the competitive aspect between teams 
and/or individuals. In other words, innovative active learning typically promotes the issue of winning 
or losing as a significant feature. This emphasis on explicit use of gamification, which also includes the 
aspect of fun, differs from the other two concepts.  
It is noteworthy to reflect upon the fact that the three concepts, and in particular the concept of 
control & veiling, were discovered due to the methodological influence from grounded theory which 
avoids an initial delimitation of data collection. However, the uniqueness of military education means 
that there is an inherent physical limitation of the substantive field of army educational wargaming 
since it is concentrated to just a few individuals and locations. Repeatedly, each interviewee was often 
able to suggest one or a few other persons to speak to regarding wargaming: in many cases the name 
of the same individual was repeatedly mentioned. For example, this chain of discovery led the author 
to the Swedish Land Warfare Centre, where a certain type of developed wargaming exists based on 
comprehensive simulation systems at the command training facility (LTA). Their use of simulation 
systems is seldom referred to as ‘wargaming’. Instead, the simulation system is masked from the main 
training audience when the wargame is running. The wargame application, in this case the computer-
based simulation system CATS, can thus be considered veiled. The activity still functions as a wargame 
since the training audience’s constructed military actions typically generate non-scripted 
counteractions.324 If this premise were not applicable, the activity would not be considered a wargame 
but a form of scripted exercise. Notably, a core function of control & veiling is that the training 
audience assumes that their actions generate non-scripted counteractions. Nonetheless, this concept 
entails that a wargame may possibly, and easily, change into a scripted exercise. 
It can be discussed if control & veiling is a one-off phenomenon in comparison to the other two 
concepts. It was, however, found present in two different wargaming activities at the Land Warfare 
Centre: the command training facility’s (LTA) CATS simulation exercises and the ‘wargaming week’ 
during the OF2 Course. Significantly, the former is computer-based while the latter is a manual hybrid 
map/board game. In both cases the game map is hidden from the main training audience, which works 
in the organisational guise of command posts. Control & veiling thus seems applicable when the 
wargaming form is generally similar to a Command Post Exercise (CPX) regarding manned roles and 
the simulated environment. In some cases, such as at the Land Warfare Centre, the classroom is 
                                                          




configured as a command post with comparable physical limitations, while in other cases the command 
post is represented by an ordinary classroom. There are additional examples that require less 
organisational support structures: at the Defence University’s HSU 6 course, for the Senior Staff Course 
in 2013, the wargaming form used was arguably influenced by control & veiling since adjudication was 
done by instructors separated from the participants. In this specific example, the participants were 
divided into three operational planning groups that were briefed (by instructors) on the situation in 
the morning and then produced a recommendation in the late afternoon. After each group had 
presented their recommendations in the classroom, the students went home and the instructors alone 
did the adjudication for the next morning update. 
The concept of innovative active learning can be seen as the direct opposite of the concept of control 
& veiling. In the former, the wargaming system is directly put before all the participants. This mode of 
operation accentuates the issue of the game director’s own comfort in running a wargame. This 
concerns an individual’s ability to conduct firm direction, such as to determine when to ‘accelerate or 
brake’ the gaming process. For the game director to do this, he or she must be in control and envision 
how an outcome connects to learning. Control is also associated with the ability to understand – and 
to use – underlying design variables of a wargame. For this reason, individual levels of competence 
regarding game direction are a critical factor in determining what form of wargaming is suitable. The 
competence of the individual game director seems connected to that individual’s professional 
knowledge, including experience of military affairs, and how that knowledge can be used in a 
wargaming context. This knowledge must, however, also include the individual’s ability to manage a 
wargame – an artful and practical skill that arguably only can be achieved, and sustained, by actually 
conducting a wargame.325  
The presence of an assertive individual game designer is a clear indicator of the property individual 
innovativeness of innovative active learning. Certain individuals are affiliated with, and often 
identified with, certain wargaming forms. This explains why wargaming forms often change as 
individuals transfer or retire. Furthermore, such wargaming forms tend to be unique since such 
wargames generally are developed in-house and by single individuals. Examples are the creative use 
of certain COTS wargames, as well as uniquely developed wargames for specific course modules 
(‘wargaming weeks’). This concerns the BMBat hybrid map/board game at the Officer Programme 
(SEDU), the ‘reasoning-wargame’ at the Officer Programme (Kvarn, Land Warfare Centre), the hybrid 
map/board game at OF 2 Course (Skövde, Land Warfare Centre) and the COTS wargame Operational 
Art of War III for the HSU 8 at the Senior Staff Course (SEDU).  
                                                          




4.3 An analytical model: properties and indicators 
The three developed theoretical concepts are defined by their properties. Each property has one or 
several indicators. This offers the possibility for comparisons between indicators and properties as well 
as the three concepts. This comparison, and the continuous process of exploration which began during 
the data collection in Sweden, led to the development of the three theoretical concepts. The additional 
four country case studies offer further exploration of these concepts. The expression explore is 
significant, since this is in line with grounded theory methodology. In comparison, a conventional 
deductive comparative method would rather include the terms verify or falsify regarding how to use 
the developed theory for the successive four cases.326 The three theoretical concepts, and their 
properties within the substantive field of military educational wargaming, are presented below. 
Simple standardising has two properties: adherence to doctrine and simplicity. One evident example 
of this concept is course of action (COA) wargaming at the SEDU. There are also several examples in 
Sweden of map-based wargames, which are rudimentary but supported by doctrine as something that 
‘has to be done’ in the military planning process (PUT). Such manual wargames occur in all three 
embedded units of analysis in Sweden.  
Innovative active learning has two properties: promotion of gamification and individual 
innovativeness. The innovativeness concerns an explicit game design approach that takes advantage 
of gamification to promote learning. This is applied in modifications of commercial wargames or in in-
house game designs such as hybrid wargaming forms (map/board games). One example is the 
extended use of Operational Art of War III, a COTS computer wargame for PBEM but configured as a 
two-room wargame, at the SEDU in the module HSU 8. Other examples are: the BMBat for officer 
cadets at the SEDU, the hybrid map/board game at the Land Warfare Centre, and the board game at 
the SEDU during HSU 4 in 2015 and 2016. 
Control & Veiling was found to have one property: suppression of gamification. This concept is utilised 
at the command training facility (LTA) at the Swedish Land Warfare Centre, concerning map-based, 
board games as well as large computerised wargame exercises (LTÖ). The concept is also indicated in 
some examples at the SEDU, such as in the module HSU 6. This concept covers a grey zone that 
stretches into Command Post Exercises (CPX) and thus beyond what many would include as 
‘wargaming’.  
  
                                                          









Explicit support for specific wargaming form exists in the formal 
military decision-making process or military planning process.  
An attitude exists that ‘we have to do wargaming’ since it is 
doctrinally expected to do so. 
The product is more important than the wargame process. 
Simplicity Every individual officer has to manage the wargaming form: as 
every officer has to have wargaming ability. 
Intra-professional learning is how methods to manage a wargame 
are learned, rather than formal written instruction/courses. 
An attitude exists that ‘it must work in the field’ and therefore 





Support by reference to game-based learning theory: learning is 
seen as attainment of experience by experimenting - hence the 
process is important. 




An individual has either designed, or significantly modified, the 
wargaming form in order to enhance learning. 
The wargaming form changes when an individual relocates. 





The game director controls and interrupts the wargaming by ‘gas 
and brake’, or halt and restart. 
‘Free play’ is not allowed: the red cell is supervised but is not fully 
controlled with a scripted pre-planned response list).  The blue 
side’s focus is the scenario and not on playing the game (for fun). 
The product is important and this is specifically developed by 
reflections during breaks after/during the wargame.  
The training audience’s immersive credibility is safeguarded from 
potential concerns of unrealism related to the models of a 
wargame since the training audience itself does not interact with 
the simulation system because it cannot directly observe it during 
the wargame. 
An attitude exists that ‘we are not doing wargaming here’: the 
activity is not named ‘wargaming’ but perhaps ‘command training 
exercise’.  





Simple standardising: instructor buy-in occurs because of the explicit connection to doctrine – ‘we 
have to do wargaming’. This concept is closely affiliated to the military profession, which is manifested 
in the use of ordinary maps and that players staff their ordinary positions, such as, for example, roles 
in a military headquarters. One simple solution, which affirms the symbolism in wargaming, is the 
straightforward opinion to ‘use whatever you have in your pockets’ to represent units on a map. 
Adjudication is almost certainly of the so-called free type centered on instructors’ judgement rather 
than any form of rigid rules or computer simulations. This is because this form of wargaming is 
supposed to be used and practised by each and every officer. This makes it more or less impossible for 
‘outsiders’ to practise this form of wargaming: i.e. one must be proficient in the military profession. 
This entails a capable officer who is comfortable in control and believed to be credible in his 
management of a straightforward wargame. However, this simplicity may entail that simple rehearsals 
on maps, or brainstorming around a map, may be mistaken for – or promoted as – ‘wargaming’.  
Innovative active learning: instructor buy-in occurs because the game designer/game director, who 
may (or may not) be a military officer, utilises game-based learning for credibility, control and comfort. 
This is sometimes done intuitively rather than by explicit reference to theory. Accordingly, this concept 
is connected to certain individuals, i.e. ‘enthusiasts’. Hence, elements of charisma and creativity are 
involved as such individuals, implicitly or explicitly, complain that it is a challenge for other people to 
understand wargaming: i.e. ‘no one else understands wargaming’. Accordingly, instructor buy-in for 
this concept is restricted to the few individuals who can confidently rebut the possible and ever-
present question: ‘are you just playing games?´.327 Such criticism re-connects to game-based learning 
and especially promotion of gamification, which includes the element of fun for better learning.  
Control & veiling: instructor buy-in occurs because the wargame is veiled from the training audience. 
The military students are thus shielded from perceivable non-realistic combat results, or other 
perceptions, which may generate ‘gamer mode’, or non-acceptance, which are detrimental for 
learning. To prevent opinions that express that ‘we are just playing a game’ from manifesting, veiling 
is a real option for instructors. Veiling entails that the training audience does not physically observe, 
nor directly interact with, the wargame’s computer-based simulation system, map or board. 
Accordingly, it is to be expected for a game director in this concept to declare that ‘we do not do 
wargaming’. Still, the activity is arguably a wargame as long as it allows contingent symbolic 
interaction. If this free interaction does not occur the activity should be considered a non-wargame. 
One example of a non-wargame is a scripted exercise. Hence, this third concept constitutes a grey zone 
akin to simple standardising. 
                                                          





What is really going on within the field of army educational wargaming? This rhetorical question is 
answered by the core category, instructor buy-in, which is the main concern of the key individuals – 
the game directors/instructors. The core category is explained by its supporting core categories: 
credibility, comfort and control. Each explains individuals’ reasoning behind the use of certain 
wargaming forms. The core category is achieved by different methods. Three such theoretical concepts 
were identified and developed from the case of Sweden: simple standardising, innovative active 
learning and control & veiling. Properties and indicators explain each theoretical concept. This enables 
a further exploratory and comparative analysis as the developed analytical model forms the analytical 
underpinning for the country cases of Germany, the United Kingdom, the USA and Japan. Each country 
chapter covers three embedded units of analysis, and each subchapter is structured in accordance with 
the three theoretical concepts. This structure allows wargaming forms to be analysed within a relevant 









In Germany, education of army officers is centralised in the form of the German Army´s Education and 
Training Command, Das Ausbildungskommando Heer, established in 2013. This command is 
headquartered in Leipzig and controls several facilities, such as the Army’s Officer School and the 
Army´s Warfighting Simulation Centre. The Command and Staff College, Die Führungsakademie der 
Bundeswehr, is a separate entity and controlled by the central staffs of the Bundeswehr. The German 
Army has, however, a final say in the education of army officers by its general learning objectives.328 
Since it was not possible for the author to visit the German Army´s Infantry School in Hammelburg, the 
nearby simulation centre of the German Army in Wildflecken instead became the intermediate unit. 
This change came about primarily because of the issue of accessibility. However, preparative studies 
of possible embedded units in the intermediate range in Germany found that the nearby Army 
Warfighting Simulation Centre, Das Gefechtssimulationszentrum Heer, has a centralised organisational 
role in how simulation systems are used within the German Army.329 This connects to how military 
instructors learn wargaming, which in turn offers indications of how instructors receive instructor buy-
in for different wargaming forms. Accordingly, the embedded units of analysis in this chapter are:  
 The Army’s Officer School (I),  
 The Army’s Warfighting Simulation Centre (II),   
 The Command and Staff College (III). 
Before going into detail of what is done, there is a need to clarify a language issue. For an Anglo-Saxon 
reader, the embedded unit of The Army’s Warfighting Simulation Centre (II) might be seen as an entity 
for training, while the other two embedded units of analysis in Germany are for education. There is 
however no such clear-cut division in the German language (nor is there such a distinct linguistic 
division in Swedish). In Germany, education and training are generally combined into a single word: 
Bildung. Hence, education and training are not seen as separate entities as is sometimes the case in 
the English language. Furthermore, the English word ‘training’ is in Germany connoted with drills. And, 
the concept of doing drills as a form of education is not accepted in Germany.330 Hence, the German 
Army Warfighting Simulation Centre concerns primarily military professional education for army 
officers.  
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5.1 Die Offiziersschule des Heeres 
The German Army’s Officer School, Die Offiziersschule des Heeres, is located in Dresden and is the first 
step in the officer education system. The current (2015) system of officer education was established 
in 2006. Accepted officer cadets initially conduct six months pre-training and then enter the first officer 
course, OF1, which lasts for one year. The officer cadets then join one of the two universities of the 
Bundeswehr, in either Hamburg or München, for approximately four years’ studies to earn a civilian 
degree. Thereafter the officer cadets return to Dresden for the second officer course, OF2, which lasts 
for three months. After OF2 the officer cadets are commissioned as officers and transferred into one 
of the branch schools, for example, the infantry school. There they receive their final training to 
become a Platoon Commander, or alternatively, specific training towards the job they will have when 
they thereafter join an Army unit.  
 
Contemporary wargaming 
The coherence of German officer education is supported by an unwritten educational principle. This 
concerns the educational progression which in the past was as follows: 1) classroom, 2) sand table, 3) 
field. Today, simulation systems are used and hence the contemporary order is: 1) classroom, 2) sand 
table, 3) simulation system, 4) field. The addition of simulation before going into field training is 
considered worthwhile as it saves time since different tactical situations can, if necessary, be repeated 
with the use of a simulation system.331 This methodology is arguably similar at all levels in the German 
officer education system. Hence, simulation is ‘integrated in every course’ at the Officer School.332 
Notably, however, there is almost no use of simulation or wargaming during the OF1 course. The one 
and only exception is a map exercise conducted at the battalion level. On the other hand, after 
university, during OF2, ‘simulations’ are used.333 These simulations are all on the battalion level since 
this is centrally directed by the Head of the German Army. The reason is that the battalion level is 
believed to be the lowest tactical level where it is possible to cover principles of kinetic warfare in 
conjunction with tactical challenges.334  
Two simulation systems are in use at the Officer School: SIRA and SiTA. SIRA stands for 
Simulationssystem zur Unterstützung von Rahmenübungen (Simulation system in support of exercises) 
and was developed by a German company, CAE Elektronik GmbH, in 1995 for use in military education. 
The main SIRA-facility in the German Army is located at the Officer School in Dresden. Other SIRA-
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facilities are located in Münster, Hammelburg (Infantry School) and Wildflecken (Army Warfighting 
Simulation Centre). SiTA is the acronym for Simulation-based Training for military Academies. SiTA is, 
compared to SIRA, a newer system and especially developed for military classroom education.335 Both 
SIRA and SiTA are computer-based constructive simulations. In comparison SiTA is more aggregated 
and requires about 6-8 officer cadets as operators for a battalion level exercise. For SIRA, the number 
of operators required to run a battalion level exercise is about 30.336 Both simulations are used for the 
battalion level and both are run in real-time. The latter feature is believed to be essential because of 
an educational focus on decision-making.337   
There are differences in how SIRA and SiTA are used at the Officer School. SIRA is used for what is 
called ‘simulation-based exercises’ involving many officer cadets whereas SiTA is used in a classroom-
setting for individual education of officer cadets. Accordingly, SiTA is considered less advanced than 
SIRA. SiTA is therefore often used as a preparatory session for a subsequent SIRA exercise. Regarding 
the OF2 course, each class of officer cadets participates in one SIRA-session, which covers two full 
working days. SiTA is used twice (3-4 hours each time). Combined with preparation, about one month 
of the three-month educational curriculum of the OF2 course relates to the SIRA- and SiTA-sessions.338   
The simulation support centre located at the Officer School provides support to both SIRA and SiTA. 
This support involves placing units in starting positions in order to save time. Furthermore, there is 
technical system support by two-three officers. The support personnel are captains and IT-system 
specialists, usually from the signal branch as no category of simulation officers exists in the German 
Army. The main task of the SIRA-facility at the Officer School is to support courses and to provide an 
opportunity for officer cadets to practise the military decision-making process. Hence, the learning 
objectives assigned to a SIRA session concern tactical practice and decision-making. The decision-
making process is focused on the battalion headquarters, which is supported by the company tactical 
level as a lower command level (LOCON).339  
A SIRA-session does not involve direct physical interaction between the training audience and the 
simulation system. Instead, large numbers of operators are used to operate the simulation system. 
Those operators are officer cadets from another class. The operators enable the commanders to 
concentrate on reports generated from the simulation system, without the commanders themselves 
having to input orders or extract information from the computer-based simulation system.  
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Illustration no. 7: the use of SIRA at the German Army’s Officer School.340 
 
A SIRA-session could be interpreted as a Command Post Exercise (CPX). However, SIRA is referred to 
as a ‘simulation-based exercise’. This term differs from the English term ‘computer-assisted exercise’ 
(CAX), which is considered by the Officer School as a somewhat old-fashioned expression imported 
from the USA.341 While the illustration indicates the basic concept of SIRA, it does not illustrate an 
additional separate room where the ‘Director’ runs the SIRA session, as well as the extra room for the 
opposing force (OPFOR). In comparison to a CPX, which is also typically run in real-time, in SIRA the 
battalion headquarters (Bn HQ) is not a fully functional command post as staff clerks etc. are not 
present. This abstraction, and the focus on educational learning objectives, means that instructors 
consider SIRA to be a ‘simulation-based exercise’ and not a command post or staff exercise.  
Notably, the quote ‘without any view [of] the simulation system’ in the illustration reveals a certain 
feature: Company Commanders have their backs towards the computer screens. The operators, who 
interact directly with the simulation system, control the various platoons. Each Coy Commander has 
                                                          
340 Gonnermann (2015).  




his own headgear to communicate to the Bn HQ while using his own voice to communicate his own 
orders to his Platoon Commander(s) situated behind his back. Since the training audience (Bn HQ and 
Coy Commanders) do not directly interact with SIRA it is deemed enough to visualise a 2D view, rather 
than a 3D one.342  
SIRA is perceived as the highest level of tactical training at the Officer School.343 The purpose of SIRA is 
for officer cadets to learn tactical practice and decision-making. While the latter concerns primarily the 
decision-making process at a Bn HQ, Company Commanders are also included.344 A SIRA-session 
involves the rotation of assigned decision-making roles. It is not unusual to have four-to-six different 
acting Battalion Commanders during one full day. A simulated battalion usually consists of five 
companies, meaning that there are enough positions for one class of 22-24 officer cadets when leader 
positions are rotated. The training audience (one class of officer cadets) is called ‘military leaders’, 
while another class provides support as ‘operators/tactical communicators’. This support is provided 
in pairs: one officer cadet inputs orders into the SIRA simulation system while the other communicates 
with the Coy Commander. The ‘Director’, who controls the SIRA-session, is usually the Commander of 
the Officer Cadet Company to which the classes belong.345  
While a SIRA-session is conducted in the organised facilities of the simulation support centre, a SiTA –
session is done in a classroom environment. In total three classrooms at the Officer School are 
equipped with SiTA. There are three specific educational objectives in a SiTA session: 1) Improving 
tactical skills (fire and movements), 2) Increasing learning skills, and 3) Integrating of advanced training 
tools in the teaching: i.e., preparing for SIRA. However, SiTA is specifically about developing courses of 
action (COAs) as it allows the officer cadets to experience success and mistakes. The educational 
methodological alternative to SiTA is that the classroom teacher provides criticism and feedback. In 
comparison, the different ongoing interactions in SiTA allow the classroom teachers to discuss tactical 
principles by using SiTA’s after-action review features. The action is double-sided since there is a blue 
and red force. The blue force has two-levels: Bn HQ and supporting companies, while the red force has 
a smaller number of operators and is directly commanded by the classroom teacher, who uses 
standard principles regarding how the red force is supposed to act. However, the role of the classroom 
teacher is primarily as an instructor rather than as the commander of the red force.346  
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A SiTA-session is an organised and controlled process. It consists of three to four working groups, with 
about five to eight students each. Usually 5-6 officer cadets man the red battalion while the rest, about 
15, operate the blue battalion. A day before a SiTA session the officer cadets prepare their orders 
according to a standardised order format. The next day, the SiTA session takes place for about four 
hours. During the initial hour the Battalion Commander issues orders, and for the remaining three 
hours, the simulation is conducted in real time. The four working groups work in pairs (Red-Blue and 
Red-Blue). Each of the working group-pairs tests one course of action (COA). It is emphasised that the 
red side has to obey the ‘Director’ since he is also the commander of the red side. No ‘free play’ is 
allowed in order to avoid a situation when officer cadets ‘behave like cowboys’.347  
 
 
Photograph no. 10: the use of SiTA.348 
 
The photograph of SiTA from the company brochure provides a vivid visualisation since it illustrates a 
certain feature, which was acknowledged by the author´s observation on site. The officer cadet that 
acts as the Battalion Commander only looks at the map attached to the wall and not at the computer 
screen behind his back. This feature is similar to a SIRA-session (Coy Commanders). In the SiTA 
classroom, the assigned Battalion Commander uses the situational map on a wall while the operator 
behind him inputs information into the computer system and communicates verbally back-to-back. 
The operator also communicates verbally with the Company Commanders situated at the same 
table.349  
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Besides the one SIRA- and two SiTA-sessions in OF2, few if any other activities are possible to categorise 
as wargaming at the Officer School. Two ‘terrain walks’ in OF1 are conducted outdoors where different 
options are put forwards as part of the decision-making process. There are also two ‘terrain walks’ in 
OF2 – officer cadets assume the role of instructor in the last one.350 There is also a sand table located 
in every classrooms but these sand tables are allegedly only used to visualise tactical examples with 
vehicle miniatures. Hence, wargaming at the Officer School is centred on ‘simulation-based exercises’ 
with SIRA and SiTA. This concerns fictional scenarios in nearby terrain, which thus support ‘terrain 
walks’ in the same terrain. There are no historical scenarios in SIRA or SiTA. This is especially so because 
the subject of military history at the Officer School does not use simulation since apparently military 
history teachers at the Officer School are not interested in using wargaming as a method.351 
Nonetheless, there are plans by individuals to expand wargaming into the military history curriculum 
at the Officer School in Dresden during OF1. This is envisaged as a combination of tactics and 19th 
century military history, with wargaming embedded with a tactical ‘terrain walk’.352  
A possible future initiative to introduce wargaming at OF1 is linked to game-based learning, which to 
some extent already occurs at the Bundeswehr universities in Hamburg and München. During the 
officer cadets’ four year interregnum at one of the two Bundeswehr universities, one course by Armin 
Fügenschuh at the Helmut Schmidt University in Hamburg uses commercial wargames in the form of 
board games with a small group of officer cadets (eight in 2015). The purpose is to reflect on combat 
modelling by a board game of each officer cadet’s choice. One of these board games was Days of 
Battle: Golan Heights. This type of use of educational wargaming is a recent phenomenon. It is also 
explicitly encouraged by one German officer, Colonel Uwe Heilmann, who is a big proponent of the 
usefulness of wargaming in education.353 Although the Helmut Schmidt University is by itself not one 
of the three embedded units of analysis, its education is at the initial level of the greater educational 
framework of officer cadets. Likewise, at the Bundeswehr University in München there are indications 
of some student participation in ‘Planspiel’ to simulate diplomacy at the United Nations.354 Diplomacy, 
however, falls outside the tactical level.  
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Control & veiling 
Both SIRA and SiTA indicate adherence to control & veiling since they physically veil the simulation 
system from the main training audience. SIRA in particular indicates suppression of gamification by the 
physical separation of computer screens and the adjudication process from the training audience. The 
‘Director’ is in control of this separation. Furthermore, in both SIRA and SiTA, the ‘Director’ controls 
the wargaming process by the ability to pause and restart the process whenever he believes it is 
necessary. Further indications of adherence to control & veiling relates to concerns by the instructors 
about a lack of realism. To increase the feel of realism, an authentic army communication system is 
used in SIRA. Furthermore, LOCONs (Lower Control) are role-played and solve their tasks 
independently from each other: in SIRA each LOCON is separated in different rooms rather than 
together in a large hall. Nonetheless, several teachers believe that SIRA as a simulation system does 
not reflect reality very well. For example, there is no difference in combat adjudication modifiers if a 
red main battle tank is attacked from behind or from the front. There are also imperfections in the 
modelling of logistics. However, the focus of a simulation-based exercise is for students to execute the 
overall plan, which the current utilisation of SIRA achieves.355 This realisation is arguably because of 
the physical veiling. However, physical veiling is not only used to hide less realistic or poorly modelled 
elements. Veiling is also used to enhance certain aspects of the simulation in order to enable the 
training audience to construct their actions. For example, only the operators will see videos of violent 
demonstrations etc. The purpose is to achieve more realism in the operators’ reports to the training 
audience. In other words, the immersion of the operators increases, which in turn increases realism 
for the training audience. This arrangement is deemed necessary since the training audience does not 
interact directly with the simulation system.356  
A major disadvantage of adherence to the concept of control & veiling, in conjunction with the complex 
form of SIRA, seems to be a need for resources. Many operators are needed to man SIRA. It takes a full 
day of training, with five lectures, to learn how to work as an operator with SIRA. However, regarding 
the education of officer cadets, all officer cadets are at some point used as operators. When officer 
cadets are used as operators they are, however, not considered part of the training audience. This use 
of officer cadets as operators is sometimes a source of complaint by the officer cadets since it takes 
time to learn how to operate the system. From a cost and benefit perspective there is, on the other 
hand, no need for a standing staff of operators, nor extensive and costly computer graphics to enhance 
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visualisation for the training audience. The company behind SIRA, CAE Elektronik GmbH, could provide 
enhanced 3D graphics for SIRA but this option is not used.357  
In essence, SIRA allows the training audience to focus on decision-making, by providing computer-
based adjudication and a control and command system for the ‘Director’ to control the exercise. The 
game director handles frictions that occur during a session by a halt and restart procedure. A restart 
may entail a complete restart, or from a certain historical point in the scenario, or just unpause and 
continue. It is up to the game director to decide.358 This control lessens a general disadvantage about 
computer-based wargames, namely the possibility of unwanted effects by a simple push of the wrong 
button. The ‘Director’ has the power and means to correct any serious mistake by the operators, 
without the training audience even knowing about it.  
The use of SiTA at the Officer School in general follows the principles of SIRA. However, in SiTA only 
the Battalion Commander in a group of eight officer cadets is veiled from the computer system. The 
rest of the officer cadets work directly with the system. On the other hand, the central player (‘military 
leader’) is the Battalion Commander and since he or she is veiled, the entire wargaming session is 
influenced. Inference of control & veiling in SiTA is reinforced by the firm control of the game director 
and the indicator that ‘free play’ is not allowed. While SiTA is arguably not such a clear-cut case of 
control & veiling as SIRA regarding the physical aspect of veiling, the property suppression of 
gamification is evidently present in a SiTA-session.  
 
Simple standardising 
Both SIRA and SiTA are named ‘simulation-based exercises’ and not ‘wargames’. This is an indicator of 
the attitude ‘we do not do wargaming here’, which entails the adherence to control & veiling rather 
than simple standardising. However, the given reason for the referral to ‘simulation-based exercise’ 
rather than to ‘wargaming’ is that there exists a common and doctrinal view of wargaming as a COA-
comparison analytical method. Such wargaming is not considered part of the standardised military 
decision-making process in the German Army. Since wargaming is not doctrinally a part of that process, 
COA-comparison is very limited at the tactical level because of limited time for planning: wargaming is 
simply ‘not conducted’ at the Officer School. Accordingly, ‘wargaming’ is supposedly only conducted 
at the Command and Staff College (III), which is the ‘right level’ for the use of COA-comparison 
analytical methods in officer education.359  
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The situation of ‘wargaming’ not explicitly constituting a part of the German military decision-making 
process makes it problematic to argue that simple standardising is a concept that instructor can adhere 
to in order to achieve instructor buy-in at the Officer School. This issue is, however, distorted by how 
the German Army uses a narrower definition of wargaming. While SIRA and SiTA are officially not 
referred to as ‘wargaming’, both simulations fall within this thesis’s definition of educational 
wargaming. What contributes to a narrower definition in Germany is not only that the English term 
‘wargaming’ is considered to be a doctrinally COA-comparison method. The avoidance also stems from 
the fact that the German word Kriegsspiel is not a politically correct word in contemporary Germany. 
Since both doctrine and political correctness limit the use of ‘wargaming’ as a term of reference, one 
consequence is less contemporary knowledge of wargaming as an educational method than it was 
historically the case in the Germany army.360  
What does, however, indicate support for simple standardising are indicators of the property 
adherence to doctrine. The army officer education in Germany is regulated by manuals connected to 
doctrine and instead of wargaming for planning, such as COA-wargaming, the focus is on ‘simulation-
based exercises’ for execution-training: in other words, tactical challenges. This approach is directed 
by the Chief of the German Army, who has declared that officer education is to cover principles of 
kinetic warfare.361 To achieve the learning objectives entailed by this approach, SIRA and SiTA are 
considered very important systems for the army´s educational schools as well as for army units in 
general. Under the firm control of a ‘Director’, such ‘simulation-based exercises’ are considered to be 
high frequency exercises.362 With SIRA, however, the training audience arguably uses rapid decision-
making and not a military decision-making process. This would indicate a less doctrinal use than what 
simple standardising would suppose, especially since it is arguably possible for the training audience 
to actually use the military decision-making process since it is only a quick 15 minute process. This non-
use has been criticised by sceptics of SIRA. On the other hand, positive experiences from SIRA have 
transformed many sceptics into supporters.363 This support may, however, be the result of an 
organisational hierarchy that institutionally promotes SIRA – ‘everyone has to do it’. The tradition of 
using SIRA and SiTA at the Officer School involves every class, all officer cadets and all the classroom 
teachers. This indicates adherence to doctrine, meaning that everyone should use a common form of 
wargaming supported by doctrine. This support can be said to exist in the established principle of 
teaching on tactical levels. The principle covers four different and distinctive steps and one of these 
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steps explicitly concerns ‘simulation-based exercises’. Such exercises are consequently part of the 
curriculum at the Officer School.364   
While available during the entire officer educational system, SIRA is perhaps less used than what 
adherence to simple standardising would entail. One instructor mentioned that he personally only 
used SIRA two times during his basic officer education: once during the OF2 course and once at a 
subsequent branch school (Platoon Commander Course). On the other hand, it is envisaged that a 
German Army Battalion should participate in one SIRA-exercise once or twice every year. This arguably 
indicates that every officer has the ability to manage SIRA. However, only one or two classroom 
teachers at the Officer School are experienced in how to use SIRA. Hence, this limitation became a 
challenge when the Officer School’s leadership decided that each Officer Cadet Company Commander 
should serve as the ‘Director’ during a SIRA-session with his officer cadets. Not every commander had 
previous experience of being a classroom teacher, and were thus not used to working with the SIRA-
system. Instead, the classroom teacher, who is also considered the expert, does most of the work. For 
this reason, the most experienced of the classroom teachers in the Officer Cadet Company is likely to 
run the SIRA-session as ‘Director’. Sometimes, however, a more experienced classroom teacher from 
another Officer Cadet Company is used as ‘Director’.365 
The use of a few individual classroom teachers, in the role of experts, to actually run the system 
arguably indicates less reliance on simple standardising. There exists a formal preparation module for 
classroom teachers on how to run SIRA. However, not every teacher seems to attend that module. 
Instead, some of the teachers teach themselves by learning from other teachers. This informal system 
of seniors helping juniors is an indicator of simplicity, as it is possible for anyone with interest to learn 
how to use the system without any major formal training. This exchange of informal knowledge is 
stimulated by the fact that in both SIRA and SiTA no manuals exist on how to act as ‘Director’.  Hence, 
the best way is to learn from colleagues – experienced classroom teachers therefore teach less-
experienced class teachers.366 As a classroom teacher usually stays for 2-3 years at the Officer School, 
they have to learn how to improve their ways of acting as a ‘Director’ from each other.367 Accordingly, 
while both SIRA and SiTA are sufficiently complex to be exclusively used in a dedicated facility and an 
equipped classroom respectively, incidents nonetheless link them to the property simplicity 
concerning how instructors actually learn to conduct wargaming. 
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The main reason why simple standardising may seem less relevant at the Officer School is that 
‘wargaming’ in general, and SIRA in particular, are not included in the formal decision-making process. 
One instructor explained that this is mostly because of a perceived lack of time – wargaming is often 
seen as taking up too much time during the decision-making process.368 The indicator in simple 
standardising of an attitude of ‘we have to do wargaming’ may thus be considered of less relevance. 
On the other hand, every class of officer cadets has to do one SIRA ‘simulation-based exercise’ as well 
as several SiTA-sessions, run by the classroom teachers. However, the wargaming form used in SIRA is 
not based on the property of simplicity, which would, for example, entail an open map-based wargame 
in ordinary classrooms. Instead, SIRA is dependent on special facilities and is conducted as a computer-
supported wargame with software for communication, visualisation and combat adjudication. In 
addition, SIRA is built on a premise of a one-to-one proportion between the training audience (the 
‘military leaders’) and trainers/operators.  
 
Innovative active learning 
An indicator of individual innovativeness would be independent wargaming practices by certain 
individuals, such as classroom teachers. However, there do not seem to be any extra wargaming 
activities at the Officer School besides the two organisationally centralised and strictly coordinated 
activities of SIRA and SiTA. This is not to say that individual teachers at the Officer School are unable 
to conduct their own teaching methods within the curriculum. Nonetheless, despite the presence of a 
small (1x1m) sand table in each classroom and the availability of a total sum of 40 EUROS per year for 
each class to buy extra teaching aids, such as small tank models, potential simple map-based wargames 
apparently do not occur. The lack of regulations in the use of sand table in classrooms means that this 
activity is not mandatory. One teacher, for example, does not use sand tables in the classroom at all. 
However, the utilisation of a sand table is seemingly a common feature and a tool for utilisation 
outdoors in the real terrain during ‘terrain walks’. There is, however, no outdoor standard set of sand 
tables. Therefore each Officer Cadet Company buys their own miniatures for visualisation – ‘everyone 
does what they prefer’.369 Nonetheless, the use of sand tables is seemingly mainly for visualisation and 
not as a form for wargaming.  
A second indicator of individual innovativeness is that an individual has the power to significantly 
modify a wargaming form. This is not the case with either SIRA or SiTA. However, what does occur is 
that ‘Directors’ have a free hand in directing their SIRA- and SiTA-sessions. This form of control is 
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specifically when to pause the wargame and what to then bring up to the attention of the training 
audience, and finally, from where to restart the wargame. Hence the ‘Director’ controls the process to 
a very extensive extent, in SiTA even more so than in SIRA.370 Since the ‘Director’ wields the power of 
control this also allows some experimentation, particular in SiTA. In conjunction with the fact that SITA 
costs less and is much quicker than SIRA, SiTA is even considered by some teachers to be a good tool 
for ‘wargaming’. In this aspect, SiTA does not have to be realistic in every part.371 Nonetheless, this 
form of control is not an indication of individual modification.  
The option to allow for some experimentation, particular in SiTA, raises the possibility of the use of 
gamification. However, the attitude that ‘free play’ is to be avoided negates competition, an indicator 
of promotion of gamification. This attitude is attributed to the potential passive stance of ‘see what 
happens’ in a scenario, which is said to be an ‘old-traditional’ way of conducting wargaming. Instead, 
‘objective-oriented training’ is used to connect to learning objectives. This may indicate suppression, 
rather than promotion, of gamification. Such an inference is supported by fully double-sided exercises, 
meaning two equally manned opposing sides, not being done with the officer cadets. Such a 
wargaming form is deemed to cause more uncertainty in regard to reaching learning goals, and hence 
it is not conducted.372  
There are, however, indications of innovative active learning at this initial level of officer education. 
This, however, concerns only a handful of officer cadets at one minor course given during the four year 
interregnum at the Bundeswehr Universities. The course is conducted at the Helmut Schmidt 
University in Hamburg. This example offers two indicators of innovative active learning. First, one 
individual, Colonel Uwe Heilmann, is influential in this use of COTS board games in officer education.373 
Secondly, there are clear links to game-based learning since the use of commercial board games at 
Helmut Schmidt University seem to adhere to innovative active learning by the reference to the activity 
as ‘serious games’ and consequently to game-based learning.374 However, few officer cadets are 
exposed to this kind of learning. Likewise, the Model United Nations, a ‘Planspiel’ that simulates 
diplomacy within the United Nations, only accepted 15 participants from the Bundeswehr University 
in München in 2012.375 Accordingly, few officer cadets are exposed to what can only be termed as 
exceptions in army educational wargaming forms at this level (I) in Germany.  
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5.2 Das Gefechtssimulationzentrum des Heeres 
The German Army Warfighting Simulation Centre, Das Gefechtssimulationzentrum des Heeres, is a 
major actor regarding the use of constructive simulations in the German Army. The focus is on 
educating officers. This is done by bringing personnel from army units to the centre in order to man 
the simulation systems. The training audience does not consist of entire units but is limited to the unit’s 
commander and his staff. The Army Warfighting Simulation Centre’s educational activities are limited 
to providing support to army units, which are supposed to bring their own key personnel, such as 
‘Director’ to the ‘simulation-based exercise’. Besides some personnel provided by the Army 
Warfighting Simulation Centre, to man special gaming cells such as OPFOR (Opposing Force), units are 
supposed to bring all necessary personnel to man key positions and cells, such as HICON (Higher 
Command) and LOCON (Lower Control), to support the training audience. In essence, the Army 
Warfighting Simulation Centre provides support rather than a complete educational and training 
package. This support consists of the actual form of wargaming: the type of simulation system to be 
used and the structure of the ‘simulation-based exercise’. The Army Warfighting Simulation Centre 
specifically relies on four ‘pillars’ to provide this support: computer-based simulation systems, (some) 
personnel, the physical facilities and the necessary IT-support to run an exercise.376  
 
Contemporary wargaming 
The Army Warfighting Simulation Centre’s main tool for education consists of constructive simulations. 
Two constructive simulations are used: KORA (Korpsrahmen Simulationsmodell zur Offizierausbildung) 
for Corps and Divisions, and SIRA (Simulationssystem zur Unterstützung von Rahmenübungen) for 
Brigades and Battalions. In addition, VBS (Virtual Battlespace), a virtual simulation, is specifically used 
by Company Commanders to train their Platoon Commanders. All activities by the above simulations 
are referred to as ‘simulation-based exercises’, with the explicit purpose of providing training for 
tactical/operational commanders and their staff in realistic conditions. A major limitation in the use of 
simulations at the Army Warfighting Simulation Centre seems to be a lack of personnel, even though 
external visiting units supposedly staff various positions such as ‘Director’, HICON and LOCON. This 
deficiency means that the Army Warfighting Simulation Centre does not conduct two ‘simulation-
based exercises’ at the same time. Even with such limitations, the Army Warfighting Simulation Centre 
annually provides support to the following ‘simulation-based exercises’ with constructive simulations: 
4-5 brigade exercises (SIRA), 1-2 divisional exercises (KORA) and 1 corps exercises (KORA).377 
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The principle adhered to when KORA and SIRA are used is that the training audience never actually 
sees the simulation system. Consequently, it is considered that the training audience does not ‘play’ 
since they only act on reports, the majority coming from their own LOCON. One of the reasons for this 
principle is the basic belief in ‘train as you fight’.378 There are, however, some major differences 
between the use of KORA (Corps and Division levels) and SIRA (Brigade and Battalion levels). For 
example, SIRA requires much more personnel in terms of operators. KORA requires 12-16 operators 
per Brigade while, in comparison, SIRA requires 40-50 operators. On the other hand, SIRA has the 
flexibility to create your own weapons/vehicles. SIRA models every single vehicle while KORA uses 
aggregate units as symbols that represent platoons or companies rather than individual vehicles. 
Hence, the main difference between the systems is their focus on different tactical levels: SIRA, at a 
lower level, is less aggregated and hence requires more resources when used.  
The role of the Army Warfighting Simulation Centre is to function as a facilitator for simulation-based 
exercises. For this reason, the centre trains the operators from the visiting units with the simulation 
system just before the scheduled exercise. Besides the simulation system itself, a real and operational 
C3I (Command, Control and Communication & Intelligence) system is used. For example, during a 
KORA-exercise, an ‘operator’ runs the simulation system (KORA) while a ‘planner’ (a LOCON unit 
commander) runs the C3I system. Data is transferred automatically between those two systems. 
Control is done by a ‘Director’. The ‘Director’ is considered to be ‘the spider in the web’ and steers all 
the cells – OPFOR, SITFOR (Situational Forces), the White cell, HICON and LOCON – besides the training 
audience itself. A prominent feature is that the absolute majority of personnel in every cell, as well as 
the ‘Director’, are from the unit and not from the Army Warfighting Simulation Centre.379  
In addition to the constructive simulations SIRA and KORA, the virtual simulation VBS is in use since 
2012. One example of how VBS is used is from late 2014, when a mechanised infantry company visited 
for a total of three weeks. Each of the company’s three platoons spent one week of exercising with 
VBS. The military leader that was trained was the Platoon Commander. The Army Warfighting 
Simulation Centre provided support, but was not responsible for the actual context of this exercise. 
The exercise used four rooms, each with four workstations. The Company Commander (the ‘Director’) 
functioned as an overwatcher for one of his Platoon Commanders, who commanded his Section 
Leaders. Real people controlled OPFOR since the use of artificial intelligence (AI) is minimised. The 
reason is that the behaviour of AI is generally considered to be illogical, and hence unrealistic. An 
OPFOR-team in VBS consists of 3-4 individuals, either from the unit or from the support staff at the 
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Centre. In this example, to allow the training audience to run the VBS themselves without intermediate 
operators, three hours of pre-training was provided. During this pre-training the Centre emphasised 
that VBS is not a computer game but a ‘serious simulation’.380  
The use of similar simulation systems seems predominant at the intermediate level. Besides the Army 
Warfighting Simulation Centre, the Infantry School in Hammelburg utilises SIRA and to some extent 
SiTA. This use of constructive simulations for simulation-based exercises is similar to the Officer School. 
In Hammelburg SiTA is used to educate officers about the infantry branch while SIRA is used for 
operational army units.381 While there is some use of VBS at the intermediate level the focus is not on 
officers but on soldiers. This is, for example, the case at the army training facilities in Münster.382 
Notably, many of the actual educational courses for officers at the intermediate level are actually 
conducted at the Officer School in Dresden and not at the Infantry School. For example: the Company 
Commander Course, perhaps the most noteworthy and comparative intermediate course for army 
officers situated between the basic educational level for officer cadets and the more advanced 
professional education level of a staff college, is conducted at the Officer School. The Company 
Commander Course, for first lieutenants and captains, is only two weeks long, which is comparatively 
short. However, during the two weeks the military students use SIRA for two days, which is a major 
part of the actual course.383  
 
Control & veiling 
Concerns over unrealism seem prioritised at the Army Warfighting Simulation Centre. The purpose of 
each computer-based simulation system is to produce a realistic representation of time and space. To 
increase the perception of realism, and hence credibility, any sort of artificial intelligence (AI) is 
thoroughly rejected. One explicit viewpoint is that AI cannot portray the human brain. In view of that, 
human activity within the exercise needs to be credible in order to be accepted by unit commanders. 
Results produced by only computers are simply ‘not accepted’. This concern is, however, not one-
dimensional since human factors, such as luck, are perceived to be difficult to model.384 This explicit 
concern corroborates with the concept of control & veiling, which, instead of relying on the simulation 
system, relies on a ‘Director’ to control the process. In addition, physical veiling prevents the training 
audience from becoming disturbed by results from a computer-based simulation system. The veiling 
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allows the ‘Director’ to separately contemplate how to handle issues that are likely to be perceived as 
unrealistic without feeling immediate pressure from the training audience.  
One indicator of the property suppression of gamification is that the activity is not considered 
‘wargaming’. This is indicated in the attitude that ‘we do not do wargaming here’. This attitude exists 
at the Army Warfighting Simulation Centre since ‘wargaming’ was explained as specific wargaming 
forms (COA and discussion-based) conducted at higher levels. The specific reference of higher levels 
was the Command and Staff College (III).385 Accordingly, there is a perceived difference between 
‘simulation-based exercises’ and ‘wargaming’. It can be argued that the use of VBS differs from SIRA 
and KORA since the former is named a virtual simulation while the latter two are referred to as 
constructive simulations. Another difference is that using VBS is working at a lower tactical level, where 
a Platoon Commander constitutes the main training audience, rather than the levels of 
Brigade/Battalion in SIRA, and Corps/Division in KORA. Accordingly, such differences may indicate 
potential incidents of gamification in the use of VBS. However, the opposite seems to be the case. VBS 
is referred to as a ‘serious simulation’ – and not as a ‘serious game’ – which indicates a suppression of 
gamification, such as any form of ‘free play’, fun and competition. Furthermore, the organised layout 
of a VBS-exercise involves different rooms rather than one large gaming hall. This physical separation 
indicates that VBS is similar to SIRA and KORA regarding the control aspect of the ‘Director’.  
 
Simple standardising 
In the German Army ‘wargaming’ denotes ‘comparing different options on maps and whiteboards’. 
This kind of wargaming is supposedly learned at the Command and Staff College. Accordingly, it is not 
normally conducted at the Army Warfighting Simulation Centre, where all simulations are done in real-
time.386 At the tactical level, the German Army provides a clear definition of wargaming in official 
doctrine, specifically the Land Forces Command and Control System, Führungsystem der 
Landstreitkräfte (2010). The purpose is to analyse your own courses of action (COA). The exact method 
on how to do this kind of wargaming is not explicitly mentioned in the German documents. Instead, 
the wargaming form is referred to NATO documents. At the operational level, the wargaming form is 
focused on role-play (red vs. blue side). This is a method based on the COPD (Comprehensive 
Operational Planning Doctrine) in NATO, and is practised as an ‘interactive talk’ for one day at the 
Command and Staff College.387 The purpose and form of this wargaming differ from the historical 
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German use of Kriegsspiel, which was an integrated part in military education as well as planning.388 
Still, while ‘wargaming’ is seen as a specific method for higher levels, indications of adherence to 
doctrine exist in the sense that ‘simulation-based exercises’ are systematically conducted for all units, 
and hence all officers. One incident in particular that supports this inference is that units themselves 
are responsible for their simulation-based exercises. This indicates an attitude that ‘we have to do 
wargaming’. In Germany, though, the correct phrase is ‘we have to do simulation-based exercising’.  
The role of the game director, and what kind of individuals serve as game directors, is an indicator that 
concerns both simple standardising and control & veiling. At the Army Warfighting Simulation Centre, 
the role of the ‘Director’ and his ability to steer the exercise towards the learning objectives is a central 
feature of the three computer-based simulations. This is somewhat similar to the command training 
facility (LTA) and the ‘command training exercise’ (LTÖ) in Sweden, albeit in the case of Germany, a 
unit actually brings its own ‘Director’. Regarding the German Army Warfighting Simulation Centre, the 
use of many individuals rather than a few selective experts as ‘Director’ is one indicator of simple 
standardising. Hence, each unit attends and controls their exercise, albeit with some expertise support 
from the Army Warfighting Simulation Centre. This expertise support means, however, that there is an 
existing framework on how to conduct an appropriate ‘simulation-based exercise’. This rigidity is 
reinforced by limitations, such as a limited number of computers, the number of available facilities and 
the relatively few support personnel, who altogether act as a framework on how to conduct the 
exercise. The requirements for support personnel are, for example, so substantial that only one 
simulation-based exercise can run at the same time.389 This does not indicate simplicity as this form of 
wargaming cannot be set up with short notice: a simulation-based exercise is the result of long 
preparation and planning which requires expertise in support personnel as well as computers and 
prepared facilities. It is not a form of wargaming that ‘works in the field’ with ordinary maps. 
The system of units bringing their own operators, who receive a short preparative course for operators 
at the Army Warfighting Simulation Centre, seems efficient and in line with simplicity. The simulation-
based exercises of KORA, SIRA and VBS are arguably efficient simulation systems when officers who 
have recent experience of the system operate it. This should also be the case, since every army officer 
cadet becomes trained to operate SIRA at the Officer School. However, one instructor only used SIRA 
once after the Officer School (OF2), which may indicate that the amount of veiling is deterring learning 
how to operate the system – at least for the training audience. Consequently, it is considered a waste 
of time to have more senior officers as operators of SIRA. For example, during a three week course for 
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staff officers in 2014 at the Officer School a SIRA exercise was cancelled as it was deemed 
unsatisfactory to spend an entire day to learn how to operate the system. Hence, a major perceived 
drawback of the ‘simulation-based exercise’ is the need to provide operators. Full-time expert 
operators are simply not an option due to cost-effectiveness since they would only be needed for a 
limited number of days each year. 390 At the Army Warfighting Simulation Centre, operators provided 
by each unit solve this problem. While this level of participation is arguably an indicator of simplicity, 
a ‘simulation-based exercise’ is far from simple.  
 
Innovative active learning 
The emblem of the Army Warfighting Simulation Centre indicates the possibility of an awareness of 
the game aspect since it depicts a chess playing piece superimposed on a background of two crossed 
swords. However, there are few signs of any reliance on gamification. In fact, gamification is arguably 
suppressed rather than promoted. In comparison to KORA and SIRA, the training audience has direct 
access to VBS. The use of VBS is, however, referred to not as a computer game but as a ‘serious 
simulation’. This term is, however, not similar to ‘serious games’ – the opposite is true: ‘free-play’ with 
VBS is not allowed as this is seen as ‘non-serious’.391  
 
 
Illustration no. 8: the Coat of Arms of Das Gefechtssimulationzentrum des Heeres.392 
 
Incidents of certain limitations by the Army Warfighting Simulation Centre seem to indicate 
suppression of gamification. However, there are signs that the visiting units, the entities responsible 
for their exercise, have different views. Some, if not most, seem to be willing to increase the level of 
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gamification in various forms. Since 2013, high intensity warfare scenarios have become the main 
effort rather than low intensity counter-insurgency ones. In those high intensity scenarios, the unit 
commander responsible for the exercise wants ‘free play’ rather than a scripted result. This kind of 
‘free play’ is, however, limited and not a proper double-sided exercise where OPFOR is equally 
manned. Thus, ‘free play’ is more about letting an event play out rather than having a scripted result. 
Gamification, such as the question of ‘winning or losing’, is deemed a side product rather than an 
integrated part of the process. It is possible to conduct double-sided exercises but it is not done. This 
is a deliberate choice for the reason that OPFOR is seen as a tool to achieve the objective of the 
exercise, and not to test and consequently criticise commanders’ performances.393 For this particular 
reason, gamification is suppressed rather than promoted.  
  
                                                          




5.3 Die Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr 
The Command and Staff College, Die Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr, was established in 1957 and 
represents the highest level of military education in Germany. It has two major courses. The senior 
course is the General/Admiral Staff Officer Course with about 100 participants and a duration of 24 
months (in 2015). The junior course is the Staff Officer Qualification Course. The latter course is much 
shorter, about three months, and serves as a qualification course for officers to work in a higher staff 
organisation. Hence, every officer (from the rank of captain) slated for staff duty is assigned to attend 
this course. Only about 15 percent of that intake is later selected for the General/Admiral Staff Officer 
Course, which is the literal flagship course of the Command and Staff College. At the General/Admiral 
Staff Officers Course, the students study all three levels: the strategic, the operational and the tactical 
levels (army: Division/Brigade). In essence, the General/Admiral Staff Officer Course is a course in 
‘military doctrine’. There are also some additional minor courses: a subsequent course to the Staff 
Officer Qualification Course is the Junior Staff Officer Course. It is, however, only three weeks long. 
Besides the military courses above there are a variety of modules and seminars for officers and civilian 
leadership personnel, for example, leadership.394 
 
Contemporary wargaming 
The wargaming conducted at the Command and Staff College has a distinct position in the German 
Army, since by all accounts it is here that ‘wargaming’ is taught and practised.395 In 2004-06, the College 
published guidelines on ‘operational wargaming’ for the General/Admiral Staff Officer Course. Those 
guidelines were introduced by General Helge Hansen, and offer a contemporary foundation on two 
matters regarding the utilisation of wargaming. The first matter is a definition of wargaming, and the 
second matter refers to how wargaming should be conducted. ‘Wargaming’ is seen as ‘an analysis 
technique and used to assess friendly courses of action.’396 This form of wargaming is seen as 
wargaming within the NATO planning process, and consequently it is deemed necessary for the 
Bundeswehr to be proficient in this form of wargaming, as most future operations are deemed to be 
done in co-operation with other NATO-countries. The wargame methodology, the elementary 
component of a course of action (COA) wargame, is centred on recurring interaction between two 
parties, red and blue, in order to develop, compare and improve the blue side´s COA. The form is a 
manual seminar-based form with a fixed process (action/reaction/counter-action) with a ‘Coordinator’ 
to prepare the wargaming session, and a ‘Director’ to run the session.397 A COA-wargame is done within 
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an ordinary classroom. The photograph depicts a typical COA-wargaming set-up used at the Command 
and Staff College, with the blue and red sides sitting at different tables facing each other. As the 
photograph infers, a COA-wargame is an explicit ‘wargame’ by the manifestation of ‘rules’ and the 
acknowledgment that the activity is in fact a ‘game’. 
 
 
Photograph no. 11: COA-wargaming at Die Führungsakademie (in 2003).398 
 
At the Command and Staff College in Hamburg, there is a specially designed facility for wargaming, 
namely Building 11, Gebäude 11, also known as the Manfred Wörner Zentrum (MWZ). The building 
was completed in 2000 as a centre for planning exercises, hence its name in German 
Planübungszentrum (Centre for Planning Exercises). The building encompasses a large auditorium and 
eight separated planning rooms with as many as 200 computer workplaces for several simulation 
systems. All technical systems are controlled centrally in one control room, also known as the ‘Bridge 
of the [Starship] Enterprise’. The specifications of building the MWZ were based on a particular system 
of simulation system, JOANA (Joint Operational Army Navy Air Force Simulation System). However, it 
is no longer in use. In fact, it was never put into use as each service continues to use their own 
simulation systems. Compared to the USA, Germany never implemented a joint (land-navy-air force) 
                                                          




simulation system for three reasons: high license fee, need for personnel and instructor 
dissatisfaction.399 Hence, numerous simulation systems exist for each single service.  
According to a report in 2013 there are several simulation systems in use at the Manfred Wörner 
building. These systems are used to support education and are referred to as: constructive simulations, 
operational analyses, wargaming, decision/planning support and command & information systems. 
Notably, ‘wargaming’ is only one label of many. Four computer-based simulation systems support land 
operations. These four simulation systems are: SimoF, KORA/OA, GAMMA-L/LAMBDA-L and ZETA.400 
KORA/OA (Das Korpsrahmen Simulationsmodell zur Offizierausbildung) is used to support exercises in 
land operations (Corps to Brigade level), such as the DECISIVE WARRIOR, and COA analysis. SimoF (Das 
Simulationsmodell für Übungen operative Führung) is used at the Corps level. GAMMA-L (Global 
Aggregated Model for Military Assessment-Land) is used to rate different options in a land operation 
by incorporating all actors, while LAMBDA-L (Land-Air-Maritime Determination Algorithms-Land) is 
used to calculate various data in an army operation on a day-to-day basis. Operational analysts use 
GAMMA-L and LAMBDA-L during the exercises JOINT ENDEAVOUR I (for concept development) and 
JOINT ENDEAVOUR II (for campaign synchronisation). This is in line with NATO’s COPD (Comprehensive 
Operations Planning Directive). Finally, ZETA (Zoran Effects Based Tool For Asymmetric Analysis) is a 
simulation on a governmental level, dealing with asymmetric threats such as terrorist attacks. ZETA is 
used by operational analysts to identify risks in order to recommend certain courses of action (COA) 
during the exercises JOINT ENDEAVOUR I and JOINT ENDEAVOUR II. Yearly utilisation is rather constant 
and in 2014-2016 was as follows:401 
 KORA/OA: seven exercise days (DECISIVE WARRIOR), 
 SimoF: six exercise days, 
 GAMM-L/LAMDA-L/ZETA: seventeen exercise days (JOINT ENDEVOUR I and II). 
Focus is on supporting exercises with COA-analytical tools to see if a certain COA is feasible.402 For 
example, KORA/OA, designed in the mid-1990s as a force on force simulation, is used for time and 
space calculation. It visualises assumptions, for example, percentage decreases during a defending 
battle or a frontal assault. This ability to display the situation is a major advantage of KORA/OA and is 
done with a 2D map view.403 Another example is the use of SimoF during the exercise COMMON TRAIL 
in 2013. It was aggregately used and provided overlays for COA-analysis. The simulation was done 
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separately by the different services: the Air Force did their simulation before the Army, and the results 
were not integrated. One reason for not integrating the simulation systems further is that classroom 
teachers are not interested since they risk getting personally surprised by the output from the 
simulations.404  
Beside the computer-based simulations and COA-wargaming an additional form of wargaming was also 
discovered: the use of commercial board games in the education of leadership skills. In quantity, this 
covers one week in the General/Admiral Staff Officer Course as well as one module for both military 
students from the General/Admiral Staff Officer Course and some well-qualified civilians. This 
wargaming form was developed by a handful of officers. The form is manual, with two sides who 
conduct a cycle of actions (‘planning – conducting – live with the results’). In comparison, such a 
sequence of action is rare in other courses and modules at the Command and Staff College. The 
learning purpose is threefold: team building, practising issuing orders, and experiencing the principle 
of mission command. In one of the commercial board games used, Crusader Rex, which depicts the 
Third Crusade (1187-1193), the objective is to practise principles of land warfare. Hence, the students 
may make an assumption based on operational analysis on the consequences of attempting to storm 
a certain castle, or the consequences of refraining from doing so.405  
Currently (2015), three different commercial board games are used: Command and Colors: Ancients 
(tactical  level, used for three days), Castle Panic (for team building only, one afternoon) and Crusader 
Rex (operational level, used during one week).406 The reasons the scenarios are distant historical cases 
is because of Germany’s modern history and the Second World War. Wargames about that recent era 
are deemed non-acceptable in Germany. Some modern fictional games are also unacceptable, such 
as, for example, a wargame about a contemporary war in East Asia. There exists an underlying, 
sometimes articulated, obligation to be ‘politically correct’. Consequently, wargames which are 
perceived to risk criticism by the press and/or public are avoided. However, many recently published 
commercial wargames are acceptable and several of those are sufficiently complex to be used in 
professional military education in Germany.407 
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Photograph no. 12: COTS-games in use at Die Führungsakademie.408 
 
In summary, three forms of wargaming exist at the Command and Staff College. The first is seminar-
based COA-wargaming. The second is various computer-based simulations, which seem to be primarily 
used for COA-analytic support as simulation-based exercises, such as, for example, SiTA at the Officer 
School. The third form constitutes commercial board games. The impression from interviews and 
observations is that the initial wargaming forms are in decline, or stagnant, while the third type is on 
the rise (albeit from a small number).  
 
Control & veiling 
Instructors do not consider the various simulations, such as KORA/OA, ‘wargaming’. This attitude is 
one indication of control & veiling. However, the actual use of simulation systems, such as KORA/OA, 
is not akin to a ‘simulation-based exercise’ as at the Officer School and the Army Warfighting 
Simulation Centre. Instead of focusing on decision-making, the focus at the Command and Staff College 
is on analysis: an external operational analyst inputs data and provides feedback. Specifically, the 
analyst enters the data of the students’ solutions into a simulation system and then sometimes lets 
the computer run the simulation overnight. Instead of a ‘Director’, an analyst presents the results. On 
the other hand, simulation systems provide support for exercises, such as DECISIVE WARRIOR. 
However, teachers seem disconnected from the simulation process as they lack control over the 
simulation systems. In fact, it is visiting personnel from the Army Warfighting Simulation Centre that 
operate the simulation systems. As an additional complicating matter, technical limitations do not 
                                                          




allow data transfer between different computer-based simulation systems. Data has to be transferred 
manually, which is time consuming and limits the utilisation of simulations.409  
The absence of physical veiling and instructor control at the Command and Staff College may have 
reinforced instructors’ lack of enthusiasm for the simulation systems. Students sometimes interact 
with the simulation systems which is a difference compared to the Officer School and the Army 
Warfighting Simulation Centre. However, this accessibility has arguably contributed to a situation 
where teachers are concerned about realism: instructors have voiced reservation about combat results 
generated by the simulation in full view of the students. Consequently, students reportedly do not 
input data directly into the simulation systems as the teachers are not in favour of that. One reason is 
that teachers supposedly neglect the output by the simulations systems since the teachers seem to 
have difficulties accepting results due to perceptions of unrealism. Since the simulations are computer-
based, the well-known ‘black box syndrome’ of computer-based combat calculations is likely to have 
affected the instructors’ perception of unrealism. One interesting remark is, however, that students 
generally are more used to, and thus more positive to, simulations systems than the teachers, as some 
systems have been used in recent military operations, such as Afghanistan.410   
 
Simple standardising 
It is up to individual instructors to implement wargaming in the form of COA-wargaming. However, the 
challenge is not only to ‘convince your boss’ as a teacher, but also to influence students, in order to be 
able to introduce and implement wargaming.411 Instructor buy-in, while clearly dependent on the 
individual teacher, is thus also connected to the individual’s milieu, which includes hierarchy buy-in 
and participants’ buy-in. Such buy-in connects to adherence to doctrine: existing regulations in the 
Germany Army on how to do wargaming and when. In comparison to the USA, the German Army’s 
policy is to do COA-wargaming at the operational level, and not at the tactical level. Specifically, 
‘wargaming’ in the German Army is about identifying risks/chance in a specific COA, and not several 
COAs as in the US Army.412 One reason for this difference is that wargaming is deemed time-intensive, 
and that the process is staff-driven in Germany and commander-driven in the USA. Since not everyone 
is convinced of its value, there is supposedly less wargaming conducted in the German Army. Hence, 
the German Army seems to have lost old lessons of wargaming. One instructor concluded that 
‘Germany is the only army that is not using wargaming on a tactical level’. The reasons are that there 
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are no clear regulations. Consequently, ‘wargaming’ does not fit into the German military decision-
making process, and as a result there is a lack of trained personnel in ‘wargaming’.413 In other words, 
traditional German skills in wargaming are gone. This point was emphasised with the illustration below, 
which was presented to the author as an example of previous historical and extensive use of 
wargaming within the German Army. 
 
 
Illustration no. 9: traditional German military wargaming.414 
 
The use of COA-wargaming at the Command and Staff College seems to be more limited than might 
have been expected considering the presence of a simulation centre and a well-known manual on COA-
wargaming. One example is the education in tactics. While the General/Admiral Staff Officer Course is 
a joint course, the three services learn tactics separately. There are three blocks within the army 
department: Corps, Division and Brigade levels. Neither of them contain COA-wargaming. While it is 
the seminar leaders who decide if wargaming should be used, a lack of time is seen as a major obstacle 
impeding COA-wargaming.415 In addition, according to Lieutenant Colonel Kodalle who ran the 
Manfred Wörner Zentrum in 2006-08 and then again in 2012-14, since 2006 there has been a decline 
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in the use of simulation systems at the Command and Staff College. This decline is attributed to staff 
reluctance and lack of acceptance. This explicitly indicates challenges of achieving instructor buy-in. 
Furthermore, personnel that were trained in using simulation systems in 2006 have since left. Since it 
is time-consuming to learn how to use simulation systems the knowledge is therefore lost. This then 
becomes a structural and circular problem: no knowledge in simulation systems means that simulation 
systems are not used. In conjunction with reorganisation in 2015-16, that saw the Manfred Wörner 
Zentrum absorbed into the communication section (S-6), use of simulation may diminish even more.416 
This perceived lack of wargaming stands in contrast to clear indicators of the property adherence to 
doctrine. The manual on COA-wargaming in Germany was written and published at the Command and 
Staff College as recently as 2004-06.417 Education on COA-wargaming based on this manual continues 
at the Command and Staff College. This is in line with the indicator that ‘we have to do wargaming’. 
However, simplicity envisages that ‘every officer must manage wargaming’. This does not seem to be 
the case. In fact, during the study visit to the Command and Staff College, one – only one – officer was 
named ‘the expert’ on COA-wargaming.418 Unfortunately, during the author´s visit that officer was not 
available for an interview. Another inference is that while there are indications of ‘we have to do 
wargaming’, it does not seem that any COA-wargaming is done at the tactical level. Instead, the 
German form of COA-wargaming is applicable to the operational level, and consequently much more 
limited than would be the case if it were also applicable to tactical levels. In short, while there are 
potentially ample opportunities to conduct COA-wargaming, there are indications that it is utilised 
more rarely than the author had envisaged based on previous visits to the Officer School and the Army 
Warfighting Simulation Centre. One reason may be found in the limited number of personnel with 
sufficient knowledge of COA-wargaming. However, the main reason behind the limited application 
seems to be that German doctrine limits the use of ‘wargaming’. There are other instructors, with 
specific knowledge of COA-wargaming, but they do not practise it with their classes. In other words, 
there is a potential to increase COA-wargaming. This, however, entails a modification in doctrine as 
well as more simplicity. One German instructor, with knowledge of COA-wargaming at the tactical level 
in the USA, expressed the following: ‘A handbook entails more experts. However, to use such a manual 
you also need experience.’ Simply put, a manual is in itself not enough: you also need personnel who 
have the ability to make it work, by knowing how wargaming ‘really works’.419 This viewpoint indicates 
that wargaming is for anyone: accordingly, ‘you’ as an army officer must be able to do it. Simply put, 
while relying on doctrine, i.e. manuals and regulations, this adherence must be backed-up by 
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numerous experienced personnel, who are able to conduct and understand the inner workings of a 
straightforward and regulated form of wargaming. While the German form of operational COA-
wargaming is straightforward, the property of simplicity is based on the indicator that every officer has 
the ability to conduct wargaming. This can be questioned since the operational COA-wargaming is 
arguably more expert-led than the opposite. In addition, while the operational COA-wargaming 
practised at the Command and Staff College is arguably in accordance with the property of doctrinal 
adherence, its use is also constricted by doctrine.  
 
Innovative active learning 
Indications of promotion of gamification exist at the Command and Staff College. During the data 
collection wargaming activities were discovered that were different, compared to the ubiquitous 
‘simulation-based exercise’ at the previous levels (I, II) and to COA-wargaming (III). These activities 
were the use of COTS board games. This usage is connected to incidents, such as references to articles, 
individual expertise in games and the phrase ‘serious gaming’, that indicate the property promotion of 
gamification. Such incidents were discussed in detail with several instructors, who strongly believed in 
the usefulness of educational games for learning. The rationale behind the use of commercial (COTS) 
board games is that in essence they function as a double-sided staff exercise but without any expensive 
computer simulation system. This viewpoint is attributed to one individual, Colonel Uwe Heilmann, 
who is described as ‘the father of the idea’. This idea is as follows: ‘if a board game is good, it can be 
applied’.420 However, while an application of a board game can be described as a substitute for a 
computer simulation system for a staff exercise, it is not used in a similar way. In other words, the 
manual board game is not veiled but put right in front of the training audience. This is because a central 
feature is the interaction between the game and the players. In other words, the players’ symbolic 
interaction by physically touching game pieces. This physical interaction was compared by one 
instructor to the use of LEGO blocks in education: ‘when the player can actually move units by hand, 
this creates a feeling that is very important for communication and to explain things’.421 This 
visualisation of game design features explicitly connects to the promotion of gamification. 
One indicator of the presence of the property promotion of gamification is the use of theories such as 
game-based learning: in other words, ‘how to learn’. Such connections to theory was indicated in the 
preference for manual wargames. One example is the utilisation of the COTS wargame Command & 
Color: Ancients. This wargame is organised as a double-sided wargame. Each side’s commander (and 
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staff) also have subordinate commanders, who are all together in one large room. In one of the 
conducted games, the commander chose to replace one of his subordinate commanders. The new 
subordinate commander looked at his forces, paused, and then remarked to the umpire ‘The table 
looks completely different from when I was an onlooker’.422 This emphasis on roles, which often 
change during the game, and the awareness of winning or losing, have the purpose of getting the 
players ‘out of their comfort zone’.423 The instructor’s subsequent feedback on the player’s soft skills 
seems important. Soft skills encompass, for example, communication, motivation and situational 
awareness. This feedback is combined with the allowance of failure as a form of learning. This was 
verbally explained as ‘whatever happens during the game stays in the room’ – a rule explicitly alluded 
to an Abbey’s ‘Rose of Silence’. The basic and underlying concept is to ‘try again and fail better’.424 The 
focus is on ‘how to learn’ during the process, which in turn generates spin-off effects. For example, in 
Crusader Rex the participants learned the geography of Israel although that was not an articulated 
learning objective.425 While learning objectives, or expressed training goals, are present in any of the 
three theoretical concepts, the indicator of innovative active learning concerns the process of the 
participants’ construction of their actions – in German the expression is Handlung. While this action-
oriented and constructive form of learning is part of ‘serious gaming’, it is combined with an open 
admittance that it is alright to play a game, have fun, and learn.426 The instructors interviewed clearly 
believed this way of learning is how future learning will be constituted and that they are part of a 
‘grass-root movement’ for the use of ‘serious gaming’ in military education.427  
One indicator of individual innovativeness is the implicit, or explicit, expression that ‘no one 
understands wargaming’. This attitude is articulated in this example. For example, one instructor 
revealed that the word ‘play’ is hard for their superiors to comprehend. However, in the instructor’s 
view, ‘game’ means ‘play’, as in game-based learning. The counter-argument is that ‘a soldier does not 
play games’.428 This argument is overcome by the instructors by reliance on theory, specifically 
gamification from the civil sector, as a counter-weight.429 A central challenge is to find the ‘right 
balance between play and topic’. Notably, gamification necessitates an emphasis on ‘free play’ and 
that the players have to ‘live with the results’, which are more or less instantly delivered.430 The 
emphasis on being allowed to fail was brought up repeatedly by the instructors as a big advantage of 
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this conceptual form of wargaming. This is based on a conviction that there is a steeper learning curve 
for losers than winners. And, ‘losing is natural.’431 Furthermore, since two of the board games depict 
historical conflicts rather than fictional modern ones, participants do not raise the issue of unrealism. 
The emphasis on doing, and the possibility to fail (and lose), also allows this use of board games for 
team building. This is considered important since the participants tend to be both military and civilian 
students.432 
One further indicator of individual innovativeness is the presence of self-design features in the 
wargaming form. Individual innovativeness is not about taking a commercial wargame ‘off the shelf’ 
and putting it to immediate use. Instead, a commercial board game can be modified to a certain extent. 
For example: instead of the designed one person per side, there are 6-12. Moreover, instead of 
drawing random combat cards which determine activation of units in Command & Color: Ancients, the 
commander and his staff may choose from every available combat card. One card is selected and then 
given to the subordinate commanders together with a written note, since verbal communication is not 
allowed. This rule was implemented to simulate historical battle conditions. However, its practical 
feature is that it allows observations of the players’ behaviour. As one instructor puts it: ‘We want to 
see how the team works [and who will become the leader] (…) In each staff [red and blue] we have 
two observers, one officer and one civilian psychologist. When they realise something, they can stop 
the simulation at any time, for a 15 min inbrief. (…) [Since] the game is only a tool, a way to experience. 
(…) the aim is not to win/lose, if you end in the middle of a battle, then you end there.’433  
While the teachers’ views diverge about the amount of instructor control to steer the wargame –
players’ behaviour drives the wargame – this usage is nonetheless a good example of a wargaming 
form centred on individual innovativeness and promotion of gamification. This form of wargaming is 
used during two occasions (in 2015): one week during the General/Admiral Staff Officer Course and in 
one independent module. This somewhat limited amount of usage indicates the direct relations to 
certain instructors, who are knowledgeable in theories of game-based learning and accept the 
premises of this approach of learning. In other words, they achieve their instructor buy-in by adhering 
to the concept of innovative active learning.  
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Two units, the Officer School (I) and the Army Warfighting Simulation Centre (II), indicate adherence 
to control & veiling. This concerns the use of computer-based simulations (SIRA and SiTA) in the form 
of ‘simulation-based exercise’. The indicator of physical separation – veiling – is clearly present. So is 
also the control aspect of a ‘Director’, who supresses gamification by a ‘halt and restart’ process. In 
addition, the attitude of ‘we are not doing wargaming here’ is another indication of control & veiling. 
There are two reasons behind this attitude. First, the historical word for wargame, Kriegsspiel, is not a 
politically correct word in today’s Germany. Second, the contemporary term ‘wargaming’ is delimited 
to course of action (COA) wargaming, which only occurs at the Command and Staff College (III)).  
The concept of control & veiling was not the only indicated concept at the Officer School (I) and the 
Army Warfighting Simulation Centre (II). The property of simplicity, regarding the concept of simple 
standardising, was indicated in how instructors learn to work as a ‘Director’. This concerns the 
determination that every classroom teacher should be able to work as a ‘Director’ with SiTA and SIRA. 
To achieve this, individual instructors learn from each other. Besides simplicity, there were indications 
of adherence to doctrine since every officer cadet participates in SIRA and SiTA exercises, which are 
deemed very important in the German Army educational curriculum. Accordingly, while the concept 
of control & veiling seems to dominate, there are also indications of simple standardising.  
The situation at the third embedded unit of analysis, the Command and Staff College (III), is different. 
Here elements of all three concepts are involved. First, ‘wargaming’ is formally delimited as COA-
wargaming, which is an indicator of adherence to doctrine. However, this doctrinal support was found 
to limit the use at the tactical level. Consequently, there are few educational occasions with COA-
wargaming at the Command and Staff College. In addition, while COA-wargaming by itself is a rather 
straightforward form of wargaming as it resembles a combination of a seminar- and map-based 
wargame, conducted within a single room, there were few indications of simplicity. Instead, only one 
officer at the Command and Staff College was referred to as the ‘expert’ in COA-wargaming. While 
adherence to doctrine was clearly indicated, there were less indications of simplicity regarding COA-
wargaming 
The second example of the Command and Staff College (III) concerns computer-based simulations, 
which were not used in a similar fashion compared to the Officer School (I) and the Army Warfighting 
Simulation Centre (II). Instead of decision-making the focus was on analysis. In addition, the simulation 
systems were visible to students. Teachers were critical of the computer-based simulations because of 
perceptions of unrealistic combat adjudication. In addition, the individuals who actually worked the 




simulations, in conjunction with little instructor control over the simulation, are likely to have 
contributed to non-acceptance among instructors – arguably, instructor buy-in was not achieved 
because control & veiling was not fully implemented. Teachers simply did not accept the results from 
the simulations and were thus not interested in using them, let alone handling the systems themselves.  
The third example from the Command and Staff College (III) concerns how instructors achieve 
instructor buy-in by adherence to the concept of innovative active learning. This adherence was 
indicated in the use of COTS wargames in the form of modified board games, such as Crusader Kings, 
which cover a historical military campaign. While enthusiastic in their application of game-based 
learning and promotion of gamification, the instructors were nonetheless wary that other officers 
would have difficulty accepting this form of wargaming since it has connotations of ‘play’, which is 
perceived to be non-serious for professional military education. Notably, adherence to the concept of 
innovative active learning was also found to be the least common concept in Germany.  
The results from the exploration of the three embedded analytical units in Germany indicate that one 
concept dominates a particular form of wargaming. This domination is best exemplified by the 
computer-based SIRA regarding control & veiling (I and II) and COTS board games regarding innovative 
active learning (III). It can, however, be stated that educational wargaming activities in German military 
education for army officers and officer cadets in general occur according to the concept of control & 
veiling. The major exception is the Command and Staff College (III), where COA-wargaming indicates 
adherence to simple standardising while the concept of innovative active learning is utilised for 
instructors to achieve instructor buy-in for modified COTS board games. This is not to say that a 
wargaming form must be exclusively connected to one concept only. For example, the findings 
demonstrated that it is possible for two or more concepts to exist within the same educational facility 
and that some wargaming forms, for example SiTA, include indicators of both control & veiling and 
simple standardising. When instructor buy-in is not achieved, which was indicated with teachers and 
computer-based simulations at the Command and Staff College (III), the educational usefulness of 
these simulations seems to decline – despite the presence of a dedicated simulation facility and the 







6. United Kingdom 
  
Introduction 
The initial step in the British Army’s professional military education is the Royal Military Academy 
Sandhurst (RMAS). After a one-year successful education at RMAS as an officer cadet, the individual 
receives an officer commission as a second lieutenant. After some years of service at an army regiment, 
the officer attends various shorter courses at the Land Warfare Centre, for example the Captains 
Warfare Course. Both the RMAS and the Land Warfare Centre are organisationally part of the 
Sandhurst Group: two of the three embedded units of analysis in the UK thus belong to the same 
organisational hierarchy. The third unit is the Joint Services Command and Staff College (JSCSC) where 
selected officers receive education in tactics and staff work. However, there is also another military 
educational establishment in the United Kingdom beyond the Joint Command and Staff College. This 
is the Royal College of Defence Studies. It is not further investigated since it is beyond the scope of 
education in tactics and educates only a small number of senior officers. Accordingly, the embedded 
units of analysis in the UK are:  
 The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, RMAS (I),  
 The Land Warfare Centre (II),   
 The Joint Services Command and Staff College, JSCSC (III). 
Since 2003 all three embedded units, the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, the Land Warfare Centre 
and the Joint Services Command and Staff College, have been affected by an initiative to promote 
wargaming. Those efforts became tangible for the author following the initial annual UK Connections 
wargaming conference in London in 2013, which was arranged by Professor Philip Sabin and Major 
(reserve) Graham Longley-Brown. The promotion of wargaming is connected to certain individuals, 
such as, for example, Major General (ret.) Andrew Sharpe, Lieutenant Colonel Ivor Gardiner, Major 
Tom Mouat and Major (reserve) Graham Longley-Brown, who are outspoken proponents of an 
increased use of military wargaming.434 The drive towards an increased use of educational wargaming 
was particularly articulated during a British Army wargaming symposium on 9 May 2014, for British 
Army officers with the rank of captain or major, at the UK Defence Academy in Shrivenham (in close 
proximity to the JSCSC). This symposium came about after an initiative by Lieutenant Colonel Ivor 
Gardiner. Almost 100 army officers were introduced to different wargaming forms during this day, in 
particular manual wargaming. The purpose was to spread ‘best practice’ and thus increase the use of 
                                                          




wargaming.435 The photograph indicates that this introduction gave every participant a possibility for 
a quick (15 minutes) hands-on wargame consisting of a double-sided board game designed by 
Professor Philip Sabin on the German land offensive into France in 1914. The author also participated 
in this symposium and subsequently, a year later, visited the three embedded units of analysis. The 
drive for an increased use of military wargaming continued during the entire course of this research. 
In fact, in august 2017, during the final writing up period for thesis, a doctrinal wargaming handbook 
was published with Major (reserve) Graham Longley-Brown as the lead author.436 The purpose of the 
handbook is to introduce wargaming and provide guidance with different examples.437 Those 
examples, regarding educational wargaming, are covered in this chapter. 
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Royal Military Academy Sandhurst (RMAS) 
Sandhurst is one of the world’s best known military educational establishments for army officer cadets. 
About 1,000 officer cadets enter Sandhurst per year (three intakes) and more than 80 percent 
subsequently graduate successfully after the three terms. In total, the length of education constitutes 
about ten months. The main course at Sandhurst is the Regular Commissioning Course where future 
officers are ‘intellectually grounded’. The Regular Commissioning Course is divided into three terms: 
junior, intermediate and senior. Each lasts three months. The junior term consists of three modules, 
provides basic soldier skills and lays the foundation of professionalism. The intermediate term covers 
two specific modules: offensive and defensive. In this term officer cadets are introduced to military 
decision-making and the military planning process. Finally, the senior term covers two modules with 
increased complexity, including stabilisation operations. The academic context is provided by the three 
academic departments at RMAS: War Studies, Defence and International Affairs, and Communication 
and Applied Behaviour Science. Formal assessment, however, focuses on the officer cadets’ command 
appointments in exercises. Approximately 46 % of allocated time is spent on exercises that are 
conducted either outdoors in the field or in classrooms. This combination of military training and 
academic studies aims to develop a ‘keen intellect’. In order to develop this ‘intellectual warrior’, 
learning starts with explanations in lectures and expands to the application of practical knowledge in 
order to further understanding of relevant issues that the officer cadet may face in the future. For 
example, military history is used to exemplify military decision-making.439  
 
Contemporary wargaming 
Based on presentations at the UK Connections wargaming conference in 2013 and 2014, as well as the 
British Army’s wargaming symposium in 2014, there was an expectation by the author that there would 
be few, if any, examples of contemporary wargaming at Sandhurst. Information prior to the visit 
indicated an ongoing (2015-2016) initiative to introduce manual forms of wargaming. However, the 
author discovered an additional form of wargaming during the visit to Sandhurst. During a walk around 
with one of the military support staff, the author was introduced to facilities that supported a form of 
exercise that can be considered a form of wargaming. This form utilises eight specially designed 
classrooms. Each classroom represents a Company Command Post, specifically named ‘Coy Ops Room’. 
Accordingly, the activity was referred to as a ‘Coy Ops Room Exercise’.440  
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Photograph no. 14: the ‘Coy Ops Room Exercise’. Visible on the back wall are the two 
computer screens (VBS) for UAV and ISTAR.441 
 
A ‘Coy Ops Room Exercise’ is a form of wargaming since it is a playable simulation for educational 
purposes. Notably, the ‘Coy Ops Room Exercise’ was never referred to as a Command Post Exercise 
(CPX). Instead, it was described as an ‘exercise’ that relies on a computer-based simulation system, the 
Virtual Battlespace (VBS), to practise communication skills and decision-making. A third purpose of this 
exercise is pre-training before the start of an outdoor field exercise: the terrain in the simulation covers 
the same area as the upcoming outdoor field exercise. A fourth and educational purpose, besides 
practising communication skills, decision-making and pre-training preparation, is that the exercise 
makes the officer cadets realise how quickly a plan falls to pieces.442 The physical layout of a Coy Ops 
Room involves at least five officer cadets who man the following roles: the second-in-command of the 
company (2IC) who functions as leader and battle captain; the controller of the Predator UAV 
(unmanned aerial vehicle) via a VBS-station; the controller of ISTAR (miscellaneous UAV and 
intelligence assets) via a VBS-station; and two signallers. The other half of the class is in a nearby 
classroom and controls aggregated platoons in the company: there is one officer cadet per platoon as 
LOCON. HICON (in this case the Battalion HQ) is played by instructors behind a divider in the same 
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sectionalised classroom as the Coy Ops Room. An exercise is run for six hours, and the officer cadets 
change positions around half-time: Platoon Commanders switch to the Coy Ops room, and the 
members of the Coy Ops room switch to Platoon Commanders. A ‘Coy Ops Room Exercise’ is run twice: 
once during the intermediate term and once during the senior tem.443  
In 2015 a wargame in the form of a board game was introduced to military instructors in order to be 
tested before a formal introduction in the curriculum for officer cadets. The name of the wargame was 
Exercise Aldershot Skirmish RMAS Wargame, which can be described as a manual board game akin to 
traditional hobby wargaming of historical battles. The in-game interaction is focused on the adversarial 
aspect since there are two players: one plays the blue force while the other plays the red force in a 
turn-based order. Gamification is explicit in the ‘victory conditions’, although those are also based on 
formal military expressions, such as ‘destroy’ and ‘deny’. The map is hexagonally gridded. It is however 
not an ordinary map with a hexagonally grid superimposed. There are no contour lines on the map as 
instead hexagons graphically represent different terrain and visualise lines of sight.444 Aldershot 
Skirmish was developed for the first module in the second (intermediate) term. The intermediate term 
is when the officer cadets are to start thinking about decision-making, based on the military planning 
process. The first module entails four weeks with a focus on offensive actions, followed by an 
additional four weeks on defensive actions. If the test of the Aldershot Skirmish were to go well, there 
was an impetus to develop another, quite similar wargame, for the defensive module as well. 
Regarding the third and senior term, where ‘human terrain’ is introduced, there was supposedly not 
enough time for wargaming. In addition to this apparent concern of lack of time, the senior term was 
also deemed ‘complex enough’. However, in 2015 the testing of Aldershot Skirmish by the instructors 
did not lead to the implementation of this particular wargame in the intermediate term as planned. 
Instructors did not like this wargame and consequently it was not used in the module. The reason given 
for this was that ‘in the real world, officers do not use dice and counters. Instead we use sand table 
and use things in our pockets to mark units.’ 445 For that reason, Aldershot Skirmish was deemed not 
suitable. Instead, wargame development was restarted with a focus on keeping the wargaming form 
adversarial, but remodelling the wargame to be simpler: i.e. by allowing for potential use in the 
outdoor terrain with ordinary military maps.446  
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Photograph no. 15: a player aid card in Exercise Aldershot Skirmish.447 
 
Following Aldershot Skirmish a subsequent wargame was initiated. This new wargame, Sandhurst Free 
Kriegsspiel, was developed by a different and external individual, Major Tom Mouat, from the Defence 
Capability Centre with the UK Defence Academy in Shrivenham. Details concerning this development 
were later publicised by the website PAXsims, which covers military and civilian educational games and 
simulation-based learning. In regard to the Sandhurst Free Kriegsspiel, it made all the files relating to 
the wargame accessible.448 The main part of what was developed, or in fact re-developed, was the 
application of ‘common-sense rules’. This concerns ideas that offer suggestions on how an instructor 
may run the wargame, rather than relying on rigid rules. The core of the wargame design remains 
double-sided and adversarial: two opposing teams and each team controls about one platoon of 
troops. What is new is that this wargame consists of two ordinary (enlarged) maps and some simple 
counters to represent the units (squads or single vehicle). To immerse the officer cadets in a fog of war 
the two teams are located with some distance between them, while the instructor moves to each team 
in turn for adjudication. Each team is organised as a student group with no command structure. 
Decisions are supposed to be made through team discussions, which entail reaching a ‘consensus after 
a discussion’. The Sandhurst Free Kriegsspiel was run for the first time at Sandhurst with the officer 
cadets in early 2016. The military instructors were initially trained in the wargame themselves for five 
hours by Major Mouat in order to function as game directors. The wargame was then implemented 
immediately after an outdoor tactical exercise without troops (TEWT). Initial feedback from the 
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military instructors, who ran the wargame, said that the officer cadets were positive when they 
engaged with the game. The two-room approach (in reality each team sitting at a different end of the 
same classroom) was ‘surprisingly effective’. However, another instructor remarked that this wargame 
would not prepare them for the later wargames they would encounter in their army careers, such as 
at the Land Warfare Centre’s Junior Officer Tactical Course (JOTAC) and Captains Warfare Course 
(CWC) as well as at the Battlegroup and Brigade levels.449  
 
 
 Photograph no. 16: the use of Sandhurst Free Kriegsspiel at RMAS.450 
 
Finally, the curriculum of Sandhurst offers indications of exercises which include role-playing and 
decision-making. For example, during a well-known study trip to Normandy, the officer cadets are 
instructed on the historical action of how a German coastal artillery battery was captured by a British 
battalion during the Normandy landing in June 1944. This example is used to exemplify the need for 
quick decision-making when faced with an uncertain situation. Therefore, the officer cadets have to 
run from the historic landing beach to the starting position for the attack and are faced with a similar 
dilemma: they must develop an improvised plan to capture the battery. As an aid for this task, the 
officer cadets use the ‘7-questions combat estimate’ which is a decision-making tool used throughout 
the British Army. After this phase, the story of what really happened historically in 1944, at the same 
location, is revealed.451 However, there is no interaction since each officer cadet only presents what 
orders he or she would issue. This order is then compared to what orders were issued historically. In 
Sweden military instructors would recognise this kind of activity as a ‘verbal combat exercise’. At 
                                                          
449 Email: Mouat, 2016-09-08. 
450 Ministry of Defence (2017), pp. 85-86. 




Sandhurst however, the exercise is run by civil academics rather than military instructors.452 This 
activity is not called a wargame and neither would this thesis consider a study trip with no contingent 
interaction a wargame. In other words, the historical narrative is not a playable simulation. Nor does 
the ‘role-playing’ aspect of the study trip to Normandy place it within this thesis’s definition of 
wargaming. In comparison, the ‘Coy Ops Room Exercise’ is a wargame although it is labelled as 
something else.  
 
Control & veiling 
The name of the ‘Coy Ops Room Exercise’ is an indicator of the attitude that ‘we do not do wargaming’. 
Furthermore, the indicator of director control is present as the director has a firm grip of the exercise 
as he is also the HICON, in this scenario the Battalion Commander. As the director is in the same room 
he can, and will, overhear the main training audience’s conversation during their actions. However, 
such a physical presence does not in itself indicate that a ‘halt and restart’ process is actually used. The 
property suppression of gamification is nonetheless further indicated by a physical separation of the 
simulation system from the training audience. However, this separation is only partially fulfilled. The 
LOCON (Platoon Commanders) are located in a separate room and are only fed information by the 
means of a communication system to the Company Command Post. However, the command post has 
access to the simulation system, VBS, by the means of two workstations that control the UAV and 
ISTAR video feed. Hence, the visual feeds allow those present in the Company Command Post to 
receive real-time information about their own forces as well as other actors. Since this is the case, the 
‘Coy Ops Room Exercise’ arguably does not entirely veil the simulation system since the actual 
visualisation produced by the simulation is not concealed. It is only the subordinates themselves, and 
their views in the simulations, that are hidden.   
There are indications that suppression of gamification is present in a ‘Coy Ops Room Exercise’ since 
the emphasis is on the exercise being realistic. One indication of this is that instructors, who promote 
emphasis on realism, play the red cell. For example, the officer cadets have to use real radios to call 
for medevac, rather than just verbally put that request directly to the adjacent instructor, who 
represents the Battalion HQ. The temptation to verbally ask teachers in the same room is thus to be 
avoided by the use of a specific – and realistic – communication system. In combination, the officer 
cadets in the physical Coy Ops Room are only to observe visually in the wargame what they would 
observe visually in reality. They must communicate with their LOCON by genuine army 
                                                          




communications systems. Overall, these efforts can be categorised as ways of handling instructor 
concerns about the training audience’s potentially unrealistic behaviour.  
In comparison to the ‘Coy Ops Room Exercise’, Aldershot Skirmish and Sandhurst Free Kriegsspiel do 
not offer indications of control & veiling. Both of these wargaming forms are explicitly exposed to the 
training audience. While the Sandhurst Free Kriegsspiel takes the form of a two-room wargame 
(typically within the same classroom) the purpose of this physical separation is to increase the fog of 
war. This separation does not hide the wargame itself from the training audience. While Aldershot 
Skirmish is akin to a hobby manual board game laid out on a table and played with rigid rules, Sandhurst 
Free Kriegsspiel is a free map-based wargame with two competing teams (red and blue). Hence, while 
there are differences, there are no indications of the property suppression of gamification in either 
form. This is because a key element in both wargames is adversarial interaction.  
 
Simple standardising 
There seem to exist different views among British Army officers on what a ‘wargame’ actually is. One 
inference is that adversarial wargaming, often referred to as ‘Kriegsspiel’ by proponents of more 
wargaming, is not understood within the British Army. Proponents of wargaming describe ‘wargaming’ 
as similar to a ‘rapid decision-making exercise’, where the wargame does three things: 1) allows the 
plan to be tested in an adversarial environment, 2) makes officers/officer cadets better decision-
makers, 3) enhances understanding of doctrine. What is understood among most officers, however, is 
the use of wargaming to test the validity of a developed plan. This understanding is because of 
doctrine. For this reason, ‘wargaming’ in the British Army is an integral part in military planning. This 
doctrinally supported understanding envisages that a wargame is used as a tool to evaluate one or 
several courses of action (COAs) within the military planning process. This use of wargaming occurs at 
the Land Warfare Centre, specifically at the Junior Officer Tactical Course (JOTC) and the Captains 
Warfare Course (CWC).453 Based on this account, it may be possible to argue that ‘testing the plan’ is 
what ‘wargaming’ at RMAS is supposed to do. The reasons are that such a use is supported by doctrine 
and occurs at the next level of officer education. However, of the three wargaming forms discovered 
at Sandhurst – ‘Coy Ops Room Exercise’, Aldershot Skirmish and Sandhurst Free Kriegsspiel – none 
seem to be used for evaluation of COAs according to doctrine.  
There are indications of a lack of adherence to doctrine regarding potential use of wargaming at 
Sandhurst. On the other hand, there is support for wargaming from the organisational hierarchy: a 
                                                          




statement from the RMAS former Commanding General in 2014 endorsed wargaming as ‘important’. 
This was stated in conjunction with the display of a photograph of a specific and historic wargaming 
form (‘Operation SEA LION’) from 1974.454 This hierarchical support is in line with the attitude that 
acknowledges wargaming as ‘something we have to do’. Consequently, this support offers credibility 
even though such forms of wargaming lack the formal connections to doctrine. On the other hand, this 
form of hierarchical support for credibility may not be enough for individuals to achieve instructor buy-
in. For example, Aldershot Skirmish may have suffered from a lack of formal doctrinal support in 
addition to a perception by instructors of being too complicated. In other words, absence of the 
property simplicity.   
In a comparison between Aldershot Skirmish and Sandhurst Free Kriegsspiel the latter arguably relies 
on simple standardising to achieve instructor buy-in. The property simplicity is arguably a core feature 
of Sandhurst Free Kriegsspiel, which physically consists only of a pair of ordinary maps and a few basic 
pre-manufactured unit markers. However, since the wargame is to be conducted as a two-room 
wargame with two teams of about ten officer cadets each, this raises the level of complexity – the 
instructor must constantly move between the two adversarial teams in order to present the latest 
positions and possible detection and/or encounter of enemy units. The issue of controlling the 
wargame in this wargaming form becomes apparent. However, ordinary instructors directed the 
wargame. Based on the initial feedback from instructors, there does not seem to have been any major 
setback. Feedback from the military instructors of their initial implementation in 2016 found that most, 
if not all, instructors managed to successfully run Sandhurst Free Kriegsspiel. This seems to have been 
accomplished by the inclusion of ordinary maps and the free combat adjudication, that may be 
tweaked by each instructor. Furthermore, another indicator of simplicity can be found in the fact that 
a senior colleague and experienced wargaming instructor, Major Mouat, the wargame designer 
himself, taught the instructors. This makes this wargame an educational activity that every officer 
should manage. This inclusiveness is supported by the rulebook that states that an outdoor TEWT 
(Tactical Exercise Without Troops) is a preparatory activity for a wargame. Accordingly, just like any 
officer is supposed to manage a TEWT, so they are to conduct a wargame exercise. Since the 
wargaming form is dependent on the individual instructor, it is reasonable to argue that the form will 
evolve based on the preferences of the instructor. The rulebook also emphasises that the Sandhurst 
Free Kriegsspiel ‘[is] actively umpired, with decisions being arbitrated on the military experience of the 
umpire.’ Accordingly, ‘there aren’t any rules per se, just military common sense and a few guidelines’. 
However, the rulebook also asks: ‘are you senior enough to receive automatic suspension of disbelief?’ 
                                                          




regarding the instructor’s direction vis-a-vi the training audience’s perception of the wargame.455 This 
affirms the central position of the individual as a director and relevance of the supporting core 
categories of control, credibility and comfort. For example, one instructor added discussions of details, 
quite similar to the ‘reasoning wargame’ in Sweden regarding details about handling weapons, i.e. 
what can be reasonably expected and where certain weapons are actually located in a specific 
situation.456  
In comparison to Sandhurst Free Kriegsspiel, neither Aldershot Skirmish nor the ‘Coy Ops Room 
Exercise’ is synonymous with simplicity. Aldershot Skirmish may in theory have been simple to grasp, 
since it consisted of only a few written pages of rules and a limited number of playable units. 
Nonetheless, teachers were hesitant to use it. Ultimately, the instructors rejected it. One of the 
reasons for this rejection might be that its particular form – board game – is not supported by any 
doctrinal documents. It is simply not part of the ‘military culture’.457 Hence, it would be relatively 
unknown and consequently perceived as complicated to most instructors, unless they use such 
wargames as a hobby and at their own initiative. The ‘Coy Ops Room Exercise’, on the other hand, is 
substantially similar to a CPX. Therefore, this configuration is arguably more familiar to officers and 
thus perceived as less ‘complicated’. On the other hand, the arrangement of a ‘Coy Ops Room Exercise’ 
is also somewhat complicated since it relies on a multitude of systems (VBS and military 
communication systems) for realism in order for the participants to experience immersion. 
Consequently, a ‘Coy Ops Room Exercise’ is not a simple form of wargaming but a fixed and bulky 
installation with several integrated systems. On the other hand, it seems that every officer should 
manage it, which indicates similarity to the Sandhurst Free Kriegsspiel.  
 
Innovative active learning 
The prototype wargame Aldershot Skirmish is a good example of a wargame that offers several 
indications of the concept of innovative active learning. Promotion of gamification is indicated in 
several game elements, such as victory conditions and turn sequences. This wargame design also 
connects to a view, held by some officers, that competition is relevant since it is an indicator for 
enjoyment and thus good for education.458 Competition is a part of gamification, which is evident in 
the board game form of Aldershot Skirmish and the competiveness of two players facing each other. 
However, Aldershot Skirmish failed to achieve instructor buy-in by the military instructors who 
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evaluated the wargame for the purpose of finding out if it was a good way to teach tactics to the officer 
cadets. The fact that the military instructors did not approve of Aldershot Skirmish is akin to the 
concern raised in the 19th century by Colonel von Verdy. He believed that ‘a fundamental flaw is 
exposed when an officer fluent in operations is intimidated by the prospect of administrating a 
wargame – the dissonance being that if a wargame is truly supposed to train officers for war, how can 
seasoned officers lack the capability to conduct wargames?’.459 Officers are supposed to be experts on 
combat, if this skill is not transferable into the ability to conduct a wargame, the deductive reasoning 
entails that such a wargame should not be used. Instead, explicit control mechanisms by a game 
director to allow control, such as ‘halt and restart’, in order to clarify rules and to avoid drastic results 
based on misunderstanding the rules seem to be a desired need of military instructors.460 This connects 
to a perceived need to pause and discuss certain issues. Consequently, this would arguably transform 
the wargaming form into a ‘reasoning wargame’, a form that was exemplified in Sweden, or to a veiled 
form, such as SIRA in Germany. This need of explicit control indicates that the perception of achieving 
control of a wargame is essential, which highlights a latent suppression of gamification. 
The issue of gamification is somewhat connected to the issue of achieving the right balance in 
complexity versus simplicity. For military officers, it is sometimes perceived as good to include every 
small detail instead of too much abstraction. A key general concern extrapolated from a British Army 
officer tasked to test play the Aldershot Skirmish is that ‘complexity gets you engaged but also turns 
you off’.461 Notably, this view is from a British officer who is familiar with the relatively complex 
wargame form of Advanced Squad Leader (ASL). This is because his Battalion Commander, Lieutenant 
Colonel Gardiner, mandated that particular wargame, a COTS hobby wargame in the form of a board 
game, as an educational tool for officers in his battalion. Lieutenant Colonel Gardiner is a hobby 
wargamer and decided to use wargames as an educational tool in order to move beyond the ordinary 
mandated COA-wargaming and to ‘give the enemy a vote’. Notably, however, Lieutenant Colonel 
Gardiner himself proposes a simpler wargame for Sandhurst rather than the ASL, which he chose 
because of his familiarity with ASL as a part of his hobby wargaming.462 Most officers are ‘non-
wargamers’ and thus certain wargaming forms, such as board games, are perceived as too complex 
and/or alien.463 This potential issue of a perception of too much complexity can be interpreted as 
detrimental for an instructor to achieve instructor buy-in. Complexity is not an unknown issue in 
educational wargaming. Professor Philip Sabin has described this dichotomy between accuracy and 
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simplicity as a delicate balance since a wargame must be both ‘realistic’ and ‘playable’ for the players 
to learn.464 With such a dichotomy inherent in any wargame design, the successor of Aldershot 
Skirmish, the Sandhurst Free Kriegsspiel, leaves it to the instructor to decide the level of complexity. 
This avoids a rigid wargaming form’s inflexible level of complexity inherent in rigid rules and/or 
unfamiliar features, such as victory points, likely to be considered ‘complicated’ by instructors. 
Nonetheless, both forms feature double-sidedness.  
Two particular similarities of the Sandhurst Free Kriegsspiel and Aldershot Skirmish indicate adherence 
to the concept of innovative active learning. First, both wargaming forms are designs by an individual 
military instructor. This is an indicator of individual innovativeness. Second, both forms are centred on 
the element of double-sided adversarial interaction. Sandhurst Free Kriegsspiel requires a two-room 
configuration and two teams, with one map for the blue side and another map for the red side. 
Consequently, this increases the adversarial aspect, which is also inherent in the board game design of 
Aldershot Skirmish. This focus on competition indicates promotion of gamification. However, the 
difference between those two wargame designs is the emphasis on free adjudication in Sandhurst Free 
Kriegsspiel. In other words, some key aspects, such as the combat adjudication, are left to the 
discretion of the instructor, which are thus indications of simplicity. Accordingly, Sandhurst Free 
Kriegsspiel seems to achieve instructor buy-in by adhering to innovative active learning in combination 
with the property simplicity of simple standardising. 
Finally, the property promotion of gamification was not discovered regarding the ‘Coy Ops Room 
Exercise’. There were neither explicit references to learning theories nor any obvious game design 
elements by individual instructors. The wargaming form is also one-sided as the instructors themselves 
control and play the red cell. Based on observation of the facilities and a conversation with an 
instructor, the ‘Coy Ops Room Exercise’ is devoid of explicit gamification.465 Nor is there any indication 
that a certain individual is responsible for the wargaming form. On the contrary, the wargaming form 
seems enduring with many involved instructors as directors.  
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Land Warfare Centre 
The Land Warfare Centre in Warminster was originally the School of Infantry, which then became the 
Combined Arms School, which later became the Land Warfare Centre. This development is somewhat 
similar to the history of the Swedish Land Warfare Centre. Both Centres also have a similar focus, which 
is on the education and training of junior officers as well as entire army units. While there are other 
army branch schools in the UK their focus is on specialty arms courses – accordingly those schools are 
‘schools of trade’. The Land Warfare Centre, on the other hand, has two focus areas: individual career 
courses and collective training courses. The latter include activities such as CATT, CAST and field 
training.466 CATT stands for Combined Arms Tactical Training, and involves the use of 140 linked vehicle 
simulators, while CAST stands for Command and Staff Training, which is comparable to ‘command 
training’ and the use of the computer-based simulation CATS at the Swedish Land Warfare Centre. 
Regarding the individual career courses there are three major and two minor courses. The three major 
courses are the JOTC (Junior Officer Tactical Course), the CWC (Captains Warfare Course) and the 
CATAC (Company Commanders Tactical Course). The additional two minor courses do not involve 
tactics as they focus on administrational tasks at the battlegroup and brigade level.  
 
Contemporary wargaming 
One issue that appeared right away during data collection in the UK relates to the generally vague 
definition of a ‘wargame’. There is a plethora of activities at the Land Warfare Centre and many of 
those could potentially be referred to as wargaming activities within the general range of military 
simulations. While the general attitude in the British Army seems to accept that ‘wargaming’ is a good 
idea, there is actually no definitions of ‘wargaming’. The closest equivalent to a definition would be 
found in the widely distributed Staff Officer Handbook. However, only a minor section in this British 
Army communal handbook concerns wargaming.467 Consequently, as was the case with Sandhurst, 
wargaming activities are possibly referred to as non-wargaming activities. For this reason, the 
discovered activities at the Land Warfare Centre are contextualised by the application of this thesis’s 
refined definition of military educational wargaming. While a playable simulation encompass different 
physical forms, absence of contingent symbolic interaction between participants would negate an 
educational activity to be considered as a wargaming activity.  
Several wargaming activities at the Land Warfare Centre were discovered in the three courses for 
officers. The initial course, the Junior Officer Tactical Course (JOTAC), covers four to six weeks. Officers 
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attending this course belong to the combat arms: armour/cavalry and infantry. Some officers from the 
army air corps also attend, in addition to selected artillery and engineer officers. The focus of the JOTAC 
is to educate Platoon Commanders in the use of different arms. There are supposedly no wargaming 
activities within JOTAC, which is also the initial course in an educational progression of courses. The 
second and subsequent course is the Captains Warfare Course (CWC). This course is especially 
noteworthy for the reason that every captain in the British army enters this course, which lasts for a 
total of twelve weeks. The CWC is the first instance of formal staff training (‘staff duties and tactics’) 
and is an essential step for an officer in order to become an adjutant at a Battlegroup or Brigade 
headquarters. In the second half of the CWS, COA-wargaming is conducted three times as part of the 
planning process. The COA-wargaming form is directly linked to the Staff Officer handbook (section 
3.6.5) and the focus during a COA-wargame is on force ratio, risk and rewards.468 The CWC thus 
supposedly introduces British Army officers to a doctrinal view of wargaming in the form of COA-
wargaming. 
The third course is the Company Commanders Tactical Course (CATAC). It was developed from a 
combined arms tactical course. This course used to cover six weeks, but it has been reduced to only 
two weeks. There is reportedly no wargaming in this course. One of the reasons seems to be the brevity 
of the course. However, during discussions on implementing wargaming one major concern was that 
a future wargame has to be realistic and therefore ‘acceptable’. For example, map-based wargaming 
was deemed to not provide sufficiently good visualisation in comparison to 3D-shaped landscapes with 
a sand table design. However, the latter form was believed to be too time-consuming to create. While 
there is an option to use an existing computer-based simulation system, such as VBS or CATS, such a 
design would entail only one individual being trained in the role of a Company Commander, as these 
particular computer-based simulation systems require input from many people, for example, to drive 
individual vehicles.469       
Existing activities beyond COA-wargaming can be classified as wargaming. This concerns the use of 
computer-based simulations, which supposedly occur in the JOTAC and the CWC. Instructors do not, 
however, consider such activities to be ‘wargaming’. In JOTAC a computer-based virtual simulation 
system (VBS or CATS) is utilised. However, there are concerns about inefficiency since most students 
man supporting roles, such as controlling individual vehicles, rather than engage in decision-making at 
the proper level of command.470 For the CWC, the Battlegroup Command and Control Training (BC2T) 
computer-based simulation is utilised. This constructive simulation allows plans to be tested in the 
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form of tactical activities, which means that one group of students mans a battlegroup HQ while the 
majority of the students operate in a separate room as LOCON and different cells, including a small 
enemy cell. This activity is connected to the COA-wargaming, which is conducted before a BC2T-
session. The purpose of BC2T is to execute plans. However, the necessity to operate many roles outside 
the HQ means that not every student has ‘a meaningful role’.471 Such limitations of computer-based 
simulations, including too much focus on digital visualisation, can be criticised.472 The BC2T, which 
includes about 20 computer laptops and the BOWMAN communication system, is present at about 50 
British Army locations. However, the BC2T is supposedly only used as a simulation at the Land Warfare 
Centre. This is arguably so because contractors are handling the system at the Land Warfare Centre. 
Accordingly, the use of external contractors is a way of ensuring that a computer system is actually 
used as a simulation, since, alternatively, it may not be used at all.473  
Besides classroom-based simulations in courses, two large-scale activities are in use for collective 
training (units and unit headquarters) at the Land Warfare Centre. These systems are connected to 
two specific training exercises: CATT (Combined Arms Tactical Training), which has a network of 140 
vehicle simulators, and CAST (Command and Staff Training), which is used as a command training 
exercise. CAST is a headquarters (HQ) exercise that uses ABACUS, Advanced Battlefield Computer 
System, a constructive simulation. In comparison to CAST, CATT is a ‘battlegroup trainer’ with a ‘virtual 
battlefield’ that integrates manoeuvre elements with combat support. The main difference between 
CATT and CAST is that CATT uses vehicle simulators for LOCON to enable input to the main training 
audience at the Battlegroup level, while CAST uses a constructive simulation that allows four different 
training levels (Battlegroup, Brigade, Division and Corps).474   
A third exercise exists which is a combination of CATT and CAST. This third activity is the Combined 
Staff Tactical Training Exercise (CSTTX). Based on presentations received during a visit to the Land 
Warfare Centre, it seems that this third activity actually constitutes the main activity, as the other two 
activities are first and foremost meant for LOCON in order to generate input for the command level in 
focus for the exercise.475 Regarding the CSTTX layout, the Battlegroup Headquarters (BG HQ) – the 
primary training audience – is physically separated from subordinate units (LOCON) and vehicle crews, 
who are placed with the vehicle simulators. Hence, in a CSTTX, the virtual battlefield is for LOCON eyes. 
In addition, within a CSTTX a CAST is conducted with the purpose of assessing staff ability to support 
the unit commander. This is examined during a CSTTX, which usually lasts for three weeks. During the 
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third week three different planning and execution events occur.476 The focus of a CSTTX is to expose 
the training audience to the ‘friction of execution’.477 Based on observation during the visit, there is a 
small red cell (OPFOR) of one or two operators.478 On the blue side there are indications of dynamic 
interaction between the BG HQ and the LOCON. This dynamic interaction, within the overall adversarial 
framework, is probably sufficient for this activity to be considered a form of wargame, at least for the 
primary training audience. On the other hand, use of scripted event-lists would arguably transform the 
activity into non-wargaming. 
 
 
Illustration no. 10: overview of the Combined Staff Tactical Training Exercise (CSTTX).479 
 
While CATT, CAST and CSTTX belong to a grey zone regarding wargaming activities, ‘wargaming’ 
actually constitutes an explicit part within a CAST as part of planning sessions. This concerns ‘COA-
wargaming’, with the purpose of ‘stress-testing’ the developed plan. Such a COA-wargame is 
conducted in accordance with a doctrinal manual and uses a characteristic action/reaction/counter-
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action/consolidation and judgement procedure. It also features a ‘robust’ adversary played by the 
intelligence section of the visiting HQ.480 The presence of an explicit wargame within an overall exercise 
is not limited to CAST. One interesting feature that CATT uses since 2015 is what can be described as a 
wargame opportunity within the overall activity. A force on force engagement occurs on the last day 
of the initial visiting week. The battlegroup is divided into two competing teams: one tank and one 
mechanised coy vs. one tank and one mechanised coy. The reason behind this competitive approach 
is that it is believed to be beneficial for learning ‘since no one likes to lose’. To avoid losing, the 
participants need to learn how to handle the vehicle simulators. Apparently, the Coy Commanders 
stimulate the competiveness by a promise of free beer if their company wins. The belief in the 
educational effectiveness of competitiveness was likened to the sport of ice hockey: ‘if it is a game, 
and not just training, the focus is not on how to skate but on team play in order to win.’ Because of 
this reasoning by the officer in charge of CATT, this force on force activity was introduced in 2015.481 A 
classic force on force simulation is a good example of a wargame session. While CAST, CATT and CSTTX 
are examples of activities that are only potentially ‘wargames’ because of the likelihood of limited (and 
possible scripted) interaction, the discovered ‘wargame within a wargame’ offers interesting examples. 
There are also ideas of introducing further wargames. A manual wargame under development, the 
Camberley Kriegsspiel, is contemplated to be used as a wargame activity within CAST and/or a CATT, 
in order to achieve better results and to further understanding of co-ordination, team-training, 
observation of communication and improvement in tactical performance by replaying, and thus 
refighting, a bad outcome in another wargaming format.482  
The CWC is where a manual wargaming form is contemplated to be introduced as ‘formal wargaming’. 
This is an initiative by General Major (ret.) Andrew Sharpe, head of the British Army’s Centre for 
Historical Analysis and Conflict Research (CHACR). General Major (ret.) Sharpe was a key speaker at 
the British Army wargaming symposium in 2014 where he promoted his views on the necessity of 
adversarial wargaming.483 The wargame Camberley Kriegsspiel was subsequently developed in 2015 
and there were plans to introduce it in the CWC in 2016.484 This would make it the second increment 
of wargaming since the initial opportunity for wargaming at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. 
This initial step became the Sandhurst Free Kriegsspiel in 2016. The contemplated second step would 
be the Camberley Kriegsspiel while a third potential step concerns another wargame under 
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development. This third step involves the potential use of the Rapid Campaign Analysis Toolset (RCAT) 
for junior majors at the Joint Services Command and Staff College (JSCSC).485   
 
 
Photograph no. 17: the prototype of the Camberley Kriegsspiel in 2015.486 
 
The initial development of the Camberley Kriegsspiel was finalised in early 2016. Instead of an umpire, 
the wargame uses the term ‘observer-controller’. This is because the form of the wargame is a manual 
three-room wargame: one table for the blue team/commander, one for the red team/commander, 
and a third, in the middle, for the control team with all units visible. Accordingly, the observer-
controller of the control team informs each team of observations and combat results. They also receive 
orders for upcoming adjudications, which are conducted by rigid rules that are available for the players 
to read. Hence, the observer-controller is not the umpire, as ‘the losing side will blame that person’. 
However, the observer-controllers need to be capable individuals in order to impose rigour on both 
sides. The training audience’s acceptance of the observer-controllers’ information and reasons is 
deemed a crucial part of getting the wargame accepted.487 This indicates concerns related to control, 
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credibility and comfort, i.e. instructor buy-in. However, similar to the initial Sandhurst initiative with 
the Aldershot Exercise, there are no data from actual use in courses. In addition, the Camberley 
Kriegsspiel was re-developed in late 2016 by a different developing team led by Lieutenant Colonel 
Gardiner.488 Reports from testing by real army units (battalion to division) in late 2016 and early 2017 
indicate more flexibility in the game design, i.e. a possibility for semi-rigid adjudication and adapted 
rules as well as maps.489 
 
Control & veiling 
Of the wargaming activities discovered at the Land Warfare Centre arguably only the CSTTX (Combined 
Staff Tactical Training Exercise), achieves instructor buy-in by adhering to the concept of control & 
veiling. The property suppression of gamification is indicated by the physical separation between the 
main training audience and the simulation systems: constructive computer-based simulation (CAST) 
and virtual simulators in mock-ups (CATT). These simulation systems are handled by LOCON (Lower 
Control). It is possible to perceive that the LOCON/vehicle crew constitutes the main training audience, 
since the LOCON/vehicle crew interacts directly with the simulation systems. Instead, it is the opposite: 
the primary training audience are the officers in the headquarters above the LOCON. Those officers do 
not directly input instructions into the simulation/simulator. Instead they use ordinary map overlays 
and ordinary communication system. This approach is akin to the Swedish and the German approaches 
at their embedded units at the intermediate level of education.  
One of the indicators of suppression of gamification is the attitude that ‘we are not doing wargames 
here’. CSTTX, including CAST and CATT, are not referred to as wargaming exercises. CSTTX, including 
CAST and CATT, seemingly indicate suppression of gamification. A central indicator of the property 
suppression of gamification is that ‘free play’ is not allowed in conjunction with the director supervising 
the red cell (OPFOR). In the case of CSTTX, OPFOR does not seem to be totally controlled and scripted 
with a pre-planned response list. This is supported by the willingness to use a force on force session 
during CATT, which encourages completely free play. This may, however, constitute an exception that 
indicates that the opposite is generally true for CAST and CATT. In any case, collected data indicate 
that the red cell is indeed supervised and controlled by the director. Another indicator of the 
suppression of gamification is that the training audience’s immersive credibility is safeguarded from 
potential concerns of unrealism related to the models of the wargame. This is achieved because the 
training audience itself does not directly interact with the simulation system, which is hidden from 
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view. This assertion is, however, contingent on the designation of primary and secondary training 
audiences since parts of the training audience do interact with the simulation system: the mock-up 
simulators in CATT. Another indicator of the property suppression of gamification is that the director 
controls and interrupts the wargaming by the use of ‘gas and brake’ or ‘halt and restart’. Regarding 
CAST, CATT and CSTTX, this direction is explicit and conditional on a ‘default model’ schedule that limits 
the week to three scenarios, each within an allocated and limited time block.490 The need to achieve 
training objectives within limited time thus requires director control.  
The use of BC2T is arguably in many ways similar to a CAST. There is an indication of some, if not full, 
physical veiling. It seems that only one laptop with the computer-based simulation BC2T is located in 
the room for the HQ while the other laptops are placed in a separate room for LOCON and other 
cells.491 This might indicate some form of veiling since it would be impractical for the eight students in 
the HQ to use only one laptop. This amount of veiling seems similar to the ‘Coy Ops Room Exercise’ at 
Sandhurst. In fact, the two exercises seem rather similar. The differences are that BC2T is for a higher 
level (BG rather than Coy), involves more students, and utilises contractors that support and/or 
operate the BC2T-laptops.  
 
Simple standardising 
Indications of adherence to doctrine are found in the recurrent incidents of COA-wargaming. This 
particular wargaming form is practised three times in the Captains Warfare Course (CWC). COA-
wargaming also occurs as an integrated activity within CAST. The wargaming form is regulated and 
organised in accordance with official manuals, such as the British Army Staff Officer Handbook.492 COA-
wargaming is arguably perceived by British Army Officers as the only official form of ‘wargaming’ since 
it forms an integrated part in the military planning process. Consequently, COA-wargaming therefore 
‘has to be done’ in order to produce a product: the refinement of a military plan. In comparison, the 
prototype of the Camberley Kriegsspiel, does not indicate adherence to doctrine with one exception: 
the manifestation of an attitude that ‘we have to do wargaming.’ This support was exemplified during 
the UK Connections wargaming conference in 2015, when Camberley Kriegsspiel was promoted by 
British Army generals.493 However, there are no indications of support for this particular wargaming 
form, i.e. ‘classic Kriegsspiel’, in formal doctrine. Such supports cover COA-wargaming only. 
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Photograph no. 18: ‘COA-wargaming’ during CAST.494 
 
As indicated in the photograph, and based on instructions provided in the received presentations, 
there are several indications of simplicity in COA-wargaming: the wargame runs in straightforward 
sequence (action/reaction/counter-action). Record keeping is done in accordance with instructions 
from the Staff Officer Handbook. In short, every single British army officer should manage the 
wargaming form of COA-wargaming – any British staff officer has to be able to organise and run this 
form of wargaming. COA-wargaming is indeed conducted multiple times during education in the CWC. 
Significantly, this course is for every captain in the British Army. Consequently, the CWC constitutes an 
opportunity to implement a specific form of wargaming, which in this case is COA-wargaming. 
Accordingly, this course offers the possibility for every officer to learn a common form of wargaming. 
Indeed, this seems to be the case with COA-wargaming. Notably, the CWC has also been suggested as 
the course where the recently (2015-2016) developed map-based wargame Camberley Kriegsspiel 
should be introduced.495  
The somewhat complicated wargaming form of Camberley Kriegsspiel raises questions if this wargame 
is connected to the property of simplicity in order to achieve instructor buy-in. One indicator of 
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simplicity is that any officer can manage it. The actual form of Camberley Kriegsspiel is a three-room 
wargame with limited information, a form that is more complicated than a single map (one-room), as 
in a COA-wargaming. Hence, this may leave less possibility of intra-professional transfer of practical 
wargaming direction knowledge. The Camberley Kriegsspiel uses ordinary maps, albeit with specific 
terrain-based square overlays to categorise mobility. However, the overlay, in conjunction with the 
three-room configuration and the necessity of observer-controllers, who rely on rigid sets of rules for 
combat adjudication, makes it arguably a more complicated form of wargaming than the COA-
wargaming form envisaged in the Staff Officer Handbook. Consequently, there is little indication of the 
property of simplicity regarding Camberley Kriegsspiel. This assertion, however, is based on a 
preliminary design prototype (2015) not yet implemented in courses. Recent developments (2016-
2017) seem to have led to more flexibility and, arguably, more emphasis on simplicity, i.e. every officer 
must be able to manage it.496 
 
Innovative active learning 
Two wargaming forms at the Land Warfare Centre seem to indicate the concept of innovative active 
learning. The first concerns the Camberley Kriegsspiel while the second wargame is the force on force 
wargame exercise within CATT. Both examples indicate the property promotion of gamification, which 
concerns explicit reference of – or reliance on – learning theory as justification for the actual 
wargaming form. The force on force exercise is particularly noteworthy since the concept of winning 
or losing is central to why it is done at all: the belief is that learning is increased ‘since no one likes to 
lose’.497 Competition is seen as an essential feature, which is a strong indication of explicit gamification. 
While the force on force exercise is limited to a certain place and time within the framework of CATT, 
and used as a form of preparatory exercise, the intention of the Camberley Kriegsspiel is more 
ambitious. The Camberley Kriegsspiel aims to make the participants understand co-ordinated warfare. 
Since the Camberley Kriegsspiel is designed for the Battlegroup level (BG), it has been proposed to be 
used as a wargame specifically for the BG Commander and to be used before a CATT in order to 
increase understanding of the inner workings of a particular BG HQ. In short, the Camberley Kriegsspiel 
offers collective and team-based training akin to a Command Post Exercise. It is also envisaged that a 
COA wargame could be run in combination with the Camberley Kriegsspiel. The intended result would 
be improved battlegroup performance at CAST/CATT.498 In other words, a belief in wargaming as an 
efficient educational tool was fundamental in the development of the Camberley Kriegsspiel. 
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The property of individual innovativeness is indicated in the force on force wargame and the Camberley 
Kriegsspiel. One indicator of the property of individual innovativeness is that an individual, or a few 
individuals, have designed the actual wargaming form. The force on force wargame is connected to a 
single officer. The development of the Camberley Kriegsspiel is connected to a handful of individuals. 
The sponsor, and proponent of adversarial wargaming, is Major General (ret.) Andrew Sharpe. Three 
additional people conducted the initial development and design work: Professor Philip Sabin at King’s 
College London, retired British Army Major General John Drewienkiewicz and Major Gary Bourne at 
the Land Warfare Centre. The prototype was developed in 2015 and the initial design was finalised in 
early 2016. Individual innovativeness is further indicated by the fact that different individuals, led by 
Lieutenant Colonel Ivor Gardiner, further developed the wargame in 2016-17.499 
Another indicator of the property of individual innovativeness is the attitude that ‘no one understands 
wargaming’. There are indications that concerns over instructor buy-in of the Camberley Kriegsspiel 
have influenced the actual wargaming form. This can be seen in the opinion that the Camberley 
Kriegsspiel has to ‘reflect the conditions on how participants view war’, and hence, the Camberley 
Kriegsspiel needs to be close to a form that looks like a ‘map table’ at Battlegroup level. The wargame 
design uses an ordinary map with an overlay. This is intentional, as the ‘medium of gaming has to 
reflect reality’, i.e. how the commander actually fights a war.500 This particular concern of instructor 
buy-in connects to a wider spectrum: the participants (training audience), the organisational hierarchy 
(commanders) and the actual instructors. It is, however, the instructors who will ultimately use the 
wargame as a tool. The ambitions behind the Camberley Kriegsspiel imply that any army officer should 
be able to run it – hence the perceived need of the wargame form to be akin to a ‘map table’, which 
would be familiar and arguably offer better comfort and credibility to an officer tasked to run this 
particular form of wargaming. Nonetheless, the initial (2015) design arguably adhered more to the 
concept of innovative active learning than simple standardising. However, a later design (2016-17) has 
arguably emphasised simple standardising to gain acceptance from ‘initially-sceptical’ army officers, 
who are supposed to run it as directors and umpires.501  
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Joint Services Command and Staff College 
In 1997 the three single-service staff colleges were combined into the Joint Services Command and 
Staff College (JSCSC). Since 2000, the JSCSC is located at Shrivenham and is organisational separately 
from the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst (RMAS) and the Land Warfare Centre. The JSCSC is 
organised within a general framework of the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, which is 
responsible for post-graduate education and ‘the majority of command, staff, leadership, defence 
management, acquisition and technology training for members of the UK Armed Forces’.502 Cranfield 
University as well as King’s College London (KCL), in particular the Department of Defence Studies, 
provide the academic credentials of the JSCSC.503  
There are two courses of interest for this thesis at the JSCSC. The first one is the Intermediate 
Command and Staff Course (Land), ICSC (L), which consists of 30 weeks of formal staff training for 
junior majors. The officers receive their promotion to majors shortly before entering the ICSC (L). There 
are actually three separate ICSCs as each service is responsible for their own course (Royal Navy, Army 
and RAF Divisions). Notably, the facilities are not located in the main JSCSC building but in the case of 
the Army Division, in the nearby Roberts Hall. The second course of interest is the Advanced Command 
and Staff Course (ACSC), which follows approximately eight years after the ICSC. The ACSC is a joint 
course and covers 46 weeks. The military participants have the rank of major or lieutenant colonel (OF-
3 and OF-4). Civil servants may also attend this course and King’s College London accredits the course 
to academic standards. An MA degree is offered as an option for those attending the full course.504 
Finally, there is a third course, the Higher Command and Staff Course (HCSS), which spans 17 weeks. 
The HCSS is, however, only superficially included since this course is on a higher strategic level. Only a 
few and very qualified officers attend the HCSS: about 24 UK officers yearly with the ranks OF-5 and 
OF-6 (colonel and brigadier).505  
Another part of the Defence Academy, and adjacent to the Shrivenham compound of the JSCSC, is the 
interim Defence Simulation Centre (iDSC). This is an interim organisation to assess a possible future 
permanent Defence Simulation Centre. The reason behind this approach is to create ‘more effective, 
cheaper and environmentally sustainable enabling capability for Defence’. This is to be accomplished 
by the creation of ‘a single point of access for all Defence M&S [Modelling and Simulation] matters’. 
The modelling and simulation include, for example, Virtual Battlespace (VBS) and various developed 
models, such as terrain databases, for use in computer-based simulations.506 The focus of the iDSC is 
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on virtual rather than constructive simulations. As part of the defence virtual simulation programme, 
the intent is ‘to exploit commercial games-based technology to provide the common virtual simulation 
software component to Defence systems’.507  
 
Contemporary wargaming 
The Intermediate Command and Staff Course (Land), ICSC (L), covers two terms, each involving 15 
weeks of studies. The initial term concerns staff routines. The second term is referred to as the 
‘operational term’, with a focus on brigade operations within a divisional framework. There are 
reportedly five wargaming occasions during the second term.508 Four of those occasions are conducted 
in accordance with the Staff Officer Handbook. The focus is on planning and the wargames are referred 
to as course of action wargaming, i.e. COA-wargaming. The wargaming form is manual and based on 
ordinary maps. The four occasions of COA-wargaming constitute ‘formal teaching of wargaming’ with 
the purpose of refining courses of action.509   
There are concerns among instructors that COA-wargaming is not done properly. One reason 
mentioned by one respondent is that not enough time is allotted to wargaming in the military planning 
process. Compared to the USA, where the planning process is staff-driven, military planning in the UK 
is driven by the commander. Consequently, wargaming within planning is dependent on the 
personality of the individual commander. In addition, a ‘rock drill’ is allegedly sometimes understood 
as ‘wargaming’ although that should not be the case. ‘Wargaming’ is connected to doctrine by the Staff 
Officer Handbook, which in sections 3.6.5.2 and 3.6.5.8., gives instructions on the ‘COA-wargaming’ 
process and force ratio probabilities. However, if wargaming is not properly done, as one respondent 
claims often is the case, the wargame merely validates one’s own assumptions while ignoring any 
objections: a wargame must answer ‘what if’ questions. During this conversation with a respondent 
concerned about how wargaming is conducted, the author also observed, in the same room, a table 
layout which was referred to as an ‘informal wargame’ by the same respondent. This form of 
wargaming consisted of a map with a tactical overlay and specially made pins to symbolise units. The 
specific purpose of this ‘informal wargame’ was to visualise a brigade assault and the option of either 
doing it simultaneously or sequentially: both alternatives also included a deception plan.510 This simple 
wargaming form indicates a grey zone of wargaming activities that arguably includes COA-wargaming.  
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Photograph no. 19: the ‘informal wargame’ at ICSC (L) in 2015.511 
 
In addition to four occasions of COA-wargaming, which include the ‘informal wargame’, the fifth 
wargame activity in the ICSC (L) is focused on execution-training. This concerns an exercise named 
FEARFUL EYE. This exercise is organised as a CAST (Command and Staff Training) with participating 
students organised as a brigade headquarters. FEARFUL EYE is considered to be a double-sided exercise 
since there is a red cell, supposedly composed of three persons. Over a span of six days, planning and 
subsequent execution-training are conducted. Operational analysts are brought in for combat 
adjudication and results are subsequently input into ARCADIA, a computer-based simulation run by 
civilian operational analysts from the Land Warfare Centre. Notably, units in FEARFUL EYE are actually 
moved on an ordinary map, albeit in accordance with the output from the computer-based simulation. 
Furthermore, the simulation is supplemented by a genuine communication system, BOWMAN, widely 
used by the British Army in real operations. The exercise has traditionally run in four parallel 
sessions.512 There are, however, different options on how to run FEARFUL EYE beyond 2016. One 
option is to go for a manual approach, while another option is to use computer-based simulations, 
such as VBS for an ISTAR observational view for the training audience. The wargaming form might thus 
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change, but this change is arguably dependent on several factors, such as the availability of facilities 
for computer-based simulations at Shrivenham.513   
The Advanced Command and Staff Course (ACSC) is a longer course of 46 weeks compared to the 30 
weeks of the ICSC (L). Four wargaming activities occur during the ACSC. The most noteworthy is the 
‘Theatre Wargame’, which lasts for three weeks and uses the computer-based simulation JOCASTS for 
combat resolution. Accompaniments for JOCASTS are additional supporting simulation systems in 
order to replicate the support available to a one/two star CJTF HQ. JOCASTS is provided by an external 
contractor, the company NSC (Newman and Speer Consultancy).514 JOCASTS is an acronym for Joint 
Operations Command and Staff Training System. The purpose of JOCASTS, a constructive computer-
based simulation, is to provide ‘realistic strategic training for staff officers in the conduct of joint and 
combined operations within complex environments.’515 JOCASTS is used as turn-based simulation with 
six hour turns. It also features a small red cell. However, since the ACSC is undergoing changes, in the 
future only one third of the ACSC may participate in the ‘Theatre Wargame’.516 Besides the ‘Theatre 
Wargame’ with JOCASTS there are also three occasions of COA-wargaming at the ACSC. The wargaming 
form is derived from the Staff Officer Handbook and is adapted for the joint operational level. Since 
the Staff Officer Handbook mandates wargaming, it ‘must be done’ during the planning process.517  
In addition to the ICSC (L) and the ACSC, the Higher Command Staff Course (HCSC) also runs a one week 
‘Theatre Wargame’ at the ‘Strat/Pol/Mil level’ based on a dynamic real world/real time scenario. In 
this wargame, conflict resolution is achieved through ‘applied judgement drawing on a wide range of 
experienced and senior supporting staff’.518 Since this wargame is on a higher strategic level, it is 
beyond the comparative scope of the tactical level. Consequently, this particular ‘Theatre Wargame’ 
at the strategic level will not be further explored, with the exception of one feature. This feature is that 
an external contractor seems to be contributing everything: the red team, the green cell, LOCONs 
etc.519 This use of an external contractor is somewhat similar to the use of JOCASTS at the ACSC.  
External support to wargaming activities at JSCSC potentially encompasses the adjacent Defence 
Capability Centre (DCC) at Shrivenham. The DCC is an overarching organisation to the aforementioned 
interim Defence Simulation Centre (iDSC) and delivers education and training.520 The facility used for 
education and training is named the Development Training Facility, which began as the C2 battle lab 
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in 2009. Any virtual software can be used in the facility while scenarios and LOCONs are provided by 
training audiences.521 While as many as 6-8 large exercises may be delivered per year, two were 
scheduled in 2015. Those exercises were, however, not conducted for the JSCSC since they, according 
to the DCC, conduct their own wargaming. However, the Defence Academy, of which JSCSC is part of, 
does sometimes use the facilities as classrooms, for example, regarding cyber training. There are ideas 
to offer practical exercises to the JSCSC in the future. Such support may concern exercises equivalent 
to the aforementioned FEARFUL EYE at the ICSC (L).522 This acknowledges the importance of external 
contractors, outside of the Defence Academy, for large wargaming exercises at the JSCSC.  
In an innovative development a new wargaming form was recently introduced (2015-2016) at the ICSC 
(L). This concerns a manual wargaming form generally known as the Rapid Campaign Analysis Toolset 
(RCAT).523 RCAT is loosely based on COA-wargaming form in regard to the action-reaction process. 
RCAT was developed from 2013 by Cranfield University contracted by the Centre for Defence 
Enterprise (CDE) and driven by the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl). RCAT is 
described as an analytical wargame, and not as an educational wargame, with a focus on a level 
between the operational and the strategic ones.524 Developments since 2013 seem to have advanced 
RCAT to the higher tactical and operational level, as indicated by the use in the British Army divisional 
headquarter exercise IRON RESOLVE in 2014. Based on the discovered initiative to introduce new and 
innovative forms of wargaming, such as the Aldershot Skirmish at Sandhurst and the Camberley 
Kriegsspiel at the Land Warfare Centre, indications are that RCAT is considered to be the third step in 
a potential triad of recently developed wargames for the professional military education of British 
Army officers. RCAT has also been informally used within the ‘Theatre Wargame’ at the ACSC in order 
to stimulate discussion between individuals tasked with exercise control. Notably, while the use was 
informal and not referred to as ‘RCAT’, all elements including force ratio and combat calculations were 
used. One reason why this manual wargaming form is used within a larger wargaming exercise is 
arguably to enhance the director´s control over the exercise. In other words, the wargaming exercise 
is steered by the director in order to meet the exercise objectives.525 This manual simulation, by many 
simply referred to as RCAT, warrants a more detailed exploration.  
RCAT was originally developed as an analytical tool but has since been adapted for educational use. 
Since RCAT was designed as an analytical tool it entailed a verification and validation process including 
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peer review.526 Jeremy Smith, one of the game designers, describes the beneficial points of RCAT as: 
adversarial and oppositional game play, dynamic and imaginative scenario development, military-
strategic consequences, non-kinetic soft effects and human terrain, look ahead (24 hours in advance), 
guidance and parameters to support computer simulation, and, finally, flexibility.527 Some of these 
points are inherent elements in wargaming, for example, dynamic game play. This list of benefits, 
however, indicates that one of the key functions of RCAT is to support computer-based simulation 
systems. This was the case during the exercise IRON RESOLVE, which provides a good example of a 




Illustration no. 11: the use of RCAT and ABACUS in a British Army Exercise (2014).528 
 
The picture indicates a physical separation of the training audience from the actual wargaming. From 
the perspective of the training audience they are not aware of the presence of RCAT even though they 
are affected by it. The same can also be said for the computer-based simulation system, ABACUS, which 
was used for the exercise IRON RESOLVE and run by a defence contractor. RCAT was used to support 
ABACUS, a constructive computer simulation that handled kinetic effects only. The role of RCAT was 
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to explore the narrative and the ‘soft effects’.529 In short, the central function of RCAT in this example 
concerns ‘the ability to pre-consider events 24 hours in advance and thereby shape the exercise to 
best achieve the TOs’ [training objectives]. The RCAT ‘estimates’ proved sufficiently accurate to allow 
the game controller to adjust game play and identify and carefully monitor real-time outcomes that 
might have adversely affected the exercise.’530 This provides a good explanation of how RCAT is used 
as a control mechanism. However, RCAT has three different modes: facilitation, manual game and 
advanced (detail rules). These three wargaming forms are all a manual form of wargaming. 
  
 
Photograph no. 20: RCAT in process (OA estimate) at a British Army Exercise (2014).531 
 
RCAT is connected to concerns related to weaknesses of computer-based wargaming forms. RCAT was 
developed as a lesson from the rapidly developing situation in Libya in 2011 as there was a need to 
plan new contingencies for strategic planning which was something a computer programme, that takes 
years to develop, could not deliver.532 In essence, this reconnects to a belief that manual wargames 
are underutilised even though they have an inherent flexibility to allow the participants to experiment 
freely as ‘everything can be implemented’. In comparison, an assessment of a computer-based 
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simulation’s ability to accurately model, for example, a Challenger II main battle tank often ends up in 
how realistically the modelled object is portrayed visually in the simulation. What is arguably missed 
in this comparison is that both manual- and computer-based wargames rely on models. Such models 
are connected to a relevant and identified concern which entails loss of credibility. This is accentuated 
when a costly technology-driven computer simulation cannot be used to answer a military question.533 
Consequently, according to Smith, the key factor in ‘player acceptability’ – which connects to the 
overarching issue of credibility – lies in human engagement. This is an argument for a manual 
wargaming approach and an argument for the need of a well-trained game director to run the 
wargame.534 In short, RCAT is a manifestation of a belief in the effectiveness of manual wargaming 
forms, by the accentuation of the director’s ability to control the wargame.   
 
Control & veiling 
Two wargame exercises at the JSCSC indicate suppression of gamification. First, the exercise FEARFUL 
EYE during the ICSC (L) is organised as CAST (Command and Staff Training). Combat adjudication is 
conducted by a combination of operational analysts and a computer-based simulation system, 
ARCADIA. Notably, combat results and unit movements are presented to the participants on an 
ordinary map. Hence, combat adjudication occurs separated from the training audience. In addition, 
FEARFUL EYE is neither called wargaming nor offers direct interaction between the training audience 
and the actual simulation system (ARCADIA). This separation is arguably connected to the indicator of 
safeguarding the training audience’s immersion by sidestepping issues with the combat resolution that 
may clash with the training audience’s perception of realism. Secondly, the ‘Theatre Wargame’ during 
the ACSC uses the computer-based simulation system JOCASTS for combat resolution. While there was 
no opportunity to observe this exercise there are examples accessible on the internet that exemplify 
the use of JOCASTS by the same contractor. The contractor, the NSC, was also represented at the UK 
Connections 2016 where they presented one of their ‘lessons learnt’: namely the need to ‘hide the 
simulation’ in a computer-assisted exercise. The reasons for this explicit assertion, which ties directly 
into the property suppression of gamification, is that separation creates more power to analysts who, 
in a control mode, can ‘override’ the simulation and thus allow ‘rollback’.535 This ‘halt and restart’ 
procedure is an explicit indication of suppression of gamification. 
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Photograph no. 21: integration of JOCASTS and RCAT.536 
 
The ‘Theatre Wargame’ during the ACSC seems to be a good example of control & veiling. While the 
photograph is not from said exercise, it offers a visualisation of JOCAST integrated with RCAT. The 
photograph depicts the room of game control. The participants, the training audience, have a different 
perspective. Each exercise-day the students are shown only one or perhaps two map updates, shown 
as the iNet screen in the photograph. The reason stated for this limitation of information, related to 
the presentation of a Common Operational Picture (COP), indicates concern over the vulnerability of 
the training audience’s (TA) immersion in perceptions of unrealism:  
In an educational context (most Staff College wargames), a once- or twice-daily COP 
update is sufficient, especially with a TA working at the operational level. Using a real-
time COP results in a ‘Nintendo effect’ whereby the TA become fixated with the 
unfolding picture at the tactical level, and do not maintain the correct planning 
horizon.537 
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Control is essential to avoid this latent ‘Nintendo effect’ from occurring for the training audience, and 
consequently to protect instructors’ comfort and credibility from complaints of unrealism. Hence, the 
quote below is a good example of adherence to control & veiling by exercise control (Excon):  
Excon coordination meetings ensure the coherence and credibility of all products and 
injects presented to the TA, irrespective of the means or interface. Any inconsistencies 
or contradictions detract from the ‘reality’ of the situation and threaten the TA 
‘suspension of disbelief’. This matters, and should be avoided if at all possible. (…) 
JOCASTS outcomes were adjudicated by Excon and, where necessary, amendments 
made to ensure the resulting COP satisfied the TOs and the Game Controller’s D&G 
[Direction and Guidance].538 
The above quotes indicates that the facilitator mode of RCAT is a good example of adherence to control 
& veiling. This concerns the use of RCAT within another wargame exercise to increase control of the 
overall exercise. Incidentally, RCAT is not referred to as a ‘game’ but as a ‘tool’. It should, however, be 
emphasised that the facilitator mode is one of three modes of RCAT. Besides the facilitator mode, the 
other two modes are the manual game and the advanced adjudication (detailed rules). If one of the 
two latter modes allow the participants (the training audience) direct interaction, such a mode of RCAT 
would arguably no longer adhere to control & veiling. 
 
Simple standardising 
The ‘informal wargame’ used during the ICSC (L) to visualise different courses of action on a map may 
arguably be a physical element of a COA-wargame or, more likely, function as a stand-alone activity 
before the ‘formal’ COA-wargaming. In both cases, the wargaming form is constructed by adherence 
to doctrine which is made clear by the explicit connection to the Staff Officer Handbook. The focus is 
on a tangible product. In-house military instructors at the JSCSC run this form of wargaming and the 
instructors use the Staff Officer Handbook as a guide. This indicates simplicity: i.e. the idea that every 
officer should manage these wargaming forms. Furthermore, the use of ordinary maps etc. also 
indicate simplicity as the wargame does not need special facilities etc. 
While the actual wargaming form of the ‘informal wargame’ is straightforward with the use of an 
ordinary map, overlay and pins symbolising units, one concern is if this form of wargaming is done 
correctly. One reason for this concern is that this form of wargaming is driven by personality: 
commanders are passionate about their own plans and there is thus a risk that the wargame is not 
                                                          




properly done – it may be biased.539 Those concerns are reinforced by a general belief that wargames 
are ‘misapplied, misused and misunderstood’: meaning wargaming is sometimes perceived as a rock 
drill, while it is instead a process, which is always at risk of being dismissed or maligned. A wargame 
may become a non-wargame activity. For a wargame to be successful the instructor must be skilful 
and the wargame design tested.540 In regard to the COA-wargaming and the ‘informal wargame’ at the 
JSCSC, a potential risk is that the wargaming form becomes too simple. In other words, it is no longer 
a question of a wargame but instead of teaching tools used for visualisation of a plan, or courses of 
action, rather than actually wargaming. This risk is primarily indicated by the development of the 
‘informal wargame’, which otherwise is a good example of adherence to simple standardising, if it is 
utilised as a wargame and not just as a visualisation tool.  
 
Innovative active learning 
Regarding the indicator of individual innovativeness, one opinion is that there is no ‘Mr Wargaming’ at 
the JSCSC. Expertise in wargaming is instead brought in externally, either in the form of contractors, or 
operational analysts from other military establishment such as the Land Warfare Centre. In the latter 
case these operational analysts arrive in civilian garb, thus being a recognisable symbol of external and 
non-officer expertise for the military students.541 There is, however, military expertise in wargaming at 
the facilities, a fact that was also acknowledged during this visit. At the nearby Defence Capability 
Centre (DCC) in Shrivenham, Major Tom Mouat is a well-known proponent of wargaming for education 
and training. Over the course of many years Major Mouat has acquired much experience in different 
wargaming methods and game designs. He is therefore relatively well-known in the UK’s military 
educational establishments as an expert in military wargaming.542 Because of this indication of 
individual innovativeness, it is essential to consider Major Mouat’s concerns in more detail.  
According to Major Mouat military educational wargaming faces two common issues: educational 
effect and cost. It is deemed difficult to measure the educational effect of different forms of 
wargaming. Cost, on the other hand, is more tangible, such as the personnel ratio between trainers 
and training audience. The issue of cost alone would arguably favour simpler (i.e. manual) forms of 
wargaming, such as board games, or innovative game designs, such as ‘mega-games’. Such manual 
forms of wargames are connected to individuals. Hence, the issue of credibility appears more of a 
concern than the issue of cost. One anecdote from the RMAS was that they (in the 1970s) used to run 
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‘experimental wargames’ relevant to courses. These wargames were self-designed by a single 
individual. Some of these wargames were, however, ‘utter failures’. Consequently, this approach of 
relying on one innovative individual comes with a risk. Some form of quality control is necessary for 
educational military wargaming. One solution offered by Major Mouat is to use a straightforward test 
named the ‘Jonathan test’: ‘if the time to set up is longer than effective training time then it cannot be 
used in education.’ While acknowledging the risk of ‘utter failures’, Major Mouat nonetheless has a 
positive attitude to innovative manual wargaming for the following reasons: manual wargames are 
reliable, cheap and good for learning.543 
The main drawback of innovative manual wargames is the issue of credibility since instructors perceive 
manual wargames as ‘fragile’. This becomes an issue especially if the wargame includes rolling dice. 
Accordingly, such a wargame is perceived to be ‘a game of chance’, which means that the wargame is 
open to superficial ridicule if the participants are not happy with how the concept of risk is modelled. 
Therefore, from a game design perspective, it is better to focus on decisions rather than on dice-rolling. 
Notably, this is arguably an issue that is inherent in any transparent manual game since a computer-
based simulation seldom displays actual digital dice-rolls during combat adjudication. One explicit 
suggestion by Major Mouat on how to overcome ridicule would be by the creation of wargaming 
departments.544 The idea is that a better organisational solution would allow instructor buy-in because 
of formal organisational and hierarchal support. This would go beyond merely doctrinal support as in 
the case of simple standardising. Instead, a wargaming department could rely on a theoretical 
underpinning of game-based learning, in other words, the property promotion of gamification. 
Nonetheless, the continuous use of COA-wargaming, as well as the recent development of RCAT, 
indicate that manual wargaming is viable. However, this does not entail adherence to innovative active 
learning.  
The example of RCAT indicates adherence to different concepts rather than innovative active learning 
only. Specifically, this adherence becomes evident in a playtesting event with the Canadian Armed 
Forces in 2015 with RCAT as a manual game. Suppression of gamification, the property of control & 
veiling, was indicated by the control and interruption of the wargame by the director in terms of ‘gas 
and brake’. This reliance on the skills of the director is an essential part within the concept of control 
& veiling. However, it can also be argued that the skill of the instructor is central for any form of 
wargaming, and consequently all three concepts, since control is a supporting core category of 
instructor buy-in. The issue of control is especially apparent in RCAT: 
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The RCAT team knew exactly when to play the rules-as-written, and when to tweak the 
system on the fly to best model the unfolding situation. They also had the wisdom and 
experience to keep the game flowing despite potential distractions (including incessant 
comments and suggestions from me!)—and, conversely, also knew when to slow things 
down to allow for a deeper-dive or extended discussion.545 
The above quote may suggest an incident of interruption, which is an indicator of the property 
suppression of gamification. However, the focus of the control was to keep the flow of the game rather 
than a ‘halt and restart’ routine. In addition, the example above does not support any of the additional 
three indicators of the property suppression of gamification. Instead the opposite is true: free play is 
allowed, physical veiling does not occur and the attitude of ‘we are not doing wargaming’ is clearly not 
applicable. The participants interact around one table, the red cell is allowed to dynamically conduct 
their actions according to their objectives and RCAT seems to be acknowledged as a ‘wargame’. 
Consequently, in the mode of manual game, RCAT arguably indicates more adherence to innovative 
active learning than to control & veiling. This is because of the clear indications of promotion of 
gamification and individual innovativeness.  
 
  
                                                          





The case of the UK is particularly interesting because of the efforts to invigorate military educational 
wargaming. Many of the respondents are either proponents of, or sympathetic to, manual wargaming. 
Preference of manual wargaming is arguably accompanied by adherence to the concept of innovative 
active learning. The preference is centred on the tangible human engagement and interaction around 
the game table. The human dimension is also connected to physical factors, such as a belief that the 
human eye prefers a physical map and real figures as game pieces.546 This support of manual 
wargaming by enthusiasts is to a certain extent supported by army officers. The majority of army 
officers are, however, not hobby-wargamers with various experiences in, for example, board games. 
As a case in point, the wargaming club at Sandhurst, which was reactivated in 2015, neither had officer 
cadets nor military instructors attending the various wargames events (approximately one every 
second month) in 2015.547 Hence, officers’ perception of ‘wargaming’ is the in-house army definition 
of wargaming found in the Staff Officer Handbook and referred to as ‘COA-wargaming’ – a 
straightforward manual wargame. Arguably, the majority of army officers therefore seem likely to 
adhere to the concept of simple standardising. In contrast, the category of enthusiastic individuals 
adhere to innovative active learning. Accordingly, while both categories of individuals support manual 
wargaming each category seems to prefer adherence to a different concept.  
Two different preferences became apparent at RMAS (I), a unit which the author was initially told 
involved ‘no wargaming’. The Aldershot Skirmish did not achieve a sufficient degree of comfort and 
credibility to enable buy-in with the military instructors while the Sandhurst Free Kriegsspiel apparently 
did. This can be interpreted as a rejection of the concept of innovative active learning, and an 
acceptance for simple standardising as the concept for implementing ‘wargaming’ in the curriculum. 
However, the Sandhurst Free Kriegsspiel also indicates adherence to the concept of innovative active 
learning. The difference is that the Aldershot Skirmish has few indications of simple standardising while 
the Sandhurst Free Kriegsspiel indicates adherence to both concepts. Arguably, instructors who 
preferred adherence to the concept of simple standardising rejected the Aldershot Skirmish. There was 
a lack of comfort in understanding how to run an unfamiliar form of wargame, which in turn arguably 
generated a perceived risk of loss of credibility in front of the officer cadets. The absence of simplicity 
in particular was reportedly an explicit concern among instructors, as they preferred a wargaming form 
they felt comfortable with.  
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In military culture there seems to be an aversion to miniature, board and tabletop wargaming. In 
particular, hex-based board games are ‘very alien’ to an army officer.548 Such forms of wargaming 
generally indicate promotion of gamification and thus the concept of innovative active learning. 
Accordingly, the majority of army officers in the UK seem to adhere to either simple standardising or 
control & veiling to achieve instructor buy-in. This is indicated by evolutions in wargame design. One 
example is the indication that a wargame ‘must work in the field’. Accordingly, designers of the 
prototype Camberley Kriegsspiel, a wargame design designed for courses at the Land Warfare Centre 
(II), opted to use regular military maps since this was deemed more acceptable. An even more tangible 
evolution can be ascertained regarding the Sandhurst Free Kriegsspiel. This wargame design is devoid 
of rigid rules and thus leaves much of the details up to the individual instructor to decide upon. 
Furthermore, the instructors learned how to conduct the wargame by intra-professional learning – a 
senior officer teaches junior colleagues – which supports the property of simplicity. The other property 
of simple standardising concerns adherence to doctrine, which is inherent in the multiple examples of 
COA-wargaming at the Land Warfare Centre (II) as well as at the JSCSC (III).    
Acceptance applies to not only the wargaming instructors, but also to the participating players and 
superiors (hierarchy). Importantly, commanders will not buy-into a wargame form if the wargame does 
not proceed according to doctrine and does not produce expected results.549 Acceptance thus seems 
to materialise from the fact that the actual wargaming form is not at odds with doctrine. Notably, while 
the issue of acceptance is a factor regarding the above case of the Aldershot Skirmish, the outcome of 
non-acceptance did not lead to a complete rejection of ‘wargaming’ by instructors. Support from the 
hierarchy seems to have contributed to a continuation of the wargaming efforts at Sandhurst (I). This 
support can be traced to the presence of British Army generals, such as the Commandant of RMAS, at 
the British Army Wargaming Symposium as well as the annual UK Connections conference. This also 
indicates an underlying belief in simple standardising: ‘every officer’ has to wargame since ‘we have to 
do it’. Nonetheless, acceptance of a specific wargaming form is up to each individual instructor. The 
importance of individual instructors was further ascertained in their rejection of the Aldershot Skirmish 
at Sandhurst (I). 
Control & veiling is arguably an alternative concept for instructors that consider a wargaming form 
either too complex or too alien. Furthermore, suppression of gamification can pre-empt the raising of 
concerns of unrealism by the training audience, colleagues or superiors (hierarchy). In the UK, control 
& veiling is applicable to a number of wargaming exercises of which many are located in a grey zone 
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of wargaming. At Sandhurst (I), the ‘Coy Ops Room Exercise’ offers similarities to the use of SIRA at the 
German Officer School (I). Both seemingly use ordinary instructors as directors and concentrate the 
main effort to actors within a single command post. The main difference is of level and scale: the ‘Coy 
Ops Room Exercise’ aims to realistically wargame tactical action from the perspective of a company, 
rather than a battalion. In addition, in SIRA, the training audience has no direct interaction with the 
simulation system at all, whereas this is actually the case with the ‘Coy Ops Room Exercise’. What is 
similar is the presence of indicators such as a desire to avoid perceptions of unrealism. The control 
aspect by the director enhances and enables this desire. The modus operandi of veiling computer-
based simulation also exists in the other two embedded units of analysis (II and III). However, here 
external contractors handle the actual simulations. This might be essential for instructor buy-in 
because of the combination of large-scale activities with many students and limited time to achieve 
objectives. Mishandling of the computer-based simulations during such activities would be detrimental 
and very likely result in no further use of such activities. Hence, there is a need for external contractors, 
or a standing support organisation, concerning wargaming with a large number of students in 
combination with computer-based simulations. At the Land Warfare Centre (II) this concerns the CSTTX 
(with CAST and CATT) and the BC2T. At the JSCSC (III) control & veiling is achieved by the use of external 
contractors regarding the FEARFUL EYE and the Theatre Wargame. The external contractor bring their 
method for combat adjudication, which is hidden from the training audience because of concerns that 
they would otherwise find aspects unrealistic, and/or, begin to act unrealistic. Such concerns by 
instructors is manifested in the stated concern of a ‘Nintendo effect’. This concerns a situation when 
the training audience is in direct interaction with the simulation system and gets into too much detail 
and loses the overall picture.550 In other words, they start to play the game. A ‘Nintendo effect’ is thus 
somewhat analogous to ‘gamer mode’ when players become short-sighted and only aim to win the 
game.551 The facilitator mode of RCAT is a good example of how such concerns are avoided by the 
suppression of gamification and firm control of the entire wargaming exercise.  
Evolutions of game designs, including the possibility to switch between alternative modes, manifest a 
tangible movement towards increasing instructor buy-in at the potential expense of the wargame 
ending up as a non-wargaming activity. This risk especially applies to wargaming forms that may be 
categorised as ‘non-wargaming’ and thus belong to a grey zone. Examples are the CSTTX at the Land 
Warfare Centre (II) and the ‘informal wargame’ at the JSCSC. A greater emphasis on control & veiling, 
manifested in an attitude of ‘we are not doing wargaming here’, may drive the wargame into a scripted 
exercise to such a degree that it would no longer be possible to consider it a wargame. Suppression of 
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gamification may thus become self-fulfilling. A scripted red team (OPFOR), in combination with a 
situation where player decisions would have no or negligible impact on the flow of events, would 
constitute a non-wargaming exercise. There are indications that the potential regress of a wargame 
into non-wargaming is an issue of concern among some instructors.552 On the other hand, flexibility in 
the wargame design may preserve the activity as a wargame. RCAT is an interesting example since it 
has different modes. The facilitator mode indicates control & veiling whereas the manual mode, 
indicates the concept of innovative active learning. It is open to question if the facilitator mode may 
change the wargame into an exercise control tool only – RCAT is after all presented as a tool rather 
than a wargame. Another example, the ‘informal wargame’, can be said to exemplify the risk of a 
wargame form becoming too simple. In other words, absence of contingent interaction between 
players results in it no longer being a wargame supported by the concept of simple standardising, but 
instead a teaching tool for visualisation of a plan or courses of action. Such concerns of misuse of 
wargaming were indicated at the JSCSC (III) and can be manifested in the existence of the ‘informal 





                                                          




7. United States 
 
Introduction 
The initial embedded unit of analysis consists of the United States Military Academy, simply known as 
West Point, located in the state of New York. West Point, however, educates only a minority of US 
Army officer cadets, since the ROTC (Reserve Officer Training Corps) educates the majority. West Point 
is nevertheless a symbolic and elite school, which produces a disproportionate portion of officers who 
eventually reach the rank of General. West Point is also the equivalent of other cases’ military 
educational establishments for officer cadets, such as the Swedish Defence University and the Royal 
Military Academy Sandhurst in the UK. The Maneuver Center of Excellence at Fort Benning, Georgia, 
where junior army officers (armour and infantry branch) receive education and training in tactics, 
represents the intermediate level in the USA. This unit is a relatively clear-cut equivalent to the other 
country cases’ selected intermediate embedded unit of analysis, such as the Land Warfare Centre in 
the UK. The third embedded unit is the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, 
Kansas, where junior US Army majors receive their education. 
This thesis delimits the focus to army educational wargaming at the tactical level for officers and officer 
cadets. For this country case, this limitation becomes palpable because there are other military 
educational facilities in the USA where educational military wargaming takes place. In addition, the 
USA as a case is significantly larger than the other cases. For example, in comparison to other cases 
such as Sweden, there is no specific and required formal course in the US Army for an officer to become 
lieutenant colonel. Such a senior course would arguably fit as the concluding course in the higher level 
embedded unit of analysis. However, in the US Army, the ‘difficult gate’ in the military education is to 
become full colonel.553 This sets it apart from other cases where this ‘gate’ is arguably at the rank of 
lieutenant colonel. In the USA, the military education for the rank of colonel is at the US Army War 
College (USAWC) in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. The USAWC curriculum is focused on strategic leadership. 
Because of this focus, and the high-ranking level of officers (colonel), this facility falls outside the scope 
of this thesis as a potential embedded unit of analysis. Nonetheless, the Strategic Wargame Project by 
the Simulation Division exemplifies tangible educational wargaming activities at the USAWC.554 Hence, 
this exclusion does not entail the suppression of possible influences from the USAWC on the embedded 
units of analysis in the USA.   
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The limitation to army officers excludes other armed services such as the US Air Force. This is similar 
to the other country cases. However, the US Marine Corps is also excluded although it is primarily a 
land force. Hence, there are no embedded units of analysis of the US Marine Corps. This is not only to 
ease comparison between the other country cases. Similar to the USAWC, this exclusion is not a total 
exclusion since flexibility is part of the selected method for this thesis. Specifically, exploratory case 
studies, informed by grounded theory, allow the addition of sources if explored data finds worthwhile 
connections.555 For this reason, the author considered including an example of educational wargaming 
at the US Marine Corps War College (MCWAR) in Quantico, Virginia, in this chapter. This thought 
occurred because of the author’s exploration of military educational wargaming activities in the USA 
during the initial data collection.556 This in turn brought the author to visit MCWAR in 2014 in 
accordance with the research method, which encourages a broad exploratory approach during data 
collection. However, the findings indicated that this educational wargame was focused on senior 
officers (lieutenant colonels and colonels) and on strategy rather than tactics.557 For this reason, it is 
not further included in this chapter.   
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United States Military Academy (West Point) 
West Point, officially known as the United States Military Academy (USMA), was founded in 1802. After 
acceptance to West Point, the officer cadet enters a four-year programme. The USMA has about 4,300 
officer cadets enrolled, of which about 1,000 graduate each year (an 80 % success rate). After a 
successful graduation from West Point, the officer cadet receives an engineering undergraduate 
degree, a bachelor in science, regulated by educational standards. The educational focus is to mentor 
leaders. Of the overall officer corps in the US Army, about 20 percent come from West Point. The rest, 
almost 80 percent, come from the ROTC.558 In addition, a few officers are added from officer candidate 
schools, where selected enlisted non-commissioned officers, and civilians with an academic degree, 
are offered an officer career after a short 12 week course.559  
 
Contemporary wargaming 
There are two named facilities for ‘simulation’ at West Point. The first is named the West Point 
Simulation Center. Its stated mission is to ‘educate, train, and inspire the Corps of Cadets through 
design, development and application of full spectrum simulation training programs’. The following 
simulation systems are available: Engagement Skills Trainer 2000 (EST 2000), Follow me, Virtual 
Battlespace (VBS) and Call For Fire Trainer (CFFT II).560 The West Point Simulation Center is, however, 
a small and rather unique entity at West Point. Basically, it provides only one individual who supports 
the entire USMA.561 Based on information from the West Point homepage there is in addition to the 
Simulation Center a facility named the Combat Simulation Lab. This, however, concerns research 
rather than education: the Combat Simulation Lab ‘provides faculty and officer cadets the opportunity 
to investigate a wide range of interdisciplinary, systemic issues and to apply simulation software to 
visualise and test projects from the classroom and research’. The following software is listed as 
available for officer cadets and classroom use: Infantry Warrior Simulation (IWARS), Joint Conflict and 
Tactical Simulation (JCATS), One Semi-Automatic Force (OneSAF), and Virtual Battlespace (VBS).562 
Based on the author’s observation during the visit to West Point, the listed software supports the 
individual officer cadet’s study project by being experimentation tools, i.e. this is mathematical 
modelling for officer cadets’ research projects rather than educational wargaming. The purpose is ‘to 
apply simulation software to visualise and test projects from the classroom and research.’ For example, 
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VBS is used to rehearse tactical missions and conduct AARs of training sessions.563 Consequently, this 
is not wargaming but non-playable simulation for analysis and visualisation, as well as computer 
modelling, to answer hypotheses. For this reason, the Combat Simulation Lab at the Department of 
System Engineering is not further explored.  
 
 
Photograph no. 22: officer cadets and the West Point Simulation Center.564 
 
Educational wargaming is carried out in the Department of Military Instruction. This specifically 
concerns the course MS200, which has 17 instructors and 33 student classes (530 officer cadets). The 
Military Science Programme is built on three courses: MS100 Introduction to War-Fighting, MS200 
Tactical Decision Making and MS300 Platoon Operations. Teaching techniques include ‘heavy use of 
Tactical Decision-Making Games’ and simulation exercises.565 The use of simulation is integrated in the 
education by the use of the ‘tactical example’ (TE), which covers four activities during three days: 
1) Lectures (including videos), 
2) Tactical Decision Exercise (TDE) preparation roughly similar to a map exercise. The output is to 
come up with a plan,  
3) An outdoor terrain-walk for one day, 
4) The ‘simulation-day’. In a classroom the developed plan is put through a simulation.566 
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The simulation system in use for the ‘simulation-day’ is Virtual Battlespace (VBS). A few classrooms are 
equipped with VBS for 14-18 officer cadets, who are divided into roles such as platoon-sergeant, 
squad-leader and special weapons (machine guns, anti-tank weapons). The room layout basically 
consists of five tables with computers. During a ‘simulation-day’, there are typically 2-3 runs conducted 
per class. Verbal communication is used since they are all in same classroom. A double-sided concept 
has been tested with a minor red cell run by three officer cadets. However, only 13 officer cadets are 
then left to control the blue platoon. There have been ideas to run a force on force simulation 
(between two platoons), but all cadets would have to be in the same classroom. Issues of practicality, 
such as available facilities and the difficulty of de-conflicting the scheduling of 33 classes, have ruled 
out the idea of force on force.567   
Besides the use of VBS in classrooms, there are indications of additional educational wargaming 
activities. One of the first things mentioned to the author at the start of the visit to West Point was 
that there used to be a wargaming club for officer cadets. This club, the Wargame Committee, involved 
extra-curricular wargaming activities, such as hobby wargames and participation in game conventions: 
The Wargames Committee promotes the development of tactical skills by conducting 
military simulations of both actual and fictious military engagements using both 
tabletop miniatures and board wargames. These wargames cover all historical periods 
from ancient Greeks and Romans to modern Middle Eastern warfare. We attend 
wargame conventions hosted by the Historical Miniatures Gaming Society such as Fall-
In and Cold Wars and we host our own wargaming convention, POINTCON, each 
spring.568 
The photograph below is allegedly from POINTCON 2011, ‘the annual wargaming event of the Cadet 
Wargames Club at the United States Military Academy at West Point’. It depicts one of the officer 
cadets at West Point directing a wargame based on the ‘Battle of Neumarkt’ in 1809 using 25 mm 
Napoleonic miniatures. However, based on data obtained in early 2016, there ‘is no longer sufficient 
cadet support to justify the amount of work involved to plan and execute the convention 
[POINTCON]’.569 While POINTCON has been discontinued, the so-called Wargames Committee still 
seems to exist as an official club.570 However, another source claims that no wargaming club is in 
existence since in 2013 the number of cadet clubs (190) was reduced by 50 %. One concern was that 
                                                          
567 Observation: 2015-12-08. 
568 USMA (2016c). 
569 POINTCON (2011). 




such activities took away time for evening studies.571 A wargaming club may still exist but with much 
less publicity.  
 
 
Photograph no. 23: Battle of Neumarkt, 1809, POINTCON XXXIV, 9 April 2011.572 
 
Another club for officer cadets explicitly uses the term ‘simulation’. This is the West Point Forum / 
Model UN. Activities are centred on conferences, where officer cadets use their debating skills in 
‘simulations which address contemporary international security and socio-economic issues’.573 This is 
a very competitive club. The conferences take place in summer, and one purpose is to allow the 
participating officer cadets to gain experience of learning the role of leader.574 However, while an 
interesting activity, this is not a clear-cut case of wargaming. Furthermore, since the focus is on 
diplomacy and debating skills, the UN debating team falls outside the scope of this thesis. This makes 
this activity comparable to the Bundeswehr University in München and their involvement in a 
‘Planspiel’ to simulate diplomacy at the United Nations.575  
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Another example of an activity at West Point that may constitute educational wargaming is ‘Leader 
Challenge’ (LC). This is a method for developing leaders. In short, a session ‘engages participants in a 
difficult leadership decision as described by the junior officer who actually experienced it’. LC is done 
in a small group with participants that reflect on a real case visualised as a sequential video interview 
of the actual junior officer. In the end, it is about reflecting on ‘what would you do next?’, while 
listening to other perspectives in the group.576 LC is part of the professional development of the officer 
cadets at West Point. However, it is not a wargame. The main difference to a wargame is that LC is not 
a playable simulation. Instead of constructing a narrative, LC lets the participants reflect on another 
person’s, a junior officer’s, real narrative.577 The use of LC nonetheless indicates that experimental and 
active learning is promoted, and developed, at West Point. Accordingly, this raises expectations of 
indications of innovative active learning in the use of educational wargaming.  
An indication of the use of theories for ‘effective learning’ and wargaming at West Point is the use of 
Tactical Decision Exercises (TDE).578 Major John Schmitt (USMC) developed this form of exercise in the 
early 1990s as a so-called Tactical Decision Game (TDG).579 This raises the possibility of the TDE being 
a form of wargaming. However, a TDE offers a tactical situation (dilemma) that the officer cadet needs 
to address and provide a course of action. While the instructor may incrementally provide further 
information, a TDE is not a wargame since there are no turns, i.e. the opposing side does not respond 
to the presented course of action. However, a wargame (‘combat simulation’) generally occurs after 
the TDE to examine a course of action.580 The use of VBS is a clear example of this sequential order. 
 
Control & veiling 
The explicit use of VBS within a classroom and with officer cadets does not indicate complete 
adherence to control & veiling. There are, however, several indicators of suppression of gamification 
that are in need of further exploration. One is the intervention of the game director regarding control 
and interruptions, i.e. ‘halt and restart’. Regarding the specific use of VBS, a high degree of director 
control is indeed how an instructor in the classroom conducts wargaming. The reason for this level of 
control is arguably a perceived risk of loss of instructor credibility. Control of the classroom during a 
VBS-session is done in order to rein in gamification: VBS is seen as a ‘videogame’ and therefore the 
instructor has to ‘ride the cadet very hard’ in order to control the classroom. Consequently, ‘if the 
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instructor does not have total buy-in he loses the class’.581 One key aspect for this effort of control to 
succeed is the category of comfort – the instructor needs to be comfortable in the direct use of VBS in 
the classroom. However, it takes time, even years, for an instructor at West Point to learn to 
comfortably utilise VBS for learning.582  
Another indicator of the suppression of gamification is that free play is not allowed. The reported use 
of VBS indicate that free play is limited: if a red cell is utilised, it is supervised and much smaller than 
the blue side. In most of the ‘simulation-days’, however, only the instructor controls the opposing force 
in VBS. This control to suppress gamification is augmented by the view of ‘we are not doing wargaming 
here’. The use of VBS is exclusively referred to as a ‘simulation’. Nonetheless, there is still an awareness 
that VBS is akin to a game. To suppress a potential eagerness by officer cadets to play VBS as a game, 
officer cadets are actually allowed – but only in one lecture – to compete against each other in a match 
where they can shoot at each other. This is arguably a force on force activity and thus somewhat 
comparable to the British force on force exercise within CATT (Combined Arm Tactical Training) at the 
British Land Warfare Centre. In Britain this was done for subordinate personnel (LOCON) to quickly 
learn how to work the simulation (mock-up combat vehicle simulators). At West Point, the stated 
reason is to get rid of the officer cadets’ eagerness to shoot at each other in a ‘game’.583 Another step 
to reduce, or even eliminate the fun factor, is to grade each officer cadet’s performance during the 
VBS exercise. As a result, the seriousness of grades ‘takes the fun out of the game’ for the officer 
cadet.584 This particular incident of grades, without the elements of fun and competition, is an explicit 
indication of suppression of gamification and a form of control. 
One final indicator of suppression of gamification is that the training audience’s immersive credibility 
is safeguarded from potential concerns of unrealism by the physical separation of the simulation 
system from the training audience. No such indications were found. While there are some elements of 
hiding, such as the covering of the administrative workstation’s screen, which is utilised for ‘leader 
recon’ when only the Platoon Commander is allowed to take an initial look thus representing a realistic 
personal recce mission, the VBS is clearly used directly by the all the students. Consequently, the most 
obvious form of suppression of gamification, the actual veiling of the simulation system, is not 
indicated. On the other hand, limited free play, interruptions by the director and an attitude of ‘we are 
not playing games’ are present.  
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At West Point, there are indications of organisational and doctrinally underpinnings to the use of VBS, 
which indicate an attitude that ‘we have to do wargaming’. A major effort has been made to make 
simulation exercises, such as VBS, part of the curriculum. A certain level of success has been achieved, 
especially since one course director – Major Carter – has bought into the use of VBS. It is not a 
coincidence that VBS is used. The recommendation from the Simulation Center at West Point is to ‘stay 
away from COTS’ as they want to introduce officer cadets to simulation systems they will later 
encounter and use in the US Army. VBS, which arguably is a modified COTS virtual simulation, is 
considered to be valid since it is used at US Army simulation centres.585 Thus, there is organisational 
US Army support for this particular simulation system. Indeed, during a ‘simulation-day’ with VBS, 
‘instructors emphasise the principles that underlie US Army Doctrine while avoiding reliance on 
checklists, set processes and approved solutions.’586  
One indicator of simplicity is that the wargaming form should be encompassing, i.e. every instructor 
should be able to use it. It seems that not every instructor is happy with VBS as an educational tool, 
especially since it takes a rather long time to be proficient in the management of VBS in a class. On the 
other hand, the versatility of VBS, represented by its real-time editing capability, is a key reason why 
VBS is used for learning purposes.587 A major weakness in this form of wargaming seems to be in 
possible technological mishaps regarding the computer-based simulation. Hence, one conclusion is 
that if issues with technology create friction for an exercise for the officer cadets then the simulation 
system, and the instructor, will lose credibility.588 This problem might be reduced by employing civilian 
experts on VBS and letting them run the exercise. However, the author was emphatically told that ‘the 
military instructors are necessary for acceptance’ as (civilian) experts from the West Point Simulation 
Center cannot deliver this solution by themselves.589 This emphasis on military instructors is 
comparable to other cases, such as the use of SiTA at the German Officer School and the use of 
Sandhurst Kriegsspiel at RMAS. Accordingly, instructor buy-in by army officer instructors is essential. 
However, the use of VBS is not a simple task, i.e. it is not a free map-based wargame such as Sandhurst 
Kriegsspiel. Instead the use of VBS in a ‘simulation-day’ is rather similar to the computer-based SiTA in 
Germany. It is a challenge for instructors to be proficient at this form of wargaming (it takes years). For 
this reason, instructors seemingly learn it from their colleagues rather than from formal instruction.  
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Innovative active learning 
The use of VBS at West Point indicates individual innovativeness and a belief in the importance of the 
wargaming process for learning. The use of VBS in one course is related to the course director’s interest 
in improving education. For example, instead of grading plans only simulation results are graded. 
Simulation results entail specific criteria, such as ‘destroy all four enemy vehicles’. Hence, the idea is 
that the outcome is more important than the plan. The use of simulation in the classroom is, however, 
not about testing the plan, it is to show why the plan failed. Hence, VBS is used as a tool with which 
the officer cadet can actually see why it failed. The after-action review functions in VBS are thus 
important to emphasise teaching points. One trick is to pick just one or two vital points during the 
after-action review (AAR), conducted by the instructor at the end of the exercise.590 Accordingly, the 
best feature of VBS is its real-time editing capability, which is utilised by the classroom instructor. This 
gives the instructor the opportunity to inject his/her expertise to show learning points.591 In this 
process, it might arguably have been sufficient with an experienced instructor simply saying ‘this is not 
going to work’ based on his or her veteran-experience such as from Afghanistan and/or Iraq. However, 
the modus operandi of the instructor is instead to say ‘let’s run it’.592 This entails learning by experience 
generated by experiments with the use of a simulation. Hence, this process connects to active learning, 
attainment of experience by experiment, an element in game-based learning. This is manifested in the 
ability ‘to teleport’ officer cadets into a certain map area from where they can try to spot and shoot. 
This experience becomes tangible since it is the surrounding training area at West Point that is 
modelled as the 3D map in VBS. This realistic visualisation promotes understanding of capabilities of 
weapons and personnel. Furthermore, the use of VBS as a wargame makes the officer cadets feel 
pressure and miscommunicate, which visualises intangible features.593  
Perhaps the most significant answer to why VBS, as a form of educational wargame, has entered the 
curriculum is because the course director mandated it. According to the course director, Major Carter, 
he emphasised the need to think outside the box regarding education since he himself is not fond of 
classroom education. Notably, he initially tried another simulation system, Follow Me, before VBS. 
However, VBS was later mandated for all classes in the course since it allows 3D while Follow me is 
visualised in 2D only. It was deemed important to visualise the Platoon Commander’s eye-perspective 
as well as line-of sight from certain deployed weapons. Hence, the ability for visualisation was found 
to be a key reason behind the use of VBS as an educational tool. However, it seems that not every 
instructor is supportive. Accordingly, to generate additional support for this particular form of 
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simulation exercise, researchers are present in the classroom to study the learning process. This 
ongoing (2015) research is done by surveys of officer cadets and by the collection of video data. This 
arguably allows alignment and comparison of what is happening in the simulation to what is at the 
same time going on in the classroom.594 It also indicates an attitude that ‘no one (else) understands 
wargaming’. Accordingly, this form of wargame is to be supported by additional research of its 
educational effects in order to increase its – and subsequently the instructor’s – credibility. 
It can be argued that the use of VBS during the ‘simulation-day’ of tactical exercises (TE) is the epitome 
of adherence to innovative active learning. For example, the use of VBS is seen as a progression from 
previous 2D map-based tactical decision-making exercises. With the support of VBS and its 3D view 
the officer cadets ‘play out their plan into the game’ and can, with the real-time editing capability of 
the instructor, instantly receive feedback. For example, ‘here is your view for your machine gun’. The 
instructor would then let the officer cadet pause and think, in order to reflect on their choice. The VBS 
exercise was found to generate learning in a broader understanding of terminology, which is in line 
with the learning purpose for the individual officer cadet: to understand concepts and how to apply 
them.595 The question of how you learn is arguably the foundation to how the VBS is used in the 
classroom. By playing out the effects and allowing the officer cadets to try things, the instructor 
facilitates learning by demonstrating battle effects. For example, officer cadets can actually see the 
effects from 155 mm artillery fire in the simulation.596 Promotion of game-based learning is thus 
evident in the use of experimentation as a way of gaining experience. However, and this is significant, 
competition is arguably unwanted. For example, there is seldom a red cell as the instructor runs the 
opposing force himself. On the other hand, the officer cadets are graded on how well they perform in 
the wargame. This would seem a form of competition in itself as grading actually ranks the officer 
cadets. However, the seriousness of grades ‘takes the fun out of the game’ for the cadet.597 Hence, the 
VBS exercise is a ‘serious activity’ and not ‘videogame’. This desired seriousness is reinforced by the 
grading system in combination with the control of the room by the instructor. The absence of fun and 
of competition indicates suppression, rather than promotion, of gamification.  
The concept of the use of VBS in classrooms at West Point in accordance to the military instructional 
curriculum seems to have come about by a successful pairing of simulation support personnel and 
military instructors. One indicator of the property individual innovativeness is that one or a few 
individuals have created or modified the specific wargame in use. In the case of VBS at West Point, a 
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technical solution in the form of a computer-based simulation system supports the idea from the 
course director on how to achieve learning. However, the support from the West Point Simulation 
Center concerns only the initial set-up and consecutive running of technical systems. The actual 
administrative control of VBS in the classroom is up to the instructor. Since technical hitches occur with 
the hardware a military instructor has to know the system very well.598 If the instructor does not know 
how to administer VBS in class the instructor’s credibility is at risk. Notably, while not every instructor 
seems to attain instructor buy-in of this particular form of wargaming, the majority of military 
instructors do seem to accept this form of wargaming.599 Buy-in of military instructors in this use of 
VBS seems indispensable for the actual concept to work. Without military instructors, the Simulation 
Center would not be able to deliver this actual form.600 Accordingly, the exact application in class is 
dependent on the individual military instructor. 
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Maneuver Center of Excellence (Fort Benning) 
The Maneuver Center of Excellence, formed in 2010 by the merger of the US Armor and Infantry 
Schools, is an educational organisation. According to instructors, initiatives developed at the Maneuver 
Center of Excellence are ‘spread around’ to other US Army Centres of Excellence such as aviation, 
engineers, and military intelligence. The central position of the Maneuver Center of Excellence in the 
education of US Army officers is affirmed by the fact that the School of Advanced Leadership Tactics 
(SALT) at Fort Leavenworth accredits the curriculum. The main course at the Maneuver Center of 
Excellence is the 22 week long Maneuver Captains Career Course. This course accepts 150 military 
students each year. The Maneuver Captain Career Course (in 2015-2016) has different phases: an initial 
company phase, a mid-course exam (85 % pass rate) and a final battalion phase. Within the different 
phases, sub-modules (A1, B1 etc.) focus on different organisational types (armour, infantry, Stryker). 
The common core of the curriculum prescribed by Fort Leavenworth is a total of eight weeks, but it is 
spread across the 22 weeks to avoid becoming a separate block.601   
The main subject in the Maneuver Captains Career Course is tactics. The Tactics Division is responsible 
for the main subject with three teaching teams and eleven instructors in each team. Turnover for an 
instructor is two and a half years, and to become an instructor, an officer has to be nominated and 
vetted. Each teaching team usually includes one field artillery, one engineer and one or two aviation 
officers besides officers that belong to the armour and infantry branches. Each teaching team is in 
charge of one class with 15 students per class. The teaching philosophy is ‘small group instruction’ and 
each class consequently has its own designated classroom. Education is centred on visualisation of how 
enemy and friendly mechanised forces fight. This is considered a challenge since most of the students 
have a professional background in dismounted infantry. Hence, they are not used to the much faster 
way of combat, i.e. mechanised ‘move and fight’. For this reason, the instructors need to ‘break them’ 
from bad habits in order to handle a mechanised infantry company. An additional challenge is that the 
students’ previous military experience is considered weak since it usually concerns counter-insurgency 
(COIN) with weak enemy opposition. After graduation (2015), almost every one of the captains is 
assigned to a staff position (battalion/brigade). Then, after about one year, they become Company 
Commanders.602 
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Contemporary wargaming  
A multitude of simulations is in use in the Maneuver Captain Career Course. The different modules 
involve specific use of simulations. For example: the Virtual Battlespace (VBS) is used in sub-module 
A1 and the Close Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT) is used in sub-module A3. These sub-modules concern 
dismounted infantry combat. The general focus of all the simulation-based activities is on two aspects: 
practice – i.e. the students are to solve tactical problems – and visualisation of terrain and different 
actors such as civilians. The students’ tactical solution is communicated by a standardised order-
format. This is part of the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP), which is used as the framework 
for what is called ‘formal wargaming’.603  
The simulation-based activity of ‘formal wargaming’ is part of a planning session of eight hours (one 
day) where wargaming is one step of eight that is executed. Such sessions occurs in sub-modules B1, 
B2 and B3, which belong to the battalion phase in the final part of the Maneuver Captain Career 
Course. This particular form of wargaming spans across two parts: an initial analysis of Centre of 
Gravity and then a wargame – comparison – of possible Courses of Action (COA). The ‘formal wargame’ 
is supposed to identify critical events and is conducted by the common action/reaction/counter-action 
process. To save time and keep focus, delimitation consists of a wargaming technique of three physical 
concepts: BOX, BELT and AVENUE. A BOX concentrates on one area only, for example, the area of the 
final assault, or a river crossing. A BELT concerns actions synchronised in time at different places in a 
sequential order. This makes this concept logical and is thus considered the best concept for beginners. 
Synchronisation is also the case with an AVENUE, however, it is more geographically limited and 
sequentially covers one route of activity only. These three concepts all delimit the map area where 
actions occur. The wargaming process is ‘walked through’ during the first battalion module (B1) with 
an instructor as the executive officer (XO) in charge of all staff activities, including the wargame. This 
‘formal wargame’ is also known as a COA-wargame. During a discussion session with the actual 
instructors, they argued that their main focus in this form of wargame is to control the wargame in 
order to get output and to keep things realistic: wargaming is not about ‘playing’, but to ‘control chaos’ 
and fit in the action/reaction and counter-action process. It is essential to visualise the plan and 
outcome of actions manifested in time and space. For that specific reason, a relatively straightforward 
terrain model laid out on the classroom floor seems to be the common method of visualisation as part 
of this ‘formal wargame’.604   
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Photograph no. 24: a classroom terrain model of a ‘formal wargame’. The Maneuver 
Captains Career Course (Fort Benning, 2016) provided the photograph. 
 
The person responsible for running a ‘formal wargame’ is a field grade officer. Specifically, this is the 
executive officer (XO), also known as S3, usually a major in a battalion headquarters. However, since 
such officers are ‘not very good at wargaming’, captains with more recent education take a larger role 
in the actual running of a ‘formal wargame’. In essence, the S3 plan officer and the S2 intelligence 
officer have to play the wargame and apply all steps in the Military Decision-Making Process since the 
XO has ‘no idea of wargaming’ and the S3 is usually away together with the Battalion Commander.605 
The implication from this statement is that the Maneuver Captains Career Course is the place where 
COA-wargaming is actually learned.  
Students are taught how to facilitate a ‘formal wargame’ at the Maneuver Captains Career Course. 
Fundamentally, the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) is the bedrock on how to conduct a 
‘formal wargame’. However, there is slight variation – within ‘left and right limits’ – based on the 
individual instructor. For example, deciding which one of the three physical limitation concepts (BOX, 
BELT or AVENUE) to use. This choice by the wargame facilitator depends on several factors. One 
instructor, for example, favours the BOX in conjunction with sketch notes since this allows more focus. 
This is, however, contingent on how large the BOX is. In the course, the BOX concept tends to be used 
for the company phase while the BELT concept is used for the battalion phase. This is because 
instructors believe that the BELT concept is better for synchronised events rather than critical 
                                                          




events.606 In addition to the instructors, former Battalion Commanders are brought in to supervise in 
classrooms. Furthermore, at mid-point in the course, all study groups are changed while instructors 
are switched. The underlying reason for allowing input from many individuals is to help the military 
students visualise by the use of COA-wargaming.607 In addition, the students get different perspectives 
from different instructors.  
Military instructors are concerned that many students do not spend enough time on wargaming. COA-
wargaming in the military decision-making process occurs during an eight hour coached procedure 
that begins with a task and ends with the issue of orders. The time limit of eight hours, however, causes 
only the top ten percent of the students to do wargaming properly. One indication of properly done 
planning is that the student, as a wargame facilitator, includes the enemy action. One indicator of 
failure to do the process properly is that the military students spend too much time with the COA 
development step. This results in no time for rehearsal and often no wargame. The instructors offered 
two insights into this problem: first, there is an inherent challenge to determine the scope of 
wargaming and, second, to determine how to wargame. The latter issue specifically concerns the 
battalion level and a scenario with many critical events.608  
Beside the COA-wargame there are three other examples of simulation-based activities. The first 
concerns the use of VBS and dismounted infantry operations. One student acts as the Company 
Commander. The purpose is to visualise time and space and to demonstrate a potential lack of COA-
analysis in the previous COA-wargaming. An instructor controls the enemy force (OPFOR) in VBS. 
Specifically, OPFOR is used to visualise a gap in the plan, for example, a flank threat, a contingency that 
was not envisioned in the plan. The idea is that the student has to worry about ‘the next thing’: for 
example, the blue force’s transition from attack to defence as the OPFOR reserves may counterattack. 
Based on a classroom observation, one student is assigned to the enemy side, and is the individual 
who actually moves the avatars in the VBS. The classroom instructor is observing both sides in the 
wargame – and thus has control of the class – within the same classroom.609  
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Illustration no. 12: the Close Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT).610 
 
The second activity is the Close Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT), which is located at the Clarke 
Simulation Center, also at Fort Benning. It is a ‘virtual collective training simulator’. At the core of the 
facility are 32 M1 Abrams and 32 M2 Bradley mock-ups, referred to as ‘crewed simulators’. The CCTT 
is considered an ‘effective simulation of (…) combat environment’ with ‘sufficient fidelity’. The CCTT is 
used by the Maneuver Captains Career Course to simulate the attack and the defence of a mechanised 
company. The purpose is to expose gaps in the plan. There are, however, no force on force sessions 
since that would constitute ‘blue on blue’ scenarios, i.e. friendly fire, such as M1 Abrams engaging 
another M1 Abrams. This is not something that the Simulation Center wants to make a habit of. In 
addition to the CCTT, the Simulation Center also provides training for the military instructors regarding 
their use of VBS in the classrooms. In total, an instructor undergoes one day of training by the 
Simulation Center on how to use VBS. This training allows one instructor to run VBS with a class in their 
classroom.611  
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Photograph no. 25: the Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation JCATS (2012).612 
 
The third activity is the Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation (JCATS), which is also located at the Clarke 
Simulation Center. JCATS is a constructive computer-based simulation that provides visualisation by a 
2D map. Specifically, JCATS ‘is a joint multi-sided, real-time, stochastic - high resolution, interactive 
computer-based simulation system that models force interactions from the Joint Task Force level to 
the individual person’.613 The strength of JCATS is the flexibility to move units around and to allow 
students to participate as a battalion staff. Furthermore, JCATS allows the students to watch their plan 
in action. For these reasons, JCATS is used for execution-training at the battalion phase in the 
Maneuver Captains Career Course. There is, however, only one scheduled JCATS-session during the 
entire course. This single occasion was cancelled in 2015.614   
There are indications that wargaming forms are evolving at the Maneuver Center of Excellence. While 
the Maneuver Captain Career Course’s schedule specifies different wargaming activities and thus 
specific forms of simulations, the fine-tuning of the exact wargaming procedure is up to the instructor. 
In fact, an instructor has the opportunity to conduct additional wargaming activities. The consequence 
of adding additional wargames is, however, that something else has to go. Hence, it is therefore 
considered indispensable that the instructor actually knows and understands the wargaming method 
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in order to produce results within the assigned time limit.615 One reason why wargaming activities are 
sometimes dropped is because of a lack of resources. For example, it was mentioned that it takes too 
long to input scenarios into computers. A lack of time was seemingly one of the reasons why the JCATS-
session was cancelled in 2015. It is also a question of control. For example, regarding the VBS activity, 
it is the instructor, and not the Simulation Center, that actually runs the system. This focus on the 
instructor is specifically apparent in manual-based wargames such as the ‘formal wargame’ (COA-
wargaming), which is sometimes supplemented by a terrain model laid out on the classroom floor. 
Such a terrain model is usually straightforward with just a blanket, with cushions below it to visualise 
and model elevations. However, it still takes about two hours to construct a rudimentary terrain 
model. Based on observation it seems to be entirely up to the individual instructor to decide the terrain 
model’s level of elaboration. One apparently very ambitious instructor – as acknowledged by other 
instructors – even used miniatures on the terrain model for extra visualisation.616  
 
Control & veiling 
Physical veiling does not seem to occur at the Maneuver Center of Excellence. Collected data indicates 
that the training audience interacts directly with the simulation system. Indeed, the training audience 
is directly involved in every example of discovered wargaming activities. One major purpose of 
wargaming at the Maneuver Captain Career Course is to visualise the company and battalion command 
levels for the military students. With this in mind, the simulation system and the military students 
interact physically. One incident of this connection between visualisation and learning, by direct 
exposure to the wargame, is the use of terrain models in conjunction with COA-wargaming. 
Regarding other indicators of the suppression of gamification there are signs that the instructor, 
regarding the use of Virtual Battlespace (VBS) in a classroom, executes full control of the simulation. 
There are, however, no distinct indications of ‘gas and brake’ concerning halt and restart. Instead, 
control seems to occur in deciding the starting position of the respective force. What is clear, however, 
is that free play is not allowed: the instructor wields tight control over the OPFOR in order to expose 
known weaknesses in the students’ plan. In the case of VBS, one (of fifteen) students may operate the 
VBS as OPFOR. Every wargaming activity, except the ‘formal wargame’ (COA-wargame), is furthermore 
referred to as simulation rather than wargame.  
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The method of using wargaming as a tool to expose apparent weaknesses in students’ plans seems to 
constitute the general idea behind the use of wargaming at the Maneuver Center of Excellence. 
However, testing a plan, i.e. execution-training (‘classroom warfighting’), only concerns about half of 
the wargaming activities. At least half of the wargaming activities are part of the process of producing 
a plan, i.e. ‘classroom planning’. The ‘formal wargame’, COA-wargaming, is used to develop a plan as 
part of a COA-analysis. This form of wargaming is the only activity that is directly referred to as 
‘wargaming’, whereas other forms, CCTT, VBS and Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation (JCATS), are 
referred to as ‘simulation’. In terms of numbers, COA-wargaming seems the most common wargaming 
activity, with VBS as the second most common form. In both cases, the individual classroom military 
instructor has a central role in the wargaming session. 
The emphasis on COA-wargaming makes it possible to explore the properties of the concept of simple 
standardising. The constant references to the MDMP – the Military Decision-Making Process – and the 
use of wargaming to analyse courses of actions (COA) with different physical concepts (BOX, BELT or 
AVENUE) is an indicator of the property adherence to doctrine. Concerns by instructors that the 
students tend to cut corners, and even skip wargaming because of time constraints, indicate the belief 
that ‘we have to do wargaming’. This is because wargaming is doctrinally – and thus formally – 
established as one explicit step in the MDMP, hence, a ‘formal wargame’. Since COA-wargaming is a 
specific step in the MDMP it also has to produce results. The actual product – the outcome of the COA-
analysis – is important. Consequently, the property adherence to doctrine is evident regarding COA-
wargaming. For other forms, focused on execution-training, adherence to doctrine is arguably not 
apparent.  
COA-wargaming and the other forms of wargaming also seem to differ regarding the property of 
simplicity. One indicator of the property of simplicity is that the wargaming form is encompassing, i.e. 
every officer must manage the wargaming form and therefore every officer should be able to practise 
wargaming. This ability to facilitate is relevant for the individual classroom instructor, who has to 
supervise and control different wargaming activities. This includes COA-wargaming, and the simulation 
activity of VBS. In the case of the latter, the local simulation centre provides support to individual 
military instructors in the form of one day of training. This, however, seems somewhat inadequate for 
feeling fully comfortable with the simulation system. At West Point, an instructor arguably needs more 
than one year of experience to feel comfortable using VBS. This difference may, however, indicate a 
difference in how VBS is used – there seems to be more emphasis on simplicity at the Maneuver Center 
of Excellence. One indication is that, regarding CCTT and JCATS, civilians at the Clarke Simulation Center 




military instructors are responsible for the after-action report.617 Hence, the indication that every 
officer must have the ability to manage wargaming does not seem apparent in CCTT and JCATS. On the 
other hand, the use of VBS, and in particular COA-wargaming, indicates that every officer has to have 
the ability to wargame.  
The indicator of intra-professional learning can further explore the reliance on instructors to run most 
wargaming forms. One of the military instructors explained that he first learned about COA-wargaming 
in his army career at the Maneuver Captain Career Course. He subsequently had the opportunity to 
observe a number of COA-wargames at the US Army National Training Center (Fort Irwin) conducted 
by visiting army units. In addition, he also conducted wargaming during one tour of duty in Afghanistan. 
Personal and professional experience formed the base from where the instructor then developed his 
own method of wargaming. This method integrates and blurs the formal wargaming technique with 
the physical concepts of BOX, BELT and AVENUE. For example, in order to conduct a quick-running 
wargame, since time is always short in planning, the instructor selects one critical event (or ‘friction 
point’) and plays it as a BOX in combination with – to ensure synchronisation – BELT and/or AVENUE.618 
This method of blending concepts into a practical wargaming procedure was developed from 
professional experience rather than from formal instructions and manuals. One key property within 
this development was the need for the instructor to comfortably control the wargame. This striving for 
comfort and control connects to the property of simplicity. Further indications of simplicity are the 
attitude that wargaming forms ‘must work in the field’. This is not related to issues of cost. Instead, 
the real issue for the instructor is what happens if the computer malfunctions – perhaps because of a 
cyberattack. Hence, many instructors realise that maps are still needed as a ‘back-up’.619 This concern 
of the instructors thus connects the manual-based COA-wargame to the property of simplicity.    
 
Innovative active learning 
Promotion of gamification does not seem apparent in the wargaming activities at the Maneuver Center 
of Excellence. While there is arguably much focus on execution-training to force the military students 
to reflect on their constructed plans and to learn to think ahead and anticipate actions and reactions, 
there were no references to gamification from instructors as a way of increasing learning. The data 
collection, for example, did not reveal findings of competition. On the contrary, it was even stated that 
wargaming is ‘not about playing.’ There were, for example, no incidents of force on force sessions with 
the Close Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT). Instead, the instructors emphasised the control of the 
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wargame, in order to get outputs and to keep things realistic.620 This emphasis on instructor control 
goes together with the ambition to visualise what happens in time and space. This focus does not 
indicate promotion of gamification.   
Palpable instructor control may indicate individual innovativeness, the second property of innovative 
active learning. Notably, there seems to be some flexibility for individual instructors to run a wargame 
session according to their ideas. This flexibility seems primarily to concern the classroom wargaming 
activities: COA-wargaming and VBS. One instructor added a terrain model to the COA-wargame and 
ostensibly did a ‘full wargame’ (action/reaction/counter-action) with both a COA-analysis and a 
rehearsal in the same session.621 However, this example of individual innovativeness seems to be an 
exception since instructors at the Maneuver Center of Excellence arguably wield little influence to 
affect the overall wargaming form. For example, support personnel at the Clarke Simulation Center 
run CCTT and JCATS. However, instructors can modify the procedures within a manual COA-wargame 
according to their own ideas, such as for example, blending the three concepts of BOX, BELT and 
AVENUE. Notably, this individual experimentation is considered to be art whereas the instructors 
consider formal procedures to be science. For this reason, the individual that runs a wargame needs a 
certain level of understanding, something which is of central importance in order for that individual to 
successfully conduct wargaming.622 While the running of a wargame thus entails some individual 
innovativeness, the ‘formal wargame’ does not seem to significantly change when instructors transfer.  
Regarding the ‘attitude that no one else understands wargaming’, there are signs that such attitudes 
exist at the Clarke Simulation Center. This is indicated in a striving to ‘heighten awareness’ of their 
simulation systems, in particular JCATS.623 Notably, JCATS is different from the other computer-based 
simulations (VBS, CCTT) in that JCATS is a 2D constructive simulation, rather than a 3D virtual 
simulation. However, JCATS is, at least temporarily, no longer in use in the Maneuver Captain Career 
Course. This situation and the striving to ‘heighten awareness’ by offering free sessions to any course, 
in combination with argumentation centred on cost-effectiveness and environmental friendliness, may 
be interpreted as an attitude that ‘no one else understands wargaming’.  
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Command and General Staff College (Leavenworth) 
The Unites States Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) was established in 1881 and 
currently (2015) has about 7,500 students every year. This includes about 6,000 students enrolled in 
distance education. The CGSC consists of four schools. The first is the Command and General Staff 
School (CGSS) where mid-career army officers with the rank of major, or slated to become major, 
receive intermediate level education (ILE) in a ten-month program. This is the ten month long 
Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) for mid-career US Army officers. The focus is on 
division, brigade and battalion levels. The students may opt to study towards a master’s degree in 
Military Arts and Sciences (MMAS). The second is the School of Advanced Military Studies, also 
colloquially known as the ‘Jedi-course’, which is a post-ILE program for selected students who receive 
a master’s degree (MMAS). The focus is on the strategic and operational levels. The third is the School 
for Command Preparation (SCP) where senior officers (colonels and lieutenant colonels) attend a short 
course of three to four weeks regarding special topics before assuming command of a brigade or a 
battalion. The fourth, and last, is the School of Advanced Leadership and Tactics (SALT), which covers 
the development of US Army officers from the rank of first lieutenant to the selection for major: i.e. 
the entire timeline from the basic officer course (post-West Point or ROTC) until the officer’s entry into 
the CGSS. A keyword in this educational timeline is the development of the concept of Scholar-Warrior-
Leader, which concerns branch-specific skills in tactics, staff processes (battalions and brigades) and 
command competence.624  
 
Contemporary wargaming 
Computer-based simulations at the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) support three major 
exercises. Two of those involve the Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC). The first is 
named ’23 Div MCO staff exercise’ and is supported by Decisive Action. The second exercise is the ’88 
BCT stability staff exercise’, which uses Elusive Victory. The third exercise is for the School for Command 
Preparation (SCP) and is named the ‘BN/BCT stability op commander exercise’. It uses UrbanSim for 
support. All three simulations use students as operators and ordinary classroom computers. Most 
exercises seem focused on the planning process. The only acknowledged simulation for execution-
training is the ’23 Div MCO staff exercise’ with Decisive Action. This particular exercise is run with no 
fewer than 23 ongoing simulations in parallel. With this quantity, the simulation team with a total of 
five individuals is unable to provide full support. Instead, the first tier of support consists of the Tech 
Cell, manned and led by students that usually belong to category FA57 (Functional Area 57: Simulation 
                                                          




Operations).625 These students teach their fellow students how to operate Decisive Action. In each 
‘section’ of 64 students, one or two FA57 students receive 16 hours of pre-training with Decisive Action. 
They then teach their fellow students: ten of the 64 students become the simulation operators.626 
During an exercise, in one section of 64 students, the majority would man the divisional headquarters, 
while the rest are placed in other cells, such as LOCON (four blue brigades) and OPFOR (four students). 
Notably, the classroom instructor typically plays the role of the Division Commander. The ’23 Div MCO 
staff exercise’ covers two weeks plus one week of preparation, all within a course module of 4-5 weeks. 
Each classroom instructor decides at what point in the scenario, for example, at an ‘early entry’ or at 
the ‘final push’, the simulation will commence.627  
 
 
Photograph no. 26: Decisive Action at the CGSC.628 
 
Decisive Action is described as a staff-centric wargame for major combat operations at the division and 
army corps level. It is a 2D computer-based constructive simulation with a flexible editing system for 
the instructor that runs and control the wargame. An instructor, Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Lunsford, 
designed Decisive Action for the CGSC in 1998. Decisive Action later became available on the 
commercial market in a civilian version. Continuous updates have led to the derivative Decisive Action 
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Brigade Level. The reason why Decisive Action became computer-based, and not manual, was 
dependent on two factors: the designer’s own programming skills and the military culture’s alleged 
non-acceptance of board games. Before developing Decisive Action the designer and instructor 
Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Lunsford actually used the manual Dunn and Kempf Wargame (1977-1997) 
once. However, ‘people hated it’. This was allegedly not because of the design, which was good, but 
because the military culture did not accept this form of wargaming. The computer, on the other hand, 
provided a level of credibility while the board game format did not.629 
Decisive Action is not the only wargame designed by Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Lunsford. Follow me was 
designed for West Point and covers the basics of tactics at company and lower levels. However, the 
visit to West Point revealed that Virtual Battlespace (VBS) is used instead because of its 3D-
vizualisation. On the other hand, VBS is not used at the CGSC since VBS is designed for platoon tactics, 
which is not a level of concern at the CGSC. Another wargame by Lunsford is Crucible of Command, 
which covers offense/defence at the company level. Crucible of Command is apparently not used as 
much anymore. According to some instructors, with a background from the Maneuver Center of 
Excellence, Crucible of Command is ‘not detailed enough’. Consequently, the instructors preferred the 
Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation (JCATS) instead.630 This is logical since these instructors should be 
familiar with JCATS since it has been used at the Maneuver Center of Excellence.  
Besides the computer-based simulations, the other type of wargaming activity discovered concerns 
so-called ‘Bite-Sized Games’, which are run in accordance to learning theory. Students are provided 
concrete experience from the start – for example, a short movie sequence. Then the situation is 
‘published’ and the students have to ‘process’ the information. This second step is GNI, which stands 
for ‘generalise new information’. The third and final step is to apply the GNI. This three-step process 
relates to game-based learning. This is further evident in that simulation and games are used for 
examinations, where individual students are observed. There is a plethora of different ‘Bite-Sized 
Games’. One noticeable example is UrbanSim which is based on web-deliverability and about stability 
operations. UrbanSim apparently suffers from a weak scenario editor with only two scenarios (Iraq and 
Afghanistan). A further and more serious drawback is that UrbanSim is not a ‘staff driver’: i.e., an entire 
class (16 students) cannot participate. Another example of a ‘Bite-Sized Game’ is Future Force, which 
covers five operational areas. Future Force is ‘extremely abstracted’ with one student playing as the 
chief of staff of the US Army for twenty turns. There is no need for any major pre-training and this 
game has been used since 2010. Future Force is also commercially available. Another example is a 
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logistical simulation, Forward into Battle, which allows up to five players for the following roles: 
OPFOR, logistics, movement, protection and corps level fuel management. Forward into Battle was 
created from a board game and is based on ‘force flow’.631  
The various ‘Bite-Sized Games’ have been developed locally for specific teaching purposes. The Grand 
Offensive was developed at the Digital Leader Development Center (DLDC) and was apparently inspired 
by a commercial 1980s game. The Grand Offensive is about the First World War, specifically the Battle 
of Somme, and it depicts the urge to ‘try again’ in order to make a perfect push against prepared 
German defensive positions. The Grand Offensive is played for one turn only with several parameters 
that can be tweaked, such as force concentration, surprise attack, time for assault (night/day) etc. 
Students have to submit a screenshot of their best result – the very same screenshot also shows how 
many times the student has tried (i.e. attacked). One student attacked 23 times but it is not possible 
to win the Grand Offensive – only to improve historical results, which explains why the students made 
repeated attacks. These actions can be compared to the repeated attacks that have happened 
historically. The Grand Offensive is perceived to be a ‘simple simulation’ and is used by the Department 
of Military History.632 The main design feature is that the player is playing alone and competing against 
himself, with self-induced iterations. While it can be argued that the single player and one turn only 
does not make the Grand Offensive a wargame, the multiple turns arguably transfer it to the 
wargaming category.  
In addition to the examples of computer-based simulations and the ‘Bite-Size Games’ there are 
additional wargames used in elective ‘after-class activities’ at the CGSC. First and foremost is the 
classical military wargame, Kriegsspiel 1824, a copy of the traditional Prussian-styled map-based 
wargame. Kriegsspiel 1824 is used to run a scenario on the ‘Metz map’, with three army corps per side. 
This wargame is part of the elective module ‘Decision in Action’ that addresses the evolution of the 
tactical and operational levels of war, from Napoleon through the Second World War, using a 
combination of in-class discussion, reading, and various wargames.’633 Another elective wargame is the 
Dunn and Kempf Wargame. Two US Army officers, Hilton Dunn and Steve Kempf, developed it in 1975 
when they were students at Fort Leavenworth. Dunn and Kempf were allegedly influenced by a 
commercial wargame design (WRG 1970-75). The Dunn and Kemp Wargame is a manual wargame at 
the battalion level, with miniatures, that utilises a terrain board. It was superseded in the 1990s by 
various computer-based wargames.634 The continued use of the Dunn and Kempf Wargame in elective 
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‘after-class activities’ seems connected to the individual instructor. This inference becomes more 
evident concerning a naval ‘home-made’ board game on strategic dilemmas. This particular board 
game is centred on the logic behind the so-called 5-5-3 naval balance between Great Britain, United 
States and Japan in the 1920s. This naval wargame, on prioritisation of warship-building in the 1930s, 
is used in a two-hour class. The game comprises an umpire and two players. This can, however, be 
expanded to 8-10 players with different maps if the instructor is ‘comfortable’ in handling this.635 As 
one instructor mentioned: ‘the instructor (game master) is a key component of the learning process.’636 
In other words, these wargames are connected to individuals who are comfortable with this manual 
form of wargaming.  
 
 
Photograph no. 27: Kriegsspiel 1824 at DLDC, CGSC.637 
 
Control & veiling 
According to the data acquired, the modus operandi of the simulation exercises, the ‘Bite-Sized Games’ 
and the elective wargames, seems to be that the students themselves operate and interact with the 
wargames. They either learn how to operate the wargame, or a certain category of students (FA57) 
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are the ones that operate the computer-based simulation system. All the simulation systems seem to 
indicate direct interaction with the military students. There are no indications of physical separation. 
Furthermore, since the students themselves run the systems, control by the classroom instructor 
seems more indirect, i.e. the focus is on the starting point of the scenario rather than direct 
intervention (‘gas and brake’) during the actual wargame. A purpose that was mentioned several times 
during data collection was that the use of a wargame in a classroom was to ‘drive a discussion’.638 This 
may, however, indicate that the wargame is limited and that gamification is suppressed. 
One potential indicator of suppression of gamification would be that free play is not allowed. However, 
while there are few examples of exercises on execution-training, the one that was mentioned – the ’23 
Div MCO staff exercise’ with Decisive Action – has a red cell of four students. On the other hand, there 
are not two equal teams in a double-sided exercise – the bulk of the 64 military students per simulation 
man the divisional headquarters. Regarding the indicator of the attitude of ‘not doing wargaming 
here’, the fact of the matter is that ‘wargaming’ is a rarely used term. On the other hand, the term 
‘game’ is explicitly used for some activities, i.e. the ‘Bite-Sized Games’. The term ‘simulation’, however, 
seems to be the dominating term and especially so for the larger wargaming activities.  
 
Simple standardising 
When it comes to the property of simplicity is seems that wargaming forms that are selected have to 
be encompassing since it is the classroom instructors that have to exercise control. However, the 
instructors have extra support in the form of assigned simulation officers (FA57) among the students 
who handle the computer-based simulation systems, such as Decisive Action. These simulation officers 
receive in-house pre-training: either specifically regarding a special simulation system or more 
generally based on a few shorter courses on simulation for training and education. Simulation officers 
(FA57) are a particular category of personnel that are assigned one or two billets in the training section 
(S7/G7) in a US Army headquarters (BN/BDE/DIV/CORPS). Their function at the CGSC, besides 
completing their education like everyone else, is to support and train their fellow students. The 
presence of simulation officers among the military students is an indicator of intra-professional 
learning – the vast majority of the military students seem to learn wargaming from their peers rather 
than from formal course modules. Lastly, there was no indication of viewpoints that argued that 
selected wargaming forms ‘should work in the field’. On the other hand, there were concerns regarding 
cost. The use of Decisive Action seems to support an opinion that simulations are preferably run in a 
classroom setting with ordinary computers and within (a limited) budget and with no extra personnel 
                                                          




beside the classroom instructor and the FA57 student(s). Arguably, this concern of cost and limited 
budgets may be seen as an indicator of simplicity. On the other hand, this concern does not propose 
an evidently cheaper wargaming form, such as manual map-based wargames. Arguably, the reason is 
because the computer adds a certain level of credibility.639 This, on the other hand, does not indicate 
simplicity, such as that the wargame ‘should work in the field’.  
 
Innovative active learning 
There are several indications of support from game-based theory, such as the ‘Experiential Learning 
Model’ that emphasises decision-making, as well as apparent and prominent roles of innovative and 
enthusiastic individuals.640 The indicators of innovative active learning can be further explored by the 
organisational context. The Digital Leader Development Center (DLDC) provides wargaming support to 
the Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC). The DLDC has an explicitly pedagogic 
approach in their use of educational wargaming. The approach consists of three parts: the first is the 
use of experimental learning to ‘close the gap between textbook (crawl) and fieldwork (run)’, the 
second is to make each student engaged in making relevant decisions, and third, to use simulation 
routinely – everywhere and everyday – ‘to gain and maintain cognitive skills.’641 Based on this 
pedagogic approach educational wargames are selected in accordance to four factors: pre-game 
preparation (i.e. how long it takes for the students to learn to operate the game); the level of 
abstraction; commander-centric (small group/individual) or staff-centric (entire class); and finally, type 
of operation (stability operation or a major combat operation). All four factors are integrated into a 
matrix that purportedly explains how different educational wargames are used within the CGSC.642 This 
matrix, illustrated below as the ‘simulation matrix’, indicates the variables behind the selection of 
different educational wargames.  
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Illustration no. 13: the simulation matrix at the CGSC.643 
 
The simulation matrix is based on thoughts grounded in game-based learning in addition to an explicit 
ambition of more wargaming, i.e. ‘a battle in every classroom’.644 The matrix can be summarised in the 
question: ‘How and why do you choose the simulation you use in your exercises?’ The answer to this 
relevant question, which stresses the role of the individual instructor, is presented as the PDI process 
(Purpose, Decisions and Interactions). While the students’ learning objectives are the purpose, the 
wargame is supposed to provide ‘decisions and dilemmas’, which the military students must face to 
learn. The process is important: the interaction covers the initial situation, input of decisions, and 
outcome of those decisions. The PDI process may be applied either to develop a new wargame, or to 
evaluate existing games. For example, if the requirement is to use a wargame within a time span of 60-
90 minutes the wargame must be abstracted but still ‘present the essentials of the dilemma’. An 
example of such a wargame is UrbanSim which ‘drives discussion about stability operations’.645 Due to 
the envisaged short time span one requirement is that it should not take more than ten minutes of the 
class (16 students) to learn how to use UrbanSim. In comparison, if the wargame is to ‘drive a small 
staff exercise’ the level of details is increased but still limited to what is considered important for the 
student’s ‘key decisions’.646 Striving for more details, and presumably an increased level of realism, is 
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considered a tangible development since ‘humans always want more details.’ However, the designated 
approach of the PDI process is ‘to enable tailored experimental learning environments on demand’. 
This customisation is described as ‘selective fidelity’, since the selected approach ‘focuses on decisions 
rather than details.’ Hence, too much realism is deemed unnecessary. Instead, a core element of 
wargaming, human interactional decision-making, is made central.647  
Besides the PDI process, there are indications of individual influence and of friction between simulation 
support personnel and classroom instructors. Apparently, some instructors do not want to use manual 
board games since they would then have to learn more in order to run the game. Instead, they prefer 
a computer-based simulation since board games are considered ‘difficult’. While there often exists 
mutual understanding between the military instructors and the simulation support team at DLDC, 
there are also disagreements. It seems to be the case that the simulation support personnel, who 
consist of ‘gamers’, focus on the aspect of decision-making by adhering to the motto (allegedly by Sid 
Meyer) that ‘a good game is a game with many decisions’. The classroom teachers, on the other hand, 
have other concerns, such as non-complicated facilitation. This in turn connects to an explicit concern, 
from a simulation support standpoint, about the risk of ‘overselling’ a wargame since ‘no wargame fits 
everything’. And, if such a promoted wargame becomes a failure the result will be a loss of credibility 
– in this case for the Simulation Division within the DLDC. The explicit method of increasing credibility 
is by the use of the simulation matrix, which presents instructors with four different alternatives rather 
than a single wargame. In addition to the matrix, a division of labour means that the DLDC does 
simulation support and seemingly does not carry out facilitation by controlling the simulations in the 
classroom.648 This control is instead left to the instructor, with students as simulation operators. 
Accordingly, issues of control, comfort and credibility all feature in this arrangement of wargame 
selection.  
The ‘Bite-Sized Games’ are based on learning theory and indicate promotion of gamification. 
Specifically, these games are ‘concrete experience drivers’ and allow the students to assess 
information and then make decisions based on the processed information. This approach connects to 
game-based learning. However, no data indicate that the wargames are actually used in a competitive 
setting – player interaction seems to be concentrated on everything but the adversarial aspect. There 
is one exception: the ’23 Div MCO staff exercise’ with Decisive Action. The red cell in that exercise, 
however, consists of only four of 64 students in each simulation. Therefore, the red cell is arguably 
mostly symbolic. Regarding the issue of competitiveness, ‘gamers’, of which there are several at the 
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CGSC – especially at the DLDC – are in favour of a more competitive posture in wargames, which would 
see both the red and blue sides fully manned: for example 16 vs. 16 students.649 This indicates that 
while game-based learning is present in the reasoning behind the use of specific wargaming forms 
there are, on the other hand, few indications of competitive elements, at least in regard to a classical 
setting of two teams (red vs. blue) in a Kriegsspiel.  
The example of Decisive Action reveals issues regarding individual innovativeness. According to the 
designer and instructor, Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Lunsford, he originally designed Decisive Action 
because he believed that there was a need to improve education in tactics, specifically, how to win 
battles against opponents. His arguments convinced his boss, who let Lunsford use his simulation in 
his class. Accordingly, during the course module five ‘battles’ were conducted with opposing sides, 
with the students divided into two equal ‘blue’ teams, who fought each other without the perception 
of one team being OPFOR (i.e. the ‘red team’). Learning was augmented with an after-action review 
(AAR). This involved the videotaping of a three minute presentation by both sides, about their plan and 
their considerations about their opponent’s plan, before the battle. This avoided possible student 
suspicion, when a setback occurred, that instructors had ‘cheated’ by deliberately causing a bad result 
for one team. The videotaping also contributed to creativity, as the students became aware that they 
were exposed to the other team’s thinking and estimates what they might do. One of the five battles 
was the historic battle of Gazala (1942, North Africa). However, the students were neither aware that 
the simulation covered this particular battle, nor that it was an actual scenario from the Second World 
War. Each battle lasted four hours in addition to the AAR. The students put in considerable effort, the 
simulation was low-cost, only one instructor was needed, and support was forthcoming from the 
higher organisational hierarchy. Consequently, Lunsford’s boss wanted all instructors to use Decisive 
Action the next year. This, however, turned out ‘a complete failure’. Lunsford’s own conclusion from 
this was that ‘the most important thing is the instructor.’ One contentious issue was that many 
instructors found it difficult that ‘students were running ahead of schedule’ – thus, the instructor 
stopped everything and restarted the simulation. Consequently, Lunsford then modified the wargame 
since he realised that flexibility and comfort were important for instructors.650 Accordingly, ‘the game 
master (teacher) is a key vector for success or failure. The game itself, while critical, is no more so than 
the person who runs the class.’651 
The example of Decisive Action leads to further exploration of the indicator that the wargame form 
changes when the instructor transfers since it reveals several entities with an interest in the form of 
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wargaming. The different actors are: the classroom military instructor, the Simulation Division within 
the Digital Leader Development Center (DLDC) and the overarching organisational hierarchy. To 
balance these different viewpoints the PDI process is used. More importantly, however, this PDI 
process is followed by a joint decision between the Simulation Division at DLDC and the individual 
instructor.652 While this indicates the importance of the individual instructor, it also acknowledges an 
overall organisational framework for simulation within US Army education. The US Army National 
Simulation Center (NSC), also located at Fort Leavenworth, and the US Army Program Executive Office 
for Simulation, Training and Instrumentation (PEO STRI) in Orlando, have important roles in the 
procurement of simulations. The NSC is the combat developer, while PEO STRI is the material 
developer and is tasked by NSC. Hence, simulation procurement is supposed to be carried out 
according to a fixed organisational scheme. Decisive Action was not procured according to this system. 
This caused friction when the NSC promoted a new divisional-level simulation. The implication was 
that CGSC had to use the new simulation if it proved to be better than Decisive Action. From the 
perspective of Decisive Action’s designer Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Lunsford, ‘people have no idea of 
gaming’ as the formal requirement was for a ‘simulation’ with as many details as possible, whereas a 
‘game’ is about abstraction.653 This indicates that an individual instructor may have strong opinions 
about wargaming. It would thus be expected that when the instructor has transferred away the 
wargaming form changes. This also occurred: instead of a double-sided wargame, the large exercise 
’23 Div MCO staff exercise’ with Decisive Action focuses on primarily one side (the ‘blue’ force). 
However, Decisive Action is still in use. This is arguably because Decisive Action was redesigned to be 
more flexible, which arguably makes it easier for an instructor to achieve control, comfort and 
credibility.  
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Data from the three embedded units of analysis: the United States Military Academy (USMA) at West 
Point (I), the Maneuver Center of Excellence at Fort Benning (II) and the Command and General Staff 
College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth (III), indicate the importance of the military instructor. For 
example, at West Point (I), the military instructors appreciate the versatility of Virtual Battlespace 
(VBS) and its real-time editing. One view is that teacher acceptance is a prerequisite for student 
acceptance. External support cannot replace a teacher for this purpose.654 This indicates the inherent 
credibility of the military instructor within the officer profession. It also indicates that instructor buy-
in is crucial and more important than buy-in from military students and the organisational hierarchy. 
The case of the USA has revealed that instructor buy-in does not necessarily entail fitting one specific 
wargaming form to one concept only. For example, the use of VBS at West Point (I) indicates adherence 
to properties of every conceptual category. For example, suppression of gamification is indicated by 
the seriousness of grades, which ‘takes the fun out of the game’ for the officer cadets. At the same 
time, promotion of gamification is indicated in how VBS is used in the classroom to generate 
experience and promote active learning, an element in game-based learning. This can be symbolised 
with the instructor saying ‘let’s run it’, rather than explaining that ‘this will not work’. Furthermore, 
the property simplicity is indicated by the fact that every instructor needs to be able to handle VBS in 
the classroom. Since all three concepts are involved, this entails a balancing act between indicators. 
However, this also means that the individual instructor can choose to focus more on one concept – for 
example, the degree of gamification (such as allowing competition). 
The so-called ‘formal wargaming’, or COA-wargaming, at the Maneuver Center of Excellence (II), is a 
good example of a wargame that seems to overwhelmingly adhere to one concept: in this case simple 
standardising. Adherence to doctrine is manifested in the formal Military Decision-Making Process 
(MDMP) of the US Army. Simplicity is found in the manual-based approach, with ordinary maps and/or 
simple terrain models. This form of wargame is also to be managed by all officers. However, there are 
some indications of instructors conducting modifications: such as experimenting with the wargaming 
technique of three physical concepts, BOX, BELT and AVENUE, to achieve better results within the 
limited time available; or, a more elaborated use of a terrain model for actual wargaming rather than 
visualisation only. This indicates some individual innovativeness. However, such modifications are 
minor since the actual wargaming form is arguably not significantly altered. Notably, these 
modifications seem to adhere to simplicity since these are arguably developed from intra-professional 
experience rather than from formal learning theories.  
                                                          




The CGSC (III) unit of analysis in particular explored instructor buy-in vis-à-vis the selection of 
wargaming forms. While there exists a formal process named PDI (Purpose, Decision and Interaction), 
the final decision involves the classroom instructor. Some instructors have strong personal views about 
wargaming. For example, several instructors allegedly do not want to put in any extra effort to learn 
how to use the manual wargaming form of board games. Instead, they prefer the computer to run the 
game. Since the game experts at the Simulation Division do not run the wargames themselves, the 
classroom instructor has a major role in generating credibility for the selected educational wargame. 
This is crucial since every wargame is likely to be questioned by the students. In one example, regarding 
Decisive Action, one instructor had to ‘defend the game’ repeatedly. This issue of credibility – and 
comfort – arguably arises because of a general perception that simulations are likely to have built-in 
biases. For that reason, the wargame may actually be a ‘bad tool’ if the wargame teaches the students 
incorrect lessons, for example, an inflation of the capacity of attack helicopters on a battlefield. At the 
CGSC, such potential problems of credibility are arguably mitigated by the application of the 
aforementioned PDI process. In other words, ‘without this process the wargame proponent will lose 
credibility’.655 Accordingly, instructor buy-in will not be achievable if an instructor cannot defend a 
wargame. Without instructor buy-in, any attempt to conduct an educational wargame is likely to result 
in a ‘complete failure’. This became the case in the initial general use of Decisive Action at CGSC (III). 
The simulation was subsequently redesigned to allow the instructor more control and flexibility. 
Accordingly, while formal support in terms of organisational hierarchy and formal processes is helpful, 
the individual instructor – the classroom teacher – is the most important person. For an instructor to 
quickly learn how to manage a particular educational wargame, the property of simplicity seems 
appropriate. Enthusiasts, or ‘gamers’, on the other hand, seem vital for the introduction of new 
wargaming forms. However, such forms are likely to disappear, evolve or transform when the 
innovative instructor transfers away, as exemplified by the current (2014) use of Decisive Action at 
CGSC (III) which differs from its initial use.  
 
  
                                                          







Officer education in the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) is comparable to the other country cases in 
regard to the selected embedded units of analysis. The initial embedded unit of analysis is the National 
Defense Academy (NDA). It offers a four-year university-level education (bachelor degree) for officer 
candidates, who intend to become officers in the Self-Defense Forces. The initial level also includes the 
GSDF Officer Candidate School and its six-month education after the NDA. This is somewhat similar to 
the case of Germany with its two Bundeswehr universities and the Army Officer School in Dresden. 
The intermediate embedded unit of analysis is the branch school for armour and infantry officers. It is 
located close to Mount Fuji and known as the GSDF Fuji School. The third and final embedded unit of 
analysis is the GSDF Staff College in central Tokyo where GSDF officers study to attain the rank of major.  
The main challenge regarding the case of Japan was accessibility, which was an actual issue during the 
visiting period in Japan. Access was gained to the NDA, which was visited by the author. Access was, 
however, not achieved in the form of a personal visit to the GSDF Officer Candidate School. In fact, a 
visit to the GSDF Officer Candidate School was discouraged by one of the author’s GSDF contacts ‘since 
there is no wargaming there’.656 This declaration led to further discussions with respondents of what 
‘wargaming’ actually entails in Japan. Moreover, a scheduled visit to the Fuji School was cancelled due 
to the wargaming facilitators not being available at the scheduled time of visit. On the other hand, 
information on wargaming was obtained since all the interviewees had personally attended courses at 
the Fuji School during their officer careers. Some had also served as teachers and instructors at said 
school. Hence, based on the interviewees’ experiences, data were available of wargaming activities at 
the Fuji School, as well as of educational activities at the GSDF Officer Candidate School. Data on 
wargaming at the GSDF Staff College were obtained in a similar fashion. In addition to interviews with 
former instructors and students, internet searches – based on keywords from the interviews – revealed 
photographs and texts of wargaming activities. This provided the basis for a formal request for 
information, via the Swedish Embassy, which provided further information on military educational 
wargaming in Japan. In the end, data were obtained on all three embedded units of analysis.  
 
  
                                                          




National Defense Academy (Boueidaigakkou, 防衛大学校) 
In 1954, the National Defence Academy (NDA) was established near Yokosuka in Kanagawa prefecture, 
close to Tokyo. The purpose was, and is, to provide education at the university level to future officers 
of all three services in the Self-Defense Forces of Japan. The education program of the NDA spans four 
years. After graduation, the students transfer to one of three officer candidate schools (Land, Maritime 
or Air). At the GSDF Officer Candidate School (Kanbukouhoseigakkou, 幹部候補生学校), located at 
Maekawahara on the island of Kyushu, the military curriculum spans six months. Thereafter the officer 
candidate graduates as a commissioned officer with the rank of second lieutenant. Notably, officer 
candidates with a degree from the NDA constitute only about 20 % of all candidates at the GSDF Officer 
Candidate School. Slightly less than one-fifth are from civilian universities, and slightly less than half 
are recruited from within the GSDF.657 For this reason, the NDA can be considered the equivalent to 
West Point in the USA.  
 
Contemporary wargaming 
The initial comment received by the author during a visit to the National Defense Academy (NDA) was 
that ‘there is no wargaming here at NDA’.658 Likewise, nor are there, allegedly, any wargaming activities 
at the GSDF Officer Candidate School.659 These revelations led to further discussions on military 
educational wargaming. Several views surfaced among the respondents, all officers within the GSDF. 
One respondent defined ‘wargaming’ as a course of action (COA) session during the military planning 
phase. This particular wargaming form was described as influenced by – and for that reason similar to 
– US Army Doctrine (FM 101-5). For this reason, the term ‘wargaming’ – an English loanword – is 
accordingly included as a specific part of the GSDF’s military decision-making process. GSDF officers, 
however, habitually call this encompassing process of producing a plan and orders in accordance with 
a situation, a ‘map maneuver’. A ‘map maneuver’ is officially not ‘wargaming’, but some officers 
consider it a ‘wargame’.660 To make this use of terminology even more confusing, a Command Post 
Exercise (CPX) is generally referred to as ‘map maneuver’. CPXs are conducted in schools as well as at 
the GSDF regional level (army) with field units. The difference between the official doctrinal term of 
‘wargaming’ and officers’ colloquial expressions of ‘map maneuver’ raises questions of the possible 
existence of a multitude of wargaming forms.  
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When pressed to what wargaming really entails several respondents settled on an assertion that 
‘technically, wargaming is fighting between blue and red forces’. In the GSDF, ‘wargaming’ refers to 
fighting between red and blue forces in a ‘virtual area’ for the purpose of improving plans or orders. 
Respondents were in agreement that the ‘unofficial definition’, by the majority of GSDF officers, is that 
a ‘wargame’ is used within the process of a CPX. There are, however, two kinds of wargames: one is 
for planning (keikaku, 計画) and one is for execution-training, i.e. to literally ‘battle’ (sentou, 戦闘). 
These two wargames, with different purposes, are both integrated into the decision-making process: 
the initial wargame is to improve the plan during the ‘planning stage’, while the second wargame is to 
improve the orders (to be given) to subordinate units (LOCON) in the ‘fighting stage’.661 Wargaming is 
doctrinally an integrated and essential part of a CPX. This explains why a CPX is sometimes referred to 
as a ‘map maneuver’.662 The reference to ‘map’, however, comes from the fact that a ‘map maneuver’ 
generally uses maps with ‘blocks, transparencies or magnets’ as unit symbols. A ‘map maneuver’, or 
simply a ‘MM’, is perceived to be a form of manual-based wargaming. Notably, both wargames within 
a CPX are organised with a similar physical form: a map-table with an enlarged map and unit 
symbols.663 For this reason, wargaming in the GSDF is considered to be a ‘map exercise’, zujyouenshuu, 
図上演習. However, GSDF officers colloquially refer to wargaming, i.e. ‘map exercise’, as ‘map 
maneuver’ (MM) or CPX. Moreover, a ‘map exercise’ are sometimes referred to as heigienshuu, 兵棋
演習.664 This seems the case particularly when execution-training is considered, i.e. for the second 
wargame within a CPX/MM. Notably, the Japanese term heigienshuu is linguistically connoted to a ‘war 
game’, for example, in the form of chess, and as a ‘military simulation’.665 
 
 
Illustration no. 14: perception and definition of wargaming in the GSDF.  
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At this initial level of officer education, there is allegedly no occurrence of any forms of wargaming as 
described above. One example of this non-existence is that all military schools use military history as 
examples of military operations and leadership. This education in military history is, however, provided 
as lectures on the Pacific War, the Korean War and various Middle Eastern wars. Real maps, terrain 
models and symbolic unit markers are explicitly used, which make the education in military history 
potentially open to the use of wargames for learning. Nonetheless, the teaching format is lectures and 
hence, while hypothetically possible, there is no wargaming in military history. Nor is there any 
wargaming in the education of tactics at this level.666 While it might be possible for an individual 




Photograph no. 28: military history (left) and tactics (right), GSDF Officer Candidate 
School.668 
 
The photograph on the left portrays a military history session with a general focus on strategy and 
tactics since the Meiji era (1868) while the photograph on the right illustrates a class in basic 
contemporary tactics. As is evident in the photographs, terrain and map tables are present and 
integrated into the education at the GSDF Officer Candidate School. There are, however, no indications 
– or suggestions – from the interviewees that such apparatuses are utilised as wargaming. Instead, 
interviewees emphasised that wargaming is not conducted at this level of officer education in Japan.669 
Further collection of data did, however, find reference to a single incident of a possible wargaming 
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activity, a so-called zujyouenshuu, 図上演習, i.e. ‘map exercise’, at the NDA. However, this activity 
occurs only once for Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) officer candidates during their fourth year at the 
NDA.670 This incident does not involve land officer candidates. The policy is that map exercises are not 
conducted at the NDA since the officer candidates ‘do not know tactics and military operations’. The 
single example of a map exercise referred to on the internet is thus not what GSDF officers would 
consider a real map exercise.671    
No example of wargaming was found at the initial embedded unit of analysis, the level of officer 
candidates. Consequently, there are little data available for a discussion on the three conceptual 
categories. While activities such as lectures in military history and military tactics use maps and 
symbolic unit markers such educational activities do not constitute wargaming. Interviewees were also 
adamant that no wargaming occurs at the NDA and the GSDF Officer Candidate School. On the other 
hand, the same interviewees explained that wargaming activities do occur at the other two embedded 
units of analysis, in particular at the second intermediate embedded unit regarding branch schools, 
the GSDF Fuji School.  
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Fuji school (Fujigakkou, 富士学校) 
The GSDF Fuji School was established in 1954 in the city of Gotemba, located on the eastern side of 
Mount Fuji, not far from Tokyo. The Fuji School is responsible for education, training and development 
concerning the armour, infantry and artillery branches of the GSDF. Hence, the Fuji School is a 
combination of a training area, with assigned training units, and an officer school. There are two 
principal courses for officers at the Fuji school: the Basic Officer Course, where the new second 
lieutenants study for nine months, and the Advanced Officer Course, where officers study for six 
months to become captains.  
 
Contemporary wargaming 
There are several examples of training/education (kyouiku, 教育) activities at the Fuji School that may 
be considered wargaming, such as sand table exercises.672 First, it should be noted that the Japanese 
word kyouiku can be translated as either education or training, which is thus similar to the German 
and Swedish languages, rather than English, which differentiates education from training. The use of 
sand table exercises is seemingly prevalent in the education of GSDF officers. The many accessible 
photographs of sand table exercises on the internet strengthen this assertion.  
 
 
Photograph no. 29: leader exercise with sand board (saban, 砂盤) at the Fuji School.673 
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Data from interviewees revealed that GSDF officers experience wargaming at the Fuji school. This 
concerns the Advanced Officer Course, which runs for six months. This course is allegedly the first 
instance in the career of a GSDF officer when he/she experiences wargaming.674 This introduction of 
wargaming in the GSDF’s officer education is done within the framework of a Command Post Exercise 
(CPX). Prior to this educational introduction, GSDF officers allegedly only use maps to explain and 
rehearse orders at the platoon and company levels. Such activities are not regarded as wargaming. 
Instead, such activities are considered to be a facilitating method when giving orders to subordinate 
commanders. One particular form for this facilitation method is the sand table, which is used by lower 
unit commanders (platoon, company). In Japanese this form is called saban, 砂盤, meaning ‘sand 
board’.675 Wargaming is perceived to be something different. However, the main difference between 
a sand board – with its small tank miniatures and terrain features – and a wargame may consist of the 
fact that in a wargame the pieces on the sand board (or on the map) are actually moved. In other 
words, in a wargame, the military operation is comprehensively played out with symbolic interaction. 
The photograph below indicates an outdoor sand board exercise for the Basic Officer Course at the 
Fuji School. Notably, the attached text in the source to the photograph below explicitly articulates that 
when the small tank models are actually moved, the exercise ‘becomes a map exercise’, i.e. 
zujyouenshuu, 図上演習.676  
 
 
Photograph no. 30: sand board exercise with miniatures for the Basic Officer Course.677 
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The concept of a map exercise is arguably the general form of wargaming in the military education of 
the GSDF. Specifically, a map exercise is to ‘show reality’ by ‘Realistic Battle-focused Education & 
Training’.678 GSDF officers colloquially refer to this form of wargaming as a ‘map maneuver’ rather than 
the formal designation of ‘map exercise’ (zujyouenshuu). In fact, wargaming is commonly referred to 
by GSDF officers as being an ‘MM’, which is a Japanese acronym for map maneuver. Notably, if 
miniatures are used on the map as unit symbols instead of blocks, the map exercise may instead be 
called heigienshuu, 兵棋演習.679 The first part of this word, heigi, is associated with game pieces in 
ordinary board games while the second part, enshuu, covers a range of meanings such as: practice, 
exercise, manoeuvre and seminar. The above terms resonate with how a wargame is conducted in 
practice. ‘Map maneuver’, map exercise (zujyouenshuu) and miniatures (heigienshuu) are thus more 
or less the same form of exercise, implemented at the Fuji School and the GSDF Staff College.680 
At the initial Basic Officer Course (nine months), two ‘map maneuvers’ are conducted according to a 
presentation from 2015. At the subsequent Advanced Officer Course (six months), no fewer than six 
‘map maneuvers’ and one CPX are included. The number of ‘map maneuvers’ from 2015 differs slightly 
from one of the respondent’s recollection of a total of five ‘map maneuvers’/CPX.681 The difference 
may be attributed to the more recent date of the curriculum data in comparison to respondents’ 
experience. Another factor to consider is that the number of wargaming activities in each branch 
(infantry, armour, engineer, intelligence etc.) differs. A third factor is the colloquial mix-up between 
‘map maneuvers’ and CPX. One likely interpretation, based on interviewees and an official 
presentation, is that it is the two-step wargaming of a CPX, and the process of COA comparison, that 
is introduced at the Advanced Officer Course. On the other hand, the basics of ‘map maneuvers’ – the 
physical layout of the general form of map-based wargaming – is seemingly introduced at the Basic 
Officer Course.682  
A wargame is an integrated activity within a Command Post Exercise (CPX) at schools. For this reason, 
CPX is synonymous with ‘map maneuver’. Furthermore, a ‘map exercise’, zujyouenshuu, and a CPX are 
seen as being more or less similar.683 The Advanced Officer Course is when a CPX is introduced in the 
military education of GSDF officers. The armour branch conducts ‘map maneuvers’ (CPX) five times 
during the Advanced Officer Course, with each occasion lasting one week.684 In this specific case, the 
term ‘map maneuver’ is used synonymously with the term CPX, which consists of a planning stage and 
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a combat stage. In each stage of the CPX a wargame is used: the initial wargame is used to check the 
operation plan (COA-comparison) while the second wargame, during the combat stage, is to check the 
operation order.685 This twofold approach results in a weeklong CPX that contains two subsequent 
wargames. The two wargames within a CPX are map-based and rather similar to each other. One 
difference is that the initial wargame is apparently conducted within one room, whereas the second 
wargame utilises an additional ‘battle room’, where combat adjudication occurs. The initial wargame 
spans about two to three hours, while the second wargame may last up to 24 hours as it is typically 
conducted in real time.686 
A weeklong CPX is a consistent educational activity. Monday to Wednesday is used to draft the plan, 
including the initial wargame, which is done during four hours on Tuesday. This concerns the COA-
development and comparison for the operation plan. Beginning on the week’s Thursday, students 
switch their positions to experience different roles, and hence different perspectives, when they 
wargame the developed operation order. The initial wargame is staff-run as the commander is not 
present. After the commander’s selection of a course of action (COA) the second wargame is 
conducted.687 The instructor typically plays the role of the unit commander, while a student, 
purportedly one of the top scoring students, plays the role of the executive officer (XO). Notably, the 
position of XO for all practical purposes actually directs the wargame, especially the initial COA-
wargame. The focus of the second wargame is on execution-training by the use of the developed order 
from the initial part of the week. This second wargame has a similar layout as the initial wargame with 
one difference: an additional room is used for subordinate commanders. This additional second room 
is called the ‘battle room’ while the first room is referred to as the ‘command post room’. Combat 
adjudication occurs in the ‘battle room’ either by dice, instructor’s opinion or by a computer-based 
simulation system. Communication between the two rooms is conducted by radio or written notes. 
The wargame is conducted in real-time. This is, however, a perception, since in reality the wargame 
advances by incremental adjudication turns of ten minutes in the ‘battle room’. The second wargame 
may continue throughout the night until Friday morning. The actual CPX ends on Friday afternoon with 
an after-action review (AAR).688   
What may differ between different CPXs is the actual form of adjudication. It is the responsible 
instructor who decides the adjudication. This decision based on individual preference is, however, 
possibly influenced by a learning objective that stipulates that students should learn combat 
                                                          
685 National Defense Academy (2015). 
686 Interview: Anonymous D5, Ground Self Defense Forces, 2015-07-10. 
687 Interview: Anonymous C5, National Defense Academy, 2015-07-08. 




adjudication during the wargames. Adjudication is conducted with a focus on calculable factors by the 
application of a combat point system. Morale values are reflected upon but not calculated. So-called 
hard facts are derived from historical records. Other than combat adjudication, which may be free 
(instructor’s opinion) or rigid (use of dice and/or computer-support), it seems difficult for the 
instructors to actually change the wargaming form.689 In fact, wargaming forms seem to remain 
constant. The instructors may, however, make changes to the scenarios, and make alterations between 
computer-based adjudication and manual adjudication.690 However, the latter would be superficial if 
adjudication is indeed separated in a ‘battle room’ as indicated. Furthermore, instant adjudication 
would diminish the students’ learning of combat adjudication by questions and answers. Hence, 
combat adjudication by computers seems to occur at later stages in the educational process. 
 
Control & veiling 
One of the indicators of the suppression of gamification is director control, manifested in the 
interruption of the wargame procedures and resulting in subsequent restarts. There are no hints of 
this behaviour from the collected data. In fact, it is arguably up to the individual instructor to intervene 
when military students make mistakes, or, to bring it up after the conclusion of the wargame during 
the closing after-action review (AAR). This choice is entirely at the discretion of the responsible 
instructor who is facilitating the wargame.691 Among the instructors there are, however, explicit 
concerns over realism, which can be interpreted as connected to the issue of gamification. When it 
comes to the issue of avoiding gamification, it seems that students ‘always win’ in school education, 
since the purpose is to gain basic skills and to ‘experience success’. This approach is reportedly 
different when compared to unit (field) training in the GSDF, where participating units do not always 
win (against another unit).692 This approach to ‘always win’ may inhibit free play, and hence limit 
gamification. Furthermore, there are data that indicate that OPFOR is run by instructors only and thus 
may be totally scripted and therefore not responsive to the blue side’s behaviour. This absence of an 
active interactional opponent seems to be the case when the wargame suffers from a lack of available 
time. This then necessitates a ‘small wargame’, which is conducted with only the S3 (blue operations) 
members participating.693 Such a ‘wargame’ thus seems to have minimal input from OPFOR, and may 
therefore not constitute a wargame. 
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A major indicator of the suppression of gamification is the physical separation of the simulation system 
in order to safeguard the immersive credibility of the training audience. A ‘map maneuver’, denoting 
a week-long CPX, is not considered fully realistic by GSDF officers: i.e. there is a recognised lack of 
simulated frictions during the process.694 Efforts are therefore made to increase the factor of realism. 
For this reason, planning during a CPX occurs during nights and the participating officers wear battle 
dress uniform including helmets to increase the leadership requirements by the addition of further 
stress and fatigue. Scenarios are also designed to be perceived as being difficult. During the second 
wargame in a weeklong CPX, fog of war is prioritised. A level of uncertainty is attained by the 
separation of the ‘command post room’ from the ‘battle room’. This physical partition is based on 
concerns about realism: hence the rooms ‘have to be separated’ to increase realism by limiting 
communication between the command post and subordinate units to reports via radio or telephone.695 
The separated second room, the so-called ‘battle room’, is purportedly utilised with the red side’s 
commanders as well as the blue side’s subordinate commanders. This is utilised in real time, with ten 
minute adjudication intervals, which are not perceptible to the main training audience in the 
‘command post room’. This separation thus seems to allow more realism, and more immersion, as 
combat reports and orders are transmitted between the battle room and the command post room in 
‘real-time’ and with fog of war. Hence, instructors’ concerns about realism seem to have resulted in a 
separation of the room with combat adjudication from the room containing the command post, which 
may use a manual map-based wargaming form for visualisation.   
A final indicator of suppression of gamification concerns the attitude that ‘we are not doing wargaming 
here’. At the GSDF Fuji School, ‘wargaming’ is officially referred to as COA-wargames within a map 
exercise.696 However, this only covers the initial wargame in a CPX. The use of several non-explicit 
terms, such as ‘map exercise’, may indicate suppression of gamification. However, a ‘map exercise’ 
connotes the actual form of the wargame. Accordingly, terms are often used interchangeably 
regarding map-based wargaming, such as ‘map maneuver’, map exercise (zujyouenshuu) and the use 
of miniatures (heigienshuu). While ‘wargaming’ as a specific term is doctrinally connected to the 
process of COA comparison, a ‘map exercise’ constitutes a more general and interchangeable term of 
wargaming. The plethora of different terms does not, however, constitute the indicator of ‘we are not 
doing wargaming here’. Instead, the plethora in itself indicates that wargaming is extensively used. 
Specifically, the widespread and colloquial reference to ‘MM’, i.e. ‘map maneuver’, which is 
synonymous with GSDF educational wargaming, does not indicate a suppression of gamification 
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regarding this attitude-indicator. Instead, the integration of wargaming for planning and warfighting 




Adherence to doctrine is indicated by the existence of formal support based on the authorised military 
planning and decision-making process. Wargaming at the Fuji School is organised according to 
doctrine: wargaming is used to improve plans and orders and therefore constitutes an integral part of 
the military planning process. For this reason, ‘wargaming’ is standardised as a COA-comparison 
wargame, which represents a key and integrated feature of the military planning process.697 
Consequently, ‘wargaming’ is interpreted as a staff method. In Japanese doctrine, reference is made 
to the US Army Field Manual FM 101-5 concerning the purpose of wargaming. Accordingly, the form 
of COA-wargaming in the GSDF is ‘almost the same’ as COA-wargaming in the US Army. The GSDF 
seems influenced by the US Army’s decision-making process. With this perspective in mind, the actual 
term ‘wargaming’ in Japan has come to symbolise COA-development by COA-comparison. This 
comparison is a ‘staff estimate’ conducted by simulation (time/space) where the outcome is the staff 
recommendation of one COA to the unit commander.698 This form of wargame is regimented: the 
participants are organised according to doctrine and the activity is basically centred on a map laid out 
on a table. The main participants are the executive officer (XO/’EXO’) as the director and umpire while 
the intelligence officer (S2) represents the enemy. The operation officer (S3) represents friendly forces. 
The layout and tasks of all participants in this wargame are visible in the picture below. One indication, 
evident in this picture, is that this form of COA-wargaming is rooted in a manual and map-based 
wargaming form. There are explicitly marked boxes of game pieces (heigi, 兵棋) at each end of the map 
table for both the red and the blue sides. This indicates a traditional, and standardised, preference for 
using miniatures and/or game pieces on the actual map for wargaming. 
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Illustration no. 15: participants’ positions and tasks around the wargaming table.699 
 
 
Photograph no. 31: infantry officers at the Advanced Officer Course conducting 
wargaming (zujyouenshuu) at the Fuji school, possibly in 2003.700 
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The illustration and photograph above offer a good visual comparison between what doctrinal 
instructions envisage and what physical forms wargaming takes in reality. The photograph depicts 
officers at the Advanced Officer Course at the Fuji school. It illustrates the ‘command post room’ and 
the means of communication (the telephone) to the ‘battle room’. Sometimes a computer-based 
simulation system is used instead of the manual adjudication on a map in the ‘battle room’. However, 
the computer system is then located in the ‘controller’s room’, which in essence constitutes a similar 
separated adjudication area such as the ‘battle room’.701  
Another indicator of adherence to doctrine concerns the attitude of believing that ‘we have to do’ 
wargaming. A wargame is generally seen as an integrated activity within a Command Post Exercise 
(CPX). Data collection revealed the presence of two different wargames within a CPX: an initial COA-
wargame to improve the plan, and a second one to improve the order. It seems clear that the initial 
wargame in a CPX is doctrinally driven – it is, for example, affiliated to US Army doctrine. It is also staff-
driven, i.e. intended for all GSDF officers. Consequently, every GSDF officer needs to have the ability 
to facilitate and participate in such a wargame. The second wargame in a CPX seems to vary in some 
aspects. Notably, the second wargame has a specific purpose, which is to check the developed orders 
by running through the operations against a represented red force (OPFOR). This wargaming form also 
involves blue subordinate unit commanders. Apparently, the second wargame does not seem to be 
mandatory as the initial COA-comparison wargame within a CPX. The question of personality appears, 
as some GSDF unit commanders, outside of military educational establishments, allegedly do not elect 
to have many wargames.702 Hence, there seems to be a latent personality issue of preference regarding 
the ambition of the second wargame, i.e. a question of whether or not this wargame session should 
be a rehearsal instead, which thus in essence would change the wargame to a non-wargame. This is a 
different approach compared to playing out the entire battle systematically and allowing continuous 
interaction. There are also data that indicate that this ambition varies between schools regarding the 
extent of ‘map maneuvers’. According to some GSDF officers, the ambition is linked to the person in 
charge of the wargame. This is supposedly because there is no official manual on wargaming except 
one minor volume. Hence, GSDF officers tend to learn wargaming from personal experience. A specific 
exercise handbook is, on the other hand, supposedly made for each and every CPX in order to achieve 
common recognition for both the facilitator (‘controller’) and players.703 While there exists an attitude 
of acceptance of wargaming among GSDF officers because wargaming is part of the military decision-
making process, the actual wargaming form is influenced by the facilitator’s ambition. On the other 
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hand, this question of ambition seems to be offset by the official format of map-based wargaming 
which is straightforward, simple and based on an established practice of the use of terrain models in 
military education. Consequently, wargaming is organised as an activity within the military decision-
making process as a standardised form of wargaming in accordance with doctrine.704  
Another indicator of adherence to doctrine is the importance of products rather than the actual 
wargaming process. The initial wargame in a CPX has a certain doctrinal outcome, namely a staff 
recommendation to the unit commander. This product is sometimes described as a conceived 
‘counter-counterattack plan’.705 In other words, this is a plan to counter the enemy’s reaction to your 
own side’s initial action. While this indicates the importance of a wargaming process of actions and 
reactions, this focus on a tangible product is an indicator that the product is paramount since that is 
what is doctrinally envisage for the wargame to produce. The collected data thus connect this doctrinal 
product to a standardised form of wargaming.  
The second property of simple standardising is simplicity. One indicator of simplicity is that the 
wargaming form in use is for all officers: hence every GSDF officer should be able to use a particular 
form of wargaming, and that wargaming form would thus by definition become encompassing. The 
wargaming form described above regarding the second wargaming within a CPX has long been used 
continually in the officer education of the GSDF. Apparently, there have been no changes in this format, 
which is ordinary maps with symbolic red and blue unit markers. This seems to indicate a durability of 
wargaming, which would enable every officer to eventually learn to manage this form of wargaming. 
In fact, it is common that students themselves direct the wargames as one student is assigned to the 
position of execution officer while the instructor observes.706 This arrangement specifically concerns 
the initial wargame during a CPX. However, when it comes to the initial occasion when officers in the 
GSDF experience a wargame, at a branch school (such as the Fuji School), an instructor usually plays 
the role of chief of staff/executive officer. The instructor thus sets an example for the military students 
for how to conduct a wargame. After graduating from the Fuji School, the military students are 
supposed to bring their learned wargame experience to their field units.707 This alone indicates intra-
professional learning, an indicator of simplicity. For this reason, the GSDF educational wargaming form 
seems to be used by every officer, rather than by talented individuals only. 
The particular form of map-based wargame seems to adhere to the indicator that ‘it must work in the 
field’. In fact, the form seems to be an evolved wargaming version of the visualisation concept of sand 
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tables. Regarding the map, the essential component for this form of wargaming, there are apparently 
three different scales in use: 1:50 000 or 1: 25 000 are for the ‘divisional’ level (i.e. reinforced brigade), 
while the ‘regimental’ (i.e. large battalion) level uses the 1: 5000.708 However, the Fuji School actually 
has 1:10,000 as a ‘preferable map scale’.709 This use of enlarged maps indicates a more refined 
classroom approach. However, it is still the case that the maps can be utilised in the field. This simplicity 
is also evident in the unit markers, known as the game pieces (heigi, 兵棋). They seem to consist of 
either miniatures or some form of simple map markers and/or blocks. It seems that the exact choice 
of game pieces is up to the actual facilitator running the wargame. It is, however, likely that a facility, 
such as the Fuji school, makes an assortment of game pieces available for facilitators, since there is an 
explicit illustration of ‘boxes for wargame miniatures’ in the doctrinal document.710    
 
Innovative active learning 
Promotion of gamification is indicated by explicit reference to game-based learning theories for 
credibility support. The learning process is put at the centre stage and accordingly credibility can be 
found in the actual wargaming process rather than from a product (such as a staff recommendation). 
While there are no data of explicit reference to game-based learning theories at the Fuji School some 
data indicate an awareness of how military students learn in conjunction with wargaming. For 
example, several military wargaming instructors prefer manual wargaming as it is deemed more 
effective for student learning than computer-based simulations. One particular reason is that 
computer-based simulation needs time for scenario administration, organisation and deployment. 
Another reason for the preference of manual wargaming methods, which connect to the rehearsal 
techniques by the utilisation of a sand board, is apparently that a major emphasis in the wargaming 
exercises, ‘map maneuvers’, is on the officers role-playing their staff positions. Assignments (roles) of 
participants are also changed in the middle of a wargaming week (CPX), meaning that the officer has 
one duty during planning (the initial wargame) such as intelligence, and then another position, such as 
engineering, during the second wargame focused on execution-training. The participants need to 
consider this during the wargame and hence their output needs to be transparent and easy to grasp in 
order for this transition from planning to execution to work. In addition to this emphasis on human 
interaction there is also an aspiration during the educational wargaming for the participating officers 
to learn how to calculate combat results. The military instructor may therefore ask a participant during 
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a wargame to ‘please give your estimate of combat result’. This inquiring is done regardless if the 
wargaming adjudication is manual or computer-based.711  
The concerns by instructors about a lack of realism in wargaming do not seem to lead to an effort to 
increase competition. On the contrary, military instructors think that the presence of a red team would 
actually inhibit control of the actual wargame. Therefore, the indicator of competition as a good 
feature in wargaming does not seem to exist at the Fuji School. This could be interpreted that 
gamification is unwanted as a feature as this would entail some participants ending up on the losing 
side in a wargame. While competition is used between units in field training – there is in fact an 
‘aggressor unit’ from western Japan stationed at the Fuji School and that unit has allegedly not lost a 
field training combat exercise in fifteen years – wargaming at military schools is different for two 
reasons. First, the purpose of wargaming is simply to train skills.712 Second, there is an underlying 
cultural ambition to reward effort and hence the use of the term kanarazu katsu (必ず勝つ), literally 
interpreted as ‘winning is necessary’.713 Based on these two reasons wargaming does not seem 
connected to competition, and consequently is not connected to gamification. As one instructor put 
it: ‘If [the military students] lose the fight early in the scenario, and if the fighting ends, the training is 
over, and there is no chance to learn about the operational order and to co-ordinate. We intentionally 
let them have that chance [to learn].714 On the other hand, individual officers are assessed on an 
individual level during a wargame by instructors (the ratio is 4-5 instructors per 20 students).715 It is 
thus plausible to consider some presence of elements of individual competition within the blue team. 
However, since completion does not seem to occur between teams – there are no indications of a 
prevalent and well-known practice of double-sided settings between two equal teams – promotion of 
gamification is not indicated. 
The second property of innovative active learning concerns individual innovativeness concerning the 
game design. This property is indicated by the presence of individual instructors who have designed or 
modified the wargaming form. Discovered data in the form of the two wargames within the CPX format 
indicate that the wargaming form is not based on single individuals. However, data show that 
individual facilitators can rely on different adjudication methods. Consequently, individual facilitators 
have some influence, albeit only to a certain extent, regarding the actual wargaming method. This is 
limited since it is apparently up to the head of education, or the school commandant, at the military 
school to decide if a particular wargaming exercise (heigienshuu or zujyouenshuu) should be double-
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sided as in ‘opposition method’ (taikouhoushiki, 対抗方式) or ‘unilateral’.716 At the Fuji school, 
however, there are no indications of the latter method and thus a focus on only one-sidedness 
arguably indicates a more organisational and standardised approach. Another indication that may limit 
potential individual influence is that the manual map-based wargaming forms seems to remain 
constant. While some aspects, such as the exact combat adjudication method may change when an 
instructor transfers away, the general wargaming form, evident in the picture and photographs in the 
section on simple standardising, is likely to remain constant and enduring.      
 
  
                                                          




Staff College (Kanbugakkou, 幹部学校) 
The GSDF Staff College is the school where GSDF officers study to achieve the rank of major. The 
location of the GSDF Staff College is Nakameguro, Tokyo, in close proximity to the Maritime and Air 
Staff Colleges.717 There are basically two different ways for GSDF officers to attain the rank of major by 
formal courses at the Staff College. Some officers, aiming to achieve the rank of colonel, attend the 
Command and General Staff Course (CGC) for two years. In addition, there is a shorter functional 
course, the Tactical Administrator Course (TAC), of one year. The second shorter course (TAC) is for 
officers that are to become specialists. For this reason, they are likely to remain at the rank of major. 
For officers that successfully graduate from the CGC there is a possibility to later attend, if accepted, 
the Advanced Command and General Staff Course (AGS) for six months. This is a course for officers 
with the rank of colonel who are shortlisted to be promoted to general.718 This embedded unit of 
analysis is focused on the CGC, and the shorter TAC, since these two courses are of a similar educational 
level to the other four country cases. Hence, the shorter AGS for high-ranking officers will not be 
further covered as this is a course for a few selected high-ranking officers centred on strategic issues, 
rather than on education for the tactical level.  
As with the intermediate embedded unit of analysis, the GSDF Fuji School, the author had no direct 
access to the GSDF Staff College. On the other hand, the author visited the co-located facilities of the 
National Institute of Defense Studies (NIDS).719 NIDS has its own simulation division, with a focus on 
high-level strategic (policy) wargames for senior officers. Hence, while NIDS is delimited from an 
inclusion as an embedded unit of analysis, NIDS’s staff, which includes officers, supplied valuable 
information on educational wargaming at the GSDF Staff College. Notably, each of the three co-located 
JSDF staff colleges has its own unique focus on wargaming. The staff college with the longest 
experience in the use of wargaming is the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) Staff College.720 This 
use goes back to the introduction of wargaming (heigienshuu, 兵棋演習) in 1898, which evolved into 
the contemporary expression of map exercise (zujyouenshuu, 図上演習).721 The focus of wargaming at 
the MSDF Staff College is, however, on theatre level, rather than on tactics. Such naval theatre level 
wargames are, for the last twenty years, supported by a computer-based simulation system, which 
models modern naval warfare.722 For this reason, possible use of computer-based simulation at the 
GSDF Staff College was looked into during the data collection.  
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Illustration no. 16: map exercises (zujyouenshuu, 図上演習), a Japanese traditional form 
of wargaming, according to the MSDF Staff College.723 
 
Contemporary wargaming 
Educational wargaming activities are carried out at the GSDF Staff College. At the CGC (Command and 
General Staff Course) of two years there is allegedly a total of nine wargames. At the shorter TAC 
(Tactical Administrator Course) of one year there are three to five wargames. The number is dependent 
on the officers’ branch (armour, intelligence etc.). Wargaming sessions at the GSDF Staff College are 
apparently conducted in a similar fashion as at the Advanced Officer Course at the GSDF Fuji School. 
Accordingly, the wargaming form is the previously discussed Command Post Exercise (CPX). In other 
words, this is a weeklong exercise with two integrated wargames.724  
There is potentially more emphasis on computer-based wargaming at the GSDF Staff College compared 
to the Fuji School. What is in existence at the GSDF Staff College is a computer-support system named 
TESS (Tactical Education Support System). It is described as follows: TESS supports CPXs for student 
training by simulating double-sided warfighting games between blue and red forces on a situational 
map. Students normally take the roles of blue force commander and staff while controllers constitute 
the red force team as well as communicate events to player units for subsequent action.725 The 
computer-based simulation is, however, seemingly integrated into a form of wargaming that is similar 
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to the Fuji School and its CPX. It therefore seems that computer-support (TESS) is used for combat 
adjudication. In other words, combat adjudication is seemingly conducted according to computer-
based simulation rather than manual methods, such as the use of dice or adjudication by an 
umpire/instructor. It is to some extent unclear if TESS is fully relied upon for visualisation of the 
simulated battlefield or if ordinary maps are used as well. Information from some interviewees, 
however, clearly states that computers are only used for combat adjudication and for calculating the 
relative combat power of the blue and red sides.726 It can be asserted that wargaming at the GSDF Staff 
College is arguably similar to educational wargaming at the GSDF Fuji School. This includes reliance on 
ordinary maps for visualisation and the physical separation of a ‘command post room’ from a ‘battle 
room’. Likewise, the information above on the use of TESS indicates that the military students only 
play, and man, the blue force. However, the use of a separate ‘battle room’ may allow some flexibility 
on this configuration. 
 
Control & veiling 
It is likely that the indications of suppression of gamification are similar to the Fuji School since the 
overall wargaming form (CPX) is similar to what is conducted at the Fuji School. The first and foremost 
indicator of suppression of gamification is arguably the presence of the physical separation of the 
‘command post room’ and a ‘battle room’. This configuration would allow the instructor to ‘halt and 
restart’ the wargame. However, no indications of such unambiguous control were indicated at the 
GSDF Staff College. What was indicated, however, was a more explicit reliance on computer-based 
combat adjudication. However, as was the case at the Fuji school, combat adjudication is confined to 
a ‘battle room’. Hence, even if ‘halt and restart’ occurs, students manning the command post may not 
notice it. Consequently, it is possible that this form of control occurs. Nonetheless, no instructor 
brought this up in relation to courses at the Staff College. Moreover, regarding this possible 
suppression of ‘free play’, data indicate that students only play on the blue side at the Fuji School. Here 
another difference surfaces. There are indications that wargaming is done at the GSDF Staff College 
according to a ‘force on force’ philosophy.727 This indicates more emphasis on ‘free play’ and 
competition between teams and hence on promotion, rather than suppression, of gamification. 
Notably, however, every year, this choice seems to reside within the hierarchy of the GSDF Staff 
College rather than with instructors.728  
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The similarity to wargaming at the Fuji School allows further exploration of the concept of simple 
standardising. First, the property adherence to doctrine is indicated by the desired products connected 
to the wargaming of different COAs. Wargaming is placed within a distinct planning process: the 
‘Operation Estimate Procedure’ (i.e. COA Analysis). The COA wargame is of central value in this process. 
The purpose is that the students are to ‘war-game OCOA [Own Courses of Action] and ECOA [Enemy 
Courses of Action] and examine and deliberate the situational development, battle landscape[s], 
challenges to be addressed and appropriate measures to be taken’.729 This indicates the place of 
wargaming within the formal planning process and also the necessity to wargame, i.e. ‘we have to do 
it’. The final indicator is also present, since the product is the most important and necessary for the 
second step (issuing of orders). 
Regarding the property simplicity, a discovered photograph reveals additional information about the 
actual wargaming form when it comes to a CPX. The photograph below, found on the internet in a 
Japanese text from 1979, describes the use of educational wargaming at the GSDF Staff College. While 
this source may arguably be outdated, to a direct question if a new version of said text existed, the 
answer was no.730 Specifically, the illustrated activity is described as ‘heigienshuu’ (兵棋演習). Present 
in the photograph are staff officers that attended the CGS at the GSDF Staff College. The photograph 
provides an indication of the continuity of a similar and standardised form of wargaming: a simple and 
straightforward map-based format. This is a map exercise, known as zujyouenshuu (図上演習).731 
Notably, however, the activity is described as heigienshuu, which arguably is a more explicit 
acknowledgement of wargaming than zujyouenshuu, which may indicate a discussion around a map 
rather than a wargame. The property of simplicity is indicated by the photograph, which visualises a 
straightforward approach of wargaming, similar to what was indicated at the Fuji School.  
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Photograph no. 32: staff officers exercising with ‘heigienshuu’ in 1979.732 
 
This form of manual (and computer-supported) map-based wargaming has potentially evolved from 
the use of miniatures on a sand board, which is a method every GSDF officer learns at the Basic Officer 
Course at the Fuji School. On possible inference is that, at the GSDF Staff College, the sand board has 
transformed into a standardised map-based wargaming form. This wargaming form is integrated 
within a division or brigade level Command Post Exercise (CPX) at GSDF schools and at GSDF units. 
Accordingly, one conclusion from the available data is that the wargaming form is simple, standardised 
and constitutes the basis of how GSDF conducts military educational wargaming. Hence, ‘every officer 
must manage it’, and it is repeatedly conducted during a course. 
 
Innovative active learning 
There are, at the level of the GSDF Staff College, some indications of the promotion of gamification. 
This regards an incident of competition. The text from 1979 speaks of a certain form of learning 
technique, which is referred to as taikouhoushiki (対抗方式), literally a combination of ‘antagonism’ 
and ‘method’. This phrase is also in use today at the GSDF Staff College.733 Accordingly, course 
participants are divided into team A and B. Seemingly, team A and B face each other as competing 
forces during the entire wargame session. This division into opposing forces of A and B was seemingly 
done to further the students’ understanding of possible actions of each side, during the development 
of plans and subsequent orders for action. Within this process subordinate commanders were 
integrated as part of the ‘realisation’, which was the stated effect behind the use of an educational 
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wargame (‘heigienshuu’). Learning would thus result in a ‘strengthened individual duty of the future 
staff officer’.734 Accordingly, this points to an understanding of gamification, in this case the realisation 
of interaction regarding ‘antagonism’ (competition) as useful for learning. Notably, this find is in 
contrast to previously conducted interviews, which stated that this form of competition in wargames 
did not exist in the school system.735 It may very well be that this form of opposing teams has been 
discontinued, since this written data goes back to 1979. However, the text is still considered valid as 
there has been no update of this procedural text.736 As a result, this indicates the possibility of 
promotion of gamification at the GSDF Staff College. Incidentally, one of the main educational 
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The case of Japan is an example of how wargaming is integrated within a professional military 
organisation and its military educational curriculum. At the very root of GSDF educational wargaming 
is the use of sand boards (saban, 砂盤) with which all GSDF officers are familiar. Sand boards are closely 
related to wargaming as the transition from a sand board to a wargame only entails the 
commencement of movement of game pieces and adjudication of combat results. For this reason, the 
concept of simple standardising is dominating how wargaming is organised within the military 
educational establishments of the GSDF. While no wargaming activities were found at the lowest level 
of officer education the basis of identified forms of wargaming at the other two embedded units of 
analysis – the GSDF Fuji school (II) and the GSDF Staff College (III) – were grounded in the widespread 
and simple use of sand boards, as well as supported and standardised by doctrine. The emphasis on a 
sand board format – and subsequently maps as a substitute – provide a good example of adherence 
to simple standardising.  
The similarities between the Fuji School and the GSDF Staff College indicate a collective approach to a 
single form of wargaming in the military education of the GSDF. Arguably, this approach seems 
connected to traditional military wargaming in Japan, i.e. map exercises. This wargaming form is 
manual and based on maps with either miniatures (historical tradition), or symbolic blocks, 
representing units. While there are several terms for wargaming in the GSDF they are all basically of 
the same physical map-based format. This form of wargaming is not learned from the very beginning, 
at the NDA (I). Instead, it is learned during the Basic and Advanced Officer Courses at the GSDF Fuji 
School (II). On the other hand, the very names of these courses, and the junior rank of students (second 
and first lieutenants), indicate that wargaming is introduced early on in the career. Every GSDF officer 
must manage this form of wargaming, i.e., the skill of conducting wargaming is recognised by GSDF 
officers as special and widespread ‘know-how’ within the GSDF. It is thus not surprising that this 
standardised form of map-based wargaming form – zujyouenshuu within a CPX – has been introduced 
outside the GSDF as a ‘disaster imagination game’ (DIG) for disaster (earthquake and tsunami) 
countermeasure planning and execution by civilian authorities in Japan.738  
There are some indications of control & veiling: a core concern of wargaming facilitators is to achieve 
accurate, realistic and reliable combat adjudication in order to simulate friction.739 The solution of 
these concerns over a potential lack of credibility can be seen in the physical separation of the 
‘command post room’ from the ‘battle room’, where the combat adjudication occurs during the second 
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wargame in a CPX. In combination with the use of a robust enemy force, lack of sleep for the military 
students and the physical separation between the ‘command post room’ and the ‘battle room’, 
frictions are set to play a greater role in the wargame which would alleviate concern over unrealism. 
In other words, while the concept of simple standardising would seem to be the only method for 
achieving instructor buy-in, there are also some indications of control & veiling, primarily by the 
physical separation of combat adjudication and the command post.  
Few indications were found of innovative active learning. Specific wargaming forms developed by 
individuals seem non-existent. There are, however, some indications on the use of competitiveness in 
the form of opposing teams and double-sided exercises. Interviewees, however, were adamant that 
this approach is minimised in the educational establishments. One reason is that whether or not a map 
exercise is conducted with the ‘opposition method’ (taikouhoushiki, 対抗方式) or with ‘unilateral 
method’, is decided by the command hierarchy at each educational facility rather than the individual 
instructor. 740 Less influence from individuals may also explain why the wargaming form has remained 
the same over time. For example, the GSDF Staff College (III) has, at least since 1979, utilised a certain 
form of learning technique, which is referred to as taikouhoushiki (対抗方式). This involves a 
competition between team A and B as part of an educational wargame, heigienshuu. While there are 
some opportunities for individual facilitators to modify the wargaming form on how to conduct combat 
adjudication, by adding computer support, the actual adjudication data remain the same as they are 
based on official statistics from historical cases. However, since there are concerns by facilitators 
regarding the unrealism of computer simulation systems, manual adjudication is instead habitually 
used.741 The concerns about realism are particularly focused on the limitation of computer-based 
simulation to accurately model soft factors such as morale.742 These concerns are exacerbated with 
the issues of technical unreliability and subjective databases concerning adjudication of combat 
results.743 Hence, it is likely that individual instructors influence the wargaming form by changing 
between free and rigid adjudication, rather than introducing or limiting competition. On the other 
hand, such individual influence is arguably limited since GSDF wargaming seems standardised, 
especially when compared to the other countries.  
Military educational wargaming is standardised in Japan. The intermediate embedded unit of analysis 
– the GSDF Fuji School (II) – was found to be of vital importance for the practice of military educational 
wargaming in the GSDF. To quote one interviewee, ‘wargaming is mandatory’.744 Courses at the Fuji 
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School uphold a similar wargaming form in the entire GSDF since every GSDF officer attends at least 
one of the Fuji School’s map exercises. The final ‘map maneuver’ (CPX) at the Fuji school is conducted 
with all the other branch schools as well as with some subordinate field units. This level of participation 
indicates that the wargaming format is standardised within the GSDF. The Fuji School can therefore be 
seen as the de facto centre of wargaming of the GSDF as every officer in the GSDF consequently 
experiences the same form of wargaming at least once in their military education. Notably, there are 
also organisational developments and testing at the Fuji School concerning computer software for 
wargaming support. This further reinforces the notion of the Fuji School as the hub of GSDF military 
educational wargaming. Although each of the five regional GSDF ‘army field commands’ has their own 
training support unit, the so-called ‘Battle Command Training Centre’ which offers and facilitates 
computer combat adjudication, every GSDF officer participating in such exercises has previously 
passed through the Fuji School.745 In essence, learning of wargaming arises from an intra-professional 
perspective, i.e. experienced officers at the Fuji School personally teach younger GSDF officers. This 
simple and straightforward wargaming form is continued at the GSDF Staff College (III). Furthermore, 
the wargaming form is also in use outside the educational facilities at GSDF field units. The wargaming 
form, centred on a map table, is approximately similar regardless if the purpose is planning (keikaku, 
計画), or execution (sentou, 戦闘). In either case, the wargaming form is referred to as zujyouenshuu (
図上演習), i.e. map exercise. The case of Japan is thus a good example of when adherence to the 




                                                          






Reflection: the four initial conjectures 
Four supporting questions were included in the introduction as potential answers as to why 
educational wargaming takes the form it does. These original questions were the author’s conjectures 
based on his personal experience as an instructor, game director and game designer in military 
educational wargaming at the Defence University (SEDU) in Sweden. The initial part of the concluding 
chapter will reflect on those four initial questions and offer a comprehensive deliberation on the 
author’s initial conjectures. Furthermore, before the main part on instructor buy-in and the three 
conceptual categories, the initial part will also ascertain if wargame patterns of the Swedish case 
repeat themselves in the other four country cases. As a guide for the initial discussion, Table F below 
presents the included wargaming forms.  
The wargaming overview indicates that in four of the five countries a prevalent form of wargaming 
exists. The exception is the UK where there is arguably more diversity in wargaming forms. In Sweden, 
wargaming forms are generally manual, such as map-based or seminar. This is different from Germany, 
where many forms are computer-supported. While Sweden and Germany are different, they are also 
similar in that one physical form of wargaming is more prevalent than other forms: manual in Sweden 
and computer-supported in Germany. In comparison, the USA case indicates a prevalence of 
computer-based wargaming forms. In Japan the situation is the opposite of the USA: wargaming forms 
in Japan (GSDF) are generally manual (and sometimes computer-supported), rather than computer-
based. While there are indications of a prevalent physical form in four of the five countries, physical 
form is only one of four variables regarding wargaming form. Concerning the number of participating 
sides, the vast majority of wargames are not truly double-sided (with equal teams), although there are 
some notable exceptions to this general similarity in each country. The third variable on available 
information generally differ between wargames for ‘classroom planning’ (open) and wargames for 
‘classroom warfighting’ (limited) – with a few exceptions concerning the latter type. The fourth and 
final variable regarding combat adjudication seems diverse. However, this variable does not offer a 
true picture since, for example, most wargames in Germany (I/II) are controlled (halt and restart) by 
the director and also veiled – and for those reasons are categorised as ‘computer-supported’ rather 
than ‘computer’. When all four variables are considered, wargaming in Japan, as well as in Germany 
and the USA, seems rather standardised. On the other hand, Table F is imprecise. Nonetheless, the 




























































































































‘Game the plan’ (PUT) MAP    O        
BMBat  MAP/BOARD.            
VBS COMPUTER            





‘Wargaming week’ MAP/BOARD.            
‘Game the plan’ (1) MAP    O        
‘Game the plan’ (2) MAP    O        











‘Game the plan’ MAP    O        
‘Wargaming week’ 2013 
‘Wargaming week’ 2016 
‘Wargaming week’ 2016 
MAP            
MAP/COMPU.            
MAP/BOARD.            
COA-wargaming SEMINAR    O        
‘Wargaming week’ 2013 
‘Wargaming week’ 2015 
SEMINAR    O        
BOARD    O        
COA-wargaming SEMINAR    O        
‘Wargaming week’ SEMINAR            









SiTA MAP/COMPU.            




SIRA MAP/COMPU.            
VBS COMPUTER            




KORA/OA  COMPUTER            
COA-wargaming SEMINAR    O        

















Sandhurst Free Krieg. 
BOARD GAME    O        
MAP            






COA-wargaming MAP    O        
BC2T MAP/COMPU.              
CATT: force on force COMPUTER            
CSTTX MAP/COMPU.            







COA-wargaming MAP    O        
‘Informal wargame’ MAP    O        
FEARFUL EYE MAP/COMPU.            
‘Theatre Wargame’ MAP/COMPU.            
RCAT (manual game)* 
RCAT (facilitator) 
BOARD GAME    O        


























































































































COA-wargaming MAP/SAND    O        
VBS COMPUTER            
CCTT COMPUTER            




Decisive Action COMPUTER            
The Grand Offensive COMPUTER            





Zujyouenshuu, 計画 MAP    O        
Zujyouenshuu, 戦闘 MAP/COMPU.        ?    
III Heigienshuu MAP/COMPU. ?      ?     
 
Table F. wargaming forms in the five countries (2013-2016).  
 
  Notes: *not (yet) implemented, #discontinued. 
Two player sides (double-sided) were only indicated when each team was roughly equal in size. For 
example, when the red team consisted of only 1-2 people out of maybe 30 participants the wargame 
was deemed to be a one player side (one-sided).  
A question mark (?) was added when the collected data were not deemed sufficient for clear-cut 
categorisation. 
In Sweden, the initial ‘wargaming week’ (III) was abridged: the 2015 one-sided version of the computer 
wargame (SSM-Land) was removed since it is almost identical to the 2016 version.   
In Japan a more distinct separation was made between Zujyouenshuu and Heigienshuu. Although both 
are more or less in the same physical form, the difference in names symbolises a possible greater 
emphasis on team vs team (A vs B) wargaming at the GSDF Staff College (III). 





Foreign concepts and national traditions 
This conjecture of differences between foreign and national ways of wargaming offers limited 
explanation as to why wargaming takes the form it does. For example, in Sweden wargaming for plan 
development at the Senior Staff Course (III) is influenced by COA-wargaming in NATO. On the other 
hand, wargaming to ‘game the plan’ (plan development in PUT) at all three embedded unit of analysis 
in Sweden constitutes an in-house developed form of wargaming. Both variants (seminar and map-
based) constitute a similar form of wargaming according to the four variables. In a comparison 
between countries, Sweden and Germany have a comparable national concept of wargaming. This 
concept covers ‘command training exercise’ (LTÖ) in Sweden and ‘simulation-based exercise’ (such as 
SIRA) in Germany. This similarity is perhaps not too surprising since Swedish officers have visited SIRA-
facilities in Germany. In Sweden, however, the computer-based simulation system is different and of 
British origin (CATS). There are also other differences: in Germany visiting units bring their own game 
director whereas in Sweden a small and dedicated staff provides game director continuity. Hence, 
while there is some international congruence, there are still national differences. For example, the 
data indicates Japan as a country with a long national tradition of wargaming signified by its in-house 
development of map exercises in the last hundred years. Nonetheless, the official and contemporary 
manual wargaming form in Japan (GSDF) is explicitly influenced by COA-wargaming in the USA. On the 
other hand, the concept of map exercises within the overall concept of a ‘map maneuver’ (‘MM’) is to 
a major extent a Japanese way of wargaming. Therefore, one conclusion is that foreign concepts and 
national traditions are intermingled. As the Swedish case of ‘command training exercise’ (LTÖ) 
revealed, a foreign influenced wargaming form can combine with a national form of wargaming. 
 
Availability of COTS 
The collected data from the five countries indicate that usage of COTS is rare. In Sweden, this is limited 
to the use of the commercial computer game Operational Art of War III during the final ‘wargaming 
week’ in the Senior Staff Course (III). There are, on the other hand, wargames that began as a 
commercial wargame, such as Virtual Battlespace (VBS). While VBS has its roots in a commercial game, 
it is arguably not a true COTS since it is a refined version specifically developed for military use. Besides 
Sweden, a few examples of the use of COTS can be found in Germany, such as the use of the board 
game Crusader Kings. However, COTS games in Germany have been modified to support learning 
objectives. Furthermore, teachers, with the exception of a short teambuilding session with the 
commercial game Castle Panic, exercise firm control of the wargame session. The only other example 
outside Sweden and Germany is the Grand Offensive in the USA (III). While this wargame was 




a previous commercial game. One potential reason that makes COTS wargames less attractive in 
military education is that there is relatively little focus on military history in contemporary military 
education. Furthermore, contemporary military education in military history is seemingly seldom done 
by wargaming. The case of the USA is an exception: the connections between educational wargaming 
and military history first and foremost concern the Command and General Staff College (III), as well as 
the, not included, US Marine Corps War College (MCWAR). In the other countries, however, instead of 
a focus on scenarios from military history, modern and fictional scenarios are in focus. This is evident 
in the case of Sweden regarding its only example of COTS. This wargame, Operational Art of War III, 
has endured not because of its numerous historical scenarios of various battles and campaigns, but 
because of its scenario editing capabilities. Few COTS have a similar comprehensive ability to edit and 
construct a complete scenario with accurate units in a certain terrain. Moreover, few if any COTS have 
the ability to halt and restart – at any given time with complete options for alternations – during a 
wargame. This lack arguably limits the level of instructor control. The few examples of the use of COTS 
wargames seems connected to the willingness of instructors to experiment with such wargames. For 
this reason, the conjecture regarding availability of COTS wargames seems of little value to explain 
why wargaming takes the form it does. On the other hand, the few examples of COTS do indicate 
individual influence in the form of willingness from individual instructors to introduce, modify, and 
keep a COTS wargame in the course curriculum.  
 
Connection to processes 
A wargame is likely to be perceived as either analytical or educational. Hence, this question supposes 
that this perception of difference in purpose also bring about a difference in wargaming form. In 
military education, this would entail separation between wargames for ‘classroom planning’ (plan 
development) and wargames for ‘classroom warfighting’ (execution-training). For example, COA-
wargaming is a wargame conceived for, and implemented in, the military planning process in all five 
countries. The similar COA-wargaming form between countries seems to support the conjectural 
connection between a process and a wargaming form. This is evident in the case of Japan where the 
difference is that the wargame for execution-training is more time-consuming, by limiting information 
for participants, to allow for more realistic decision-making. Nonetheless, there are also similarities in 
the map-based form – both wargames are a ‘map exercise’. What can be said about COA-wargaming 
is that it constitutes a manual form of wargaming that is generally consistent between countries and 
across educational levels. This consistency sets it apart from wargames focused on execution-training, 
which are generally much more varied, i.e. such wargames cover the entire spectrum of manual, 




The congruence in form regarding wargames for ‘classroom planning’, specifically COA-wargaming, 
affords this question with more merit than the previous two conjectures. However, COA-wargaming 
covers only a minority of the included wargames. Only a few expert instructors practise COA-
wargaming. Furthermore, in some cases, instructors actually chose not to conduct COA-wargaming, 
citing, for example, a lack of available time. It is also common that military students, such as in the USA 
(II), focus on analysis instead of wargaming due to their perception of a lack of time in the military 
planning process. Alternatively, the COA-wargaming may regress into a non-wargaming activity such 
as a rehearsal. For example, the case of the UK indicated a strict adherence to official instructions (the 
Staff Officer Handbook) to prevent the likelihood of such developments, which may nonetheless occur 
in regressed variants of ‘informal wargames’, i.e. visualisations on maps only. Visualisations are a 
common military practice and, as in the case of Japan, are not considered wargames until the units 
(symbolic game pieces) are physically moved. Consequently, while there is evidence of a preferred 
form of wargaming in the military planning process in the form of COA-wargaming  – one-sided, open, 
free and manual – this does not mean that such a wargame is actually conducted as a wargame (or at 
all). This once again indicates the influence of individuals.   
 
Individual game directors  
This conjectural question on influence by individual instructors (game directors) is the most 
explanatory of the four supporting questions. The initial case of Sweden revealed the core concern of 
the individual game director:  how game directors endeavor to achieve instructor buy-in by adherence 
to three conceptual categories (concepts). The additional four country case studies further explored 
this endeavor by instructors. Accordingly, while several examples of wargaming are part of an 
established institutional structure such as SIRA in Germany, ‘command training exercise’ in Sweden, 
VBS at West Point and standardised map-based wargaming in Japan, these wargaming forms are 
influenced by individual game directors. It is possible to argue that without instructor buy-in, the 
wargaming form either discontinues or transforms. Arguably, with no instructor buy-in, there is little 
possibility for a new wargaming form to become established. One example of this is Aldershot Skirmish 
in the UK (I). Influence by individual game directors and instructors thus explains why military 
educational wargaming is evolving. It is also common that a specific wargaming form is attributed to a 





The core category and the three methods 
The indication of individual influence is manifested in the concerns of the individual game director and 
instructor. Accordingly, the main result from the initial case study of Sweden was the discovery of the 
core category: instructor buy-in. In order to achieve acceptance for a specific form of wargaming, three 
conceptual categories were discovered as methods, or strategies, employed by the individual. 
Adherence to one of the three methods – control & veiling, simple standardising and innovative active 
learning – constitute how instructor buy-in is achieved. This also explains why the wargaming form is 
eventually accepted, alternatively, why it evolves or even discontinues. An analytical model, based on 
the core category and the three methods, was developed and explored in Chapters 5 to 8.  
One overarching query is if the three methods (concepts) are separated or if a wargaming form draws 
support from two or even all three methods. For example, a specific concept may connect to a specific 
wargaming form and thereby provide a clear explanation why wargaming takes certain forms. To 
determine this relation, and to illustrate an emerging and substantive field of army educational 
wargaming, data from the country cases are combined in a table where indicators of the properties of 
the three theoretical concepts are numbered and denoted with symbols. For better visualisation, two 
tables are utilised. The initial Table G is a reiteration from Chapter 4 with serial numbers and 
identifiable symbols added. The subsequent Table H presents a comparative overview of educational 
wargaming activities at the five country cases. Table H also include wargaming activities of Sweden to 
facilitate comparison with the four explored country cases (Germany, the United Kingdom, the USA 
and Japan) regarding the core category, the three methods, and the various wargaming forms. 
Since an overview of educational wargaming activities in five different countries is an optimistic 
endeavour, Table H should not be considered a 100 percent accurate synopsis of every single military 
educational wargame in the five countries. First, wargaming forms evolve or discontinue on a regular 
basis. Second, limited access in several cases, such as the GSDF Staff College (III) in Japan, increases 
the possibility for the existence of some additional forms of wargaming. Third, the author may have 
overlooked a certain activity, for perhaps no other reason than that respondents did not consider it 
‘wargaming’, or, because an instructor was absent during the author’s visit. However, while some 
inaccuracies are likely, the space triangulation, with three levels of analytically embedded units in each 
country case, nonetheless offers a comparably general overview regarding each country’s wargaming 
forms. This overview offers indications of what theoretical concepts instructors adhere to in order to 










Explicit support for specific wargaming form exists in the formal 
military decision-making process or military planning process.  
An attitude exists that ‘we have to do wargaming’ since it is 
doctrinally expected to do so. 
The product is more important than the wargame process. 
Simplicity Every individual officer has to manage the wargaming form: as 
every officer has to have wargaming ability. 
Intra-professional learning is how methods to manage a wargame 
are learned, rather than formal written instruction/courses. 
An attitude exists that ‘it must work in the field’ and therefore 





Support by reference to game-based learning theory: learning is 
seen as attainment of experience by experimenting - hence the 
process is important. 




An individual has either designed, or significantly modified, the 
wargaming form in order to enhance learning. 
The wargaming form changes when an individual relocates. 





The game director controls and interrupts the wargaming by ‘gas 
and brake’, or halt and restart. 
‘Free play’ is not allowed: the red cell is supervised but is not fully 
controlled with a scripted pre-planned response list).  The blue 
side’s focus is the scenario and not on playing the game (for fun). 
The product is important and this is specifically developed by 
reflections during breaks after/during the wargame.  
The training audience’s immersive credibility is safeguarded from 
potential concerns of unrealism related to the models of a 
wargame since the training audience itself does not interact with 
the simulation system because it cannot directly observe it during 
the wargame.  
An attitude exists that ‘we are not doing wargaming here’: the 
activity is not named ‘wargaming’ but perhaps ‘command training 
exercise’.  
















































   
 
 










































































































‘Game the plan’ (PUT) MAP      
BMBat MAP/BOARD      
VBS COMPUTER      





‘Wargaming week’ MAP/BOARD      
‘Game the plan’ (1) MAP      
‘Game the plan’ (2) MAP      











‘Game the plan’ MAP      
‘Wargaming week’ 2013 
‘Wargaming week’ 2016 
‘Wargaming week’ 2016 
MAP      
MAP/COMPU.      
MAP/BOARD      
COA-wargaming SEMINAR      
‘Wargaming week’ 2013 
‘Wargaming week’ 2015 
SEMINAR      
BOARD      
COA-wargaming SEMINAR      
‘Wargaming week’ SEMINAR      









SiTA MAP/COMPU.      




SIRA MAP/COMPU.      
VBS3 COMPUTER      




KORA/OA  COMPUTER      
COA-wargaming SEMINAR      

















Sandhurst Free Krieg. 
BOARD GAME      
MAP      






COA-wargaming MAP      
BC2T MAP/COMPU.      
CATT: force on force COMPUTER      
CSTTX MAP/COMPU.      







COA-wargaming MAP      
‘Informal wargame’ MAP      
FEARFUL EYE MAP/COMPU.      
‘Theatre Wargame’ MAP/COMPU.      
RCAT (manual game)* 
RCAT (facilitator) 
BOARD GAME      










2 9 8 
12 13 
9 12 
11 14 10 5
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COA-wargaming MAP/SAND      
VBS COMPUTER      
CCTT COMPUTER      




Decisive Action COMPUTER      
The Grand Offensive COMPUTER      





Zujyouenshuu, 計画 MAP      
Zujyouenshuu, 戦闘 MAP/COMPU.      
III Heigienshuu MAP/COMPU.      














Notes: *not (yet) implemented, #discontinued. 
In Sweden a 14 was added for BMBat (I) since the main training audience (Bn HQ) is separated. Also, a 2 was 
added for VBS (I) because of the centrally promoted concept of StriSim-PC. At level III, regarding the initial 
wargaming week, a 14 was not added to the two wargaming forms (2016) since the students, at least 
momentarily, can observe (and thus interact with) the wargame. 
In Germany at the initial level (I) a 5 was added because while there is a short formal course (and no manual) 
for game directors only some instructors attend: consequently, the usual way to learn how to direct 
wargaming is to watch fellow officers direct. At the Army Simulation Center (II) units are expected to use their 
own officers to direct the simulation exercises (SIRA, KORA and VBS): consequently a 4 was added. At level III 
a 2 was added to KORA/OA since it is connected to COA analysis. A 12 was added to the COTS board games 
because of the director-controlled pauses. At all levels, SiTA, SIRA, KORA and VBS were given a 2 to represent 
that these forms (simulation-based exercises) are supported by educational doctrine by the German Army 
hierarchy.     
In the UK at the initial level (I) a 2 was added to both Aldershot Skirmish and Sandhurst Free Kriegsspiel since 



















































































First, the data reveal whether or not one of the three conceptual categories (concepts) is dominant in 
a single country case. A domination would indicate a high level of commonality in instructor buy-in in 
a specific country. Japan is one example with an overall emphasis on simple standardising, although a 
few incidents also indicate a presence of aspects of control & veiling as well as possibly some 
gamification at one embedded unit of analysis (III). The difficulty with accessibility regarding the 
Japanese case makes ascertaining the tangible level of gamification problematic. What, however, is 
clear from the collected data is that simple standardising is the dominant strategy for instructor buy-
in in the Japanese case. Another case where one method is arguably dominant is the German case, 
where control & veiling is how instructor buy-in is achieved. While Japan and Germany thus have a 
high level of commonality in instructor buy-in, the same cannot be said of the UK and the USA. The 
latter two countries do not have one dominating method. Neither are there clear-cut divisions 
between the embedded units of analysis of the UK and the USA. Instead, specific wargaming forms 
connected to a certain course and a specific purpose constitute separate examples of how instructor 
buy-in is achieved. This blend is similar to Sweden, where the changes in wargaming forms relate to 
certain individuals. Accordingly, a higher level of commonality in instructor buy-in seems to exist in 
Germany and Japan compared to Sweden, the UK and the USA. 
Second, one fundamental query is if a high level of commonality in instructor buy-in, such as in Japan 
and Germany, is mirrored in a high consistency between a wargaming form and a method (concept). 
The explored data indicate that, in general, an educational military wargame involves focus on one 
method for instructor buy-in. In only a few cases, for example the usage of VBS at West Point, USA (I), 
are the theoretical concepts distinctly intermingled. On the other hand, in most examples, there are 
indications of support from more than one concept. When a wargaming form finds support from more 
than one theoretical concept, it usually involves simple standardising and control & veiling. This 
concerns, for example, wargaming in Japan (II and III) with a focus on execution-training. Other 
examples of this particular combination are wargaming forms in Germany such as SiTA, SIRA and VBS. 
These examples cover wargames run exclusively by instructors (officers) without external support. 
RCAT (facilitator mode) in the UK (III) is one example of the much rarer combination of innovative 
active learning and simple standardising. This example is also a case when external support, rather 
than in-house personnel, provides needed expertise – individuals – to run the wargame. The different 
extent of intermingling between methods provides further indications of the general uniqueness of 
wargaming forms and their connections to individuals. 
The intermingling between concepts and wargaming forms seems to indicate the absence of a 
straightforward explanation that presupposes that one specific concept results in a specific tangible 




conceptual category can be determined. First, COA-wargaming, map-based or in the guise of seminar 
wargaming, is almost exclusively connected to the method of simple standardising. Second, board 
games are almost exclusively connected to innovative active learning. Beyond those examples, 
connections between forms and methods become more indistinct. Computer wargames might 
arguably be connected to control & veiling, as is mostly the case with SIRA in Germany. In the USA, 
however, VBS and Decisive Action adhere to a combination, which includes simple standardising to a 
significant degree. There are also examples of computer wargames with a focus on innovative active 
learning, such as the force on force wargame in the UK (II). Accordingly, while a physical wargaming 
form may connect to a conceptual category, it does not constitute a general rule. This especially 
concerns computer games, which arguably can connect to any of the three concepts to different 
extents. Adherence to a specific concept may thus indicate, but does not necessarily entail, the physical 
feature of a wargame.  
The possibility of congruence between specific wargaming forms and the three conceptual categories 
is explained by the core category of instructor buy-in and its three supporting categories of control, 
credibility and comfort. For example, control was apparent in the use of VBS at West Point in the USA 
(I). In fact, a lack of control by the game director was seen as leading to unwanted gamification and 
subsequently possible loss of credibility. Gamification, or the perception of too much gamification, is 
evidently a major potential issue: there is a distinct choice to include – or exclude – it in a wargaming 
form. This choice seems to ultimately rest with the game director, the classroom instructor, whose 
personal credibility is at risk. Credibility is congruent with the wargaming form: it becomes 
synonymous with the game director and instructor. This personal connection was evident in one 
incident of Decisive Action at the CGSC in the USA when an instructor became defensive when a military 
student questioned the (lack of) realism in the wargame.746 A lack of perceived realism can bring severe 
discomfort to a game director, who has to defend the use of a wargaming form for the participants as 
well as colleagues and/or superiors. The inherent need for a game director to defend and motivate the 
choice of a wargaming form in education connects to the issue of comfort in directing a wargame. For 
example, among instructors there was a reluctance to serve as game director for SIRA at the 
Offiziersschule in Germany (I). In this case, the issue of comfort was connected to the need to 
constantly override a computer simulation in order to control the wargame for the purpose of reaching 
certain learning objectives within a limited time frame.747 More complexity in the wargaming form 
seems to bring less comfort for the majority of officers. For example, the use of VBS at West Point in 
the USA (I) is not a simple procedure – instructors apparently need up to one and a half years of 
                                                          
746 Interview: Sterrett, 2014-10-17. 




experience to learn how to effectively use the real time editing function in VBS and apply it during 
class. While VBS can be found in many locations of the US Army, evidently far from every US Army 
officer feels comfortable with this particular form of wargaming. Without the dedicated wargaming 
support organisation at West Point, it is arguable whether comfort would have been achievable at all 
for the instructors. Technical glitches might, for example, cause severe discomfort, and subsequent 
loss of control and credibility for the instructor. Notably, the example from the UK (I) regarding the 
abandoned implementation of Aldershot Skirmish is a good example when instructors do not achieve 
instructor buy-in and subsequently no wargaming is carried out. One quote from the UK case study 
unambiguously describes this lack of instructor buy-in as follows: ‘[we] did not join the army to play 
games’.748 Accordingly, if a game director does not achieve instructor buy-in, in this case regarding 
innovative active learning, the wargaming form is likely to be changed or even discontinued. 
One straightforward option to achieve instructor buy-in is to forgo complexity in wargaming forms, 
such as any form of computerised support and simulation systems, and instead aim for complete 
simplicity and adhere to basic visualisation methods such as maps and terrain models ‘that work in the 
field’. In many aspects, this is how COA-wargaming is done since it is almost exclusively connected to 
simple standardising. Moreover, this approach can be said to constitute the modus operandi in Japan, 
where wargaming is arguably introduced somewhat later (II) in the educational progression compared 
to the other four countries (I). This standardised form is learned by all GSDF officers at the intermediate 
embedded unit of analysis, the Fuji School (II), which thus functions as the centre of GSDF’s wargaming 
expertise and arguably both enables and protects the professionalisation of the wargaming form. A 
similar approach to the adherence of simple standardising in Japan can be said to exist in Germany, 
which has its own dedicated Army Simulation Center. In Germany, however, control & veiling is the 
prevalent method in conjunction with an infrastructure of multiple facilities that allows large-scale 
computer-supported wargaming. These organisational approaches can be contrasted to an individual 
approach – the enthusiasts – who are directly connected to a certain form of wargaming. Specific 
examples are: Major Cory and VBS at West Point in the USA (I), Major Mouat and Sandhurst Free 
Kriegsspiel in the UK (I), and a few German officers with their modified COTS board game in Germany 
(III). In all these examples the individual has either invented or modified the wargaming form to a major 
extent. There are thus two identifiable approaches: 1) either a broad and organisational approach 
aimed at the vast majority of officers centred on either simple standardising or control & veiling, 2) or 
a more specialised approach, carried out by a few enthusiastic individuals, and centred on innovative 
active learning.  
                                                          




Different methods (concepts) do not form insurmountable barriers between each other. One example 
of this is the use of RCAT in the UK. This wargame comes with two different modes, manual game 
mode and facilitator mode. The former relies on innovative active learning, whereas the latter arguably 
relies on control & veiling, to achieve instructor buy-in. Accordingly, it is not too difficult to modify an 
existing wargaming form in accordance to what the game director prefers. A board game can, for 
example, be physically moved away from the players and situated in an adjacent room together with 
a small control team/game director. Hence, a transition in focus from innovative active learning to 
control & veiling. This was by and large what occurred during a ‘wargaming week’ in Sweden (II) with 
a map/board game. While combat adjudication can be done in accordance with rigid rules, control & 
veiling would keep the players in the dark about adjudication procedures and instead force them to 
rely on their own experience and perception when they construct their actions during the wargame. 
This separation provides the game director with the power to control information within the wargame. 
In some cases, this physical separation inherent in control & veiling is acknowledged as a more 
preferable – and a more realistic – form of wargaming, such as at the Offiziersschule (I) in Germany. 
This approach also diminishes the perception that the participants are merely ‘playing a game’, which 
is a palpate concern of game directors and consequently a major feature of the substantive field of 





The substantive field of army educational wargaming 
The substantive field of army educational wargaming is essentially a triangle with each of its three 
corners as one of the three theoretical concepts. This form of diagram illustrates the possibility for a 
game director to employ one, two or even all three conceptual categories, to various extents, in order 
to achieve instructor buy-in. For example, the use of VBS at West Point (I) indicates properties of all 
three theoretical concepts. However, if this were a standard routine the substantive field would 
arguably become archaic and of little use to explain instructor buy-in. This is, however, not the case 
as a majority of wargames focus on one concept, albeit usually with some additional support. Of the 
three concepts, adherence to (parts of) simple standardising and control & veiling are more common 
than adherence to innovative active learning. The general use of manual-based COA-wargaming, as 
map-based or seminar wargaming, is a good example of a wargaming form’s placement near the corner 
of simple standardising. Simulation-based exercises (SIRA) at the German Offiziersschule (I) are likewise 
an example of a wargaming form that is close to the corner of control & veiling. In comparison, 
placement near innovative active learning is exemplified by the use of board games at the CGSC in the 
USA (III).  
 
 





At an early stage during the data collection gamification emerged as a particular issue that instructors 
either support or oppose. It seems that a majority of officers are against a palpable use of gamification 
in army educational wargaming. This aversion explains why, for example, board games and 
competitions between equal teams in army educational wargaming are uncommon. This absence is 
arguably somewhat unexpected considering the historical use of Kriegsspiel between equal teams 
during the military education of officers. Furthermore, suppression of gamification stands in 
opposition to contemporary educational theories that promote game-based learning, which 
emphasises features such as competitive rewards, fun and role-play as means of enhancing learning. 
However, some officers both accept and promote gamification. Such officers, when serving as game 
directors, arguably adhere more to innovative active learning for instructor buy-in. However, this does 
not entail exclusive adherence. The introduction of Sandhurst Free Kriegsspiel in the UK (I) is one 
example of a combination since it indicates properties of simple standardising. Arguably, without some 
combinational adherence, the promotion of gamification in innovative active learning sets it too much 
apart from the other two conceptual categories. This in turn makes it more difficult to achieve 
instructor buy-in. 
During the constant analytical process, with cycles of data gathering and comparisons between and 
within cases, the concerns about the issue of ‘just playing a game’ became apparent. This issue is 
recognised by previous research, which acknowledges educational military wargames as ‘(…) a tool to 
support officers becoming members of one practice in the military profession.’749 The connection 
between wargaming and the officer profession increases the professional responsibility of the game 
director. For such an individual, instructor buy-in is a necessity in the form of credibility, comfort and 
control. One thing that particularly highlights credibility and comfort is concerns about ‘realism’. This 
became apparent in the German case, where instructors adhere to control & veiling since that allows 
them to hide artefacts in the wargame from the participants. For example, the author was told that 
one drawback in SIRA is that it does not separate flanking or frontal fire.750 This issue would have been 
obvious if players had direct access to the game with exact positions and facings of vehicles. Instead, 
by veiling off the wargame, potential protests would not arise since the players would not know the 
exact disposition of their own and enemy individual vehicles. It is instead up to the game director to 
decide to halt (and restart) the wargame if; results become corrupt due to game artefacts; one side 
makes a technical mistake (interaction man-machine); or, a major tactical mistake is committed which 
effectively ends the scenario too rapidly. Another approach regarding control & veiling is the existence 
of US Army simulation officers (FA57) as military students, who provide essential simulation knowhow 
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during larger wargaming exercise at the CGSC (III). This allows the majority of the military students to 
concentrate on the overall tactical situation rather than to think about game rules and how to move 
and fire units within the game itself. This connects to the issue of rigid rules vs. free rules. One example 
of this dichotomy is the development and implementation of the Sandhurst Free Kriegsspiel in the UK 
(I). This wargaming form relies on instructor judgement, which can include giving the students 
themselves the opportunity to discuss a possible outcome related to detailed effects from specific 
weapons systems. Accordingly, this is not just a question of realism, it is also a question of 
professionalism of officers, i.e. their role as directors is strengthened by enhancing their credibility, 
and hence comfort and control, by allowing them to construct their own adjudication rather than 
relying on rigid rules. If an instructor wishes to avoid the perception of adhering to unrealistic rigid 
rules, more adherence to simple standardising and/or control & veiling becomes a valid option. The 
latter in particular offers the instructor the most latitude regarding control, including the possibility of 
overruling an adjudication by a computer simulation system without the participants noticing.  
Promotion versus suppression of gamification is probably the most important variable in the 
substantive field of army educational wargaming. Based on the collection of data most game directors 
achieve their instructor buy-in by not adhering to innovative active learning. There is an awareness 
among army officers that gamification exists. It is not uncommon among game directors that 
gamification is considered undesirable and at least needs to be controlled and/or supressed. One 
argument behind this desire for suppression is that combat adjudication has to be credible and 
‘realistic’. If this process is conducted separately from the players this increases the comfort of the 
game directors, since they are able to hide game artefacts from the participants and lessen the impact 
of a ‘black box syndrome’ when a computer makes all the decisions, which in turn offers little insight 
in, for example, probability.751 An additional argument for veiling is that ‘the detail needed to run the 
simulation is irrelevant to student learning’.752 Furthermore, suppression of gamification is also 
associated with a conscious effort to avoid ‘gamer mode’, i.e. when participants’ focus only on winning 
the game.753 Hence, a wargaming form that is connected to innovative active learning needs to be 
constantly defended by the game director. This defence can involve the gathering of support from 
other categories to strengthen instructor buy-in. One example of this intermingled approach is 
Decisive Action in the USA (III). This wargaming form has proved enduring arguably because it is 
supported by all three conceptual categories to various degrees. This form of balancing increases the 
possibility for individual game directors to achieve instructor buy-in.  
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Illustration no. 18: the substantive field and instructor buy-in (attitudes). 
 
The second illustration of the substantive field displays the different attitudes (indicators) of each 
conceptual category. In addition, the perception of an area where most army officers attain instructor 
buy-in is made explicit. This assertion is based on the relatively few instances when a wargaming form 
relies on innovative active learning to achieve instructor buy-in. This area is substantiated when 
historic individuals are considered. For example, the enthusiast Lieutenant von Reisswitz would 
arguably be located near the top at innovative active learning, whereas his sponsor, General von 
Müffling, instead would be found closer to simple standardising. The proponent of free adjudication, 
von Verdy, would arguably be at, or near, full adherence of simple standardising. In comparison, Sayre, 
who argued against gamification, would arguably be closer to control & veiling. Accordingly, 
individuals’ placement within the substantive field of army educational wargaming creates an 




The area of majority instructor buy-in seems a constant factor, historically and contemporarily. A 
majority of army officers would tend to agree with the necessity of a high level of professionalism in 
military education. After all, officers belong to a highly professional occupation and officers are 
supposed to acquire professional expertise in their military education.754 The main issue in the 
substantive field of army educational wargaming is instructors’ opinions of gamification. If in favour, 
focus will be on innovative active learning to achieve instructor buy-in. If against, there is a choice to 
either aim for simple standardising and/or control & veiling. Most instructors, especially military ones, 
do not promote gamification since ‘a soldier does not play games’.755 This is because, ‘in the real world, 
officers do not use dice and counters.’ 756 In other words, a wargame has to be realistic to be acceptable 
to instructors.757 Accordingly, the instructors’ emphasis is to control the wargame, in order to keep 
things realistic, and to produce a desirable output.758 This perception of unrealism connects to the 
physical form of wargaming: military culture has an aversion to board games and miniatures. The 
computer, on the other hand, provides a level of credibility while the board game format is ‘simply not 
believed’.759 Moreover, miniature-based tabletop wargames are ‘anachronistic to many modern 
military instructors’.760 However, while this may be so for many officers, there are still many examples 
of officers who prefer miniatures (or other symbolic units) on an ordinary map. In addition, the cases 
of Germany and Japan indicate preferences for map-based wargames rather than computer-based 
wargames. Such preferences, however, for the most part connect to simple standardising rather than 
innovative active learning. Furthermore, the use of computer wargames often entails control & veiling, 
rather than innovative active learning. 
Only a few examples of wargames adhere to a major extent to innovative active learning. One example, 
not part of any embedded unit of analysis in the USA, is the US Marine Corps War College (MCWAR) 
and their use of the COTS computer-based wargame Darkest Hour – a derivate of the Hearts of Iron 
series of strategic and operational wargames of the Second World War – to teach military history. The 
course in question was the War, Policy and Strategy Course. The wargame was used to get the 
students, about 30 lieutenant colonels and colonels, immersed in the Second World War. While this 
example is just beyond this thesis’ limitations since it concerns strategy, it is one of the very few 
examples of a COTS wargame being used for execution-training (‘classroom warfighting’). However, 
one conclusion in the after-action review by the instructors, who selected this wargame, was that 
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improvement can be made by separating the students from the wargame. The exact words were: ‘we 
need to examine the exercise construct to take students out of the role of managing tactical actions.’761 
This provides a hint of the appeal of control & veiling to an instructor. Furthermore, it indicates the 
participants’ perceptions of playing a somewhat unrealistic wargame – in this case a COTS computer-
based wargame. Arguably, both manual and computer-based wargames risk becoming perceived as an 
unprofessional game. This is seemingly more likely to occur when participants interact with the 
wargame without any efforts of veiling. Two examples are the manual wargame Aldershot Skirmish in 
the UK (I), and the initial trial of the computer wargame Decisive Action in the USA (III). However, the 
two examples also indicate that it is possible to overcome an initial failure by a comprehensive redesign 
that alleviate for instructors to achieve instructor buy-in. 
The third illustration of the substantive field covers the risk of singular adherence to a concept. In 
general, the three concepts are in concert with each other. The intermingling of concepts works as a 
balancing act since strict adherence to one single method (concept) to achieve instructor buy-in may 
cause the wargaming form to regress. Specifically, simple standardising may become ‘too simple’: i.e. 
a ‘map exercise’ may become just a tool for visualisation. This puts COA-wargaming at a risk, since this 
form is exclusively within simple standardising. As a result, the wargame may become a brainstorming 
activity. Likewise, sole reliance on control & veiling may transform the wargaming exercise into a 
scripted Command Post Exercise (CPX) or staff exercise. In comparison, sole adherence to innovative 
active learning risks being perceived as abstract unrealism – ‘it is just a game’. It would still arguably 
be a wargame but it would have become non-integrated and thus no longer perceived as a professional 
military wargame but as a ‘game’. Hence, paradoxically, ‘serious games’ are at risk of becoming 
perceived as ‘non-serious’, i.e. unprofessional. For this reason, military wargames associated with 
innovative active learning, such as board games, rely on elaborate structures to keep them from being 
perceived as unprofessional. For example, at the German Führungsakademie (III), the presence of 
psychologists and the implementation of instructor control (to halt the game) arguably help the game 
be a professional educational wargame, even though at the very core, it is just a commercial (modified) 
board game (Crusader Kings). Such board games are not that different from the historical German 
wargames, Kriegsspiel, which relied on the instructor’s (umpire) use of rigid rules grounded in realistic 
combat values of weapons. However, accurate combat modelling does not make a wargame immune 
to the risk of negative perceptions of unrealism and non-professionalism. This risk seems particularly 
apparent when the physical form of wargaming is a board game. However, even computer games are 
at risk, especially if such games are double-sided, i.e. competitive. For example, at West Point (I) in the 
                                                          




USA, instructors discourage officer cadets from viewing VBS as a ‘game’.762 A ‘game’ is generally 
perceived as unprofessional because of discomfort with gamification, risk of credibility loss regarding 
the representation of realism, and finally, control difficulties if rules are deemed ‘too complex’, i.e. too 
detailed or too abstract. For these reasons, a wargame overtly connected to innovative active learning 
risks discontinuance because of a perception of unprofessionalism. In comparison, overt affiliation with 
simple standardising and control & veiling may transform the wargame to a non-wargaming activity.     
 
 
Illustration no. 19: the substantive field and the risks of singular adherence.  
 
                                                          




The illustrated risks of shifting away from military wargaming to another activity offer an explanation 
to why it is common, and also necessary, that wargaming forms find balanced support from two, or in 
a few cases, all three concepts. This balancing and combinational action, that the individual instructor 
constructs, arguably increases the possibility of instructor buy-in and preserves the activity as a 
wargame. The illustrated risks of singular adherence both explain and delimit the grey zone of 
wargaming. This grey zone is not clear-cut because, like wargaming forms, it evolves. For example, it 
is entirely possible for a visualisation of miniatures on a sand table to instantly evolve into a wargame 
because of the actions by a single instructor. It is however only possible for this to occur if instructor 
buy-in has been achieved. If not, wargaming will not come about, or conversely, it will occur but is 







Wargaming in army education of officers and officer cadets takes the form it does because of instructor 
buy-in. This concerns an individual instructors’ aversion to the possible risk of losing control, credibility 
and comfort. Instructor buy-in of specific wargaming forms is achieved by adherence, in various 
degrees, to three different methods (concepts): simple standardising, control & veiling and innovative 
active learning. The three methods constitute a balancing act within a triangle-shaped substantive field 
concerning one significant variable: the amount of gamification, together with the other properties 
and indicators of the three methods.  
Individual game directors are crucial for army educational wargaming. If such individuals’ prospects for 
achieving instructor buy-in are not taken into account by the hierarchy and management, a top down 
approach risks becoming a costly failure. With this in mind, it can be ascertained that not all features 
in computer simulation systems are always needed for army educational wargaming. For example, a 
3D view is not particularly essential for the concept of control & veiling as the principal participants do 
not directly interact with the system. While nice to have for controllers’ immersion, such a feature 
adds development and acquisition costs. Worse, large computer facilities risk underutilisation because 
of a possible lack of instructor buy-in. By reflecting on the balance of simple standardising, control & 
veiling and innovative active learning, improvements can be made in the development, acquisition and 
utilisation of army educational wargaming. 
There are wargaming enthusiasts among officers. Such officers are usually, but not always, affiliated 
with hobby wargaming. As ‘wargamers’ they first and foremost aspire to adhere to the conceptual 
category of innovative active learning. Their comparatively low number within the officer profession 
contributes to less utilisation of gamification than might have been expected in army educational 
wargaming. It is all very well to be enthusiastic, but it is not enough: enduring army educational 
wargaming is either very simple or very controlled, and therefore an attempt to increase gamification 
does not seem to be the route to success. Gamification entails direct access to the wargaming form, 
usually a board or computer game. It is, however, clear that not every officer can run a board game or 
computer game. A psychological wall exists that is also physical. It comes in the form of the vast 
majority of military instructors, not the lone enthusiast or hired expert, who determine whether the 
wargaming form becomes very simple or very controlled. Few army officers have bought-into the use 
of gamification. This does not mean that gamification is without merits – in fact, gamification is 
arguably an effective scheme for learning. However, without instructor buy-in of a specific wargaming 
form, it is likely to become substandard. As a result, the wargame is likely to be removed from the 
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